v..;'«i 



m 



11 



38th Congress, ) HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. ( Ex. Doc. 
1st Session. ) ( No. 15. 



LETTER 



OP 



THE SECEETARY OF WAR, 



TRANSMITTING REPORT ON THE 



ORGANIZATION OF THE ARIY OF THE POTOMAC, 



ITS CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA AND MARYLAND. 



UNDER THE COSiaiAND OF 



Maj. Gen. GEOEGE B. McOLELLAlS', 



FROM 



JULY 26, 1861, TO NOVEMBER 7, 1862. 



WASHINGTON: 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. 

1864. 



EilQ 

.Hue 



^ .'^' L E T T E E 



THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 



TKANSMITTINQ 



The report of Major General George B. McClellan upon the organization of 
the Army of the Potoynac, and its campaigns in Virginia and Maryland, 
from July 26, 1861, to November 7, 1862. 



f In the House of Representatives, 

February 19, 18G4. 
Resolved, That there be printed, for the use of the members of this House, teu thousand 
additional copies of General McClellan's report. J 



War Department, 
Washington City, D. C, December 22, 1863. 
Sir: In compliance witli the resolution dated December 15, 1863, I have 
the honor to communicate herewith " the report made by Major General George 
B. McClellan, concerning the organization and operations of the army of the 
Potomac while under his command, and of all army operations while he was 
commander-in-chief." 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient sei-vant, 

EDWIN M. STANTON, 

Secretary of War. 
Hon. Schuyler Colfax, 

Speaker of the House of Representatives 



KEPOKT OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. M CLELLAN. 



REPORT. 



FIRST PERIOD. 

CHAPTEK I. 

New York, August 4, 1863. 
Sir : I have the honor to submit herein the official report of the operations 
of the army of the Potomac while under my charge. Accompanying it are the 
reports of the corps, division, and subordinate commanders, pertaining to the 
various engagements, battles, and occurrences of the campaigns, and important 
documents connected with its organization, supply, and movements. These, 
with lists of maps and memoranda submitted, will be found appended,- duly 
arranged, and marked for convenient reference. 

Charged, in the spring of 1861, with the operations in the department of the 
Ohio, which included the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and latterly Western 
Virginia, it had become ray duty to counteract the hostile designs of the enemy 
in Western Virginia, which were immediately directed to the destruction of the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the possession of the Kanawha valley, with 
the ultimate object of gaining Wheeling and the control of the Ohio river. 

The successful affairs of Phillippi, Rich Mountain, Carrick's Ford, &c., had 
been fought, and I had acquired possession of all Western Virginia north of 
the Kanawha valley, as well as of the lower portion of that valley. 

I had determined to proceed to the relief of the upper Kanawha valley, as 
soon as provision was made for the permanent defence of the mountain passes 
leading from the east into the region under control, when I received at Beverly, 
in Randolph county, on the 21st of July, 1861, intelligence of the unfortunate 
result of the battle of Manassas, fought on that day. 

On the 22d I received an order by telegraph, directing me to turn over my 
command to Brigadier General Rosecrans, and repair at once to Washington. 

I had already caused reconnoissances to be made for intrenchments at the Cheat 
Mountain pass ; also on the Huntcrville road, near Elkwater, and at Red House, 
near the main road from Romuey to Grafton. During the afternoon and night 
of the 22d I gave the final instructions for the construction of these works, 
turned over the command to Brigadier General Rosecrans, and started, on the 
morning of the 23d, for Washington, arriving there on the afternoon of the 26th. 
On the 27th I assumed command of the division of the Potomac, comprising . 
the troops in and around Washington, on both banks of the river. 

With this brief statement of the events which immediately preceded my being 
called to the command of the troops at Washington, I proceed to Jin account, 
from such authentic data as are at hand, of my military operations while com- 
mander of the army of the Potomac. 

The subjects to he, considered naturally arrange themselves as follows : 
The organization of the army of the Potomac. The military events con- 
nected with the defonccf of Washington, from Jvdy, 1861, to March, 1862. The 
campaign on the Penin ula, and that in Maryland. 

The great resources aiid capacity for powerful resistance of the south at the 
breaking out of the rel' llion, and the full proportions of the great conflict about 
to take place, were sought to be carefully measured ; and I had also endeavored, 
by every means in my power, to impress upon the authorities the necessity for 



EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAJST. 6 

such immediate and full preparation as alone would enable the government to 
prosecute the war on a scale commensurate with the resistance to be offered. 

On the fourth of August, 1861, I addressed to the President the following 
memorandum, prepared at his rer^uest : 

MEMORANDUM. 

The object of the present war differs from those in which nations are engaged, 
mainly in this : that the purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace, and 
make a treaty on advantageous terms ; in this contest it has become necessary 
to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent and warlike to constitute 
a nation. We have not only to defeat their armed and organized forces in the 
field, but to display such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our an- 
tagonists, especially those of the governing, aristocratic class, of the utter im- 
possibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this course imperative. Had 
we been successful in the recent battle, (Manassas,) it is possible that we might 
have been spared the labor and expenses of a great effort. 

Now we liaA^e no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders 
of the rebels to convince the mass of their people that Ave are inferior to them 
in force and courage, and to command all their resources. The contest began 
with a class, now it is with a people — our military success can alone restore the 
former issue. 

By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong places, and pursuing 
a rigidly protective policy as to private property and unarmed persons, and a 
lenient course as to private soldiers, we may well hope for a permanent restora- 
tion of a peaceful Union. But in the first instance the authority of the gov- 
ernment must be supported by overwhelming physical force. 

Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively demand that the 
military action of the government should be prompt and irresistible. 

The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field, and it seems proper for 
us to make the first great struggle there. But while thus directing our main 
efforts, it is necessary to diminish the resistance there offered us, by movements 
on other points both by land and water. 

Without entering at present into details, I would advise that a strong move- 
ment be made on the Mississippi, and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri. 

As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cordially united with 
us, I would advise a movement through that State into Eastern Tennessee, for 
the purpose of assisting the Union men of that region and of seizing the rail- 
roads leading from Memphis to the east. 

The possession of those roads by us, in connexion with the movement 
on the Mississippi, would go far towards determining the evacuation of Virginia 
by the rebels. In the mean time all the passes into Western Virginia from the 
east should be securely guarded, but I would advise no movement from that 
quarter towards Kichmond, unless the political condition of Kentucky renders 
it impossible or inexpedient for us to make the movement upon Eastei'n Ten- 
nessee through that State. Every efibrt should, however, be made to organize, 
equip and arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order to render 
the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other operations. 

At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to protect and re-open the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad. Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be occupied 
by garrisons sufficient to retain them in our possession. 

The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac in the 
direction of Leesburg will be very materially diminished so soon as our force 
in this vicinity becomes organized, strong and efficient, because no capable 
general will cross the river north of this city, when we have a strong army 
here ready to cut off his retreat. 



4 EEPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 

To revert to the west. It is probable that no very large additions to the 
troops now in Missouri will be necessary to secnre that 8tatc. 

I presnme that the force required for the movement down the Mississippi 
will be determined by its commander and the President. If Kentucky assumes 
the right position, not more than 20,000 will be needed, together with those 
that can be raised in that State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the latter 
region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nashville. 

The Western Virginia troops, with not more than five to ten thousand from 
Ohio and Indiana, should, under proper management, suffice for its protection. 

When we have re-organized our main army here, 10,000 men ought to be 
enough to protect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Potomac, 5,000 
will garrison Baltimore, 3,000 Fort Monroe, and not more than 20,000 will be 
necessary at the utmost for the defence of Washington. 

For the main army of operations I urge the following composition : 

250 regiments of infantry, say 225, 000 men. 

100 field batteries, 600 guns 15, 000 " 

28 regiments of cavalry 25, 500 " 

5 regiments engineer troops 7, 500 " 

Total 273,000 " 



The force must be supplied with the necessary engineer and pontoon trains, 
and with transportation for everything save tents. Its general line of opera- 
tions should be so directed that water transportation can be availed of from 
point to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. An 
essential feature of the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong 
naval force to protect the movement of a fleet of transports intended to convey 
a considerable body of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, 
thus either creating diversions and rendering it necessary for them to detach 
largely from their main body in order to protect such of their cities as may be 
threatened, or else landing and forming establishments on their coast at any 
favorable .places that opportunity might ofibr. This naval force should also 
co-operate with the main army in its efforts to seize the important seaboard 
towns of the rebels. 

It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads has introduced a new 
and very important element into Avar, by the great facilities thus given for 
concentrating at particular positions large masses of troops from remote sections, 
and by creating new strategic points and lines of operations. 

It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations suggested, 
and such others as the particular case may require. We must endeavor to seize 
places on the railways in the rear of the enemy's points of concentration, and 
we must threaten their seaboard cities, in order that each State may be forced, 
by the necessity of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the confederate 
anny. 

The proposed movement down the Mississippi will produce important results 
in this connexion. That advance and the progress of the main army at the 
east will materially assist each other by diminishing the resistance to be 
encountered by each. 

The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all questions connected 
Avith cotton is too well understood by the President and cabinet to need any 
illustration from me. 

There is another independent movement that has often been suggested and 
which lias always recommended itself to my judgment. I refin- to a movement 
from Kansas and Nebraska through the Indian territory upon Eed river 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 5 

and western Texas for tlie purpose of protecting and developing tlie latent 
Union and free- State sentiment well known to predominate in western Texas, 
and which, like a similar sentiment in Western Virginia, will, if protected, 
ultimately organize that section into a free State. How far it will be possible to 
support this movement by an advance through New Mexico from California, is a 
matter which I have not sufficiently examined to be able to express a decided 
opinion. If at all practicable, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play 
the resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as well as identifying 
them with our cause and connecting the bond of Union between them and the 
general government. 

If it is not departing too far from my province, I will venture to suggest the 
policy of an ultimate alliance and cordial understanding with Mexico ; their 
sympathies and interests are with tis — their antipathies exclusively against our 
enemies and their institutions. I think it would not be difficult to obtain from 
the Mexican government the right to use, at least during the present contest, 
the road from Guaymas to New Mexico; this concession would very materially 
reduce the obstacles of the column moving from the Pacific; a similar permis- 
sion to use their territory for the passage of troops between the Panuco and the 
Rio Grande would enable us to throw a column of troops by a good road from 
Tam.pico, or some of the small harbors north of it, upon and across the Rio 
Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot. 

To what extent, if any, it would be desirable to take into service and employ 
Mexican soldiers, is a question entirely political, on which I do not venture to 
offer an opinion. 

The force I have recommended is large; the expense is great. It is possible 
that a smaller force might accomplish the object in view, but I understand it to 
be the purpose of this great nation to re-establish the power of its government, 
and restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest possible time. 

The question to be decided is simply this : shall we crush the rebellion at one 
blow, terminate the war in one compaign, or shall we leave it as a legacy for 
our descendants 1 

Wlien the extent of the possible line of operations is considered, the force 
asked for for the main army under my command cannot be regarded as unduly 
large ; every mile we advance carries us further from our base of operations and 
renders detachments necessary to cover oiir communications, while the enemy 
will be constantly concentrating as he falls back. I propose, with the force 
which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy 
Richmond, but to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Peusacola, Mobile 
and New Orleans ; in other words, to move into the heart of the enemy's coun- 
try and crush the rebellion in its very heart. 

By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, the difficulties of trans- 
portation will be materially diminished. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that, 
in addition to the forces named in this memorandum, strong reserves should be 
formed, ready to supply any losses that may occur. 

In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of the treasury may be 
lessened by making only partial payments to our troops, Avhen in the enemy's 
country, and by giving the obligations of the United States for such supplies 
as may there be obtained. 

GEO. B. McOLELLAN, 

Major General. 

I do not think the events of the war have proved these views upon the 
method and plans of its conduct altogether incorrect. They certainly have not 
proved my estimate of the number of troops and scope of operations too large. 
It is probable that I did underestimate the time necessary for the completion of 
arms and equipments. It was not strange, however, that by many civilians 



6 KEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 

intrusted with authority there should have been an exactly opposite opinion 
held on both these particulars. 

The result of the first battle of Manassas had been almost to destroy the 
morale and organization of our army, and to alarm government and people. 
The national capital was in danger; it was necessary, besides holding the enemy 
in check, to build works for its defence, strong and capable of being held by a 
email force. 

It was necessary also to create a new army for active operations and to 
expedite its organization, equipment, and the accumulation of the material of 
war, and to this not inconsiderable labor all my energies for the next three 
months were constantly devoted. 

Time is a necessary element in the creation of armies, and I do not, therefore, 
think it necessary to more than mention the impatience with which many re- 
garded the delay in the arrival of new levies, though recruited and pressed 
forward with unexampled rapidity, the manufacture and supply of arms and 
equipments, or the vehemence with which an immediate advance upon the 
enemy's works directly in our front was urged by a patriotic but sanguine 
people. 

The President, too, was anxious for the speedy employment of our army, and, 
although possessed of my plans through frequent conferences, desired a paper 
from me upon the condition of the forces under my command and the immediate 
measures to be taken to increase their efiiciency. Accordingly, in the latter 
part of October I addressed the following letter to the Secretary of War: 

Sir: In conformity with a personal understanding with the Presideiit yes- 
terday, I have the honor to submit the following statement of the condition of 
the army under my command, and the measures required for the preservation 
of the government and the suppression of the rebellion. 

It will be remembered that in a memorial I had the honor to address to the 
President soon after my arrival in Washington, and iu my communication 
addressed to Lieutenant General Scott, under date of 8th of August; in my 
letter to the I'resident authorizing him, at his request, to withdraw the letter 
written by me to General Scott; and in my letter of the 8th of September, an- 
swering your note of inquiry of that date, my views on the same subject are 
frankly and fully expressed. 

In these several communications I have stated the force I regarded as neces- 
sary to enable this army to advance with a reasonable certainty of success, at 
the same time leaving the capital and the line of the Potomac sufficiently 
guard(id, not only to secure the retreat of the main army, iu the event of disaster, 
but to render it oxxt of the enemy's power to attempt a diversion in Maryland. 

So much time has passed, and the winter is approaching so rapidly, that but 
two courses are left to the government, viz., either to go into winter quarters, 
or to assume the ofiensive with forces greatly inferior iu numbers to the army I 
regarded as desirable and necessary. If political considerations render the first 
course unadvisable, the second alone remains. While I regret that it has not 
been deemed expedient, or perhaps possible, to concentrate the forces of the 
nation in this vicinity, (remaining on the defensive elsewhere,) keeping the 
attention and efforts of the government fixed upon this as the vital point, where 
the issue of the great contest is to be decided, it may still be that, by introducing 
unity of action .'ind design among the various armies of the land, by deter- 
mining the courses to be pursued by the various commanders under one general 
plan, transfernng from the other armies the superfluous strength not required 
for the purpose in view, and tljus re-enforcing this main army, whose destiny it 
is to decide the controversy, we may yet be able to move with a reasonable 
prospect of success before the winter is fairly upon us. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 7 

Tlie nation feels, and I sliare that feeling, that tlie army of the Potomac holds 
the fate of the country in its hands. 

The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, and the effect of the next battle 
will be so important throughout the future, as well as the present, that I con- 
tinue to urge, as I have ever done since I entered upon the command of this 
army, upon the government to devote its energies and its available resources to- 
wards increasing the numbers and efficiency of the army on which its salvation 
depends. 

A statement, carefully prepared by the chiefs of engineers and artillery of 
this aimy, gives us the necessary garrison of this city and its fortifications, 
33,795 men — say 35,000. 

The present gan-ison of Baltimore and its dependencies is about 10,000. 1 
have sent the chief of my staff to make a careful examination into the condition 
of these troops, and to obtain the information requisite to enable me to decide 
whether this number can be diminished, or the reverse. 

At least 5,000 men will be required to watch the river hence to Harper's 
Ferry and its vicinity; probably 8,000 to guard the lower Potomac. 

As you are aware, all the information we have from spies, prisoners, &c., 
agrees in showing that the enemy have a force on the Potomac not less than 
150,000 strong, well drilled and equipped, ably commanded and strongly in- 
trenched. It is plain, therefore, that to insure success, or to render it reasona- 
bly certain, the active army should not number less than 150,000 efficient 
troops, with 400 guns, unless some material change occurs in the force in front 
of us. 

The requisite force for an advance movement by the army of the Potomac 
may be thus estimated : 

Column of active operations 150,000 men, 400 guns. 

Garrison of the city of Washington 35,000 <' 40 " 

To guard the Potomac to Harper's Ferry 5,000 " 12 " 

To guard the lower Potomac 8,000 " 24 " 

Gai'risou for Baltimore and Annapolis 10,000 " 12 " 

Total effective force required 208,000 men, 488 guns, 

or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 240,000 men, should the losses by 
sickness, &c., not rise to a higher per-centage than at present. 

Having stated what I regard as the requisite force to enable this army to 
advance, I now proceed to give the actual strength of the army of the Potomac. 

The aggregate strength of the army of the Potomac, by the official report on 
the morning of the 27th instant, was 168,318 officers and men, of all grades and 
arms. This includes the troops at Baltimore and Annapolis, on the upper and 
lower Potomac, the sick, absent, &c. 

The force present for duty was 147,695. Of this number, 4,268 cavalry 
were completely unarmed, 3,163 cavalry only partially armed, 5,979 infantry 
unequipped,. making 13,410 unfit for the field, (irrespective of those not yet 
sufficiently drilled,) and reducing the effective force to 134,285, and the number 
disposable for an advance to 76,285. The infantry regiments are, to a consid- 
erable extent, armed with unserviceable weapons. Quite a large number of 
good arms, which had been intended for this army, were ordered elsewhere, 
leaving the army of the Potomac insufficiently, and, in some cases, badly armed. 

On the 30th of September there were with this army 228 field guns ready 
for the field; so far as arms and equipments are concerned, some of the batte- 
ries are still quite raw, and unfit to go into action. I have intelligence that eight 
New York batteries are en route hither; two others are read}' for the field. I 
will still (if the New York batteries have six guns each) be 112 guns short of 
the number required for the active column, saying nothing, for the present, of 



8 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

those necessary for the garrisons and corps on tlie Potomac, whicli would make 
a total deficiency of 200 guns. 

I have thus briefly stated our present condition and wants; it remains to sug- 
gest the means of supplying the deficiencies. 

First, that all the cavalry and infantry arms, as fast as procured, whether 
manufactured in this coiintry or purchased abroad, be sent to this army until 
is fully prepared for the field. 

Second, that the two companies of the fourth artillery, now understood to be 
en route from Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, be ordered to this army, to be 
mounted at once ; also, that the companies of the third artillery, en route from 
California, be sent here. Had not the order for Smead's battery to come here 
from Ilarrisburg, to replace the battery I gave General Sherman, been so often 
countermanded, I would again ask for it. 

Third, that a more effective regulation may be made authorizing the transfer 
of men from the volunteers to the regular batteries, infantry and cavalry; that 
Ave may make the best possible use of the invaluable regular "skeletons." 

Fourth, I have no official information as to the United States forces elsewhere, 
but, from the best information I can obtain from the War Department and other 
sources, I am led to believe that the United States troops are: 

In Western Virginia, about 30,000 

In Kentucky 40,000 

In Missouri 80,000 

In Fortress Monroe 11,000 

Total 161,000 



Besides these, I am informed that more than 100,000 are in progress of or- 
ganization in other northern and western States. 

I would therefore recommend that, not interfering with Kentucky, there 
should be retained in Western Virginia and Missouri a sufficient force for de- 
fensive purposes, and that the surplus troops be sent to the army of the Poto- 
mac, to enable it to assume the offensive; that the same course be pursued in 
respect to Fortress Monroe, and that no further outside expeditions be attempted 
until we have fought the great battle in front of us. 

Fifth, that every nerve be strained to hasten the enrolment, organization and 
armament of new batteries and regiments of infantry. 

Sixth, that all the battalions now raised for new regiments of regular infantry 
be at once ordered to this army, and that the old infantry and cavalry en route 
from California be ordered to this army immediately on their arrival in New 
York. 

I have thus indicated, in a general manner, the objects to be accomplished, and 
the means by which we may gain our ends. 

A vigorous employment of these means will, in my opinion, enable the army 
of the Potomac to assume successfully this season the offensive operations 
which, ever since entering upon the command, it has been my anxious desire and 
diligent effort to prepare for and prosecute. The advance should not be post- 
poned beyond the 25th of November, if possible to avoid it. 

Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action are indispensable. 
The entii-e military field should be grasped as a whole, and not in detached parts. 

One plan should be agreed upon and pursued ; a single will should direct 
and carry out these plans. 

The great object to be accomplished, the crushing defeat of the rebel army 
(noAv) at IManassas, should never for one instant be lost sight of, but all the in- 
tellect and means and men of the government poured upon that point. The 
h>yal States possess ample force to effect all this and more. The rebels have 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 9 

displayed energy, unanimity, and wisdom wortliy of tlie most desperate days 
of tlie French revolution. Should we do less ? 

The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to 
me that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object 
of doing my duty to my country. "VVhen the task is accomplished, I shall be 
^lad to return to the obscurity from which events have drawn me. 

Whatever the determination of the government may be, I will do the best I 
can with the army of the Potomac, and will share its fate, whatever may be the 
task imposed upon me. 

Permit me to add that, on this occasion as heretofore, it has been my aim 
neither to exaggerate nor underrate the power of the enemy, nor fail to express 
dearly the means by which, in my judgment, that power may be broken. Urging 
the energy of preparation and action, which has ever been my choice, but with 
the fixed purpose by no act of mine to expose the government to hazard by 
premature movement, and requesting that this communication may be laid before 
the President, 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

G. B. McCLELLA:N', 

Major General. 

Hon. Simon Cameron, 

Secretary of War. 

Wlien I assumed command in Washington, on the 27th of July, 1861, the 
number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000 infantry, less than 
1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillerymen, with nine imperfect field batteries of thirty 
pieces. 

On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organization of General 
McDowell still existed, and the troops were stationed at and in rear of Fort 
Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyon, Roach's Mills, Cole's 
Mills, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment at the Theologi- 
cal Seminary. 

There were no troops south of Hunting creek, and many of the regiments 
were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac, seldom in the best 
positions for defence, and entirely inadequate in numbers and condition to de- 
fend the long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. 

On the Maryland side of the river, iipon the heights overlooking the Chain 
bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose commanders were independent of 
each other. 

There were no troops on the important Tenallytown road, or on the roads 
entering the city from the south. 

The camps were located without regard to purposes of defence or instruction, 
the roads were not picketed, and there was no attempt at an organization into 
brigades. 

In no quarter were the dispositions for defence such as to offer a vigorous 
resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, either in the position and num- 
bers of the troops, or the number and character of the defensive works. Earth- 
works, in the nature of tetes de j^ont, looked iipon the approaches to the George- 
town aqueduct and ferry, the Long bridge and Alexandria, by the Little river 
turnpike, and some simple defensive arrangements were made at the Chain 
bridge. With the latter exception not a single defensive work had been com- 
menced on the Maryland side. 

There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within 
ejiBy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resist- 
ance. Many soldiers had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded 
with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations without authority, 
whose behavior indicated the general want of discipline and organization. 



10 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 



I at once desigiated an effijient stiff, afterwirds adliag to it as opportunity 
was afforded and necessity required, who zealously co-operated with me in the 
labor of bringing order out of confusion, re-assigning troops and commands, pro- 
jecting and throwing up defensive works, receiving and organizing, equipping 
and providing for the new levies arriving in the city. 

The valuable services of these officers in their various departments, during 
this and throughout the subsequent periods of the history of the army of the 
Potomac, can hardly be sufficiently appreciated. Their names and duties will 
be given in another part of this report, and they are commended to the favorable 
notice of the War Department. 

The restoration of order in the city of "Washington was effected through the 
appointment of a provost marshal, whose authority was supported by the few 
regular troops within my command. These troops were thus in position to act 
as a resei-ve, to be sent to any point of attack where their services might be 
most wanted. The energy and ability displayed by Colonel A. Porter, the 
provost marshal, and his assistants, and the strict discharge of their duty by the 
troops, produced the best results, and Washington soon became one of the most 
quiet cities in the Union. 

The new levies of iufantry, upon arriving in Washington, were formed into 
provisional brigades and placed in camp in the suburbs of the city for equip- 
ment, instruction, and discipline. As soon as regiments were in a fit condition 
for transfer to the forces across the Potomac, they were assigned to the brigades 
serving there. Brigadier General F. J. Porter was at first assigned to the 
cliarge of the provisional brigades. Brigadier General A. E. Burnside was the 
next officer assigned this duty, from which, however, he was soon relieved by 
Brigadier General S. Casey, who continued in cliarge of the newly arriving regi- 
ments until the army of the Potomac departed for the Peninsula, in March, 1862. 
The newly arriving artillery troops reported to Brigadier General William F. 
Barry, the chief of artilleiy, and the cavalry to Brigadier General George Stone- 
man, the chief of cavalry. 

By the 15th of October, the number of troops in and jibout Washington, in- 
clusive of the garrison of the city and Alexandria, the city guard and the forces 
on the Maryland shore of the Potomac below Washington, and as far as Cum- 
berland above, the troops under the command of General Dix at Baltimore and 
its dependencies, were as follows : 

Total present for duty 133, 201 

" sick 9,290 

" in confinement 1, 156 

Aggregate present 143, 647 

absent 8,404 

Grand aggregate 152, 051 



The following table exhibits similar data for the periods stated, including the 
troops in Maryland and Delaware : 



Date. 



December 1, 1861 
January 1, 1862 
February 1, 1862 
March 1, 1862 



For duty. 



Sick. 



169, 452 
191,480 
190, 806 
193, 142 



15, 102 
14, 790 
14, 363 
13, 167 



In confine- 
ment. 



2,189 
2, 260 
2,917 
2,108 



Absent. 



11 470 
11 707 
14 110 
13, 570 



Total present 
and absent. 



198, 213 
219,707 
222, 196 
221, 987 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 



11 



For convenience of reference the streugtli of tlie army of tlie Potomac at 
subsequent periods is given. 





Present. 


By authority. 


nt. 


ft 


Date. 


For duty. 


Sick. 


In arrest or con- 
finement. 


S 
g, 

ia 

< 


II 


N 

-^^ 




Officers. 


Men. 


Officers. 


Men. 


Officers. 


Men. 


§2 
6^ 


AprU 30 
June 20 
July 10 


4,725 
4,665 
3,834 


104, 610 
101, 160 

85,715 


233 

496 
685 


5,385 
10, 541 
15, 959 


41 
44 
60 


356 
320 
213 


115, 350 
117, 226 
106, 466 


11,037 
27, 700 
34, 638 


""887' 
3, 782 


"126, .387 
t 145, 813 
1 144, 886 



* Including Franklin. t fecluding McCall and DLx. 

J Including two brigades of Shiel's division absent, 5,354 men. 

In organizing the army of tlie Potomac, and preparing it for tlie field, tli e 
first step taken was to organize tlie infantry into brigades of four regiments 
each ; retaining the newly arrived regiments on the Maryland side until their 
annament and equipment were issued and they had obtained some little ele- 
mentary instruction, before assigning them permanently to brigades. When 
the organization of the brigades was well established, and the troops somewhat 
disciplined and instructed, divisions of three brigades each were gradually 
formed, as is elsewhere stated in this report, although I was ahvays in favor of 
the organization into army corps as an abstract principle. I did not desire to 
form them until the army had been for some little time in the field, in order to 
enable the general offices first to acquire the requisite experience as division 
commanders on active service, and that I might be able to decide from actual 
• trial who were best fitted to exercise these important commands. 

For a similar reason I carefully abstained from making any recommendations 
for the promotion of officers to the grade of major general. 

When new batteries of artillery arrived they also were retained in Washing- 
ton until their armament and equipment were completed, and their instruction 
sufficiently advanced to justify their being assigned to divisions. The same 
course was pursued in regard to cavalry. I regret that circumstances have de- 
layed the chief of cavalry. General George Stoneman, in furnishing his report 
upon the organization of that arm of service. It will, however, be forwarded 
as soon as completed, and will, doubtless, show that the difficult and important 
duties intrusted to him were efficiently performed. He encountered and over- 
came, as f;ir as it Avas possible, continual and vexatious obstacles arising from 
the great deficiency of cavalry arms and equipments, and the entire inefficiency 
of many of the regimental officers first ajipointed ; this last difficulty was, to a 
considerable extent, overcome in the cavalry, as well as in the infantry and ar- 
tillery, by the continual and prompt action of courts-martial and boards of ex- 
amination. 

As rapidly as circumstances permitted, every cavalry soldier was armed with 
a sabre and revolver, and at least two squadrons in every regiment Avith car- 
bines. 

It was intended to assign at least one regiment of cavalry to each division of 
the active army, besides forming a cavalry reserve of the regular regiments and 
some picked regiments of volunter cavalry. Circumstances beyond my control 
rendered it impossible to carry out this intention fully, and the cavalry force 
serving with the army in the field was never as large as it ought to have been. 

It was determined to collect the regular infantry to form the nucleus of a re- 
serve. The advantage of such a body of troops at a critical moment, especially 
in an army constituted mainly of new levies, imperfectly disciplined, has been 



12 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

frequently illustrated in military history, and was brought to the attention of 
the country at the first battle of Manassas. I have not been disappointed in 
the estimate formed of the value of these troops. I have always found them to 
be relied on. Whenever they have been brought under fire they have shown 
the utmost gallantry and tenacity. The regular infantry, which had been col- 
lected from distant posts and which had been recruited as rapidly as the slow 
progress of recruiting for the regular service would allow, added to the small 
battalion with McDowell's army, which I found at Washington on my arrival, 
amounted, on the 30th of August, to 1,040 men; on the 28th of February, 1862, 
to 2,682, and on the 30th of April, to 4,603. On the 17th of May, 1862, they 
were assigned to General Porter's corps for organization as a division, with the 
fifth regiment New York volunteers, which joined May 4, and the tenth New 
York volunteers, which joined subsequently. They remained from the com- 
mencement under the command of Brigadier Grcneral George Sykes, major third 
infantry United States army, 

ARTILLERY. 

The creation of an adequate artillery establishment for an army of so large 
proportions was a formidable undertaking; and had it not been that the country 
possessed in the regular service a body of accomplished and energetic artillery 
officers, the task would have been almost hopeless. 

The charge of organizing this most important arm was confided to Major 
(afterwards Brigadier General) William F. Barry, chief of artillery, whose in- 
dustry and zeal achieved the best results. The report of General Barry is ap- 
pended among the accompanying documents. By referring to it, it will be ob- 
served that the following principles were adopted as the basis of organization : 

" 1. That the proportion of artillery should be in the proportion of at least 
two and one-half pieces to 1,000 men, to be expanded, if possible, to three pieces 
to 1,000 men. 

" 2. That the proportion of rifled guns should be restricted to the system of 
the United States ordnance department ; and of Parrott and the 'smooth bores ' 
(with the exception of a few howitzers for special service) to be exclusively the 
twelve-pounder gun, of the model of 1857, variously called the ' gun-howitzer,' 
the ' light twelve-pounder,' or the ' Napoleon.' 

" 3. That each field battery should, if practicable, be composed of six guns, 
and none to be less than foxir guns, and in all cases the guns of each battery 
should be of uniform calibre. 

" 4. That the field batteries were to be assigned to divisions, and not to 
brigades, and in the proportion of four to each division, of which one was to be 
a battery of regulars, the remainder of volunteers, the captain of the regular 
battery to be the commandant of artillery of the division. In the event of sev- 
eral divisions constituting an army corps, at least one-half of the divisional ar- 
tillery was to constitute the reserve artillery of the corps. 

" 5. That the artillery reserve of the whole army should consist of one hun- 
dred guns, and should comprise, besides a sufficient number of light 'mounted 
batteries,' all the guns of positioQ, and until the cavalry were massed, all the 
horse artillery. 

"6. That the amount of ammunition to accompany field batteries was not to be 
less than four hundred rounds per gun. 

" 7. A siege train of fifty pieces. This was subseqiiently expanded, for special 
service at the siege of Yorktown, to very nearly one hundred pieces, and com- 
prised the unusual calibres and enormously heavy Aveight of m(?tal of two 
200-pounders, five 100-pounders, and ten 13-inch sea-coast mortars." 

As has been before stated, the chief of artillery reports the whole of the field 
artillery of the army of the Potomac, July 28, 1861, was comprised of nine ira- 



EEPORT OF GENEEAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 13 

perfectly equipped batteries, of thirty guns, 650 men, and 400 horses. In 
March, 18G2, when the whole army took the field, it consisted of ninety-two 
batteries, of 520 guns, 12,500 men, and 11,000 horses, fully equipped and in 
readiness for active field service; of the whole force thirty batteries were regulars, 
and sixty-two batteries volunteers. During the short period of seven months, all 
of this immense amount of material was issued by the ordnance department and 
placed in the hands of the artillery troops after their arrival in Washington. 
About one-fourth of all the volunteer batteries brought with them from their 
respective States a few guns and carriages, but they were nearly all of such pe- 
culiar calibre as to lack uniformity with the more modern and more serviceable 
ordnance with which the other batteries were armed, and they therefore had to 
be withdrawn and replaced by more suitable material. While about one-sixth 
came supplied with horses and harness, less than one-tenth were apparently 
fully equipped for service when they reported; and every one of these required 
the supply of many deficiencies of material, and very extensive instruction in 
the theory and practice of their special arm. 

The operations on the Peninsula by the army of the Potomac commenced 
with a full field artillery force of fifty-two batteries of two hundred and ninety- 
nine guns. To this must be added the field artillery of Franklin's division of 
McDowell's corps, which joined a few days before the capture of Yorktown, 
but was not disembarked from its transports for service until after the battle of 
Williamsburg, and the field artillery of McCall's division of McDowell's corps, 
(four batteries, twenty-two guns,) which joined in Jtne, a few days before the 
battle of Mechanicsville, (June 26, 1862,) making a grand total of field artillery, 
at any time with the army of the Peninsula, of sixty batteries of three hundred and 
forty-three guns. With this large force, saving in six corps d'armee of eleven 
divisions, and the artillery reserve, the only general and field ofiicers were one 
brigadier general, four colonels, three lieutenant colonels, and three majors, a 
number obviously insufiicient, and which impaired to a great degree, in conse- 
quence of the want of rank and oificial influence of the commanders of corps and 
division artillery, the efiiciency of the arm. As this faulty organization can be 
suitably corrected only by legislative action, it is earnestly hoped that the at- 
tention of the proper authorities may be at an early day invited to it. 

When there were so many newly organized volunteer field batteries, many of 
whom received their first and only instruction in the intrenched camps covering 
Washington during the three or four inclement months of the winter of lS61-'62, 
there was, of course, much to be improved. Many of the volunteer batteries, 
however, evinced such zeal and intelligence, and availed themselves so indus- 
triously of the instructions of the regular officers, their commanders, and the ex- 
ample of the regular batteries, their associates, that they made rapid progress, 
and attained a degree of proficiency highly creditable. 

The designations of the different batteries of artillery, both regular and vol- 
unteer, follow within a few pages. 

The following distribution of regiments and batteries was made, as a prelim- 
inary organiaation of the forces at hand, shortly after my arrival in Washington. 
The infantry, artillery, and cavalry, as fast as collected and brought into primary 
organization, were assigned to brigades and divisions, as indicated in the sub- 
joined statements. 

Organization of the division of the Potomac, August 4, 1861. 

Brigadier General Hnnter's brigade. — 23d, 25th, 35th, and 37th regiments 
New York volunteers. 

Brigadier General Heintzelman^s brigade. — 5th regiment Maine volunteers, 
16th, 26th, and 27th regiments New York volunteers, and Tidball's battery, (A,) 
2d United States artillery. 



14 REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAN. 

Brigadier General W. T. ^herman^s hrigade. — 9th and 14th regiments 
Massachusetts vohmteers, DeKalb regiment New York volunteers, 4th regiment 
Michigan vohxnteers, Hamilton's battery, (E,) 3d United States artillery, and 
company I, 2d United States cavalry. 

Brigadier General Kearney's brigade,. — 1st, 2d, and 3d regiments New 
Jersey volunteers. Green's battery, (G,) 2d United States artillery, and com- 
pany G, 2d United States cavalry. 

Brigadier General Hooker's brigade. — 1st and 11th regiments Massachusetts 
volunteers, 2d regiment New Hampshire volunteers, and 26th regiment Pennsyl- 
vania volunteers. 

Colonel Kei/s's brigade. — 22d, 24th, and 30th regiments New York volun- 
teers, and 14th regiment New York State militia. 

Brigadier Getieral Franklin's brigade. — I5th, 18th, 31st, and 32d regiments 
New York volunteers, Piatt's battery, (M,) 2d United States artillery, and 
company 0, New York (Lincoln) cavalry. 

Colonel Blenker's brigade. — 8th and 27th regiments New York volunteers, 
27th regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, and Garibaldi guard, New York vol- 
unteers. 

Colonel Richardson's brigade. — 12th regiment New York volunteers, and 2d 
and 3d regiments Michigan volunteers. 

Brigadier General Stone's brigade. — 34th and Tammany regiments New 
York volunteers, 1st regiment Minnesota volunteers, and 2d regiment New York 
State militia. 

Colonel William F. Smith's brigade. — 2d and 3d regiments Vermont volun- 
teers, 6th regiment Maine volunteers, 33d regiment New York volunteers, com- 
pany H, 2d United States cavalry, and Captain Mott's New York battery. 

Colonel Couch's brigade. — 2d regiment Rhode Island volunteers, 7th and 10th 
regiments Massachusetts volunteers, and 36th regiment New York volunteers. 

The 2d regiment Maine, the 2d regiment Wisconsin, and the 13th regiment 
New York volunteers, stationed at Fort Corcoran. 

The 21st regiment New York volunteers, stationed at Fort Runyon. 

The 17th regiment New York volunteers, stationed at Fort Ellsworth. 

By October the new levies had arrived in sufficient numbers, and the process 
of organization so far carried on that the construction of divisions had been ef- 
fected. 

The following statement exhibits the composition of the army, October 15, 
1861. 

Organization of the army of the Potomac, October 15, 1861. 

1. Brigadier General George Stoneman's cavalry command. — 5th United 
States cavalry, 4th Pennsylvania cavalry, Oneida cavalry, (one company,) 11th 
Pennsylvania cavalry, (Harlan's,) and Barker's Illinois cavalry, (one company) 

2. Colonel H. J. Hunt's artillery reserve. — Batteries L, A, and B, 2d United 
States artillery, batteries K and F, 3d United States artillery, battery K, 4th 
United States artillery, battery H, 1st United States artillery, and battery A, 
5th United States artillery. 

3. CITY GUARD, BRIGADIER GENERAL ANDREW PORTER. 

Cavalry. — Companies A and E, 4th United States cavalry. 
Artillery. — Battery K, 5th United States artillery. 

Infantry. — 2d and 3d battalions United States infantry, 8th and 1st compa- 
nies United States infantry, and Sturgis's rifles, (Illinois volunteers.) 



REPORT OF GERERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 15 



4. BANKS'S DIVISION. 

Cavalry. — Four compnnies 3d lepment New York cavalry, (Van Allen's.) 
Artillery. — Best's battery E, 4th United States artillery, detachment 9tli New 
York artillery, Matthews's battery E, 1st Pennsylvania artillery, Tompkins's 
battery A, 1st Rhode Island artillery. 

Infantry. — Abercrombie's brigade : 12th Massachusetts, 12th and 16th In- 
diana, and 30th Pennsylvania volunteers. Stiles's brigade : 3d Wisconsin, 29th 
Pennsylvania, and 13th Massachusetts volunteers, and 9th New York . State 
militia. Gordon's brigade : 2d Massachusetts, 28th and 19th New York, 5th 
Connecticut, 46th and 28th Pennsylvania, and 1st Maryland volunteers. 

m'dowell's division. 

Cavalry. — 2d New York cavalry, (Harris's Light,) Colonel Davis. 

Artillery. — Battery M, 2d, and battery G, 1st United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Keys's brigade : 14th New York State militia, and 22d, 24th, and 
SOth New York volunteers. "Wadsworth's brigade : 12th, 21st, 23d, and 35th 
New York volunteers. King's brigade : 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th 
Indiana volunteers. 

heintzelman's division. 

Cavalry. — 1st New Jersey cavalry, Colonel Halsted. 

Artillery. — Thompson's battery, C, United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Richardp<i^v's brigade : 2d, 3d, and 5th Michigan, and 37th New 
York volunteers. Sedgwick's brigade : 3d and 4th Maine, and 38th and 40th 
New York volunteers. Jameson's brigade: 32d, 63d, 61st, and 45th Penn- 
sylvania volunteers, and Wild Cat reserves, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) 

F. J. porter's division. 

Cavalry. — 3d Pennsylvania cavalry. Colonel Averill, and 8th Pennsylvania 
cavalry. Colonel Gregg. 

Artillery. — Battery E, 2d, and battery *E, 3d United States artillery. 

Infantry. — Morell's brigade : 33d Pennsylvania, 4th Michigan, 9th Massa- 
chusetts, and 4th New York volunteers. Martindale's brigade : 13th New 
York, 2d Maine, and 18th Massachusetts volunteers, and DeKalb regiment New 
York volunteers. Butterfield's brigade : 50th New York, 83d Pennsylvania, 
(Colonel McLean,) 17th and 25th New York volunteers, aud Stockton's inde- 
pendent Michigan regiment. 

franklin's division. 

Cavalry. — 1st New York cavalry. Colonel McReynolds. 

Artillery. — Batteries D and G, 2d United States artillery, and Hexamer's 
battery, (New Jersey volunteers.) 

Infantry. — Kearney's brigade : 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th New Jersey volunteers. 
Slocum's brigade : 16th, 26th, and 27th New York, aud 6th Maine volunteers. 
Newton's brigade : 15th, 18th, 31st, and 32d New York volunteers. 

stone's division. 

Cavalry. — Six companies 3d New York (Van Allen) cavalry. 
Artillery. — Kirby's battery I, 1st United States, Vaughn's battery B, 1st 
Khode Island artillery, and Bunting's 6th New York independent battery. 
Infantry. — Gorman's brigade : 2d New York State militia, 1st Minnesota, 

* This battery was transfeiTed to Sherman's expedition. 



16 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

15th Massachusetts, aud 34th New York volunteers, and Tammany regiment, 
(New York volunteers.) Lander's brigade : 19th and 20th Massachusetts, and 
7th Michigan volunteers, and a company of Massachusetts sharpshooters. 
Baker's brigade: Pennsylvania volunteers, (1st, 2d, and 3d California.) 

buell's division. 

Artillery. — Batteries D and H, 1st Pennsylvania artillery. 

Infantry. — Couch's brigade : 2d Ehode Island, 7th and 10th Massachusetts, 
and 36th New York volunteers. Graham's brigade : 23d aud 31st Pennsyl- 
vania, and 67th (1st Long Island) and 65th (1st United States chasseurs) New 
York volunteers. Peck's brigade : 13th and 21st Pennsylvania, and 62d 
(Anderson Zouaves) and 55th New York volunteers. 

m'call's division. 

Cavalry. — 1st Pennsylvania reserve cavalry, Colonel Bayard. 

Artillery. — Easton's battery A, Cooper's battery B, and Kein's battery G, 
Ist Pennsylvania artillery. 

Infantry. — Meade's brigade : 1st rifles Pennsylvania reserves, 4th, 3d, 7th, 

11th, and 2d Pennsylvania reserve infantry. brigade: 5th, 1st, and 

8th Pennsylvania reserve infantry. brigade : 10th, 6th, 9th, and 12th 

Pennsylvania reserve infantry. 

hooker's division. 

Cavalry. — Eight companies 3d Indiana cavalry. Lieutenant Colonel Carter. 

Artillery. — Elder's battery E, 1st United States artillery. 

Infantry. brigade: 1st and 11th Massachusetts, 2d New Hamp-. 

shire, 26th Pennsylvania, and 1st Michigan volunteers. Sickles's brigade : 1st, 
2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th regiments Excelsior brigade, New York volunteers. 

blenker's brigade. 

Cavalry. — 4th New York cavalry, (mounted rifles,) Colonel Dickel. 
Artillery. — One battery. 

Infantry. — 8th and 29th New York, 27th and 35th Pennsylvania volunteers, 
Garibaldi guard and Cameron rifles, (New York volunteers.) 

smith's division. 

Cavalry. — 5th Pennsylvania cavalry, (Cameron dragoons,) Colonel Friedman. 

Artillery. — Ayres's battery F, 5th United States artillery, Mott's 2d New 
York independent battery, and Barr's battery E, 1st Pennsylvania artillery. 

Infantry. brigade : 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Vermont volunteers. 

Stevens's brigade : 35th and 49th New York and 6th Maine volunteers, and 
* 79th New York State militia. Hancock's brigade : * 47th and 49th Pennsyl- 
vania, 43d New York, and 5th Wisconsin volunteers. Companies B and E, 
Berden's sharpshooters. 

Casey's provisional brigades. — 5th, 6th, and 7th New Jersey volunteers, 
*Round-Hcad regiment, (Pennsylvania volunteers,) battalion District of Colum- 
bia volunteers, 40th Pennsylvania, Sth New Jersey, and 4th New Hampshire 
volunteers. 

* The 79th New York State militia, the 47th Pennsylvania volunteers, and the Roxmd-Head 
regiment, were transferred to General Sherman's expedition. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 17 

5. Garrison of AJexa7idria. — Brigadier General Montgomery, military gov- 
ernor. Cameron guard, (Pennsylvania volunteers.) 

Garrison of Fort Albany. — 14th Massachusetts volunteers. 

Garrison of Fort Richardson. — 4t]i Connecticut volunteers. 

Garrison of Fort Washington. — Company D, 1st United States artillery, 
companies H and I, 37th New York volunteers, and United States recruits 
unassigned. 

6. DIX'S DIVISION, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. — Company of Pennsylvania cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery I, 2d United States artillery, 2d Massachusetts light 
battery, and a battery of New York artillery. 

Infantry. — 3d, 4th, *iid 5th New York, 17th and 25th Massachusetts, 21st 
Indiana, 6th Michigan, 4th Wisconsin, 7th Maine, 2d Maryland battalion, and 
Reading city guard, volunteers. 

On the 8th of March, 1862, the President directed, by the following order, the 
organization of the active portion of the army of the Potomac into four army 
corps, and the formation of a fifth corps from the division of Banks and 
Shields. 

Tiie following is the text of the President's order : 

" [President's General War Order No. 2.] 

" Executive Mansion, 

" Washington, Mqrch 8, 1862. 

"Ordered, 1st. That the major general commanding the army of the Potomac 
pi'oceed forthwith to organize that part of the said army destined to enter upon 
active operations, (including the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in 
the fortifications about Washington,) into four army corps, to be commanded 
according to seniority of rank, as follows : 

"First corps to consist of four divisions, and to be commanded by Major 
General I. McDowell. Second corps to consist of three divisions, and to be 
commanded by Brigadier General E. V. Sumner. Third corps to consist of 
three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier General S. P. Heintzelman. 
Fourth corps to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier 
General E. D. Keyes. 

" 2. That the divisions now commanded by the ofiicers above assigned to the 
commands of army corps shall be embraced in and form part of their respective 
corps. 

" 3. The forces left for the defence of Washington will be placed in command 
of Brigadier General James Wadsworth, who shall also be military governor of 
the District of Columbia. 

" 4. That this order be executed with such promptness and despatch as not 
to delay the commencement of the operations already directed to be undertaken 
by the army of the Potomac. 

" 5. A fifth army corps, to be commanded by Major General N. P. Banks, will 
be formed from his own and General Shields's (late General Lander's) division. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

Tire following order, which was made as soon as circumstances permitted, 
exhibits the steps taken to carry out the requirements of the President's war 

order No. 2 : 

H. Ex. Doc. 15 2 



18 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 



"AllMY COUPS. 

" Hkadquarters Army of the Potomac, 

^'Fairfax Court House, Virginia, March 13, 1862. 

General Orders No. 151.] 

" In compliance with the President's war order No. 2, of March 8, 1862, the 
active portion of the army of the Potomac is formed into army corp.?, as follows : 

" First corps, Major General Irvin McDowell, to consist for the present of 
the divisions of Franklin, McCall, and King. Second corps. Brigadier Gen- 
eral E. V. Sumner ; divisions, Richardson, Elenker, and Sedgwick. Third 
corps, Brigadier General S. P. Heintzelman ; divisions, F. J. Porter, Hooker, 
and Hamilton. Fourth corps. Brigadier General E. D. Keyes ; divisions. Couch, 
Smith, and Casey. Fifth corps. Major General N. P. Banks; divisions, Wil- 
liams and Shields. 

"The cavalry regiments attached to divisions will, for the present, remain so. 
Subsequent orders will provide for these regiments, as well as for the reserve 
artillery. Regular infintry and regular cavalry arrangements will be made to 
unite the divisions of each army corps as promptly as possible. 

"The commanders of divisions Avill at once report in person, or where that is 
impossible, by letter, to the commander of their army corps. 

" By command of Major General McClellan. 

"A. V. COLBURN, 
" Assistant Adjutant General.^' 

I add a statement of the organization and composition of the troops on April 
1, commencing with the portion of the army of the Potomac which Avent to the 
Peninsula, giving afterwards the regiments and batteries left on the Potomac, 
and in Maryland and Virginia after April 1, 1862. 

Troops of the army of the Potomac sent to the Peninsula in March and early 

in April, 1862, 

1st. Cavalry reserve, Brigadier General P. St. G. Cooke. — Emery's brigade : 
5th United States cavalry; 6th United States cavalry; 6th Pennsylvania cavalry. 
Blake's brigade : 1st United States cavalry; 8th Pennsylvania cavalry ; Bar- 
ker's squadron Illinois cavalry. 

2d. Artillery reserve. Colonel Henry J. Hunt : Graham's battery K and G, 
1st United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Randall's battery E, 1st United States, 6 
Napoleon guns; Carlisle's battery E, 2d United States, 6 20-pounder Parrott 
guns ; Robertson's battery, 2d United States, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Benson's 
battery M, 2d United States, 6 3-incli ordnance guns ; Tidball's battery A, 2d 
United States, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Edwards's battery L and M, 3d United 
States, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns; Gibson's battery C and G, 3d United States, 
6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Livingston's battery F and K, 3d United States, 4 
10-pounder Parrott guns ; Howe's battery G, 4th United States, 6 Napoleon 
guns ; De Russy's battery K, 4th United States, 6 Napoleon guns; Weed's bat- 
tery I, 5th United States, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Smead's battery K, 5th 
United States, 4 Napoleon guns ; Ames's battery A, 5th United States, 6 — 4 
10-pound^ Parrott and 2 Napoleon — guns ; Diedrick's battery A, New York ar- 
tillery and battalion, 6 20-pounder Parrott guns ; Vogelie's battery B, New York 
artillery and battalion, 4 20-pounder Parrott guns ; Knierim's battery C, New 
York artillery and battalion, 4 20-pounder Parrott guns ; Grimm's battery D, 
New York artillery and battalion, 6 32-pounder howitzer guns. Total, 100 
guns. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M^CLELLAN. 19 

3d. Volunteer engineer troops, General Woodbury : l.^th New York volun- 
teers ; 50tli New York volunteers. 

Regular engineer troops, Captain Duane : Companies A, B, and C, United 
States engineers. 

Artillery troops, with siege trains: ist Connecticut heavy artillery, Colonel 
Tyler. 

4th. Infantry reserve, (regular brigade,) General Sykes : 9 companies 2d 
United Stales infantry, 7 companies 3d United States infantry, 10 companies 
4th United States infantry, 10 companies 6th United States infantrj, 6 com- 
panies 10th and 17th United States infantry, 6 companies 11th United States 
infantry, S companies 12th United States infantry, 9 companies 14th United 
States infantry, and 5th New York volunteers, Colonel Warren. 

SECOND CORPS, GENERAL SUMNER. 

Cavalry. — 8th Illinois cavalry. Colonel Farnsworth, and one squadron 6th 
New York cavalry. 

RICHARDSON'S DIVISION. 

Artillery. — Clark's battery A and G, 4th United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; 
Frank's battery G, 1st New York, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns ; Pettit's battery 
B, 1st New York, 6 10-poiiuder Parrott guns ; Hogan's battery A, 2d New York, 
6 10-pounder PaiTOtt guns. 

Infantry. — Howard's brigade : 5th New Hampshire, 81st Pennsylvania, and 
61st and 64th New York volunteers. Meagher's brigade: 69th, 63d, and 88th 
New York volunteers. French's brigade: 52d, 57th, and 66th New York, and 
53d Pennsylvania volunteers. 

SEDGWICK'S DIVISION. 

Artillery. — Kirby's battery I, 1st United States, 6 Napoleon guns; Tomp- 
kins's battery A, 1st Rhode Island, 6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 12-pounder 
howitzer — guns ; Bartlett's battery B, 1st Rhode Island, 6 — 4 10-pounder Par- 
rott and 2 12-pounder howitzer — guns ; Owen's battery G, 6 3-inch ordnance 
guns. 

Infantry. — Gorman's brigade : 2d New York State militia, and 15th Massa- 
chusetts, 34th NeAv York, and 1st Maine volunteers. Burns's brigade : 69th, 
71st, 72d, and 106th Pennsylvania volunteers. Dana's brigade: 19th and 20th 
Massachusetts, 7th Michigan, and 42d New York volunteers. 

Note. — Blenker's division detached, and assigned to the mountain depart- 
ment. 

THIRD CORPS, GENERAL HEINTZELMAN. 

Cavalry. — 3d Pennsylvania cavalry. Colonel Averill. 

porter's DIVISION. 

Artillery. — Griffin's battery K, 5th United States, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns: 
Weeden's battery C, Rhode Island ; Martin's battery C, Massachusetts, 6 Na- 
poleon guns ; Allen's battery E, Massachusetts, 6 3-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Martindale's brigade : 2d Maine, ISth and 22d Massachusetts, 
and 25l:h and 13th New York volunteers. Morell's brigade : 14th New York, 
4th Michigan, 9th Massachusetts, and 62d Pennsylvania volunteers. Butter- 
field's brigade : 17th, 44th, and 12th New York, 83d Pennsylvania, and Stock- 
ton's Michigan volunteers. 

First Berdan sharpshooters. 



"20 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE 15 m'cLELLAN. 



hooker's division. 

Artillery. — Hall's battery H, 1st United States, G — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 
2 12-pounder howitzer — guns ; Smith's battery, 4th New York, 6 10-pounder 
Parrott guns ; Bramhall's battery, 6th New York, 6 3-incli ordnance guns ; Os- 
born's battery D, 1st New York artillery, 4 3-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Sickles's brigade : 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Excelsior, New York. 
Naglee's brigade : 1st and 11th Massachusetts, 26th Pennsylvania, and 2d New 
Hampshire volunteers. Colonel Starr's brigade : 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th New 
Jersey volunteers. 

hamiltoiN's division. 

Artillery. — Thompson's battery G, 2d United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; 
Beam's battery B, New Jersey, 6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 Napoleon — guns ; 
Randolph's battery E, Rhode Island, 6 — 4 10-pouuder Parrott and 2 Napoleon — 
guns. 

Infantry. — Jameson's brigade : 105th, 63d, and 57th Pennsylvania, and 87th 
New York volunteers. Birney's brigade : 38th and 40th New York, and 3d and 

4th Maine volunteers. brigade : 2d, 3d, and 5lh Michigan, and 37th 

New York volunteers. 

FOURTH CORPS, GENERAL KEYES. 
couch's division. 

Artillery. — McCarthy's battery C, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 10-pounder Parrott 
guns; Flood's battery D, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 10-pouuder Parrott guns; Mil- 
ler's battery E, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 Napoleon guns ; Brady's battery F, 1st 
Pennsylvania, 4 10-pounder Parrott guns. 

Infantry. — Graham's brigade: 67th (1st Long Island). and 65th (1st United 
States chasseurs) New York, 23d, 31st, and 61st Pennsylvania volunteers. Peck's 
brigade : 98th, 102d, and 93d Pennsylvania, and 62d and 55th New York vol- 
unteers. brigade : 2d Rhode Island, 7th and 10th Massachusetts, and 

36th New York volunteers. 

SiMlTH'S division. 

Artillery. — Ayre's battery F, 5th United States, 6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 
2 Napoleon — guns; Mott's battery, 3d New York, 6 — 4 10-pounder Pairott and 
2 Napoleon — guns ; Wheeler's battery E, 1st New York, 4 3-inch ordnance 
guns; Kennedy's battery, 1st New York, 6 3-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Hancock's brigade : 4th Wisconsin, 49th Pennsylvania, 43d New 
York, and 6th Maine volunteers. Brooks's brigade: 2d, od, 4th, 5tb, and 6th 
Vermont volunteers. Davidson's brigade : 33d, 77th, and 49th New York, and 
7th Maine volunteers. 

Casey's division. 

Artillery. — Regan's battery, 7th New York, 6 3-inch ordnance guns ; Fitch's 
8th New York, 6 3-inch ordnance guns; Bates's battery A, 1st New York, 6 
Napoleon guns ; Spratt's battery H, 1st New York, 4 3-inch ordnance gun? 

Infantry. — Keim's brigade : 85th, 101st, and 103d Pennsylvania, and 96th 
New York volunteers. Palmer's brigade : 85th, 98th, 92d, 81st, and 93d New 

York volunteers. brigade: 104th and 52d Pennsylvania, 56th and 

100th New York, and 11th Maine volunteers. 

5th. Provost guard : 2d United States cavaliy ; battalions 8th and 17th United 
States infantry. 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 21 

At general headquarters: 2 companies 4tli United Htatcs cavalry; 1 company 
Oneida cavalry, (New York volunteers :) and 1 company Sturges's rifles, (Illi- 
nois volunteers.) 

The following troops of the army of the Potomac were left behind, or detached 
on and in front of the Potomac for the defence of that line, April 1, 1862. Frank- 
lin's and McCall's divisions, at subsequent and different dates, joined the active 
portion of ihe army on the Peninsula. Two brigades of Shields's division joined 
at Harrison's landing : 

FIRST CORPS, GENERAL McDOWELL. 

Cavalry. — 1st, 2d, and 4th New York, and 1st Pennsylvania. 
Sharpshooters. — 2d regiment Berdan's sharpshooters. 

franklin's division. 

Artillery. — Piatt's battery D, 2d United States, 6 Napoleon guns ; Porter's 
battery A, Massachusetts, 6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 12-pounder howit- 
zer — guns; Hexamer's battery A, New Jersey, 6 — 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 
12-pounder howitzer — guns; Wilson's battery F, 1st New York artillery, 4 
3-inch ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Kearney's brigade: 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th New Jersey volunteers. 
Slocum's brigade: 16th and 27th New York, 5th Maine, and 96th Pennsylva- 
nia volunteers. Newton's brigade: 18th, 31st, and 32d New York, and 95th 
Pennsylvania volunteers. 

m'call's division. 

Artillery. — Seymour's battery C, 5th United States, 6 Napoleon guns; Eas- 
ton's battery A, 1st Pennsylvania, 4 Napoleon guns; Cooper's battery B, 1st 
Pennsylvania, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns ; Kein's battery C, 1st Pennsylvania, 
6 — 2 10-pounder and 4 12-pounder Parrott — guns. 

Infantry. — Reynolds's brigade: 1st, 2d, 5th, and 8th Pennsylvania reserve 
regiments. Meade's brigade: 3d, 4th, 7th, and 11th Pennsylvania reserve regi- 
ments. Ord's brigade: 6th, 9th, 10th, and 12th Pennsylvania reserve regi- 
ments. 

1st Pennsylvania reserve rifles. 

king's division. 

^r)!«7/er?/. — Gibbon's battery B, 4th United States, 6 Napoleon guns; Mon- 
roe's battery D, 1st Rhode Island, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns; Gerrish's battery 
A, New Hampshire, 6 Napoleon guns; Durrell's battery, Pennsylvania, 6 10- 
pounder Parrott guns. 

Infantry. brigade : 2d, 6th, and 7th Wisconsin, and 19th Indiana vol- 
unteers. Patrick's brigade: 20th, 21st, 23d, and 25th New York State militia. 
Augur's brigade: 14th New York State militia, and 22d, 24th, and 30th New 
York volunteers. 

FIFTH CORPS, GENERAL BANKS. 

Cavalry. — 1st Maine, 1st Vermont, 1st Michigan, 1st Rhode Island, 5th and 
8th New York, Keyes battalion of Pennsylvania, 18 companies of Maryland, 1 
squadron of Virginia. 

Unattached. — 28th Pennsylvania volunteers, and 4th regiment Potomac home 
brigade, (Maryland volunteers.) 



22 REPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 



WILLIAMS'S DIVISION. 

Artillery. — Best's battery F, 4tii United States, 6 Napoleon guns; Hamp- 
ton's battery, Maryland, 4 10-pounder Parrott guns; Thompson's battery, Maiy- 
land, 4 10-pounder Parrot! guns; Mathews's battery F, Pennsylvania, 6 3-inch 

ordnance guns ; ■ battery M, 1st New York, G 10-pounder Parrott guns ; 

Knapp's battery, Pennsylvania, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns; Mc^Iahon's bat- 
tery, New York, 6 3-incli ordnance guns. 

Infantry. — Abercrombie's brigade : 12th and 2d Massachusetts, and 16th Indi- 
ana, 1st Potomac home brigade, (Maryland,) 1 company Zouaves D'Afrique, (Penn- 
sylvania) volunteers. brigade: 9th New York State militia, and 29th 

Pennsylvania, 29th Indiana, and 3d Wisconsin volunteers. brigade: 

28th New York, 5th Connecticut, 46th Pennsylvania, 1st Maryland, 12th In- 
diana, and 13th Massachusetts volunteers. 

SHIELDS'S DIVISION. 

Artillery. — Clark's battery E, 4[h United States, 6 10-pounder Parrott guns; 
Jcnks's battery A, 1st Virginia, 4 10-pounder Parrott and 2 6-pounder guns; 
Davy's battery B, 1st Virginia, 2 10-pounder Parrott guns; Huntington's bat- 
tery A, 1st Oliio, 6 13-pounder James's guns; Robinson's battery L, 1st Ohio, 

2 12-pounder howitzers and 4 6-pounder guns ; and battery, 4th Ohio 

artillery. 

Infantry. brigade : 14th Indiana, 4th, 8th, and 67th Ohio, 7th 

Virginia, and 84th Pennsylvania volunteers. brigade : 5th, 62d, and 

66th Ohio, 13th Indiana, and 39th Illinois volunteers. brigade: 7th 

and 29th Ohio, 7th Indiana, 1st Virginia, and 11th Pennsylvania volunteers. 
Andrew sharpshooters. 

GENERAL W^ADSWORTH'S COMMAND. 

Cavalry. — 1st New Jersey cavalry, at Alexandria, and 4th Pennsylvania 
cavalry, east of the Capitol. 

Artillery and infantry. — 10th New Jersey volunteers, Bladensburg road; 
104th New York volunteers, Kalorama heights ; 1st Wisconsin heavy artillery, 
Fort Cass, Virginia ; 3 batteries of New Y'"ork artillery. Forts Ethan Allen and 
Marcy ; depot of New York light artillery. Camp Barry ; 2d District of Co- 
lumbia volunteers, Washington city ; 26th Pennsylvania volunteers, G street 
wharf; 26th New York volunteers. Fort Lyon; 95th New York volunteers, 
Camp Thomas ; 94th New York and detachment of 88th Pennsylvania volun- 
teers, Alexandria ; 91st Pennsylvania volunteers, Franklin Square barracks; 
4th New Y'^ork artillery. Forts Carroll and Greble ; 112th Pennsylvania volun- 
teers. Fort Saratoga ; 76th New Y''ork volunteers, Fort Massachusetts; 59th 
New York volunteers. Fort Pennsylvania ; delachment of 88th Pennsylvania 
volunteers. Fort Good Hope ; 99th Pennsylvania volunteers, Fort Mahon ; 2d 
New York light artillery. Forts Ward, Worth, and Blenker ; 107th and 54th 
Pennsylvania volunteers, Kendall Green ; Dickerson's light artillery, 86th New 
York, and detachment of 88th Pennsylvania volunteers, east of the Capitol ; 
14th Massachusetts (volunteers) heavy artillery and 56th Pennsylvania volun- 
teers. Forts Albany, Tillinghast, Richardson, Runyon, Jackson, Barnard, Craig, 
and Scott ; detachments of 4th United States artillery and 37th New York 
volunteers. Fort Washington ; 97th, 101st, and 91st New York, and 12th Vir- 
ginia volunteers. Fort Corcoran. 

In camp near Washington. — 6th and 10th New York, Swain's New York, 
and 2d Pennsylvania cavalry, all dismounted. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 23 

These troops (3,359 men) were ordered to report to Colonel Miles, command- 
ing railroad guard, to relieve 3,306 older troops ordered to be sent to Manassas 
to report to General Abercrombie. 

GENERAL DIX'S COMMAND, BALTIMORE. 

Cavalry. — 1st Maryland cavalry and detachment of Purnell Legion cavalry. 

Artillery. — Battery I, ^d United States ; battery — , Maryland ; battery L, 1st 
New York, and two independent batteries of Pennsylvania artillery. 

Infantry. — 3d and 4th New York, 11th, 87th, and 111th Pennsylvania, de- 
tachment 21st Massachusetts, :^d Delaware, 2d Maryland, 1st and 2d Eastern 
Shore (Maryland) home guards, and Purnell Legion (two battalions) Maryland 
volunteers. 

In a staff charged with labors so various and important as that of the army 
of the Potomac, a chief was indispensable to supervise the various departments 
and to relieve the commanding general of details. The officer of chief of staff, 
well known in European armies, had not been considered necessary in our small 
peace establishment. The functions of the office were not defined, and, so far 
as exercised, had been included in the Adjutant General's department. The 
small number of officer^ in this department, and the necessity for their employ- 
ment in other duties, have obliged commanding generals, during this war, to 
resort to other branches of the service to furnish suitable chiefs of staff. 

On the 4th of September, 1861, I appointed Colonel R. B. Marcy, of the 
inspector general's department, chief of staff, and he entered upon service im- 
mediately, discharging the various and 'important duties with great fidelity, 
industry, and ability, from this period until I was removed from command at 
Rectortown. Many improvements have been made during the war in our system 
of staff administration, but much remains to be done. 

Our own experience, and that of other armies, agree in determining the neces- 
sity for a".i efficient and able staff. To obtain this, our staff establishment should 
bo based on correct principles, and extended to be adequate to the necessities of 
the service, and should include a system of staff and line education. 

The affairs of the Adjutant General's department, while I commanded the 
army of the Potomac, were conducted by Brigadier General S. Williams, as- 
sisted by Lieutenant Colonel James A. Hardie, aide-de-camp. Their manage- 
ment of the department during the organization of the army in the fall and 
winter of 1861, and during its subsequent operations in the field, was excellent. 

They were, during the entire period, assisted by Captain Ricljard B. Irwin, 
aide-de-camp, and during tlie organization of the army by the following-named 
officers: Captains Joseph Kirkland, Arthur McClellan, M. T. McMahou, Wil- 
liam P. Mason, and William F. Biddle, aides-de-camp. 

My personal staff, when we embarked for the Peninsula, consisted of Colonel 
Thomas M. Key, additional aide-de-camp ; Colonel E. H. Wright, additional 
aide-de-camp and major, 6th United States cavalry; Colonel T. T. Gautt, ad- 
ditional aide-de-camp ; Colonel J. J. Astor, jr., volunteer aide-decamp ; Lieu- 
tenant Colonel A. V. Colburn, additional aide-de-camp and captain. Adjutant 
General's department ; Lieutenant Colonel N. B. Sweitzer, additional aide-de- 
camp and captain, 1st United States cavalry ; Lieutenant Colonel Edward 
McK. Hudson, additional aide-de-camp and captain, 14th United States infantry ; 
Lieutenant Colonel Paul Von Radowitz, additional aide-de-camp ; Major H. 
Von Hammerstein, additional aide-de-camp ; Major W. W. Russell, United 
States marine corps ; Major F. LeCompte, of the Swiss army, volunteer aide- 
de-camp ; Captains Joseph Kirkland, Arthur McClellan, L. P. D'Orleans, R. 
D'Orleans, M. T. McMahon, William P. Mason, jr., William F. Biddle, and E. 
A. Raymond, additional aides-de-camp. 

To this number I am tempted to add the Prince de Joinville, who constantly 



24 REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

accompauied me tlirough the trying- campaign of the Peninsula, and frequently 
rendered miportant sendees. Of these offic'ers Captain McMahon was a 3 
to tlie personal staff of Brigadier General Franklin and Captains KiJkW ^1 
Mason to that of Brigadier General F. J. Porter during the^iege ^Yorktown 
They remamed subsequently with those general officers. Majol LeCompte left 

^aptams L. i^D Or cans, R. D'Orleans, and Raymond at the close of the Peninsula 
ofleZ ,.Sf-f/----tion Captains W. S. Abert and Charle R Lowdl 

witf me un^l rt?f r"'f 7' ''\'^ "^ '''^ ""' aides-de-camp, and remaTned 
wh me until I was relieved from the command of the army of the Potomac 
All of these officers served me with great gallantry and devotion- tliev were 
fat^JuLt"^ "'"'' "^ '"'""' " "'"" '^" dangerous, diSt or 



ENGINEERS. 



bZI'S Un Jsf r '^'^ '^ '''^'™^ '^ '^'' ^''''''^' I f«-«^^ Major J. G. 
liamaid, U mted & ates engineers, subsequently brigadier general of volunteers 
occupying the position of chief engineer of that ai-my." I continued him h. he same 
office, and at once gave the necessary instructions for the completion of thcT 
fences of the capital, and for the entire reorganization of the de^pa tnaen 

Under his direction the entire system of defences was carried into ex;cution 

evmence ot the skill of the engineers and the diligent labor of the troons 

For some months after the organization of the army of the Potomac m^s com 
menced there were no engineer troops with it. At length, h o we vS three com 

vZyZ\ ""^""^- ^i'' ^^" ^^^^^"^ management of Capta^ J C Duane" 
United States engineers, these new companies rapidly became efficient and as 
will be seen rendered_ most valuable service during the ensuing campa L ' 
Ihe number of engineer troops being entirely inadequate to the nece^sUies of 

G^Zr^DpTlt "'" •";«-'r™^ P'""^'^ "°^«'-">« command ofB 4, £ 
bencra D. P Woodbuiy, major United States engineers. ° 

the':';;;t;;::dtrrPe'„EL"''' "" '"'--^-^P'^te o,.gaoi.ati„u .hen 
Bngadier Geiieial J. 6. Barnard, chief engineer ; First Lieutenant H C, 
Abbe t t,^ograplncaI engineers, aide-de-camp'! Brigade volunteer engiS'er^' 
& £ od itapW 7M.t"^rT"f'"« ■■ ^ '"■ ^'" Y°* volnnteerrgXei 
tbrt^l'lts^uSft'e'^S^te^eVgiri-^ ''""f™' 

conrpanies ,«pective,y con.nranded byFirst tl^tet nts^'o B- rero "1^ 
Cross, and O. E Babcocic, United States engineers. The cbief enSmer wt 
ablyassisednrb,s duties by Lieutenant Colonel B. S. AlexardeT^aud pTrst 

gnlrr'gantata C r'sT'' t"' »■ "^^'fj"'. -<' ^errili. United 'stats en- 
gmeers. Ijaptain O. S. Stuart and Second Lieutenant P. U. Parouhar United 
&t.Ttes engineers. j„n,ed after the army arrived at Fort Momie ^ 

Ihe necessary bridge equipage for the operations of a large army had been 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 25 

collected, consisting of bateaux with the ancliors and flooring material, (French 
model,) trestles, and engineers' tools, with the necessary wagons for their trans- 
portation. 

The small number of officers of this corps av^ailable rendered it impracticable 
to detail engineers permanently at the headquarters of corps and divisions. The 
companies of regular engineers never had their proper number of officers, and 
it was necessary, as a rule, to follow the principle of detailing engineer officers 
temporarily whenever their services Avere required. 

TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS. 

To the corps of topographical engineers was intrusted the collection of topo- 
graphical information and the preparation of campaign maps. Until a short 
time previous to the departure of the army for Fort Monroe, Lieutenant Colonel 
John W. Macomb was in charge of this department, and prepared a large 
amount of valuable material. He was succeeded by Brigadier General A. A. 
Humphreys, who retained the position throughout the Peninsula campaign. 
These officers were assisted by Lieutenants H. L. Abbott, 0. G. Wagner, N. 
Bowen, John M. Wilson, and James H. Wilson, topographical engineers. This 
number, being the greatest available, was so small that much of the duty of the 
department devolved upon parties furnished by Professor Bache, Superintendent 
of the Coast Survey, and other gentlemen from civil life. 

Owing to the entire absence of reliable topographical maps, the labors of this 
corps were difficult and arduous in the extreme. Notwithstanding the energy 
and ability displayed by General Humphreys, Lieutenant Colonel Macomb, and 
their subordinates, who frequently obtained the necessary information under 
fire, the movements of the army were sometimes unavoidably delayed by the 
difficulty of obtaining knowledge of the country in advance. The result of 
their labors has been the preparation of an excellent series of maps, which will 
be invaluable to any army traversing the same ground. 

During the campaign it was impossible to draw a distinct line of demarcation 
between the duties of the two corps of engineers so that the labors of reconnois- 
sances of roads, of lines of intrenchments, of fields for battle, and of the position 
of the enemy, as well as the construction of siege and defensive works, were 
habitually performed by details from either corps, as the convenience of the 
service demanded. 

I desire to express my high appreciation of the skill, gallantry, and devotion 
displayed by the officers of both corps of engineers, under the most trying cir- 
cumstances. 

During the Maryland campaign I united the two corps under Captain J. C. 
Duane, United States engineers, and found great advantages from the arrangement- 

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 

For the operations of the medical department I refer to the reports, trans- 
mitted hercAvith, of Surgeon Charles S. Tripler and Surgeon Jonathan Letterman, 
who, in turn, performed the duties of medical director of the army of the 
Potomac, the former from August 12, 1861, until July ], 1862, and the latter 
after that date. The difficulties to be overcome in organizing and making effec- 
tive the medical department were very great, arising principally from the 
inexperience of the regimental medical officers, many of Avhom were physicians 
taken suddenly from civil life, who, according to Surgeon Tripler, " had to be 
instructed in their duties from the very alphabet," and from the ignorance of 
the line officers as to their relations with the medical officers, which gave rise to 
confusion and conflict of authority. Boards of examination were instituted, by 
which many ignorant officers were removed ; and by the successive exertions of 
Surgeons Tripler and Letterman, the medical corps was brought to a very high 



26 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

degree of efficiency. With regard to the sanitary condition of the army while 
on the Potomac, Dr. Triplcr says that the records show a constantly increasing 
immunity from disease. "In October and November, 1861, with an army 
averaging 130,000 men, we had 7,932 cases of fever of all sorts ; of these, 
about 1,000 were reported as cases of typhoid fever. I know that errors of 
diagnosis were frequently committed, and therefore this must be considered aa 
the limit of typhoid cases. If any army in the world can show such a record as 
this, I do not know when or where it was assembled." From September, 
1861, to February, 1862, while the army was increasing, the number of sick 
decreased from 7 per cent, to 6.18 per cent. Of these, the men sick in the 
regimental and general hospitals were less than one-half; the remainder were 
slight cases, inider treatment in quarters. " During this time, so far as rumor 
was concerned, the army was being decimated by disease every month." Of 
the sanitary condition of the army during the Peninsula campaign, up to its 
arrival at Harrison's landing, Dr. Tripler says : " During this campaign the 
army was favored with excellent health. No epidemic disease appeared. Those 
scourges of modern armies — dysentery, tupus, cholera — were almost unknoAvn. 
We had some typhoid fever and more malarial fevers, but even these never 
prevailed to such an extent as to create any alarm. The; sick reports Avere 
sometimes larger than we cared to have them ; but the great majority of the 
cases reported were such as did not threaten life or permanent disability. I 
regret that I have not before me the retained copies of the monthly reports, so 
that I might give accurate statistics. I have endeavored to recover them, but 
have been unsuccessful. My recollection is, that the whole sick report never 
exceeded 8 per cent, of the force, and this including all sorts of cases, the trivial 
as well as the severe. The army of the Potomac must be conceded to have 
been the most healthy army in the service of the United States." 

His remarks at the conclusion of his report upon our system of medical 
administration, and his suggestions for its improvement, are especially worthy 
of attention. 

The service, labors, and privations of the troops during the seven days' battles 
had, of course, a groat effect on the health of the army after it reached Harrison's 
landing, increasing the number of sick to about 20 per cent, of the whole force. 

The nature of the military operations had also unavoidably placed the 
medical department in a very unsatisfactory condition. Supplies had been almost 
entirely exhaitsted or necessarily abandoned ; hospital tents abandoned or de- 
stroyed, and the medical officers deficient in numbers and broken down by 
fatigue. 

All the remarkable energy and ability of Surgeon Letterman were required 
to restore the f fficiency of his department ; but before we left Harrison's land- 
ing he had succeeded in fitting it out thoroughly with the supplies it required, 
and the health of the army was vastly improved by the sanitary measures which 
were enforced at his suggestion. 

The great haste with which the army was removed from the Peninsula made 
it necessary to leave at Fort Monroe, to be forwarded afterwards, nearly all the 
baggage and transportation, including medical stores and ambulances, all the 
vessels being required to transport the troops themselves and their ammunition ; 
and when the army of the Potomac returned to Washington after General 
Pope's campaign, and the medical department came once more und^r Surgeon 
Letterman's control, he found it in a deplorable condition. The officers were 
worn out by the labors they had performed, and the few supplies that had been 
brought from the Peninsula had been exhausted or abandoned, so that the work 
of reorganization and resupplying had to be again performed, and this while the 
army was moving rapidly, and almost in the face of the enemy. That it was 
successfully accomplished is shown by the care and attention which the wounded 
received after the battles of South Mountain and Antietam. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 27 

Among the improvements introduced into his department by Surgeon Letter- 
man, the principal are ihe organization of an ambulance corps, the system of 
field hcsjntals, and the method of supplying by brigades, all of which were in- 
stituted during the Maryland campaign, and have since proved very efficient. 

quartermaster's department. 

On assuming command of the troops in and around Washington, I appointed 
Captain S. Van Vliet, assistant quartermaster, (afterwards brigadier general,) 
chief quartermaster to my command, and gave him the necessary instructions 
for organizing his department, and collecting the supplies requisite for the large 
army then called for. 

The disaster at Manassas had but recently occurred, and the army was quite 
destitute of quartermaster's stores. General Van Vliet, with great energy and 
zeal, set himself about the task of furnishing the supplies immediately neces- 
sary, and preparing to obtain the still larger amounts which would be required 
by the new troops, which were moving in large numbers towards the capital. 
The principal depot for sud, ics in the ciiy of Washington was under charge 
of Colonel D. H. Ruckci, assistant quartermaster, who ably perfoimed his duties. 
Lieutenant Colonel l\. Ingalls, assistant quartermaster, was placed in charge of 
the department on the south side of the Potomac. I directed a large depot for 
transportation to be established at Perryville, on the left bank of the Susque- 
hanna, a point equally accessible by rail and water. Captain C. C Sawtelle, 
assistant quartermaster, was detailed to organize the camp, and performed his 
duties to my entire satisfaction. Captain J. J. Dana, assistant quartermaster, 
had immediate charge of the transportation in and about Washington, as well 
as of the large number of horses purchased for the use of the artillery and 
cavalry. The principal difficulties which General Van Vliet had to encounter 
arose from the inexperience of the majority of the officers of his department 
ia the new regiments and brigades. 

The necessity of attending personally to minor details rendered his duties 
arduous and harassing in the extreme. All obstacles, however, were surmounted 
by the uniiring industry of the chief quartermaster and his immediate subordi- 
nates, and when the army was prepared to move the organization of the depart- 
ment was found to be admirable. 

When it was determined to move the army to the Peninsula, the duties of 
providing water transportation were devolved by the Secretary of War upon 
his assistant, the Hon. John Tucker. The vessels were ordered to Alexandria, 
and Lieutenant Colonel Ingalls was placed in immediate charge of the embarka- 
tion of the troops, transportation, and material of every description. Opera- 
tions of this nature, on so extensive a scale, had no parallel in the history of 
our country. 

The arrangements of Lieutenant Colonel Ingalls were perfected with remarka- 
ble skill and energy, and the army and its materiel were embarked and trans- 
ported to Fortress Monroe in a very short space of time, and entirely without 
loss. 

During the operations on the Peninsula, until the arrival of troops at Harri- 
son's landing, General Van Vliet retained the position of chief quartermaster, 
and maintained the thorough organization and efficiency of his department. The 
principal depots of supplies were under the immediate charge of Lieutenant 
Colonels Ingalls and Sawtelle. 

On the 10th of July, 1862, General Van Vliet having requested to be relieved 
from duty with the army of the Potomac, I appointed Lieutenant Colonel In- 
galls chief quartermaster, and he continued to discharge the duties of that office 
during the remainder of the Peninsula and the Maryland campaigns in a man- 
ner which fully sustained the high reputation he had previously acquii-ed. 



28 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

The immediate amount of labor accomplished, often under the most difficult 
circunistaaces, the admirable system under which the duties of the department 
wert? performed, and the entire success which attended the efforts to supply so 
large an army, reflect the highest credit upon the officers iipon whom these oner- 
ous duties devolved. The reports of General Van Vliet and Lieutenant Colonel 
Ingalls, with the accompanying documents, give in detail the history of the de- 
partment from its organization until I was relieved from the command of the 
army of the Potomac. 

SUBSISTENCE DBPARTME\T. 

On the 1st of August, 1861, Colonel H. F. Clark, commissary of subsistence, 
joined my staff, and at once entered upon his duties as chief commissary of the 
army of the Potomac. In order to realize the responsibilities pertaining to this 
office, as well as to form a proper estimate of the vast amount of labor Avhich 
must necessarily devolve upon its occupant, it is only necessary to consider the 
unprepared state of the country to engage in a war of such magnitude as the 
present, and the lack of practical knowledge, on the part of the officers, with 
reference to supplying and subsisting a large, and, at that time, unorganized 
army. Yet, notwithstanding the existence of these great obstacles, the manner 
in which the duties of the commissary department were discharged was such as 
to merit and call forth the commendation of the entire army. 

Duiing the stay of the army of the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington, 
prior to the Peninsula campaign, its subsistence was drawn chiefly from the 
depots which had been established by the commissary department at Washing- 
ton, Alexandria, Forts Corcoran and Eunyon. In the important task of desig- 
nating and establishing depots of supplies, Colonel Clarke was ably seconded 
by his assistants. Colonel Amos Beckwith, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A.; 
Lieutenant Colonel George Bell, commissary of svibsistence, U. S. A. ; Lieuten- 
ant polonel A. P. Porter, commissary of subsistence, V. S. A.; Captain Thomas 
Wilson, commissary of subsistence, U. S. A. ; Captain Brownell Granger, com- 
missary of subsistence, U. S. volunteers ; ( 'aptain W. H. Bell, commissary of 
subsistence, U. S. A.; Captain J. H. Woodward, commissary of subsistence, U. 
S. volunteers ; and Captain W. R. Murphy, commissary of subsistence, U. S. 
volunteers. 

For a full knowledge of the highly creditable manner in which each and all 
of the above-mentioned officers discharged their duties, I invite attention to the 
detailed report of Colonel Clarke. The remarks and suggestions contained in 
his report are worthy of attention, as affording valuable rules for the future 
guidance of the subsistence department in supplying armies in the field. 
The success of the subsistence department of the army of the Potomac was in 
a great measure attributable to the fact that the subsistence department at 
Washington made ample provision for sending supplies to the Peninsula, and 
that it always exercised the most intelligent foresight. It moreover gave its 
advice and countenance to the officers charged with its duties and reputation in 
the field, and those officers, I am happy to say, worked with it, and together, 
in perfect harmony for the public good. During the entire period th it 1 was 
in command of the army of the Potomac there was no instance within my 
knowledge where the troops were without their rations from any fault of the 
officers of this department. 

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 

This very important branch of the service was placed under the charge of 
Captain C. P. Kingsbury, ordnance corps, colonel and aide-de-camp. Great 
difficulty existed in the proper organization of the department for the want of a 
sufficient number of suitable officers to perform the duties at the various head- 



KEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 29 

quarters and depots of supply. But far greater obstacles had to be surmount''d, 
from the fact that the supply of small arms was totally inadequate to the 
demands of a large army, and a vast proportion of those furnished were of such 
inferior quality as to be iinsatisfactory to the troops, and condemned by their 
officers. The supply of artillery was more abundant, but of great variety. 
Rifled ordnance was just coming into use, for the first time in this coimtry, and 
the description of gun and kind of projectile which would prove most effective, 
and should, therefore, be adopted, was a mere matter of theory. To obviate 
these difficulties, large quantities of small arms of foreign manufacture were 
contracted for ; private enterprise in the construction of arms and ammunition 
was encouraged ; and by the time the army was ordered to move to the Penin- 
sula the amount of ordnance and ordnance stores was ample. Much also had 
been done to bring the quality, both of arms and ammunition, up to the proper 
standard. Boards of officers were in session continually during the autumn and 
winter of 1861, to test the relative merits of new arms and projectiles. 

The reports of these boards, confirmed by subsequent experience in the field, 
have done much to establish the respective claims of different inventors and 
manufacturers. During the campaigns of the Peninsula and Maryland the 
officers connected with the department were zealous and energetic, and kept the 
troops well supplied, notwithstanding the perplexing and arduous nature of their 
duties. One great source of perplexity Avas the fact that it had been necessary 
to issue arms of all varieties and calibres, giving an equal diversity in the 
kinds of ammunition required. Untiling watchfulness was therefore incumbent 
upon the officers in charge to prevent confusion and improper distribution of 
cartridges. Colonel Kingsbury discharged the duties of his office with great 

efficiency until the day of July, 1862, when his health required that he 

should be relieved. First Lieutenant Thomas G. Baylor, ordnance corps, suc- 
ceeded him, and performed his duty during the remainder of the Peninsula and 
Maryland campaigns with marked ability and success. 

The want of reports from Colonel Kingsbury and Lieutenant Baylor renders 
it impossible for me to enter at all into the details of the organization of the 
department. 

PROVOST marshal's DEPARTMENT. 

Immediately after I was placed in command of the " Division of the Poto- 
mac," I appointed Colonel Andrew Porter, 16th regiment infantry, provost 
marshal of Washington. All the available regular infantry, a battery, and a 
squadron of cavalry, were placed xxnder his command, and by his energetic action 
he soon corrected the serious evils which existed, and restored order in the city. 

When the army was about to take the field. General Porter was appointed 
Provost Marshal General of the army of the Potomac, and held that most im- 
portant position until the end of the Peninsula campaign, when sickness, con- 
tracted in the untiring discharge of his duties, compelled him to ask to be relieved 
from the position he had so ably and energetically filled. 

The Provost Marshal General's department had the charge of a class of duties 
which had not before, in our service, been defined and grouped under the man- 
agement of a special department. The following subjects indicate the sphere 
of this department : 

Suppression of marauding and depredations, and of all brawls and disturb- 
ances, presei-vation of good order, and suppression of disturbances beyond the 
limits of the camps. 

Prevention of straggling on the march. 

Suppression of gambling houses, drinking houses, or bar-rooms, and bi'othels. 

Regulation of hotels, taverns, markets, and places of public amusement. 

Searches, seizures and arrests. Execution of sentences of general courts- 
martial, involving imprisonment or capital punishment. Enforcement of ord'j-rs 



30 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

prohibiting tlie sale of intoxicating liquors, whether by tradesmen or sutlers, 
and of orders respecting passes. 

Deserters from the enemy. 

Prisoners of war taken from the enemy. 

Countersigning safeguards. 

Passes to citizens within the lines, and for purposes of trade. 

Complaints of citizens as to tbe conduct of the soldiers. 

General Porter was assisted by the following named officers: 

Major W. H. Wood, 17th United States infantry; Captain James McMillom, 
acting assistant adjutant general, 17th United States infantry; Captain W. T. 
Gentry, 17th United States infantry; Captain J. W. Forsurth, 18th United 
States infantry; Lieutenant J.W.Jones, 12th United States infantry; Lieu- 
tenant C. F. Trowbridge, 16th United States infantry; and Lieutenant C. D. 
Mehaffey, 1st United States infantry. 

The provost guard was composed of the 2d United States cavalry, Major 
Pleasanton, and a battalion of the 8th and 17th United States infantry. Major 
Willard. After General Porter was relieved. Major Wood was in charge of thia 
department until after the battle of Antietam, when Brigadier Genei'al Patrick 
was appointed Provost Marshal General. 

COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEADQUARTERS. 

When the army took the field, for the purpose of securing order and regularity 
in the camp of headquarters, and facilitating its movements, the office of com- 
mandant of general headquarters was created, and assigned to Major G. 0. 
Haller, 7th United States infantry. Six companies of infantry were placed 
under his orders for guard and police duty. Among the orders appended to 
this report is the one defining his duties, which were always satisfactorily per- 
formed. 

JUDGE ADVOCATE. 

From August, 1861, the position of judge advocate was held by Colonel 
Thomas T. Gantt, aide-de-camp, until compelled by ill health to retire, at Harri- 
son's landin":, in August, 1862. His reviews of the decisions of courts-martial 
during this period were of great utility in correcting the practice in military 
courts, diffusing true notions of discipline and subordination, and setting before 
the army a high standard of soldierly honor. Upon the retirement of Colonel 
Gantt the duties of judge advocate were ably performed by Colonel Thomas 
M. Key, aide-de-camp, 

SIGNAL CORPS. 

The method of conveying intelligence and orders, invented and introduced 
into the service by Major Albert J. Myer, signal officer United States army, 
was first practically tested in large operations during the organization of the 
army of the Potomac. ' 

Under the direction of Major Myer a signal corps was formed by detailing 
officers and men from the different regiments of volunteers and instructing them 
in the use of the flags by day and torches by night. 

The chief signal officer was indefatigable in his exertions to render his corps 
effective, and it soon became available for service in every division of the army. 
In addition to the flags and torches. Major Myer introduced a portable insulated 
telegraph wire, which could be readily laid from point to point, and which could 
be used under the same general system. In front of Washington, and on the 
Lower Potomac, at any point within our lines not reached by the military tel- 
egraph, the great usefulness of this system of signals was made manifest. But 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'CLELLAN. 31 

it was not until after the arrival of the army upon the Peninsula, and during 
the siege and battles of that and the Maryland campaign?, that the great benefits 
to be derived from it on the field and under fire Avere fidly appreciated. 

There was scarcely any action or skirmish in which the signal corps did not 
render important services. Often under heavy fire of artillery, and not unfre- 
quently while exposed to musketry, the ofiicers and men of thi.s corps gave in- 
formation of the movements of the enemy, and transmitted directions for the 
evolutions of our own troops. 

The report of the chief signal ofiicer, with accompanying documents, will 
give the details of the services of this corps, and call attention to those membei-s 
of it who were particularly distinguished. 

TELEGBAPHIC. 

The telegraphic operations of the army of the Potomac were superintended 

by Major Thomas J. Eckert, and under the immediate direction of Mr. 

Caldwell, who was, with a corps of operators, attached to my headquarters 
during the entire campaigns i;pon the Peninsula and in Maryland. 

The services of this corps were arduous and efficient. Under the admirable 
arrangements of Major Eckert they were constantly provided with all the 
material for constructing new lines, Avhich were rapidly established whenever 
the army changed position; and it was not unfrequently the case that the 
operatives worked under fire from the enemy's guns; yet they invariably per- 
formed all the duties required of them with great alacrity and cheerfulness, and 
it was seldom that I was without the means of direct telegraphic communication 
with the War Department and with the corps commanders. 

From the organization of the army of the Potomac up to November 1, 1862, 
including the Peninsula and Maryland campaigns, upwards of twelve hundred 
(1,200) miles of military telegraph line had been constructed in connexion with 
the operations of the army, and the number of operatives and builders em- 
ployed was about two hundred, (200.) 

To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and enterprising aeronaut, who had the 
management of the balloons, I was greatly indebted for the valuable informa- 
tion obtained during his ascensions. 

I have more than once taken occasion to recommend the members of my staflP, 
both general and personal, for promotion and reward. I beg leave to repeat 
these recommendations, and to record their names in the history of the army of 
the Potomac, as gallant soldiers, to whom their country owes a debt of gratitude 
still unpaid, for the courage, ability, and untiring zeal they displayed during 
the eventful campaigns in which they bore so prominent a part. 

CHAPTER II. 

On the 15th of October the main body of the army of the Potomac was in 
the immediate vicinity of Washington, with detachments on the left bank of 
the Potomac as far down as Liverpool point, and as far up as Wdliamsport and 
its vicinity. The different divisions Avere posted as follows : Hooker at Budd's 
ferry, LoAver Potomac ; Heintzelman at Fort Lyon and vicinity ; Franklin near 
the theological seminary ; Blenker near Hunter's chapel ; McDowell at Upton's 
hill and Arlington ; F. J. Porter at Hall's and Miner's hills ; Smith at Mack- 
all's hill; McCall at Langley; Buell at Tonally town. Meridian hill, Emory's 
chapel, &c., on the left bank of the river ; Casey at Washington ; Stoneman's 
cavalry at Washington; Hunt's artillery at Washington; lianks at Dames- 
town, Avith detachments at Point of Ilocks, Sandy Hook, Williamsport, &c.; 
Stone at Poolsville; and Dix at Baltimore, Avith detachments on the Eastern 
Shore. 



32 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

On the 19th of October, 1861, General McOall marched to Drainsvillc with 
his division, in order to cover reconnoissances to be made in all directions the 
next day, for the purpose of learning the position of the enemy, and of cover- 
ing the operations of the topographical engineers in making maps of that region. 

On the 29th, acting in concert with General McCall, General Smith pushed 
strong parties to Freedom hill, Vienna, Flint hill, Peacock hill, &c., to accom- 
plish the same purpose in that part of the front. These reconnoissances were 
successful. 

On the morning of the 20th I received the following telegram from General 
Banks's headquarters : 

" Dabnestown, October 20, 1861. 

" Sir :- The signal station at Sugar Loaf telegraphs that the enemy have 
moved away from Leesburg. All quiet here. 

"R. M. COPELAND, 

"Assistant Adjutant General. 
" General Marcy." 

Whereupon I sent to General Stone, at Poolsville, the following telegram: 

"Camp Griffin, October 20, 1861. 

"General McOlellan desires me to inform you that General McCall occupied 
Drains ville yesterday, and is still there. Will send out heavy reconnoissances 
to-day in all directions from that point. The general desires that you will keep 
a good look-out upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive 
them away. Perhaps a slight demonstration on your part would have the effect 
to move them. 

"A. V. COLBURN, 
"Assistant Adjutant General. 
"Brigadier General C. P. Stone, Poolsville." 

Deeming it possible that General McCall's movement to Drainsville, together 
with the subsequent reconnoissances, might have the effect of inducing the 
enemy to abandon Leesburg, and the despatch from Sugar Loaf appearing to 
confirm this view, I wished General Stone, who had only a line of pickets on 
the river, the mass of his troops being out of sight of, and beyond range from, 
the Virginia bank, to make some display of an intention to cross, and also to 
watch tlie enemy more closely than usual. I did not direct him to cross, nor 
did I intend that he should cross the river in force for the purpose of fighting. 

The above despatch was sent on the 20th, and reached General Stone as 
early as 11 a. m. of that day. I expected him to accomplish all that was intended 
on the same day; and this he did, as will be seen from the following despatch, 
received at my headquarters in Washington from Poolsville on the evening of 
October 20 : 

" Made a feint of crossing at this place this afternoon, and at the same time 
started a reconnoitring party towards Leesbui-g from Harrison's island. The 
enemy's pickets retired to intrenchments. Report of reconnoitring party not 
yet received. I have means of crossing one hundred and twenty-five men once 
in ten minutes at each of two points. River falling slowly. 

"C. P. STONE, 

" Brigadier General. 
"Major General McClellan." 

As it was not foreseen or expected that General McCall would be needed to 
co-operate with General Stone in any attack, he was directed to fall back from 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 33 

Draiusville to his original camp, near Prospect hill, as soon as the required re- 
connoissances were completed. 

Accordingly he left Drainsville, on his return, at about 8^ a. m. of the 21st, 
reaching his old camp at about 1 p. m. 

In the mean time I was sui-prised to hear from General Stone that a portion of 
his troops were engaged on the Virginia side of the river, and at once sent in- 
structions to General McCall to remain at Drainsville, if he had not left before 
the order reached him. 

The order did not reach him until his return to his camp at Langlej. He 
was then ordered to rest his men, and hold his division in readiness to return to 
Drainsville at a moment's notice, should it become necessary. Similar instruc- 
tions were given to other divisions during the afternoon. 

The first intimation I received from Generel Stone of the real nature of his 
movements was in a telegram, as follows: 

"Edwards's Ferry, October 21 — 11.10 a. m. 
" The enemy have been engaged opposite Hamson's island ; our men are be- 
having admirably. 

"C. P. STONE, 

" Brigadier General. 
"Major General McOlellan." 

At 2 p. m. General Banks's adjutant general sent the following : 

"Darnestown, October 21, 1861 — 2 p. m. 

"General Stone safely crossed the river this morning. Some engagements 
have taken place on the other side of the river — how important is not known. 

"R. M. COPELAND, 
''Acting Assistant Adjutant General. 
" General R. B. Marcy." 

General Stone sent the following despatches on the same day at the hot 
indicated : 

"Edwards's Ferry, October 21, 1861 — 2 p. m. 

"There has been sharp firing on the right of our line, and our troops appear to 
be advancing there under Baker. The left, under Gorman, has advanced its 
skirmishers nearly one mile, and, if the movement continues successful, will 
turn the enemy's right. 

"C. P. STONE, 

''Brigadier General. 
" Major General McOlellan." 

"Edwards's Ferry, October 21, 1861 — 4jo. m. 
"Nearly all my force is across the river. Baker on the right; Gorman on the 
left. Right, sharply engaged. 

" 0. P. STONE, 

"Brigadier General. 
" General McOlellan. " 

"Edwards's Ferry, October 21, 1861 — 9.30^. m. 
" I am occupied in preventing further disaster, and try to get into a position 
to redeem. We have lost some of our best commanders — Baker dead, Cogs- 
well a prisoner or secreted. The wounded are being carefully and rapidly re- 
moved ; and Gorman's wing is being cautiously withdrawn. Any advance 
from Drainsville must be made cautiously. 
H. Ex. Doc. 15 3 



34 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

" All was reported going well up to Baker's death, but, in tlie confusion fol- 
lowing that, the right wing was outflanked. In a few hours I shall, unless a night 
attack is made, be in the same position as last night, save the loss of mauj 
good men. 

"C. P. STONE, 

'* Brigadier General. 
" Major General McClellan." 

Although no more fiilly informed of the state of aflfairs, I had, during the 
afternoon, as a precautionary measure, ordered General Banks to send one 
brigade to the support of the troops at Harrison's island, and to move with the 
other two to Seneca mills, ready to support General Stone if necessary. The 
9.30 p. m. despatch of General Stone did not give me an entire understanding 
of the state of the case. 

AAvare of the difficulties and perhaps fatal consequences of recrossing such a 
river as the Potomac after a repulse, and from these telegrams supposing his 
whole force to be on the Virginia side, I directed General Stone to intrench 
himself, and hold the Virginia side at all hazards until re -enforcements could 
arrive, M^hen he could safely withdraw to the Maryland side, or hold his po- 
sition on the Virginia side, should that prove advisable. 

General Banks was instructed to move the rest of his division to Edwards's 
ferry, and to send over as many men as possible before daylight to re-enforce 
Stone. He did not arrive in time to effect this, and was instructed to collect 
all the canal-boats he could find, and use them for crossing at Edwards's ferry 
in sufficient force to enable the troops already there to hold the opposite side. 

On the 22d I went to the ground in person, and reaching Poolsville, learned 
for the first time the full details of the affair. 

The following extract from the evidence of General Stone before the "Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the War" on the 5th of January, X862, will throw 
further light on this occurrence. 

General Stone says he received the order from my headquarters to make a 
jslight demonstration at about 11 o'clock a.m. on the 20th, and that, in obedience 
. to that order, he made the demonstration on the evening of the same day. 

In regard to the reconnoissance on the 21st, which resulted in the battle of 
Ball's Blufi", he was asked the following questions : 

Question. "Did this reconnoissance originate with yourself, or had you orders 
from the geueral-in-chief to make itl" 

To which he replied, "It originated with myself — the reconnoissance." 

Question. " The order did not proceed from General McClellan ?" 

Answer. " I was directed the day before to make a demonstration ; that 
demonstration was made the day previous." 

Question. " Did you receive an order from the generaJ-in-chief to make the 
reconnoissance ?" 

Answer. " No, sir." 

Making a personal examination on the 23d, I found that the position on the 
Virginia side at Edwards's ferry was not a tenable one, but did not think it 
wise to withdraw the troops by daylight. I therefore caused more artillery to 
be placed in position on the Maryland side to cover the approaches to the 
gi-ound held by us, and crossed the few additional troops that the high wind 
permitted us to get over, so as to be as secure as possible against any attack 
during the day. Before nightfall all the precautions Avere taken to secure an 
orderly and quiet passage of the troops and guns. 

The movement was commenced soon after dark, under the personal super- 
vision of General Stone, who received the order for the withdrawal at 7.15 p. m. 

By 4 a. m. of the 24th everything had reached the Maryland shore in safety. 

A few dfl.vs afterwards I received information which seemed to be authentic, to 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 35 

the effect that large bodies of the enemy had been ordered from Manassas to 
Leesburg, to cut off our troops on the Virginia side. Their timely withdrawal 
had probaLdy prevented a still more serious disaster. 

I refer to General Stone's report of this battle, furnished the War Depart- 
ment, and his published testimony before the " Committee on the Conduct of 
the War," for further details. 

The records of the War Department show my anxiety and efforts to assume 
active offensive operations in the fall and early winter. It is only just to say, 
however, that the unprecedented condition of the roads and Virginia soil would 
have delayed an advance till February, had the discipline, organization, and 
equipment of the army been as complete at the close of the fall as was necessary, 
and as I desired and labored against every impediment to make them. 

While still in command only of the army of the Potomac, namely, in early 
September, I proposed the formation of a corps of New Euglanders for coast 
service in the bays and inlets of the Chesapeake and Potomac, to co-operate 
with my own command, from which most of its material was drawn. 

On the first of November, however, I was called to relieve Lieutenant General 
Scott in the chief and general command of the armies of the Union. The di- 
rection and nature of this coast expedition, therefore, Avere somewhat changed, 
as will soon appear in the ori^nal plan submitted to the Secretary of War, and 
the letter of instructions latel" issued to General Burnside, its commander. 
The whole country indeed had now become the theatre of military operations 
from the Potomac to beyond the Mississippi, and to assist the navy in perfect- 
ing and sustaining the blockade, it became necessary to extend these operations 
to points on the sea-coast, Roanoke island. Savannah, and New Orleans. It 
remained also to equip and organize the armies of the west, whose condition was 
little better than that of the army of the Potomac had been. The direction of 
the campaigns in the west, and of the operations upon the seaboard, enabled 
me to enter upon larger combinations and to accomplish results, the necessity 
and advantage of which had not been unforeseen, but which had been beyond 
the ability of the single army formerly under my command to effect. 

The following letters, and a subsequent paper addressed to the Secretary of 
War, sufficiently indicate the nature of those combinations to minds accus- 
tomed to reason upon military operations : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Wasliington, Septemher 6, 1861. 

" Sir : I have the honor to suggest the following proposition, with the request 
that the necessary authority be at once given me to carry it out : to organize a 
force of two brigades of five regiments each, of New England men, for the 
general service, but particularly adapted to coast service — the officers and men 
to be sufficiently conversant with boat service, to manage steamers, sailing ves- 
sels, launches, barges, surf-boats, floating batteries, &c. To charter or buy for 
the command a sufficient number of propellers, or tug-boats, for transportation 
of men and supplies, the machinery of which should be amply protected by 
timber ; the vessels to have permanent experienced officers from the merchant 
service, but to be manned by details from the command. A naval officer to be 
attached to the staff of the commanding officer. The flank companies of each 
regiment to be armed with Dahlgren boat guns, and carbines with water-proof 
cartridges ; the other companies to have such arms as I may hereafter designate ; 
to be uniformed and equipped as the Rhode Island regiments are. Launches 
and floating batteries with timber parapets of sufficient capacity to land or bring 
into action the entire force. 

"The entire management and organization of the force to be under my control, 
and to form an integral part of the army of the Potomac. 

" The immediate object of this force is for operations in the inlets of Chesa- 



36 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 

peake bay and the Potomac; by enabling me thus to land troops at points 
where they are needed, this force can also be used in conjunction with a naval 
force operating against points on the sea-coast. This coast division to be com- 
manded by a general officer of my selection; the regiments to be organized as 
other land forces ; the disbursements for vessels, &c., to be made by the proper 
department of the army upon the requisitions of the general commanding the 
division, with my approval. 

"I think the entire force can be organized in thirty days, and by no means 
the least of the advantages of this proposition is the fact that it will call into 
the service a class of men who would not otherwise enter the army. 

"You will immediately perceive that the object of this force is to follow along 
the coast, and up the inlets and rivers, the movements of the main army when 
it advances. 

" I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
"■Major General, Commanding. 
" Hon. Simon Cameron, 

" Secretary of War." 

Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring th^requisite vessels, and adapting 
them to the special purposes contemplated, this expedition was not ready for 
service until January, 1862. Then in the chief command, I deemed it best to 
send it to North Carolina, with the design indicated in the following letter. 

"Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, January 7, 1862. 

"General: In accordance with verbal instructions heretofore given yo you 
will, after uniting with Flag-officer Goldsborough at Fort Monroe, proceed un- 
der his convoy to Hatteras inlet, where you will, in connexion with him, take 
the most jjrompt measures for crossing the fleet over the Bulkhead into the 
waters of the sound. Under the accompanying general order constituting the 
department of North Carolina, you will assume command of the garrison at 
Hatteras inlet, and make such dispositions in regard to that place as your 
ulterior operations may render necessary, always being careful to provide for 
the safety of that very important station in any contingency. 

"Your first point of attack will be Roanoke island and its dependencies. 
It is presumed that the navy can reduce the batteries on the marshes, and cover 
the landing of your troops on the main island, by which, in connexion with a 
rapid movement of the gunboats to the northern extremity, as soon as the 
marsh battery is reduced, it may be hoped to capture the entire garrison of the 
place. Having occupied the island and its dependencies, you will at once pro- 
ceed to the erection of the batteries and defences necessary to hold the position 
with a small force. Should the flag-officer require any assistance in seizing or 
holding the debouches of the canal from Norfolk, you will please afford it to him. 

" The commodore and yourself having completed your arrangements in regard 
to Roanoke island, and the waters north of it, you will please at once make a 
descent on Newbern, having gained ])ossession of which and the railroad passing 
through it, you will at once throw a sufficient force upon Beaufort, and take 
the steps necessary to reduce Fort Macon and open that port. When you 
seize Newbern, you will endeavor to seize the railroad as far west as Golds- 
borough, should circumstances favor such a movement. The temper of the 
people, the rebel force at hand, &c., will go far towards determining the ques- 
tion as to how far west the railroad can be safely occupied and held. 
Should circumstances render it advisable to seize and hold Raleigh, the main 
north and south line of railroad passing through Goldsborough should be so 
effectually destroyed for considerable distances north and south of that point, as 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAJS^. 37 

to render it impossible for the rebels to use it to your disadvantage. A great 
point would be gained, in any event, by the eiFectual destruction of the Wil- 
mington and Weldon railroad. 

"1 would advise great caution in moving so far into the interior as upon 
Raleigh. Having accomplished the objects mentioned, the- next point of interest 
would probably be Wilmington, the reduction of which may require that ad- 
ditional means shall be afforded you. I would urge great caution in regard to 
proclamations. In no case would I go beyond a moderate joint proclamation 
with the naval commander, which should say as little as possible about politics 
or the negro ; merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is the 
preservation of the Union, and upholding the laws of the general government, 
and stating that all who conduct themselves properly will, as far as possible, 
be protected in their persons and property. 

" You will please report your operations as often as an opportunity offers 
itself. 

" With my best wishes for your success, I am, &c., &c., 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
"Major General, Commanding in Chief. 

"Brigadier General A. E. Burnside, 

"Commai^ing Expedition.^' 

The following letters of instruction were sent to Generals Halleck, Buell 
Sherman, and Butler; and I also communicated verbally to these officers my 
views in full regarding the field of operations assigned to each, and gave them 
their instructions as much in detail as was necessary at that time-: 

" HEADCiUARTERS OF THE ArMV, 

" Washington, D C, November 11, 1861. 

" General : In assigning you to the command of the department of Missouri, 
it is probably unnecessary for me to state that I have intrusted to you a duty 
which requires the utmost tact and decision. 

" You have not merely the ordinary duties of a military commander to per- 
form ; but the far more difficult task of reducing chaos to order, of changing 
probably the majority of the personnel of the staff of the department, and of re- 
ducing to a point of economy, consistent with the interests and necessities of the 
State, a system of reckless expenditure and fraud, perhaps unheard of before in " 
the history of the world. 

" You will find in your department many general and staff officers holding 
illegal commissions and appointments, not recognized or approved by the Pres- 
ident or Secretary of War. You will please at once inform these gentlemen of 
the nullity of their appointment, and see that no pay or allowances are issued 
to them until such time as commissions may be authorized by the President or 
Secretary of War. 

" If any of them give the slightest trouble, you will at once arrest them and 
send them, under guard, out of the limits of your department, informing them 
that if they return they will be placed in close confinement. You will please 
examine into the legality of the organization of the troops serving in the depart- 
ment. When you find any illegal, unusual or improper organizations, you 
will give to the officers and men an opportunity to enter the legal military 
establishment under general laws and orders from the War Department; report- 
ing in full to these headquarters any officer or organization that may decline. 

" You will please cause competent and reliable staff officers to examine all 
existing contracts immediately, and suspend all payments upon them until you 
receive the report in each case. Where there is the slightest doubt as to the 
propriety of the contract, you will be good enough to refer the matter, with full 



38 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

explanation, to those headquarters, stating in each ease what woiilcl be a fair 
compensation for the services, or materials rendered under the contract. Dis- 
continue at once the reception of material or services under any doubtful con- 
tract. Arrest and bring to prompt trial all officers who have in any Avay vio- 
lated their duty to the government. In regard to the political conduct of affairs, 
you will please labor to impress upon the inhabitants of Missouri and the adja- 
cent States that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the Union, to uphold 
the power of our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings 
of peace and good order. 

" With respect to military operations it is probable, from the best information 
in my possession, that the interests of the government will be best served by 
fortifying and holding in considerable strength Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior 
points, keeping strong patrols constantly moving from the terminal stations, and 
concentrating the mass of the troops on or near the Mississippi, prepared for 
such ulterior operations as the public interests may demand. 

" T would be glad to have you make as soon as possible a personal inspection 
of all the important points in your department, and report the result to me. I 
cannot too strongly impress upon you the absolute necessity of keeping me con- 
stantly advised of the strength, condition, and location of your troops, together 
with all facts that will enable me to maintain that general direction of the armies 
of the United States which it is my purpose to exercise. I trust to you to 
maintain thorough organization, discipline and economy throughout your de- 
partment. Please inform me as soon as possible of everything relating to the 
gunboats now in process of construction, as well as those completed. 

" The militia force authorized to be raised by the State of Missouri for its 
defence will be under your orders. 
" I am, general, »Scc., &c., 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
"Major General, Commanding U. S- A. 

" Major General H. W. Halleck, U. "S. A., 

" Commanding Department of Missouri." 



"Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, November 7, 1861. 
"General : In giving you instriictions for your guidance in command of the 
department of the Ohio, I do not design to fetter you. I merely wish to ex- 
press plainly the general ideas which occur to me in relation to the conduct of 
operations there. That portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland river is 
by its position so closely related to the States of Illinois and Jlissouri, that it 
has seemed best to attach it to the department of Missouri. Your operations 
there, in Kentucky, will be confined to that portion of the State east of the 
Cumberland river. I trust I need not repeat to you that I regard the import- 
ance of the territory committed to your care as second only to that occupied by 
the army under my immediate command. It is absolutely necessary that Ave 
shall hold all the State of Kentucky; not only that, but that the majority 
of its inhabitants shall be warmly in favor of our cause, it being that which 
best subserves their interests. It is possible that the conduct of our political 
affairs in Kentucky is more iyiportant than that of our military operations. I 
certainly cannot overestimate the impoitance of the former. You will please 
constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which Ave are fighting ; that 
issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full authority 
of the general gOA'ernment over all portions of our territory. We shall most 
readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the government by 
xeligiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. I know that I express 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 39 

the feelings and opinion of the President when I say that we are fighting only 
to preserve the integrity of the Union and the constitutional authority of the 
general government. 

" The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it that their domestic institu- 
tions will in no manner be interfered with, and that they will receive at our 
hands every constitutional protection. I have only to repeat that you will in 
all respects carefully regard the local institutions of the region in which you 
command, allowing nothing but the dictates of military necessity to cause you 
to depart from the spirit of these instructions. 

" So much in regard to political considerations. The military problem would 
be a simple one could it be entirely separated from political influences ; such is 
not the case. Were the population among which you are to operate wholly or 
generally hostile, it is propable that Nashville should be your first and principal 
objective point. It so happens that a large majority of the inhabitants of 
eastern Tennessee are in favor of the Union ; it therefore seems proper that 
you should remain on the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, 
while you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cumberland 
gap ®r Walker's gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the railroad at that 
point, and thus enable the loyal citizens of eastern Tennessee to rise, while 
you at the same time cut off the railway communication between eastern Vir- 
ginia and the Mississippi. It ■will be prudent to fortify the pass before leaving 
it in your rear. 

" Brigadier General D. C. Buell." 



"Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, November 12, 1861. 

"General : Upon assuming command of the department, I will be glad to 
have you make as soon as possible a careful report of the condition and situa- 
tion of your troops, and of the military and political condition of your com- 
mand. The main point to which I desire to call your attention is the neces- 
sity of entering eastern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with reasonable 
chances of success, and I hope that you will, with the least possible delay, or- 
ganize a column for that purpose, sufficiently guarding at the same time the main 
avenires by which the rebels may invade Kentucky. Our conversations on the 
subject of military operations have been so full, and my confidence in your 
judgment is so great, that I will not dwell further upon the subject, except to 
urge upon you the necessity of keeping me fully informed as to the state of 
aflPairs, both military and political, and your movements. In regard to political 
matters, bear in mind that we are fighting only to preserve the integrity of the 
Union and to uphold the power of the general government ; as far as military 
necessity will permit, religiously respect the constitutional rights of all. Pre- 
serve the strictest discipline among the troops, and while employing the utmost 
energy in military movements, be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as 
to contract, not widen, the breach existing between us and the rebels. 

" I mean by this that it is the desire of the government to avoid unnecessary 
in-itation by causeless arrests and persecution of individuals. Where there is 
good reason to believe that persons are actually giving aid, comfort, or infor- 
mation to the enemy, it is of course necessary to arrest them ; but I have 
ahvays found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious arrests 
on mere suspicion. You Avill find it well to direct that no arrest shall be made 
except by your order or that of your generals, unless in extraordinary cases, 
always holding the party making the arrest responsible for the juopriety of his 
com-se. It should be our constant aim to make it apparent to all that their 



40 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'CLELLAJST. 

property, their comfort, and their personal safety will be best preserved by ad- 
hering to the cause of the Union. 

" If the military suggestions I have made in this letter prove to have been 
founded on erroneous data, you are of course perfectly free to change the plans 
of operations. 

" Brigadier General D. (3. Buell, 

*' Commanding Department of the Ohioy 



" Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, February 14, 1862. 

" General : Your despatches in regard to the occupation of Dafuskie island, 
&c., were received to-day. I saw also to-day, for the first time, your requisition 
for a siege train for Savannah. 

"After giving the subject all the consideration in my power, I am forced to 
the conclusion that, under present circumstances, the siege and capture of Savan- 
nah do not promise results commensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When 
I learned that it was possible for the gunboats to reach the Savannah river, 
above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested themselves to my mind as its im- 
mediate results. 

" First. The capture of Savannah by a ' coup de main,' — the result of an in- 
stantaneous advance and attack by the army and navy. 

" The time for this has passed, and your letter indicates that you are not ac- 
countable for the failure to seize the propitious moment, but that, on the con- 
trary, you perceived its advantages. 

" Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut oflf its supplies, and at least facilitate 
its reduction by a bombardment. 

'" Although we have a long delay to deplore, the second course still remains 
open to us ; and I strongly advise the close blockade of Pulaski and its bom- 
bardment as soon as the 13-incli mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am con- 
fident you can thus reduce it. With Pulaski, you gain all that is really essen- 
tial; you obtain complete control of the harbor ; you relieve the blockading fleet, 
and render the main body of your force disposable for other operations. 

'• I do not consider the possession of Savannah Avorth a siege after Pulaski is 
in our hands. But the possession of Pulaski is of the first importance. The 
expedition to Fernandina is well, and I shall be glad to learn that it is ours. 

" But, after all, the greatest moral effect would be produced by the I'eduction 
of Charleston and its defences. There the rebellion had its birth ; there the 
unnatural hatred of our government is most intense ; there is the centre of the 
boasted power and courage of the rebels. 

" To gain Fort Sumter and hold Charleston is a task well worthy of our 
greatest efforts, and considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I would be 
glad to have you study. Some time must elapse before we can be in all respects 
ready to accomplish that purpose. Fleets are en route and armies in motion 
which have certain preliminary objects to accomplish, before we are ready to 
take Charleston in hand. But the time will before long arrive when I shall be 
prepared to make that movement. In the mean time, it is my advice and wish 
that no attempt be made upon Savannah, unless it can be carried Avith certainty 
by a ' coup de 7nain.' 

"Please concentrate your attention and forces upon Pulaski and Fernandina. 
St. Augustine might as well be taken by way of an interlude, Avhile awaiting the 
preparations for Cliarleston. Success attends us everywhere at present. 
" Very truly, yours, 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding United States Army. 
"Brig. Gen. T. W. Sherman, 

" Commanding at Port Royal, !fc." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 41 



"Headquarters of the Army, 

" WasJiington, February 23. ] 862. 
" General : You are assigned to tlie command of the land forces destined to 
co-operate with the navy in the attacks upon New Orleans. You will use every 
means to keep your destination a profound secret, even from your staff officers, 
with the exception of your chief of staff, and Lieutenant Weitzell, of the engi- 
neers. The force at your disposal will consist of the first thirteen regiments 
named in your memorandum handed to me in person, the 21st Indiana, 4th 
Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, (old and good regiments from Baltimore.) 

"The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, will await your orders 
at Fort Monroe. 

" Two companies of the 21st Indiana are well drilled as heavy artillery. The 
cavalry force already en route for Ship island will be sufficient for your purposes. 
" After full consultation with officers well acquainted with the country in 
which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived at the conclusion that two (2) 
light batteries fully equipped, and one (1) without horses, will be all that are 
necessary. 

" This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 580 artillery; 
total, 15,255 men. The commanding general of the department of Key West 
is authorized to loan you, temporarily, two regiments ; Fort Pickens can, prob- 
ably, give you another, which will bring your force to nearly 18,000. 

" The object of your expedition is one of vital importance — the capture of 
New Orleans. The route selected is up the Mississippi river, and the first ob- 
stacle to be encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance offi^red by 
Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce these 
works ; in that case you will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in 
them to render them perfectly secure ; and it is recommended that, on the up- 
ward passage, a few heavy guns and some troops be left at the pilot station (at 
the forks of the river) to cover a retreat in the event of a disaster. These 
troops and guns will, of course, be removed as soon as the forts are captured. 

" Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your forces and 
siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, silence their fire, and carry them 
by assault. 

" The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where there are some 
earthen batteries. Here it may be necessary for you to land your troops and co- 
operate with the naval attack, although it is more than probable that the navy, 
unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city of New 
Orleans necessarily falls. In ^hat event, it will probably be best to occupy 
Algiers with the mass of your ti"Oops, also the eastern bank of the river above 
the city. It may be necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order, 
but if there appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to control the city, it may 
be best for purposes of discipline to keep your men out of the city. 

"After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it Avill be necessary to reduce all 
the works guarding its approaches from the east, and particularly to gain the 
Manchac pass. 

" Baton Rouge, Berwick bay, and Fort Livingston, will next claim your 
attention. 

" A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in view. I need 
not call your attention to the necessity of gaining possession of all the rolling 
stock you can on the diflTerent railways, and of obtaining control of the roads 
themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land 
force should be accomplished as soon as possible after you have gained New 
Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication with the northern column 
by the Mississippi, always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, 
Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after or before you have 



42 REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'CLELLAN. 

effected the junction. Allow nothing to divert you from obtaining full posses- 
sion of all the approaches to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished 
to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack ou Mobile, 
in order to gain possession of the harbor and works, as Avell as to control the 
raihvay terminus at the city. In regard to this, I will send more detailed in- 
structions as the operations of the northern column develop themselves. 

" I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition are, Jirst, the 
reduction of New Orleans and all its approaches; then Mobile and its defences; 
then Pensacola, Galveston, &;c. It is probable that by the time New Orleans is 
reduced, it will be in the power of the government to re-enforce the land forces 
sufficiently to accomplish all these objects. In the mean time you will please give 
all the assistance in your power to the army and navy commanders in your 
vicinity, never losing sight of the fact that the great object to be achieved is the 
capture and firm retention of New Orleans. 
" I am, &c., 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding United States Army. 

" Major General B. F. Butler, 

" United States Volunteers.''^ 

The plan indicated in the above letters comprehended in its scope the opera- 
tions of all the armies of the Union, the army of the Potomac as well. It was 
my intention, for reasons easy to be seen, that its various parts should be carried 
out simultaneously, or nearly so, and in co-operation along the whole line. If 
this plan was wise — and events have failed to prove that it was not — then it is 
unnecessary to defend any delay which would have enabled the army of the 
Potomac to perform its share in the execution of the whole work. 

But about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering from a severe illness, 
I found that excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of the army of the 
Potomac had taken possession of the minds of the administration. 

A change had just been made in the War Department, and I was soon urged 
by the new secretary, Mr. Stanton, to take immediate steps to secure the re- 
opening of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and to free the banks of the lower 
Potomac from the rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels. 

Very soon after his entrance vipon office I laid before him verbally my design 
as to the part of the plan of campaign to be executed by the army of the Poto- 
mac, which was to attack Eichmond by the lower Chesapeake. He instructed 
me to develop it to the President, Avhich I d:d. The result was, that the Pres- 
ident disapproved it, and by an order of January 31, 1862, substituted one of 
his own. On the 27th of January, 1862, the following order was Issued with- 
out consultation with me: 

[President's General War Order No. 1.] 

"Executive Mansion, 
" Washington, January 27, 1862. 

" Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general 
movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insur- 
gent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the army 
of the Potomac, the army of Western Virginia, the army near Munfordsville, 
Kentucky, the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of 
Mexico, be ready to move on that day. 

" That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, 
obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional oiders when 
duly given. 

" That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 43 

and of the Navy, witli all their subordinates, and the gcneral-in-chief, with all 
other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be 
held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order. 

" ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

The order of January 31, 1862, was as follows : 

[President's S}X'Cial War Order No. 1.] 

"Executive Mansion, 

" Washington, January 31, 1862. 

" Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the Potomac, after pro- 
viding safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an expedition for 
the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad south- 
westward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the dis- 
cretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 
22d day of February next. 

" ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

I asked his excellency whether this order was to be regarded as final, or 
whether I could be permitted to submit in writing my objections to his plan, and 
my reasons for preferring my own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore 
prepared the letter to the Secretary of War which is given below. 

Before this had been submitted to the President, he addressed me the follow- 
ing note : 

"Executive Mansion, 

" WasMmgton, Fehruary 3, 1S62. 

" My Dear Sir : You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement 
of the army of the Potomac : yours to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Rap- 
pahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the 
York river ; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of 
Manassas. 

"If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall 
gladly yield my plan to yours : 

" 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and 
7noney than mine? 

" 2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine ? 

" 3d. Wherein is a victory viore valuable by your plan than mine 1 

"4t.h. In fa(;t, would it not be less valuable in this : that it would break no 
great line of the enemy's jsommunications, while mine would ? 

5th. In case of disasteh would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan 
than mine 1 ' 

"Yours, trulv, 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

"Major General McClbllan." 

These questions were substantially answered by the following letter of the 
same date to the Secretary of War : 

"Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, Febrtiary 3, 1862. 
" Sir: I ask your indulgence for the following pajjer, rendered necessary by 
circumstances. 

" I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Washington on Satur- 
day, July 27, 1861, six days after the battle of Bull run. 



44 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. Jj'CLELLAN. 

" I found no army to command ; a mere collection of legiments cowering on 
the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent 
defeat, 

'' Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the southern approaches 
to the capital by means of defensive works ; nothing whatever had been under- 
taken to defend the avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. 

"The troops were not only undisciplined, undrilled, and dispirited; they 
were not even placed in military positions. The city was almost in a condition 
to have been taken by a dash of a regiment of cavalry. 

" Without one day's delay I undertook the dilTicult task assigned to me; that 
task the honorable Secretary knows was given to me without solicitation or fore- 
knowledge. How far I have accomplished it Avill best be shown by the past 
and the present. 

"The capital is secure against attack, the extensive fortifications erected by 
the labor of our troops enable a small garrison to hold it against a numerous 
army, the enemy have been held in check, the State of Maryland is securely in 
our possession, the detached counties of Virginia are again within the pale of 
our laws, and all apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at an end; the enemy 
are confined to the positions they occupied before the disaster of the 21st July. 
More than all this, I have now under my command a well-drilled and reliable 
army, to which the destinies of the country may be confidently committed. This 
army is young and untried in battle ; but it is animated by the highest spirit, 
and is capable of great deeds. 

"That so much has been accomplished and such an army created in so short 
a time, from nothing, will hereafter be regarded as one of the highest glories 
of the administration and the nation. 

" Many weeks, I may say many months ago, this army of the Potomac was 
fully ill condition to repel any attack; but there is a vast difference between 
that and the cfiiciency required to enable troops to attack successfully an army 
elated by victory and intrenched in a position long since selected, studied, and 
fintified. 

" In the earliest papers I submitted to the President, I asked for an effective 
and movable force far exceeding the aggregate now on the banks of the 
Potomac. I have not the force I asked for. 

" Even when in a subordinate position, I always looked beyond the opera- 
tions of the army of the Potomac; I was never satisfied in my own mind with 
a barren victory, but looked to combined and decisive operations. 

"When I Avas placed in command of the armies of the United States, I im- 
mediately turned my attention to the whole field of operations, regarding the 
army of the Potomac as only one, while the most important, of the masses 
under my command. 

"I confess that I did not then appreciate the total absence of a general plan 
which had before existed, nor did 1 know that utter disorganization and want 
of preparation pervaded the western armies. 

"I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, in condition to 
move towards the fidfilment of ray plans. I acknowledge that I made a great 
mistake. 

" 1 sent at once — with the approval of the Executive — ofiicers I considered 
competent to command in Kentucky and Missouri. Their instructions looked to 
prompt movements. I soon found that the labor of creation and organization 
had to be performed there; transportation — arms — clothing — artillery — disci- 
pline, all were wanting. These things required time to procure them. 

"The generals in command have done their work most creditably, but we are 
still delayed. I had hoped that a general advance could be made during the 
good weather of December ; I Avas mistaken. 

" My Avish Avas to gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee railroad, as a pre- 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 45 

liminaiy moveaient, tlieu to follow it up immediately by au attack on Nasbville 
and Richmond, as nearly at the same time as possible. 

" I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully preparing our- 
selves, and then seeking for the most decisive results. I do not wish to waste 
life in useless battles, but prefer to strike at the heart. 

" Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the advance of the 
army of the Potomac : 

"I. That of Washington — its present position — involving a direct attack 
upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at Centreville, Manassas, &c., or 
else a movement to turn one or both flanks of those positions, or a combination 
of the two plans. 

" The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack on both flanks ; 
an attack on his left flank alone involves a long line of wagon communication, 
and cannot prevent him from collecting for the decisive battle all the detach- 
ments now on his extreme right and left. 

" Should we attack his right flank by the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing 
of the Potomac below that river, and near his batteries, we could perhaps pre- 
vent the junction of the enemy's right with his centre, (we might destroy the 
former;) we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the Potomac, 
reduce the length of wagon transportation by establishing new depots at the 
nearest points of the Potomac, and strike more directly his main railway com- 
munication. 

"The fords of the Occoquan below the mouth of the Bull run are watched 
by the rebels ; batteries are said to be placed on the heights in the rear, (con- 
cealed by the woods,) and the arrangement of his troops is sucli that he can op- 
pose some considerable resistance to a passage of that stream. Information 
has just been received, to the effect thut the enemy are intrenching a line of 
heights extending from the vicinity of Saiigster's (Union mills) towards Evans- 
port. Early in January, Spriggs's ford was occupied by General Rhodes, with 
3,600 men and eight (8) guns; there are strong reasons for believing that 
Davis's ford is occupied. These circumstances indicate or prove that the enemy 
anticipates the movement in question, and is prepared to resist it. Assuming 
for the present that this operation is determined upon, it may be well to ex- 
amine briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affairs, our column 
(for the movement of so large a force must be made in several columns, at least 
five or six) can reach the Accatinck Avithout danger; during the march thence to 
the Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from Fairfax sta- 
tion, Sangster's, and Union mills. This danger must be met by occupying in 
some force either the two first named places, or better, the point of junction of 
the roads leading thence to the village of Occoquan ; this occupation must be 
continued so long as we continue to draw supplies by the roads from this city, 
or until a battle is won. 

"The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the fords from Wolf's run 
to the mouth; the points of crossing not being necessarily confined to the fords 
themselves. Should the enemy occupy this line in force, we must, with what 
assistance the flotilla can afford, endeavor to force the passage near the mouth, 
thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole line, or be taken in flank himself. 
"Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be necessary to throw a 
column by the shortest route to Dumfries; partly to force the enemy to abandon 
- his batteries on the Potomac ; partly to cover our left flank against an attack 
from the direction of Aquia; and lastly, to establish our communications with 
the river by the best roads, and thus give us new depots. The enemy would 
bj this time have occupied the line of the Occoquan above Bull run, holding 
Brentsville in force, and perhaps extending his lines somcAvhat further to the 
aouthwest. 

"Our next step would then be to prevent the enemy from crossing the Occo- 



46 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 

qiian between Bull run and Broad run, to fall upon our right flank while mov- 
ing on Brentsville. This might be effected by occupying Bacon Race church 
and the cross-roads near the mouth of Bull run, or still more effectually by 
moving to the fords themselves, and preventing him from debouching on our side. 

"These operations would possibly be resisted, and it would require some 
time to effect them, as, nearly at the same time as possible, we should gain the 
fords necessary to our purposes above Broad run. Having secured our right 
flank, it would become necessary to carry Brentsville ^any cost, for we could 
not leave it between the right flank and the main bod^. The final movement 
on the railroad must be determined by circumstances ^istins^at the tune. 

" Ibis brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great advantage n<^sessed by 
the enemy in the strong central position he occupies, ynth roadg diverging in 
every direction, and a strong line of defence enabling him to remain on the de- 
fensive, with a small force on one flank, while he coventrates everything on 
the other for a decisive action. y^ / 

" Should we place a portion of our force ii^^nt of Centreville, while the 
I'cst crosses the Occoquan, we commit the error of dividing our army by a very 
difficult obstacle, and by a distance too great to enable the two parts to support 
each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the 
other is held in check. 

" I should perhaps have dwelt more decidedly on the fact thai the force left 
near Sangster's must be allowed to remain somewhere on that side of the Occo- 
quan until the decisive battle is over, so as" to cover our retreat in the event of 
disaster, unless it should be decided to select and intrench a new base some- 
where near Dumfries — a proceeding involving much time. 

"After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this covering force 
could be drawn into a more central and less exposed position — say Brimstone 
hill or nearer the Occoquan. Aw this latitude the Aveather will for a consider- 
able period be very uncertain, and a movement commenced in force on roads 
in tolerably firm condition will be liable, almost certain, to be much delayed by 
rains and snow. It will, tlrerefore, be next to impossible to surprise the enemy, or 
take him at a disadvantage by rapid manoeuvres. Our slow progress will en- 
able him to divine our purposes, and take his measures accordingly. The 
probability is, from the best information we possess, that the enemy has improved 
the roads leading to his lines of defence, while we have to work as we advance. 

"Bearing in mind what has been said, and the present unprecedented and im- 
passable condition of the roads, it will be evident that no precise period can be 
fixed upon for the movement on this line. Nor can its duration be closely cal' 
culated; it seems certain that many weeks may elapse before it is possible to 
commence the march. Assuming the success of this operation, and the defeat of 
the enemy as certain, the question at once arises as to the importance of the 
results gained. I think these results would be confined to the possessibn of the 
field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by the enemy, 
and the moral effect of the victory ; important results, it is true, but not decisive 
of the war, nor securing the destruction of the enemy's main army, for he could 
fall back upon other positions, and fight us again and again, should the condition 
of his troops permit. If he is in no condition to fight us again out of the range 
9f the intrencliments at^Richmond, we would find it a very difficult and tedious 
inatter to follow hftn up there, for he would destroy his railroad bridges and 
otherwise impede our progress through a region where the roads are as bad as 
they well can be, and we would probably find ourselves forced at last to change 
the whole theatre of war, or to seek a shorter laud route to Richmond, with a 
smaller available force, and at an expenditure of much more time, than were 
we to adopt the short line at once. We would also have forced the enemy to 
concentrate his forces and perfect his defensive measures at the very points 
where it is desirable to strike him when least prepared. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. Jl'CLELLAN. 47 

"II. The second base of operations available for the army of the Potomac 
is that of the lower Chesapeake bay, which affords the shortest possible land 
route to Richmond, and strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in 
the east. 

" The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the year. 
"The country now alluded to is much more favorable for offensive operations 
than that in front of Washington, (which is very unfavorable,) much more level, 
more cleared laud, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the sprino- 
some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line obliges the 
enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Manassas, in order to hasten to 
cover Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for should he permit us to 
occupy Richmond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeating us 
in a battle, in Avhich he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, 
gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies of the rebels; Norfolk 
would fall ; all the waters of the Chesapeake would be ours ; all Virginia would 
be in our power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and North Caro- 
lina. The alternative presented to the enemy would be, to beat us in a posi- 
tion selected by ourselves, disperse, or pass beneath the Candine forks. 

"Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure retreat down 
the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, with our flanks perfectly covered by the 
fleet. 

"During the whole movement our left flank is covered by the water. Our 
right is secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reacli us in time ; 
he can only oppose us in front; we bring our fleet into full play. 

"After a successful battle our position would be — Burnside forming our left — 
Norfolk held securely — our centre connecting Burnside with Buell, both by 
Raleigh and Lynchburg — Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North Alabama — 
Halleck at Nashville and Memphis. 

"The next movement would be to connect with Sherman on the left, by re- 
ducing Wilmington and Charleston ; to advance our centre into South Carolina 
and Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the 
main army in Georgia; to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval expedi- 
tion from New Orleans. 

" We should then be in a condition to reduce at our leisure all the southern 
seaports ; to occupy all the avenues of communication ; to use the great outlet 
of the Mississippi ; to re-establisli our government and arms in Arkansas, 
Louisiana and Texas ; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence, instead of 
that of the rebels ; to bid defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object 
I have ever had in view — this is the general plan which I hope to accomplish. 

" For many long months I have labored to prepare the army of the Potomac 
to play its part in the programme ; from the day when I was placed in com- 
mand of all our armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other armies in 
such a condition that they, too, could perform their allotted duties. 

" Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesapeake, the point of 
landing which promises the most brilliant result is Urbana, on the lower Rap- 
pahannock. This point is easily reached by vessels of heavy draught ; it is 
neither occupied nor observed by the enemy — it is but one march from West 
Point, the key of that region, and thence but two marches to Richmond. A 
rapid movement from Urbana would probably cut off Magruder in the Penin- 
sula, and enable us to occupy Richmond, before it could be strongly re-enforced. 
Should we fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of the navy, cross the 
James and throw ourselves in rear of Richmond, thus forcing the enemy to 
come out and attack us, for his position would be untenable, with us on the 
southern bank of the river. 

" Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at Urbana, we can 
use Mobjack bay ; or, the worst coming to the worst, we can take Fort Monroe 



48 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

as a base, and operate witli complete security, although with less celerity and 
brilliancy of results, up the Peninsula. 

" To reach whatever point may be selected as a base, a large amount of cheap 
water transportation must be collected, consisting mainly of canal-boats, barges, 
wood-boats, schooners, &c., towed by small steamers, all of a very different 
character from those required for all previous expeditions. This can certainly 
be accomplished within thirty days from the time the order is given. I propose, 
as the best possible plan that can, in my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana 
as a landing place for the first detachments ; to transport by water four divis- 
ions of infantry with their batteries, the regular infantry, a few wagons, one 
bridge train and a few squadrons of cavalry, making the vicinity of Hooker's 
position the place of embarkation for as many as possible ; to move the regu- 
lar cavalry and reserve artillery, the remaining bridge trains and wagons, to a 
point somewhere near Cape Lookout, then ferry them over the river by means 
of North River ferry-boats, march them over to the Rappahannock, (covering 
the movement by an infantry force near Heathsville,) and to cross the Rappa- 
hannock in a similar way. The expense and difficulty of the movement will 
then be very much diminished, (a saving of transportation of about 10,000 
horses,) and the result none the less certain. 

" The concentration of the cavalry, &c., on the lower counties of Maryland 
can be effected without exciting suspicion, and the movement made without 
delay from that cause. 

" This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city of Washington 
to danger. 

" The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be, according to 
circumstances, from 110,000 to 140,000. I hope to use the latter number by 
bringing fresh troops into Washington, and still leaving it quite safe. I 
fully realize that in all projects offered, time will probably be the most valuable 
consideration. It is my decided opinion that, in that point of view, the second 
plan should be adopted. It is possible, nay, highly probable, that the weather 
and state of the roads may be such as to delay the direct movement fi-om Wash- 
ington, with its unsatisfactory results and great risks, far beyond the time required 
to complete the second plan. In the first case we can fix no definite time for 
an advance. The roads have gone from bad to woi se. Nothing like their 
present condition was ever known here before; they are impassable at present. 
We are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that 
we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line I regard success as certain 
by all the chances of war. We demoralize the enemy by forcing him to 
abandon his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which all is in 
our favor, and where success must produce immense results. 

"My judgment, as a general, is clearly in favor of this project. Nothing is 
certain in war, but all the chances are in favor of this movement. So much am 
I in favor of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer the move from 
Fortress Monroe as a base — as a certain though less brilliant movement than 
that from Urbana, to an atiack upon Manassas. 

"I know that his excellency the President, you, and I, all agree in our 
wishes ; and that these wishes are, to bring this war to a close as promptly as 
the means in our possession will permit. I believe that the mass of the people 
have entire confidence in us — I am sure of it. Let us, then, look only to the 
great result to be accomplished, and disregard everything else. 
I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General, Cojnmanding. 
'Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of IVar." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 49 

This letter miist have produced some effect upon the mind of the President, 
s^ince the execution of his order was not required, although it was not revoked 
as formally as it had been issued. jNIany verbal conferences ensued, in Avliich, 
among other things, it Avas determined to collect as many canal-boats as possible, 
with a view to employ them largely in the transportation of the army to the 
lower Chesapeake. The idea was at one time entertained by the President to 
use them in forming a bridge across the Potomac near Liverpool point, in order 
to throw the army over that point; but this was subsequently abandoned. It 
was also found by experience that it would require much time to prepare the 
canal boats for use in transportation, to the extent that had been anticipated. 

Finally, on the 27th of February, 1862, the Secretary of War, by the au- 
thority of the President, instructed Mr. John Tucker, Assistant Secretary of 
War, to procure at once the necessary steamers and sailing craft to transport 
the army of the Potomac to its new field of operations. 

The following extract from the report of Mr. Tucker, dated April 5, will show 
the nature and progress of this well-executed service : 

" I was called to Washington by telegraph, on 17th January last, by Assistant 
Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott. I was informed that Major General 
McOlellan wished to see me. From him I learned that he desired to know if 
transportation on smooth water could be obtained to move at one time, for a 
short distance, about 50,000 troops, 10,000 horses, 1,000 wagons, 13 batteries, 
and the usual equipment of such an army. He frankly stated to me that he 
had always supposed such a movement entirely feasible, until two experienced 
quartermasters had recently reported it impracticable, in their judgment. A few 
days afterwards, I reported to General j\IcClellan that I was entirely confident 
the transports could be commanded, and stated the mode by which his object 
could be accomplished. A week or two afterwards I had the honor of an inter- 
view with the President and General ]\IcClellan, when the subject was further 
discussed, and especially as to the time required. 

"I expressed the opinion that, as the movement of the horses and wagons 
would have to be made chiefly by schooners and barges, that as each schooner 
would require to be properly fitted for the protection of the horses, and furnished 
with a supply of Avater and forage, and each transport for the troops provided 
with water, 1 did not deem it prudent to assume that such an expedition could 
start within thirty days from the time the order Avas given. 

" The President and General McClellan both urgently stated the vast import- 
ance of an earlier movement. I replied that if favorable winds prevailed, and 
there was great despatch in loading, the time might be materially diminished. 

"On the 14th February you (Secretary of War) advertised for transports of 
various descriptions, inviting bids on the 27th February. I was informed that 
the proposed moA^ement by Avater was decided upon. That evening the Quarter- 
master General Avas informed of the decision. Directions Avere given to secui-e 
the transportation — any assistance Avas tendered. He promptly detailed to this 
duty two most efiicient assistants in his department. Colonel Rufus Ingalls was 
stationed at Annapolis, where it Avas then proposed to embark the troops, and 
Captain Henry C. Hodges Avas directed to meet me in Philadelphia, to attend 
to chartering the vessels. With these arrangements I left Washington on the 

28th February. 

******** 

" I beg to hand hercAvith a statement, prepared by Captain Hodges, of the 
vessels chartered, which exhibits the prices paid, and parties from Avhom they 
were taken : 

113 steamers, at an average price per day $215 10 

188 schooners, " " - " 24 45 

88 barges, " " " 14 27 

H. Ex. Doc. 15 4 



50 REPOET OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

"lu tliirty-seven clays from the time I received tlie order in Washington, (and 
most of it was accomplished in thirty days,) these vessels transported from 
Perryville, Alexandria, and "Washington to Fort Monroe (the place of departure 
having been changed, Avhich caused delay,) 121,500 tnen, 14,59;i animals, 1,150 
wagons, 44 hat tfripfij 74 ambulances, besides pohtobn bridges, telegraph mate- 
rials, and the enormous quantity of equipage, Sec, required for an army of such 
magnitude. The only loss of which I have heard is eight mules and nine 
barges, which latter Avent ashore in a gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe — 
the cargoes being saved. With this trifling exception, not the slightest accident 
has occurred, to my knowledge. 

" I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, for economy and celerity of 

movement, this expedition is without a parallel on record. 

*# * * *■ * * * 

"JOHN TUCKER, 

"Assistant Secretary of War." 

In the mean time the destruction of the batteries on the lower Potomac, by 
crossing our troops opposite them, was considered, and preparations were even 
made for throwing Hooker's division across the river, to carry them by assault. 
Finally, however, after an adverse report from Brigadier General J. G. Barnard, 
Chief Engineer, given below, who made a reconnoissance of the positions, and in 
view of the fact that it was still out of the power of the Navy Department to 
furnish suitable vessels to co -operate with land troops, this plan was abandoned 
as impracticable. A close examination of the enemy's works and their approaches, 
made after they were evacuated, showed that the decision was a wise one. The 
only means, therefore, of accomplishing the capture of these works, so much 
desired by the President, was by a movement by land, from the left of our 
Imes, on the right bank of the Potomac — a movement obviously unwise. 

The attention of the Navy Department, as early as Aiigust 12, 1861, had 
been called to the necessity of maintaining a strong force of efficient war vessels 
on the Potomac. 

"Headquarters Division gf the Potomac, 

" Was7ii?igton, August 12, 1861. 

" Sir : I have to-day received additional information which convinces me that 
it is more than probable that the enemy will, Avithin a very short time, attempt 
to throw a respectable force from the mouth of Aquia creek into Maryland. 
This attempt Avill probably be preceded by the erection of batteries at Matthias 
and White House points. Such a movement on the part of the enemy, in con- 
nexion with others probably designed, would place Washington in great jeopardy. 
I most earnestly urge that the strongest possible naval force be at once concen- 
trated near the mouth of Aquia creek, and that the most vigilant watch be 
maintained day and night, so as to render such passage of the river absolutely 
impossible. 

" I recommend that the Minnesota -and any other vessels available from 
Hampton Roads be at once ordered up there, and that a great quantity of coal 
be sent to that vicinity, sufficient for several Aveeks' supply. At least one strong 
war A'cssel should be kept at Alexandria, and I again urge the concentration of 
a strong naval force on the Potomac Avithout delay. 

*■ If the Naval Department Avill render it absolutely impossible for the enemy 
to cross the river below Washington, the security of the capital will be greatly 
increased. 

'• I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate compliance with these requests. 
" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General Commanding. 

" Hon. Gideon Welles, 

"Secretary of the United States Navy.** 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 51 

It was on the 27tli of September, 1861, that General Barnard, Chief Engineer, 
in company with Captain ^YJman of the Potomac flotilla, had been instructed 
to make a reconnoissance of the enemy's batteries as far as Matthias point. lu 
his report of his .observations he says : 

" Batteries at High point and Cockpit point, and thence down to Chopa- 
wampsic, cannot be prevented. We may, indeed, prevent their construction on cer- 
tain points, but along here somewhere the enemy can establish, in spite of us, as 
many batteries as he chooses. What is the remedy ? Favorable circumstances, 
not to be anticipated nor made the basis of any calculations, might jiistify and 
render successful the attack of a particixlar battery. To suppose that we can. 
capture all, and by mere attacks of this kind prevent the navigation being 
molested, is very much the same as to suppose that the hostile army in our own 
front can prevent us building and maintaining field-works to protect Arlington 
and Alexandria by capturing them, one and all, as fast as they are built." 

In another communication upon the subject of crossing troops for the purpose 
of destroying the batteries on the Virginia side of the Potomac, General Bar- 
nard says : 

" The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of defence of the 
enemy, and all that we would have to do if we were really opening a campaign 
against them there. 

" It is true we hope to force this line by turning it, by landing on Freestone 
point. With reason to believe that this may be successful, it cannot be denied 
that it involves a risk of failure. Shoiild we, then, considering all the conse- 
quences which may be involved, enter into the operation, merely to capture the 
Potomac batteries \ I think not. AVill not the Ericsson, assisted by one other 
gunboat c/ipable of keeping alongside these batteries, so far control their fire as 
to keep the navigation sufiiciently free as long as we require it % Captain Wy- 
man says yes." 

It was the opinion of competent naval officers, and I concur with them, that 
had an adequate force of strong and Avell-armed vessels been acting on the Po- 
tomac from the beginning of August, it would have been next to impossible for 
the rebels to have constructed or maintained batteries upon the banks of the river. 
The enemy never occupied Matthias point, nor any other point on the river, 
which was out of supporting distance from the main army. 

When the enemy commenced the construction of these batteries, the army 
of the Potomac was not in a condition to prevent it. Their destruction by our 
army would have afforded but a temporary relief unless we had been strong 
enough to hold the entire line of the Potomac. This could be done either by 
driving the enemy from Manassas and Aquia creek, by main force, or by ma- 
noeuvring to compel them to vacate their positions. The latter course was finally 
pursued, and with success. 

About the 20th of February, 1862, additional measures were taken to secure 
the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. The preliminary operations 
of General Lander for this object are elsewhere described. 

I had often observed to the President and to members of the cabinet that the 
reconstruction of this railway could not be undertaken until we were in a con- 
dition to fight a battle to secure it. I regarded the possession of Winchester 
and Strasburg as necessary to cover the railway in the rear, and it was not till 
the month of February that I felt prepared to accomplish this very desirable 
but not vital purpose. 

The whole of Banks's division and two brigades of Sedgwick's division were 
thrown across the river at Harper's Ferry, leaving one brigade of Sedgwick's 
divisicm to observe and guard the Potomac from Great Falls to the mouth of the 
Mouocacy. A sufficient number of troops of all arms were held in readiness 
in the vicinity of Washington, either to march via Leesburg or to move by rail 



52 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'CLELLAN- 

to Harper's Ferry, should this become necessary in carrying out the objects in 
view. 

The subjoined notes from a communication subsequently addressed to the 
War Department will sufficiently explain the conduct of these operations. 

NOTES. 

" When I started for Harper's Ferry, I plainly stated to the President and 
Secretary of War that the chief object of the operation would be to open the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad by crossing the river in force at Harper's Ferry; 
that I had collected the material for making a permanent bridge by means of 
canal-boats ; that from the nature of the river, it was doubtful whether such a 
bridge could be constructed ; that if it could not, I would at least occupy the 
ground in front of Harper's Ferry, in order to cover the rebuilding of the rail- 
road bridge ; and finally, when the communications were perfectly secure, move 
on Winchester, 

" When I arrived at the place I found the bateau bridge nearly completed ; 
the holding-ground proved better than had been anticipated ; the weather was 
favorable, there being no wind. I at once crossed over the two brigades which 
had arrived, and took steps to hurry up the other two, belonging respectively 
to Banks's and Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty of crossing supplies had 
not then become apparent. That night I telegraphed for a regiment of regular 
cavalry and foiu' batteries of heavy artillery to come up the next day, (Thurs- 
day,) besides directing Keyes's division of infantry to be moved up on Friday. 

"Next morning the attempt was made to pass the canal-boats through the 
lift-lock, in order to commence at once the construction of a permanent bridge. 
It was then found for the first time that the lock was too small to permit the 
passage of the boats, it having been built for a class of boats running on the 
Shenandoah canal, and too narrow by some four or six inches for the canal- 
boats. The lift-locks, above and below, are all large enough for the ordinary 
boats. I had seen them at Edwards's ferry thus used. It had always been 
represented to the engineers by the military railroad employes, and others, that 
the lock 2vas large enough, and, the difference being too small to be detected by 
the eye, no one had thought of measuring it, or suspecting any difficulty. I 
thus suddenly found myself unable to build the jiermanent bridge. A violent gale 
had arisen, which threatened the safety of our only means of communication ; the 
narrow approach to the bridge was so crowded and clogged with wagons that 
it was very clear that, under existing circumstances, nothing more could be done 
than to cross over the baggage and supplies of the two brigades. Of the others, 
instead of being able to cross both during the morning, the last ai-rived only in 
time to go over just before dark. It was evident that the troops under orders 
would only be in the way, should they arrive, and that it would not be possible 
to subsist them for a rapid march on Winchester. It was therefore deemed 
necessary to countermand the order, content ourselves with covering the reopen- 
ing of the raih'oad for the present, and in the mean time use every exertion to 
establish, as promptly as possible, depots of forage and subsistence on the Vir- 
ginia side, to supply the troops, and enable them to move on Winchester inde- 
pendently of the bridge. The next day (Friday) I sent a strong recnnnoissance 
to Oh;irk's-town, and, under its protection, went there myself I then determined 
to hold that place, and to move the troops composing Lander's and Williams's 
commands at once on Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus eftectually covering 
the reconstruction of the railroad. 

"Having done this, and taken all the steps in my power to insure the rapid 
transmission of supplies over the river, I returned to this city, well satisfied 
with what had been accomplished. While up the river I learned that the 
President was dissatisfied with the state of affairs; but, on my return here. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 53 

understood from the Secretary of War that upon learning the whole state of 
the case the President was fully satisfied. I contented myself, therefore, with 
giving to the Secretary a brief statement, as I have written here." 

The design aimed at was entirely compassed, and before the first of April, 
the date of my departm-e for the Peninsula, the railroad was in running order. 
As a demonstration upon the left flank of the enemy, this movement no doubt 
assisted in determining the evacuation of his lines on the Sth and 9th of March. 

On my return from Harj)er's Ferry, on the 2Sth of February, the prepara- 
tions necessary to carry out the wishes of the President and Secretary of Waf 
in regard to destroying the batteries on the lower Potomac were at once under- 
taken. Mature reflection convinced me that this operation would require the 
movement of the entire army, for I felt sure that the enemy would resist it with 
his whole strength. I undertook it with great reluctance, both on account of 
the extremely unfavorable condition of the roads and my firm conviction that 
the proposed movement to the lower Chesapeake would necessarily, as it subse- 
quently did, force the enemy to abandon all his positions in front of Washing- 
ton. Besides, it did not forward my plan of campaign to precipitate this evacua- 
tion by any direct attack, nor to subject the army to any needless loss of life 
and material by a battle near Washington, which could produce no decisive 
results. The preparations for a movement towards the Occoquan, to cany the 
batteries, were, however, advanced as rapidly as the season permitted, and I 
had invited the commanders of divisions to meet at headquarters on the Sth of 
March, for the purpose of giving them their instructions, and receiving their 
advice and opinion in regard to their commands, when an interview with the 
President indicated to me the possibility of a change in my orders. 

His excellency sent for me at a very early hour on the morning of the Sth, 
and renewed his expressions of dissatisfaction with the affair of Harper's Ferry, 
and with my plans for the new movement down the Chesapeake. Another 
recital of the same facts which had before given satisfaction to his excellency 
again produced, "s I supposed, the same result. 

The views which I expressed to the President were re-enforced by the result 
of a meeting of my general ofiicers at headquarters. At that meeting my plans 
were laid before the division commanders, and were approved by a majority of 
those present. Nevertheless, on the same day two important orders were issued 
by the President, without consultation with me. The first of these was the gene- 
ral war order No. 2, directing the formation of army corps, and assigning their 
commanders. 

I had always been in favor of the principle of an organization into army 
corps, but preferred deferring its practical execution until some little experience 
in campaign and on the field of battle should show what general officers Avere 
most competent to exercise these high commands, for it must be remembered 
that we then had no officers whose experience in war on a large scale was suf- 
ficient to prove that they possessed the necessary qualifications. An incompe- 
tent commander of an army corps might cause irreparable damage, while it is 
not probable that an incompetent division commander could cause any very se- 
rious mischief These views had freqiiently been expressed by me to the Pres- 
ident and members of the cabinet; it was therefore with as much regret as sur- 
prise that I learned the existence of this order. 

The first order has been given above ; the second order was as follows : 

[President's General War Order No. 3 ] 

"Executive Mansion, 
" Washington, March 8, 1862. 
" Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the army of the 
Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force 



54 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

as, ill the opinion of the general-in-chief and the commanders of army corps, 
shall leave said city entirely secure. 

" That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said 
army of the Potomac shall be moved on route for a new base of operations 
until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington to the Chesapeake bay, 
shall be freed from enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, or until the Presi- 
dent shall hereafter give express permission. 

" That any movement as aforesaid, en route for a new base of operations, which 
may be ordered by the general-in-chief, and which may be intended to move 
upon the Chesapeake bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 
18th March instant, and the general-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves 
as early as that day. 

" Ordered, That the army and navy co-operate in an immediate effort to cap- 
ture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the 
Chesapeake bay. 

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

" L. Thomas, Adjutant General. " 

After what has been said already in regard to the effect of a movement to the 
lower Chesapeake it is unnecessary for me to comment upon this document, fur- 
ther than to say that the time of beginning the movement depended upon the 
state of readiness of the transports, the entire control of which had been placed 
by the Secretary of War in the hands of one of the Assistant Secretaries, and 
not under the Quartermaster General; so that even if the movement were not 
impeded by the condition imposed, in regard to the batteries on the Potomac, 
it could not have been in my power to begin it before the 18th of March, imless 
the Assistant Secretary of War had completed his arrangements by that time. 

Meanwhile important eve^nts were occurring which materially modified the 
designs for the subsequent campaign. The appearance of the Merrimack off 
Old Point Comfort, and the encounter with the United States squadron on the 
8th of March, threatened serious derangement of the plan for the Peninsula 
movement. But the engagement betAveen the Monitor and Merrimack on the 9th 
of March demonstrated so satisfactorily the power of the former, and the other 
naval preparations were so extensive and formidable, that the security of Fort 
Monroe, as a base of operations, was placed beyond a doubt ; and although the 
James river Avas closed to us, the York river, with its tributaries, was still open 
as a line of water communication with the fortress. The general plan, there- 
fore, remained undisturbed, although less promising in its details than when 
the James river was in our control. 

On Sunday, the 9th of March, information from varioiis som-ces made it ap- 
parent that the enemy was evacuating his positions at Centreville and j\Ianassas, 
as well as on the upper and lower Potomac. The President and Secretary of 
War were present when the most positive information reached me, and I ex- 
pressed to them my intention to cross the river immediately, and there gain the 
most authentic information, prior to determining Avhat course to pursue. 

The retirement of the enemy towards Richmond had been expected as the 
natural consequence of the movement to the Peninsula, but the adoption of this 
course immediately on ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while 
it relieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my superiors, and 
attested the character of the design, was unfortunate in that the then almost 
impassable roads between our positions and theirs deprived xis of the oppor- 
tunity for inflicting damage usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large 
army in the face of a powerful adversary. 

The retirement of the enemy and the occupation of the abandoned positions 
which necessarily followed pi-esented an opportunity for the troops to gain 
some experience on the march and bivouac preparatory to the campaign, and to 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 55 

get rid of tlie superfluous baggage and other " impediments" wliicli accumulate 
so easily around an army encamped for a long time in one locality. 

A march to Manassas and hack would produce no delay in embarking for the 
lower Chesapeake, as the transports could not be ready for some time, and it 
afforded a good intermediate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of 
the camps around Washington, and the rigors of active operations, besides 
accomplishing the important object of determining the positions and perhaps 
the future designs of the enemy, with the possibility of being able to harass 
their rear. 

I therefore issued orders during the night of the 9th of March for a general 
movement of the army the next morning towards Centreville and Manassas, 
sending in advance two regiments of cavalry under Colonel Averill with orders 
to reach Manassas if possible, ascertain the exact condition of affairs, and do 
whatever he could to retard and annoy the enemy if really in retreat ; at 
the same time I telegraphed to the Secretary of War that it would be necessary 
to defer the organization of the army corps until the completion of the projected 
advance upon Manassas, as the divisions could not be brought together in time. 
The Secretary replied, requiring immediate compliance with the President's 
order ; but on my again representing that this would compel the abandonment or 
postponement of the movement to Manassas, he finally consented to its post- 
ponement. 

At noon on the 10th of March the cavalry advance reached the enemy's lines 
at Centreville, passing through his recently occupied camps and works, and find- 
ing still burning heaps of military stores and much valuable property. 

Immediately after being assigned to the command of the troops around Wash- 
ington, I organized a secret service force, under Mr. E. J. Allen, a very ex- 
perienced and efficient person. This force, up to the time I was relieved from 
command, was continually occupied in procuring from all possible sources in- 
formation regarding the strength, positions, and movements of the enemy. 

All spies, "contrabands," deserters, refugees, and many prisoners of war, 
coming into our lines from the front, were carefully examined, first by the out- 
post and division commanders, and then by my chief of staff and the Provost Mar- 
shal General. Their statements, taken in writing, and in many cases under oath, 
from day to day, for a long period previous to the evacuation of Manassas, com- 
prised a mass of evidence which, by careful digests and collations, enabled me 
to estimate with considerable accuracy the strength of the enemy before us. 
Summaries showing the character and results of the labors of the secret service 
force accompany this report, and I refer to them for the facts they contain, and 
as a measure of the ignorance which led some journals at that time, and persons 
in high office, unwittingly to trifle with the reputation of an army, and to delude 
the country with quaker gun stories of the defences and gross understatements 
of the numbers of the enemy. 

The following orders were issued for the examination of persons coming from 
the direction of the enemy: 

["Circular.] 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Washington, December 16, 1861. 

"The major general commanding directs that hereafter all deserters, prisoners > 
spies, ' contrabands,' and all other persons whatever coming or brought within 
our lines from Virginia, shall be taken immediately to the quarters of the com- 
mander of the division within whose lines they may come or be brought, without 
previous examination by any one, except so far as may be necessary for the 
officer commanding the advance guard to elicit information regarding his particu- 
lar post ; that the division commander examine all such persons himself, or deley 



56 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

gate such cliity to a proper officer of his staff, and allow no other persons to hold 
any communication with them ; that he then immediately send them, with a suf- 
ficient guard, to the provost marshal in this city for further examination and 
safe-keeping, and that stringent orders be given to all guards having such per- 
sons in charge not to hold any communication with them whatever; and further, 
that the information elicited from such persons shall be immediately communi- 
cated to the major general commanding, or to the chief of staff, and to no other 
person whatever. 

"The major general commanding further directs that a sufficient guard be 
placed around every telegraph station pertaining to this army, and that such 
guards be instructed not to allow any person, except the regular telegraph corps, 
general officers, and such staff officers as may be authorized by their chief, to 
enter or loiter around said stations within hearing of the sound of the telegraph 
instruments. 

"By command of Major General McClellan. 

" S. WILLIAMS, 
" Assistant Adjutant General." 



} 



"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" IVas/iington, Fehruary 26, 1862. 

General Order 

No. 27. 
********** 

" All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and other persons coming within 
our lines, will be taken at once to the provost marshal of the nearest division, 
who will examine them in presence of the division commander or an officer of 
his staff designated for the purpose. This examination will only refer to such 
information as may affect the division and those near it, especially those remote 
from general headquarters. 

"As soon as this examination is completed — and it must be made as rapidly 
as possible — the person will be sent, under proper guard, to the Provost Marshal 
General, with a statement of his replies to the questions asked. Upon receiving 
him, the Provost Marshal General will at once send him, with his statement, to 
the chief of staff of the army of the Potomac, who will cause the necessary 
examination to be made. The Provost Marshal General will have the custody of 
all such persons. Division commanders will at once communicate to other 
division commanders all information thus obtained which affects them. 
********** 

"By command of Major General McClellan. 

"S. WILLIAMS, 
*^ Assistant Adjutant General." 

In addition to the foregoing orders, the division commanders were instructed, 
whenever they desired to send out scouts towards the enemy, to make knoAvn 
tlie object at headquarters, in order that I might determine Avhether we had the 
information it was proposed to obtain, and that I might give the necessary or- 
ders to other commanders, so that the scouts should not be molested by the 
guards. 

It will be seen from the report of the chief of the secret service corps, 
dated March 8, that the forces of the rebel army of the Potomac, at that date, 
were as follows : 

At Manassas, Centreville, Bull run. Upper Occoquan, and vicinity. 80,000 men. 
At Brooks's station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan, and vicinity 18,000 men. 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 57 

At Leesburg and vicinity 4,500 men. 

In tlie Shenandoah valley 13,000 men. 



115,500 men. 



Abont three hundred field guns and from twenty-six to thirty siege guns 
were with the rebel army in front of Washington. The report made on the 
17th of March, after the evacuation of Manassas and Oentreville, corroborates 
the statements contained in the report of the 8th, and is fortified by the affida- 
vits of several railroad engineers, constructors, baggage-masters, &c., whose 
opportunities for forming correct estimates were unusually good. These affida- 
vits will be found in the accompanying reports of the chief of the secret service 
corps. 

A reconnoissance of the works at Oentreville made by Lieutenant McAlester, 
United States engineers, on March 14, 1862, and a survey of those at Manassas, 
made by a party of the United States coast survey, in April, 1862, confirmed 
also my conclusions as to the strength of the enemy's defences. Those at 
Oentreville consisted of two lines, one facing east and the other north. The 
former consisted of seven works, viz: one bastion fort, two redoubts, two 
lunettes, and two batteries; all containing embrasures for forty guns, and con- 
nected by infantry parapets and double caponieres. It extended along the crest 
of the ridge a mile and three-quarters from its junction with the northern front 
to ground thickly wooded and impassable to an attacking column. 

The northern front extended about one and one-fourth mile to Great Rocky 
run, and thence three-fourths of a mile further to thickly wooded, impassable 
ground in the valley of Cub run. It consisted of six lunettes and batteries with 
embrasures for thirty -one guns, connected by an infantry parapet in the form of 
a cremaillere line with redans. At the town of Oentreville, on a high hill com- 
manding the rear of all the works within range, was a large hexagonal redoubt 
with ten embrasures. 

Manassas station was defended in all directions by a system of detached 
works, with platforms for heavy guns arranged for marine carriages, and often 
connected by infantry parapets. This system was rendered complete by a very 
large work, with sixteen embrasures, which commanded the highest of the other 
works by about fifty feet. 

Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred to will be found among the 
maps appended to this report. 

From this it will be seen that the positions selected by the enemy at Oentre- 
ville and Manassas were naturally very strong, with impassable streams and 
broken ground, affording ample protection for their flanks, and that strong lines 
of intrenchments,swept all the available approaches. 

Although the history of every former war has conclusively shown the great 
advantages which are possessed by an army acting on the defensive and occu- 
pying strong positions, defended by heavy earthworks ; yet, at the commence- 
ment of this war, but few civilians in our country, and, indeed, not all military 
men of rank, had a just appreciation of the fact. 

New levies that have never been in battle cannot be expected to advance 
without cover under the murderous fire from such defences, and carry them by 
assault. This is work in which veteran troops frequently falter and are re- 
pulsed with loss. That an assault of the enemy's positions in front of Washing- 
ton, with the new troops composing the army of the Potomac, during the winter 
of 1861-'62, would have resulted in defeat and demoralization, was too probable. 

The same army, though inured to war in many battles, hard fought and 
bravely Avon, has twice, under other generals, suffered such disasters as it was 
no excess of prudence then to avoid. My letter to the Secretary of War, dated 



58 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE R. m'cLELLAN. 

• 
Februaiy 3, 1862, and given above, expressed the opinion that the movement 
to the Peninsula would compel the enemy to retire from his position at Manas- 
sas and free Washington from danger. When the enemy first learned of that 
plan, they did thus evacuate Manassas. During the Peninsula campaign, as at 
no former period, northern Virginia was completely in our possession, and the 
vicinity of Washington free from the presence of the enemy. The ground so 
gained was not lost, nor Washington again put in danger, until the enemy 
learned of the orders for the evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me at Harri- 
son's bar, and were again left free to advance northward and menace the na- 
tional capital. Perhaps no one now doubts that the best defence of Washington 
is a Peninsula attack on Richmond. 

My order for the organization of the army corps was issued on the 13th of 
March ; it has been given above. 

While at Fairfax Court House, on March 12, I was informed through the 
telegraph, by a member of my staff, that the following document had appeared 
in the National Intelligencer of that morning : 

[President's War Order, No. 3.] 

♦'Executive Mansion, 

" Washington, March 11, 1862. 

" Major General McClellan having personally taken the field at the head of 
the army of the Potomac, until otherwise ordered, he is relieved from the com- 
mand of the other military departments, he retaining command of the depart- 
ment of the Potomac. 

" Ordered, further, That the departments now under the respective commands 
of Generals Halleck and Hunter, together with so much of that under General 
Buell as lies west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knox- 
ville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the department of the Missis- 
sippi ; and that, imtil otherwise ordered, Major General Halleck have command 
of said department. 

" Ordered, also. That the country Avest of the department of the Potomac 
and east of the department of the IMississippi be a military department, to be 
called the mountain department, and that the same be commanded by Major 
General Fremont. 

" That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt of this order by 
them, respectively report severally and directly to the Secretary of War, and 
that prompt, full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each of them. 

-ABRAHAM LINCOLN." 

Though unaware of the President's intention to remove me from the position 
of general-in-chief, I cheerfully acceded to the disposition he saw fit to make 
of my services, and so informed him in a note on the 12th of March, in which 
occur these words : 

" I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connexion with some western 
matters, that no feeling of self-interest or ambition should ever prevent me from 
devoting myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, 
and you will find that, under present circumstances, I shall work just as cheer- 
fully as before, and that no consideration of self will in any manner interfere 
with the discharge of my public duties. Again thanking you for the ofiicial 
and personal kindness you have so often evinced towards me, I am," &c., &c. 

On the 14tb of March a reconnoissance of a large body of cavalry with some 
infantry, under command of General Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and^ 
Alexandria railroad to determine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force 
his rear across the Rappahannock, but the roads were in such condition that, 
finding it impossible to subsist his men, General Stoneman was forced to return 
after reachiujr Cedar run. 



KEPOET OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 59 

The following despatch, from him recites the result of this expedition : 

"Headquarters, Union Mills, 

" MarcJi 16, 1862. 
"We arrived here last evening about dark. We got corn for horses; no 
provisions for men. Bull run too high to cross. Had we stayed an hour 
longer we should not have got here to-day, owing to the high water in 
ilie streams. Felt the enemy cautiously, and found him in force at Warrentou 
Junction. Saw two regiments of cavalry and three bodies of infantry on the 
other side of Cedar run. Had we crossed, should not have been able to get 
back for high water. Had three men of 5tli cavalry hit driving in enemy's 
])ickets ; one slightly woimded in the head. Enemy acted confidently, and 
tollowed us some way back on the road, but did not molest us in any way. 
Enemy's force consisted of Stuart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of artillery, 
and some infantry. Railroad bridges all burned down up to Warrenton Junc- 
tion ; still entire beyond, but all in readiness to burn at a moment's warning, 
having dry wood piled upon them. Heard cars running during night before 
last ; probably bringing up troops from Rappahannock. Heard of two regiments 
of infontry at Warrenton engaged in impressing the militia and seciiring forage. 
Heard of a large force of infantry this side of Rappahannock river, having come 
up to Warrenton Junction from Aquia creek day before yesterday. Bridges 
all destroyed this side of Broad run. The aids who take this will give you 
further particulars. 

" Very respectfully, &c., 

"GEORGE STONEMAN, 
"Brigadier General, Commanding. 

" Col. COLBURN." 

The main body of the army was, on the 15th of March, moved back to the 
vicinity of Alexandria to be embarked, leaving a part of General Sumner's 
corps at Manassas until other troops could be sent to relieve it. Before it was 
withdrawn a strong reconnoissance, under General Howard, was sent towards 
the Rappahannock, the result of which appears in the following despatch : 

"Warrenton Junction, 

" MarcJi 29, 1862. 

"Express just received fi-om General Howard. He drove the enemy across 
the Roppahanuock bridge, and is now in camp on this bank of and near the 
Rappahannock river. 

" The enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. There was skirmishing dur- 
ing the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artillery, without any loss on 
our part. Their loss, if any, is not known. General Howard will return to 
this camp to-morrow morning. 

" E. V. SUMNER, Brigadier General. 

" General S. Williams." 

The line of the Rappahannock and the Manassas Gap railroad was thus left 
reasonably secure from menace by any considerable body of the enemy. 

On the 13th of March a council of war was assembled at Fairftix Court House 
to discuss the military status. The President's order No. 3, of March 8th, was 
considered. The following is a memorandum of the proceedings of the council : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Fairfax Court House, March 13, 1862. 
"A council of the generals commanding army corps, at the headquarters of 
the army of the Potomac, were of the opinion — 

" I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind 



60 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding 
army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from 
Old Point Comfort, between the York and James rivers : Provided, 

" 1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimack, can be neutralized. 

" 2d. That the means of transportation, sufficient for an immediate transfer 
of the force to its new base, can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to 
move down the Potomac ; and, 

" 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid in silencing, 
the enemy's batteries on the York river. 

" 4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give 
an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) 

" II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the 
enemy, behind the Rappahannock, at the earliest possible moment, and the 
means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with 
materials sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected, for both 
the Orange and Alexandria and Aquia and Richmond railroads. (Unanimous.) 

" N. B. — That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, 
and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia 
line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keys, Heintzelman, and McDowell.) A 
total of 40,000 men for the defence of the city wovdd suffice. (Sumner.") 

This was assented to by myself, and immediately communicated to the War 
Department. The following reply was received the same day : 

"War Department, March 13, 1862. 

" The President having considered the plan of operations agreed upon by 
yourself and the commanders of army corps, makes no objection to the same, 
but gives the following directions as to its execution : 

"1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain 
that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of commu- 
nication. 

"2. Leave Washington entirely secure. 

"3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base 
at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere between here and there, or, at all events, 
move such remainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some 
route. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 

"Major General George B. McOlellan." 

My preparations were at once begun in accordance with these directions, and 
on the 16th of March the following instructions were sent to Generals Banks 
and Wads worth: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"March 16, 1862. 

"Sir: You will post your command in the vicinity of Manassas, intrench 
yourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets well out to the front. 

" Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from Washington to 
Manassas and to Strasburg, in order to open your communications with the 
valley of the Shenandoah. As soon as the Manassas Gap railway is in running 
order, intrench a brigade of infantry, say four regiments, with two batteries, at 
or near the point where the railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something like 
two regiments of cavalry should be left in that vicinity to occupy Winchester, 
and thoroughly scour the country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah 
valley, as well as through Chester gap, which might perhaps be advantageously 
occupied by a detachment of infantry, Avell intrenched. Block-houses should 
be built at all the railway bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warreuton June- 



REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 61 

tiou and Warrenton itself, and also some little more advanced point on the 
(Jrange and Alexandria railroad, as soon as the railway bridge is repaired. 

" Great activity should he observed by the cavalry. Besides the two regi- 
ments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry will be at your disposal, to 
scout towards the Occoquau, and probably a fourth towards Leesburg. 

"To recapitulate, the most important points which should engage your atten- 
tion are as follows : 

" 1. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Manassas, perhaps 
even Centreville, and another force, (a brigade,) also well intrenched, near 
Strasburg. 

"2. Block -houses at the railway bridges. 

"3. Constant employment of the cavalry well to the front. 

" 4. Grand guards at Warrenton Junction and in advance, as far as the EaD- 
pahannock, if possible. 

"5. Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early information as to the 
wiemy. 

" 6. The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac and "Washington. 

"The above is communicated by command of Major General McClellan. 

"S. WILLIAMS, 

'^^ Assistant Adjutant General. 

"Major General N. P. Banks, 

" Commanding Fifth Corps, Army of the Potomac." 



"HEADQ.UARTERS ArMY OP THE PoTOMAC, 

"March 16, 1862. 

" Sir : The command to which you have been assigned, by instructions of 
the President, as military governor of the District of Columbia, embraces the 
geographical limits of the District, and will also include the city of Alexandria, 
the defensive works south of the Potomac, from the Occoquan to Difficult 
creek, and the post of Fort Washington. 

"I enclose a list of the troops and of the defences embraced in these limits. 

" General Banks will command at Manassas Junction, with the divisions of 
Williams and Shields, composing the fifth corps, but you should, nevertheless, 
exercise vigilance in your front, carefully guard the approaches in that quarter, 
and maintain the duties of advanced guards. You will use the same precau- 
tions on either flank. 

" All troops not actually needed for the police of Washington and George- 
town, for the garrisons north of the Potomac, and for other indicated special 
duties, should be moved to the south side of the river. 

"In the centre of your front you should post the main body of your troops, 
and proper proportions at suitable distances towards your right and left flanks. 
Careful patrols will be made, in order thoroughly to scour the country in front, 
from right to left. 

"It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain the forts and their armaments 
in the best possible order, to look carefully to the instruction and discipline of 
their garrisons, as well as all other troops under your command, and, by fre- 
quent and rigid inspections, to insure the attainment of these ends. 

" The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges and ferries, within the 
above-named limits, will devolve upon you, and you are to insure their security 
and provide for their protection by every means in your power. You will also 
protect the depots of the public stores and the transit of stores to troops in 
active service. 

" By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour the neighboring country 



62 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

south of tlie Eastei-n Branch, and also on jour right, and you will use every 
possible precaution to intercept mails, goods and persons passing unauthorized 
to the enemy's lines. 

" The necessity of maintaining good order within your limits^ and especially 
in the capital of tlie nation, cannot be too strongly enforced. 

"You will forward and facilitate the movement of all troops destined for the 
active part of the army of the Potomac, and especially the transit of detach- 
ments to their proper regiments and corps. 

" The charge of the new troops arriving in Washington, and of all troops 
temporarily there, will devolve upon you. You will form them into provisional 
brigades, promote their instruction and discipline, and facilitate their equipment. 
Report all arrivals of troops, their strength, composition and equipment, by 
every opportunity, 

"Besides the regular reports and returns, which you will be required to 
render to the Adjutant General of the army, you wall make to these headquarters 
a consolidated report of your command, every Sunday morning, and monthly 
returns on the first day of each mouth. 

" The foregoing instructions are communicated by command of Major General 
McClellan. 

"S. WILLIAMS, 

^^ Assistant Adjutant General. 

"Brigadier General J. S. Wadsworth, 

^'Military Governor of the District of Columhia.'" 

The Secretary of War had expressed a desire that I should communicate to 
the War Department my designs Avith regard to the employment of the army 
of the Potomac in an official ferm. I submitted, on the 19th of March, the 
following: . 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Theological Seminary, Va., March 19, 1862. 

"Sir : I have the honor to submit the following notes on the proposed opera- 
tions of the active portion of the army of the Potomac. 

"The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as the first base 
of operations, taking the line of Yorktown and West Point upon Richmond as 
the line of operations, Richmond being the objective point. It is assumed that 
the fall of Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the -w^hole of Virginia ; also, 
that Ave shall fight a decisiA^e battle betAA^een West Point and Richmond, to give 
which battle the rebels AA'ill concentrate all their available forces, understanding, 
as they Avill, that it iuA'olves the fate of their cause. , It therefore folloAvs — 

" 1st. That Ave should collect all our available forces and operate upon adja- 
cent lines, maintaining perfect communication between our columns. 

" 2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the field of battle. 

"The adA'autages of the peninsula betAA^een York and James rivers are too ob- 
vious to need explanation ; it is also clear that West Point should as soon as 
possible be reached, and used as our main depot, that Ave may haA'e the shortest 
line of land transportation for our supplies, and the use of the York river. 

" There arc two methods of reaching this point — 

" 1st. By moAang directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and trusting to the 
roads for our supplies, at the same time landing a strong corps as near York- 
town as possible, in order to turn the rebel lines of defence south of Yorktown; 
then to reduce YorktoAvn and Gloucester by a siege, in all probability involving 
a delay of Aveeks, perhaps. 

" 2d. To make a combined naval and land attack upon YorktOAvn, the first 
object of the campaign. This leads to the most rapid and decisive results. To 
accomplish this, the navy should at once concentrate upon the York river all 



EEPOET OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 63 

their available and most powerful batteries : its reduction shoi;ld not in that 
case require many hours. A strong corps would be pushed up the York, under 
cover of the navy, directly upon AYest Point, immediately upon the fall of York- 
town, and we could at once establish our new base of operations at a distance 
of some twenty-five miles from Eiclimond, with every facility for developing 
and bringing into play the whole of our available force on either or both banks 
of the James. 

" It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity of the full co-op- 
eration of the navy as a part of this programme. Without it the operations 
may be prolonged for many weeks, and we may be forced to carry in front sev- 
eral strong positions which by their aid could be turned without serious loss of 
either time or men. 

" It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact already alluded to, 
that the capture of Richmond necessarily involves the jjrompt fall of Norfolk, 
while an operation against Norfolk, if successful, as the beginning of the cam- 
paign, facilitates the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of 
the rebel troops involved, and that after the fall of Norfolk we should be 
obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond by the same means which would 
have accomplished it in the beginning, having meanwhile afforded the rebels 
ample time to perfect their defensive arrangements, for they would well know, 
from the moment the army of the Potomac changed its base to Fort Monroe, 
that Richmond must be its ultimate object. 

" It may be summed up in a few words, that, for the prompt success of this 
campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the navy should at once throw its whole 
available force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most 
important point — there the knot to be cut. An immediate decision upon the sub- 
ject-matter of this communication is highly desirable, and seems called for by 
the exigencies of the occasion. 

" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

Major General. 

" Hon. E. M. Stantox, 

Secretary of War." 

In the mean time the troops destined to form the active army were collected 
in camps convenient to the points of embarcation, and every preparation made 
to embark them as rapidly as possible when the transports were ready. 

A few days before sailing for Fort Monroe, while still encamped near Alexan- 
dria, I met the President, by appointment, on a steamer. He there informed me 
that he had been strongly pressed to take General Blenker's division from my 
command and give it to General Fremont. His excellency was good enough to 
suggest several reasons for not taking Blenker's division from me. I assented 
to the force of his suggestions, and was extremely gratified by his decision to 
allow the division to remain with the army of the Potomac. It was therefore 
with surprise that I received, on the 31st, the following note : 

" Executive Mansion, 
WasJiington, March 31, 1862. 

" Mv Dear Sir : This morning I felt constrained to order Blenker's division 
to Fremont, and I write this to assure you that I did so with great pain, under- 
standing that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pres- 
sure of the case, I am confident that you would justify it, even beyond a mere 
acknowledgment that the commander-in-chief may order what he pleases. 
" Yours, very truly, 

"A. LINCOLN. 
" Major General McClellan." 



64 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

To this I replied, in substance, that I regretted the order, and could ill aflPord 
to lose ten thousand troops which had been counted upon in foraiing my plan of 
campaign, but as there was no remedy, I would yield, and do the be.>?t I could 
without them. In a conversation with the President a few hours afterAvards I 
repeated verbally the same thing, and expressed my regret that Blenker's di- 
vision had been given to General Fremont from any pressure other than the re- 
quirements of the national exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the 
President's positive and emphatic assurance that I might be confident that no more 
troops beyond these ten thousand should in any event be taken from me, or in 
any way detached from my command. 

At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by the enemy, Jackson was at 
Winchester, our forces occupying Oharlestown, and Shields's reaching Bunker Hill 
on the 11th. On the morning of the 12th, a brigade of General Banks's troops, 
under General Hamilton, entered Winchester, the enemy having left at 5 o'clock 
the evening before, his rear guard of cavalry leaving an hour before our advance 
entered the place. The enemy having made his preparations for evacuation 
some days before, it was not possible to intercept his retreat. On the 13th the 
mass of Banks's corps was concentrated in the immediate vicinity of Winches- 
ter, the enemy being in the rear of Strasburg. 

On the 19th General Shields occupied Strasburg, driving the enemy twenty 
miles south to Mount Jackson. 

On the 20th the first division of Banks's corps commenced its movement to- 
wards Manassas, in compliance with my letter of instructions of the 16th. 

Jackson probably received information of this movement, and supposed that 
no force of any consequence was left in the vicinity of Winchester, and upon 
the falling back of Shields to that place, for the purpose of enticing Jackson 
in pursuit, the latter promptly followed, whereupon ensued a skirmish on the 
22d, in which General Shields was wounded, and an affixir at Winchester on the 
23d, resulting in the defeat of Jackson, who was pursued as rapidly as the ex- 
haustion of our troops and the difficulty of obtaining supplies permitted. It is 
presumed that the full reports of the battle of Winchester were forwarded direct 
to the War Department by General Banks. 

It being now clear that the enemy had no intention of returning by the 
Manassas route, the following letter of April 1 was written to General Banks : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" On board the Commodore, April 1, 1S62. 

"General : The change in affairs in the valley of the Shenandoah has ren- 
dered necessary a corresponding departure, temporarily at least, irom the plan 
we some days since agreed upon. 

"In my arrangements I assume that you have with you a force amply 
sufficient to drive Jackson before you, provided he is not re-euforced largely. I 
also assume that you may find it impossible to detach anything towards jManas- 
sas for some days, probably not until the operations of the main army have 
drawn all the rebel force towards Richmond. 

"You are aware that General Sumner has for some days been at Manassas 
Junction with two divisions of infantry, six batteries, and two regiments of cav- 
alry, and that a reconnoissance to the Rappahannock forced the enemy to destroy 
the railway bridge at Rappahannock Station, on the Orange and Alexandria 
railroad. Since that time our cavalry have found nothing on this side the Rap- 
pahannock in that direction, and it seems clear that we have no reason to fear 
any return of the rebels in that quarter. Their movements near Fredericksburg 
also indicate a final abandonment of that neighborhood. I doubt whether John- 
son will now re-enforce Jackson with a view of offensive operations. The time 
is probably passed when he could have gained anything by doing so. I have 
ordered in one of Sumner's divisions (that of Richardson, late Sumner's) to 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 65 

Alexandria for embarcation. Blenker's lias been detached from the army of 
tbe Potomac and ordered to report to General Fremont. 

" Abercrombie is probably at Warrenton Junction to-day. Geary is at White 
Plains. 

"Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered out, and are now on the way 
to relieve the two regiments of Sumner. 

" Four thousand infantry and one battery leave Washington at once for Ma- 
nassas. Some three thousand more will move in one or two days, and soon after 
some three thousand additional. 

"I will order Blenker to march on Strasburg and to report to you for tem- 
porary duty, so that should you find a large force in your front you can avail 
yourself of his aid as soon as possible. Please direct him to Winchester, thence 
to report to the Adjutant General of the army for orders; but keep him until you 
are sure what you have in front. 

" In regard to your own movements, the most important thing at present is to 
throw Jackson well back, and then to assume such a position as to enable you 
to prevent his return. As soon as the railway communications are re-established 
it will be probably important and advisable to move on Staunton, but this would 
require secure communications, and a force of from twenty-five thousand to 
thirty thousand for active operations. It should also be nearly coincident with 
my own move on Richmond, at all events not so long before it as to enable the 
rebels to concentrate on you, and then return on me. I fear that you cannot be 
ready in time, although it may come in very well with a force less than that I 
have mentioned, after the main battle near Richmond. When General Sumner 
leaves Warrenton Junction, General Abercrombie will be placed in immediate 
command of Manassas and Warrenton Junction, under your general orders 
Please inform me frequently by telegraph and otherwise as to the state of things 
in your front. 



" I am very truly yours, 



Major General N. P. Banks, 
Commanding Fifth Corps. 



"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General Commanding. 



" P. S. — From what I have just learned, it would seem that the regiments of 
cavalry intended for Warrenton Junction have gone to Harper's Ferry. Of 
the four additional regiments placed under your orders, two should as promptly 
as possible move by the shortest route on Warrenton Junction. 
" I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" GEORGE B. McOLELLAlS', 

" Major General, Commanding." 

This letter needs no further explanation than to say that it was my intention, had 
the operations in that quarter remained under my charge, either to have resumed 
the defensive position marked out in the letter of March 16, or to have advanced 
General Banks upon Staunton as might in the progress of events seem advisable. 

It is to be remembered that when I wrote the preceding and following letters 
of April 1 I had no expectation of being relieved from the charge of the opera- 
tions in the Shenandoah valley, the President's war order No. 3 giving no inti- 
mation of such an intention, and that so far as reference was made to final op- 
erations after driving Jackson back and taking such a position as to prevent his 
return, no positive orders were given in the letter, the matter being left for 
future consideration, when the proper time arrived for a decision. 

From the following letter to the Adjutant General, dated April 1, 1862, it will 
be seen that I left for the defence of the national capital and its approaches, 
when I sailed for the Peninsula, 73,456 men, with 109 pieces of light artillery, 
H. Ex. Doc. 15 5 



66 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

including the 32 pieces in Wasliington alluded to, but not enumerated in my 
letter to the Adjutant General. It "will also be seen that I recommended other 
available troops in New York (more than 4,000) to be at once ordered forward 
to re-enforce them. 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. 

"General: I have to request that you will lay the following communication 
before the Hon. Secretary of War. 

" The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left near and in rear 
of the Potomac are as follows : 

" General Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufScient to 
give him 5,000 for the defence of Ekiltimore, and 1,988 available for the Eastern 
Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men. 

" The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 10,600 men ; other 
disposable troops now with General Wadsworth about 11,400 men. 

" The troops employed in guarding the various railways in Maryland amount 
to some 3,359 men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by 
dismounted cavalry, and to send forward to Manassas. 

" General Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force, which, including 
Colonel Geary, at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount 
to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces of artillery. 

" I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in 
Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the eastern States, may be ordered 
to Washington. I learn from Governor Curtin that there are some 3,500 men 
now ready in Pennsylvania. This force 1 should be glad to have sent to Manas- 
sas. Four thousand men from General Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to 
Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, will make up 
a force under the command of General Abercrombie of something like 18,639 men. 

" It is my design to push General Blenker's division from Warrenton upon 
Strasburg. He shoiild remain at Strasburg long enough to allow matters to 
assume a definite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination. 

" The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus — including Blenker's 
division, 10,028 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery; Banks's 5th corps, which 
embraces the command of General Shields, 19,687 strong, M'ith 41 guns, some 
3,652 disposable cavalry, and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men — amount to 
about 35,467 men. 

" It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, say 850 men, 
being, with some 500 cavalry, 1,350 men on the lower Potomac. 

"To recapitulate: At Warrenton there is to be 7,780 men 

" At Manassas, say 10,859 " 

" In the valley of the Shenandoah 35,467 " 

" On the lower Potomac 1,350 " 

"In all 55,456 " 



" There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, 
under General Wadsworth, some 18,000, inclusive of the batteries under instruc- 
tion. The troops organizing or ready for service in New York, I learn, will 
probably number more than four thousand. These should be assembled at 
Washington, subject to disposition where their services may be most required. 
" I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

''Major General, Commanding. 
" Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, 

''Adjutant General United States Army." 



EEPOET OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. M CLELLAN. 67 

The following letter from General Barry shows that thirtj-two (32) field guns, 
with men, horses, and equipments, were also left in Washington city Avhen the 
army sailed. These were the batteries under instruction referred to above : 

"Headquarters Inspector of Artillery, 

" Washington, Decernber 16, 1862. 

"General : It having been stated in various public prints, and in a speech 
of Senator Chandler, of Michigan, in his place in the United States S'enate, 
quoting what he stated to be a portion of the testimony of Brigadier General 
Wadsworth, military governor of Washington, before the joint Senate and House 
committee on the conduct of the war, that Major General McClellan had left au 
insufficient force for the defence of Washington, and not a gun on wheels — 

"I have to contradict this charge as follows: 

" From official reports made at the time to me, (the chief of artillery of the 
army of the Potomac,) and now in my possession, by the commanding officer of 
the light artillery troops left in camp in the city of Washington by your orders, 
it appears that the following named field batteries were left : 

"Battery 0, 1st New York artillery. Captain Barnes, 2 guns; battery K, 1st 
New York artillery. Captain Crounse, 6 guns ; battery L, 2d New York artillery, 
Captain Robinson, 6 guns ; 9th New York independent battery. Captain Mon- 
zordi, 6 guns; 16tli New York independent batteiy. Captain Locke; battery 
A, 2d battalion New York artillery, Captain Hogan, 6 guns ; battery B, 2d bat- 
talion New York artillery. Captain McMahon, 6 guns ; total of batteries, 32 
guns. 

"With the exception of a few horses which could have been procured from 
the quartermaster's department in a few hours, the batteries were all fit for im- 
mediate service, excepting ffce 16th New York battery, which having been pre- 
viously ordered, on General Wadsworth's application, to report to him for special 
service, was unequipped with either guns or horses. 

" I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"W. F. BARRY, 
" Brig. Gen., Inspector of Artillery United States Army, 

"Maj. Gen, McClellan, 

" United States Army." 

It is true that Blenker's division, which is included in the force enumerated 
by me, was under orders to re-enforce General Fremont, but the following de- 
spatch from the Secretary of War, dated March 31, 1862, will show that I was 
authorized to detain him at Strasburg until matters assumed a definite form in 
that region, before proceeding to his ultimate destination ; in other words, until 
Jackson was disposed of. And had he been detained there, instead of moving 
on to Harper's Ferry and Franklin, under other orders, it is probable that Gen- 
eral Banks would have defeated Jackson, instead of being himself obliged sub- 
sequently to retreat to Williamsport. 

" War Department, 
"Washington, D. C, March 31, 1862. 
" The order in respect to Blenker is not designed to hinder or delay the 
movement of Richardson, or any other force. He can remain wherever you 
desire him as long as required for your movements, and in any position you 
desire. The order is simply to place him in position for re-enforcing Fremont, 
as soon as your dispositions will permit, and he may go to Harper's Ferry by 
^such route and at such time as you shall direct. State your own wishes as to 
the movement, when and how it shall be made. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 
"Maj. Gen. MgGlellan." ^ 



68 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN". 

Witliout including General Blenker's division, there were left 67,428 men 
and 85 pieces of light artillery, which, under existing circumstances, I deemed 
more than adequate to insure the j^erfect security of Washington against any 
force the enemy could bring against it, for the following reasons : 

The light troops I had thrown forward under General Stonemau in pursuit 
of the rebel army, after the evacuation of Manassas and Centreville, had driven 
their rear guard across Cedar run, and subsequent expeditions from Sumner's 
corps had forced them beyond the Rappahannock. I^hcy had destroyed all the 
railroad bridges behind them, thereby indicating that they did not intend to 
return over that route. Indeed, if they had attempted such a movement, their 
progress must have been slow and difficult, as it would have involved the re- 
construction of the bridges ; and if my orders for keeping numerous cavalry 
patrols well out to the front, to give timely notice of any approach of the enemy, 
had been strictly enforced, (and I left seven regiments of cavalry for this ex- 
press purpose,) they could not by any possibility have reached Washington before 
there would have been ample time to concentrate the entire forces left for its 
defence, as Avell as those at Baltimore, at any necessary point. 

It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to the authorities, that the movement 
of the army of the Potomac woiild have the effect to draw off the hostile army 
from Manassas to the defence of their capital, and thus free Washington from 
menace. This opinion was confirmed the moment the movement commenced, 
or rather as soon as the enemy became aware of our intentions; for with the ex- 
ception of Jackson's force of some 15,000, which his instructions show to have 
been intended to operate in such a way as to prevent McDowell's corps from 
being sent to re-enforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude made its appearance 
in front of Washington during the progress of oui^perations on the Peninsula; 
nor until the order was given for my return from Harrison's landing was Wash- 
ington again threatened. 

Surrounded, as Washington was, with numerous and strong fortifications, 
well garrisoned, it was manifest that the enemy could not afford to detach from 
his main army a force sufficient to assail them. 

It is proper to remark, that just previous to my departure for Fort Monroe, 
I sent my chief of staff to General Hitchcock, who at that time held staff re- 
lations Avith his excellency the President and the Secretary of War, to sub- 
mit to him a list of the troops I proposed to leave for the defence of Washing- 
ton, and the positions in which I designed posting them. General Hitchcock, 
after glancing his eye over the list, observed that he was not the judge of what 
was required for defending the capital ; that General McClellan's position was 
such as to enable him to understand the subject much better than he did, and 
he presumed that if the force designated was, in his judgment, sufficient, nothing 
more would be required. He was then told by the chief of staff that I would 
be glad to have his opinion, as an old and experienced officer ; to this he replied, 
that as I had had the entire control of the defences for a long time, I was the 
best judge of what was needed, and he declined to give any other expression of 
opinion at that time. 

On the 2d of April, the day following my departure for Fort Monroe, Gen- 
erals Hitchcock and Thomas were directed by the Secretary of War to ex- 
amine and report whether the President's instructions to me, of March 8 and 
13, had been complied with; on the same day their report was submitted, 
and their decision was — 

" That the requirement of the President, that this city (Washington) shall 
be left entirely secure, has not been fully complied with." 

The President, in his letter to me on the 9th of April, says: "And now 
allow me to ask, do you really think I should permit the line from Richmond, 
via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be entirely open, except what resistance 
could be presented by less than twenty thousand unorganized troops." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 69 

In the report of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, alluded to, it is acknowl- 
edged that there Avas no danger of an attack from the direction of Manassas, 
in these words : " In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy 
have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to assume that they 
have no intention of returning for the reoccupation of their late position, and 
therefore no large force would be necessary to hold that position." 

That, as remarked before, was precisely the view I took of it, and this was 
enforced by the subsequent movements of the enemy. 

In another paragraph of the report it is stated that fifty-five thoiisand men 
was the number considered adequate for the defence of the capital. That Gen- 
eral McClcllan, in his enumeration of the forces left, had included Banks's army 
corps, operating in the Shenandoah valley, but whether this corps should be 
regarded as available for the protection of Washington they decline to express 
an opinion. 

At the time this report was made, the only enemy on any, approach to Wash- 
ington was Jackson's force, in front of Banks in the Shenandoah valley, with 
the Manassas Gap railroad leading from this valley to Washington ; and it will 
►be admitted, I presume, that Banks, occupying the Shenandoah valley, was in 
the best position to defend not only that approach to Washington, but the roads 
to Harper's Ferry and above. 

The number of troops left by me for the defence of Washington, as given in 
my letter to the Adjutant General, were taken from the latest official returns of 
that date, and these, of course, constituted the most trustworthy and authentic 
source from which such information could be obtained. 

Another statement made by General Hitchcock before the " Committee on 
the Conduct of the War," i^ reference to this same order, should be noticed. 
He was asked the following question : " Do you understand now that the 
movement made by General McClellan to Fort Monroe, and up the York river, 
was in compliance with the recommendation of the council of generals com- 
manding corps, and held at Fairfax Court House on the 13th of March last, or 
in violation of it ? " 

To which he replied as follows : " I have considered, and do now consider, 

that it was in violation of the recommendation of that council in two important 

particulars ; one particular being that portion of this report which represents 

the council as agreeing to the expedition by way of the Peninsula, provided 

the rebel steamer Merrimack could first be neutralized. That important provis- 

on General McClellan disregarded." 
#* * * * * * * ** 

The second particular alluded to by General Hitchcock was in reference to 
the troops left for the defence of Washington, which has been disposed of above. 

In regard to the steamer Merrimack, I have also stated that, so far as our opera- 
tions on York river were concerned, the power of this vessel was neutralized. 
I now proceed to give some of the evidence which influenced me in coming to 
that conclusion. 

Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretaiy 
of War, was sent by the President to Fort Monroe to consult with Flag-officer 
Goldsborough upon this subject. The residt of that consultation is contained 
in the following extract from the evidence of Admiral Goldsborough before the 
" Committee on the Conduct of the War," viz: "I told Mr. Watson, Assistant 
Secretary of War, that the President might make his mind perfectly easy about 
the Merrimack going up York river; that she could never get there, for I had 
ample means to prevent that." 

Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, testifies before the 
committee as follows: 

" General McClellan expected the navy to neutralize the Merrimack, and I 
promised that it should be done." 



70 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

General Keyes, commanding 4tli army corps, testifies as follows before the 
committee : 

"During tlie time tliat tlie subject of the change of base was discussed, I had 
refused to consent to the Peninsula line of operations until I had sent word to 
the Navy Department and asked two questions: First, whether the Merrimack 
was certainly neutralized, or not] Second, whether the navy was in a condition 
to co-operate efficiently with the army to break through between Yorktown and 
Gloucester point] To both of these, answers were returned in the affirmative; 
that is, the Merrimack was neutralized, and the navy was in a condition to co- 
operate efficiently to break through between Yorktown and Gloucester point." 

Before starting for the Peninsula, I instructed Lieutenant Colonel B. S. 
Alexander, of the United States corps of engineers, to visit Manassas Junction 
and its vicinity for the purpose of determining upon the defensive works neces- 
sary to enable us to hold that place with a small force. The accompanying 
letters from Colonel Alexander Avill show what steps were taken by him to 
carry into effect this important order. 

I regret to say that those who succeeded me in command of the region in front ^ 
of Washington, whatever were the feai'S for its safety did not deem it neces- 
sary to carry out my plans and instructions to them. Had Manassas been placed 
in condition for a strong defence, and its communications secured as recom- 
mended by Colonel Alexander, the result of General Pope's campaign would 
probably have been different. 

"Washington, D. C, April 2, 1862. 

"Sir: You will proceed to Manassas at as early a moment as practicable and 
mark on the ground the works for the defence of that place, on the positions 
which I indicated to you yesterday. You will find two carpenters, experienced 
in this kind of work, ready to accompany you, by calling on Mr. Dougherty, 
the master carpenter of the Treasury extension. 

" The general idea of the defence of this position is, to .occupy the fringe of 
elevation which lies about half way between Manassas depot and the junction 
of the railroad, with a series of works open to the rear, so that they may be 
commanded by the work hereafter to be described. 

"There will be at least four of these works, three of them being on the left of 
the railroad leading from Alexandria, at the positions occupied by the enemy's 
works. The other on the right of this road, on the position we examined 
yesterday. The works of the enemy to the north of this latter position, numbered 
1 and 2 on Lieutenant Comstock's sketch, may also form a part of the front 
line of our defence; but the sides of these works looking towards Manassas 
station should be levelled, so that the interior of the works may be seen from the 
latter position. 

" Embrasures should be arranged in all these works for ^eld artillery. The 
approaches should be such that a battery can drive into the works. The 
number of embrasures in each battery will depend upon its size and the 
ground to be commanded. It is supposed there will be from four to eight embra- 
sures in each battery. 

"The other works of the enemy looking towards the east and south may be 
Btengthened so as to afford sufficient defence in these directions. The work No. 
3 in Lieutenant Comstock's sketch may be also strengthened and arranged for 
field artillery, when time will permit. This work is in a good position to cover 
a retreat, Avhich Would be made down the valley in which the railroad runs 
towards Bull run. 

" At Manassas station there should be a fort constructed. The railroad will 
pass through this fort, and the depot, if there should be one built, should be 
placed in its rear. This latter work should be regarded as the key to the posi- 
tion. It should be as large as the nature of the ground will permit. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 71 

"By goin^ down the slopes, which are not steep, it may be made large enough 
to accommodate 2,000 or 3,000 men. The top of the position need not be cut 
away ; it will be better to throw up the earth into a large traverse, which may 
also be a bomb-proof. Its profile should be strong, and its ditches should be 
flanked. It should receive a heavy armament of 24 or 32 pounders, with some 
rifled (Parrott) 20 or 30 pounders. Its guns should command all the exterior 
works, so that these works could be of no use to the enemy, should he take 
them. In accommodating the fort to the ground this consideration should not 
be lost sight of. 

" After tracing these works on the ground, you will make a sketch embracing 
the whole of them, showing their relative positions and size. This sketch should 
embrace the junction of the railroads and the ground for some distance around 
the main work. It need not be made with extreme accuracy. The distances 
may be paced, or measured, with a tape line. The bearings may be taken by 
compass. 

" Having located the works and prepared your sketch, you will report to 
Captain I'rederick E. Prime, of the corps of engineers, who will furnish you 
the means of construction. 

"It is important that these works should be built with the least possible delay. 
Tou will, therefore, expedite matters as fast as possible. 
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"B. S. ALEXANDER, 
"Lieutenant Colonel, Aide-de-Camp. 

"Captain Fred. R. Munther, Present." 



"Washington, Ajnil 6, 1862. 

"Sir: I enclose you herewith a copy of the instructions which I gave to 
Captain Muuther, in reference to the defences of Manassas. 

" As there has been a new department created, (that of the Rappahannock,) 
it is possible that you and I, as well as General McClellan, are relieved from 
the further consideration of this subject at the present time. 

" I will, however, state for your information, should the siibject ever come 
before you again, that in my opinion the communication with Manassas by land 
should be secured. 

" To eff"ect this in the best manner, so far as my observations extended, I 
think the bridge over Bull run, near Union mills and just above the railroad 
bridge, should be rebuilt or thoroughly repaired, and that a small work, or two 
or three open batteries, should be erected on the adjacent heights to protect it 
as well as the railroad bridge. 

" The communication by land would then be through or near Centreville, 
over the road used by the enemy. 

" I write this for fear something should detain me here ; but I hope to leave 
here to join you to-morrow. My health is much improved. 
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"B. S. ALEXANDER, 
"Lieutenant Colonel, Aide-de-Camp. 

"Brigadier General J. G. Barnard, 

" Chief Engineer, Army of the Potomac.''^ 

I may be permitted also to mention that the plans (also unexecuted by my 
successDr) indicated in my letter of instructions to General Banks, dated March 
16, 1862, for intrenching Chester gap and the point where the Manassas rail- 
road crosses the Shenandoah, were for the purpose of preventing even the at- 
tempt of such a raid as that of Jackson in the month of May following. 



72 EEPOKT OF GENEEAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. " 



MILITARY INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST PERIOD, 

Before taking up the histoiy of the embarcation and Peninsula campaign, I 
should remark that during the fall and winter of lS61-'62, while the army of 
the Potomac was in position in front of Washington, reconnoissances were made 
from time to time, and skirmishes frequently occurred, which were of great im- 
portance in the education of the troops, accustoming them to the presence of 
the enemy, and giving them confidence under fire. There were many instances 
of individual gallantry displayed in these afiiiirs; the reports of them will be 
found among the documents which accompany this report. 

One of the most brilliant of these affairs was that which took place at Drains- 
ville on December 20, 1861, when the 3d brigade of McCall's division, under 
Brigadier General E. 0. C. Ord, with Easton's battery, routed and pursued 
four regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and a battery of six pieces. 

The operations of Brigadier General E. W. Lander on the upper Potomac, 
during the months of January and February, 1862, frustrated the attempts of 
General Jackson against the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, Cumberland, &c., and 
obliged him to fall back to Winchester. His constitution was impaired by the 
hardships he had experienced, and on the 2d March the fearless General Lander 
expired, a victim to the excessive fatigue of the campaign. 



SECOND PERIOD. 

CHAPTER I. 

The council composed of the four corps commanders, organized by the 
President of the United States, at its meeting on the 13th of March, adopted 
Fort Monroe as the base of operations for the movement of the army of the 
Potomac upon Richmond. For the prompt and successful execution of the 
projected operation, it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole of 
the four corps should be employed, with at least the addition of ten thousand 
men drawn from tlie forces in the vicinity of Fortress Monroe, that position 
and its dependencies being regarded as amply protected by the naval force 
in its neighborhood, and the advance of the main army up the Peninsula, so 
that it could be safely left with a small garrison. 

In addition to the land forces, the co-operation of the navy was desired 
in the projected attack upon the batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester, as 
■well as in controlling the York and James rivers for the protection of our 
flanks, and the use of the transports bringing supplies to the army. With 
these expectations, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my ori- 
ginal plan of moving by Urbana and West Point was abandoned, and the 
line with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In the arrangements for the 
transportation of the army to the Peninsula by water, the vessels were ori- 
ginally ordered to rendezvous mainly at Annapolis; but upon the evacuation 
of Manassas and the batteries of the lower Potomac by the enemy, it became 
more convenient to embark the troops and material at Alexandria, and orders 
to that etiect were at once given. 

In making the preliminary arrangements for the movement it was de- 
termined that the first corps. General McDowell's, should move as a unit 
first, and effect a landing either at the Sand-box, some four miles south of 
Yorktown, in order to turn all the enemy's defences at Ship point, Howard's 
bridge, Big Bethel, &c., or else, should existing circumstances render it pre- 
ferable, land on the Gloucester side of York river and move on West Point. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 73 

The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. In order, 
therefore, to expedite matters, I decided to embark the army by divisions, 
as transports arrived, keeping- army corps together as much as possible, and 
to collect the troops at Fort Monroe. In determining the order of embarca- 
tion, convenience and expedition were especially consulted, except that the 
first corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to move it in mass to its 
point of disembarcation, and to land it on either bank of the York, as might 
then be determined. 

On the 11th of March Hamilton's division, of the 3d corps, embarked at 
Alexandria and proceeded to Fort Monroe, with the following orders : 

"Washington, D. C, 3Iarch 11, 1862. 

" You will, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, report to General Wool and 
request him to assign you ground for encamping your division. You will 
remain at Fort Monroe until further orders from General McClellan. Should 
General Wool require the services of your division in repelling an attack, 
you will obey his orders and use every effort to carry out his views. 

"R. B. MARCY, 

" Chief of Staff . 
" General C. S. Hamilton, 

" Commanding Division." 

On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, General Fitz- 
John Porter's division, of the same corps, embai'ked. General Heintzelman 
was ordered to accompany it, under the following instructions : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Seminary, March 22, 1862. 

" General : Upon the disembarcation of Porter's division at Fort Monroe, 
I have to request that you will move your two divisions. Porter's and Ham- 
ilton's, some three or four miles out from the fort to find good camping places, 
where wood and water can be readily obtained, and where your positions 
will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it advisable to 
place one division on or near the road leading to Yorktown from Newport 
News — the other upon that leading to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe. 
If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy communication 
and mutual support between the two divisions, it will be best to place one 
on each road. It will be best to remain pretty near the fort for the present, 
in order to give the impression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather 
than Yorktown. You will do well, however, to push strong reconnoissances 
well to the front to ascertain the position of the enemy and his pickets. I 
will, as soon as possible, re-enforce you by the 3d division of your corps, and 
it is probable that a part or the whole of the 4th corps will also move from 
Fort Monroe. This will probably be determined before your disembarcation 
is completed, and you will be informed accordingly. 

" Aly desire would be to make no important move in advance until we 
are fully prepared to follow it up and give the enemy no time to recover. 

"The quartermaster of your corps will receive detailed instructions in 
regard to land transportation from General Van Vliet. 

" It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least possible delay, 
and have it prepared for an advance. I have directed extra clothing, 
ammunition, &c., to be sent to Fort Monroe, so that all deficiencies may be 
supplied without delay. 

" Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of things on the 
new field of operations, and whatever intelligence you gain as to the enemy. 



74 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

" Engage guides in sufficient numbers at once, and endeavor to send out 
spies. 

" I am very trnly yours, 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
^' Major General, Commanding. 
"Brigadier General S. P. Heixtzelman, 

" Commanding od Corps." 

The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports could be sup- 
plied. 

On the 1st of April I embarked with the headquarters on the steamer 
Commodore, and reached Fort Monroe on the afternoon of the 2d. 

In consequence of the dela}^ in the arrival of the horse transports at 
Alexandria, but a small portion of the cavalry had arrived, and the artillery 
reserve had not yet completed its disembarcation. 

I found there the 3d Pennsylvania cavalry and the 5th regular cavahy; 
the 2d regular cavalry and a portion of the 1st had arrived, but not dis- 
embarked. So few wagons had arrived that it was not possible to move 
Casey's division at all for several days, while the other divisions were 
obliged to move with scant supplies. 

As to the force and position of the enemy the information then in our 
possession was vague and untrustworthy. Much of it was obtained from 
the staff officers of General Wool, and was simply to the effect that York- 
town was surrounded by a continuous line of earthworks, with strong water 
batteries on the York river, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, 
under command of General J. B. Magruder. Maps, which had been pre- 
pared by the topographical engineers under General Wool's command, were 
furnished me, in which the Warwick river was represented as flowing par- 
allel to, but not crossing, the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, 
making the so-called Mulberry island a real island ; and we had no infor- 
mation as to the true course of the Warwick across the Peninsula, nor of 
the formidable line of works which it covered. 

Information which I had collected during the winter placed General 
Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, independently of Gen- 
eral Huger's force at Norfolk, estimated at about 15,000. 

It was also known that there were strong defensive works at or near 
Williamsburg. 

Knowing that General Huger could easily spare some troops to re-enforce 
Yorktown, that he had indeed done so, and that Johnston's army of Ma- 
nassas could be brought rapidly by the James and York rivers to the same 
point, I proposed to invest that town without delay. 

The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, U. S. topographical engineers, 
attached to General Wool's staff, given to me as the result of several 
months' labor, indicated the feasibility of the design. It was also an object 
of primary importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown before the enemy 
was re-euforced sufficiently to enable him to hold in force his works at Big 
Bethel, Howard's bridge. Ship point, &c., on the direct road to Yorktown 
and Young's mills, on the road from Newport News. This was the more 
urgent, as it was now evident that some days must elapse before the first 
corps could arrive. 

Everj'thing possible was done to hasten the disembarcation of the 
cavalry, artillery and wagons in the harbor ; and on the 3d the orders of 
march were given for the following day. 

There were at Fort Monroe and in its vicinity on the 3d, ready to move, 
two divisions of the 3d corps, two divisions of the 4th corps, and one 
division of the 2d corps, and Sykes's brigade of regular infantry, together 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEOEGE B. m'clELLAN. 75 

■with Hunt's artillery reserve and the regiments of cavalry before named, in 
all about 58,000 men and 100 guns, besides the division of artillery. 

Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of the 2d and 3d corps bad not ar- 
rived, and Casey's division of the 4th corps w^as unable to move for want of 
wagons. 

Before I left Washington an order had been issued b}' the War Depart- 
ment placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies under my control, and au- 
thorizing me to draw from the troops under General Wool a division of 
about 10,000 men, which was to be assigned to the 1st corps. 

During the niglit of the 3d I received a telegram from the Adjutant 
General of the army, stating that, by the President's order, I was deprived 
of all control over General Wool and the troops under his command, and for- 
bidden to detach any of his troops without his sanction. 

This order left me without any base of operations under my own control, 
and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which led to it. 

On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James river was declared by the naval 
authorities closed to the operations of their vessels by the combined in- 
fluence of the enemy's batteries on its banks and the confederate steamers 
Merrimack, Yoi'ktown, Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag-Officer Goldsborough, 
then in command of the United States squadron in Hampton roads, regarded 
it (and no doubt justly) as his highest and most imperative duty to watch 
and neutralize the Merrimack ; and as he designed using his most powerful 
vessels in a contest with her, he did not feel able to detach to the assistance 
of the army a suitable force to attack the water batteries at Yorktown and 
Gloucester. All tliis was contrary to what had been previously stated to 
me, and materially affected my plans. 

At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the navy pre- 
pared to lend us any material assistance in its reduction until after our laud 
batteries had partially silenced the workS; 

1 had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements, to drive before me or 
capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the James river, and press on to 
Richmond before he should be materially re-enforced from other portions of 
the territory. As the narrative proceeds the causes will be developed 
which frustrated these apparently well-grounded expectations. 

I determined then to move the two divisions of the 4th corps by the New- 
port News and Williamsburg road, to take up a position between Yorktown 
and Williamsburg, while the two divisions of the 3d corps moved direct 
from Fort Monroe upon Yorktown ; the reserves moving so as to support 
either corps as might prove necessary. I designed, should the works at 
Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious resistance, to land the 1st 
corps, re-enforced if necessary, on the left bank of the York or on the Severn, 
to move it on Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse what- 
ever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and compel him to 
abandon his positions. 

In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, serious diffi- 
culties were encountered from the want of precise topographical information 
as to the country in advance. Correct local maps were not to be found, and 
the country, though known in its general feature, we found to be inaccu- 
rately described in essential particulars in the only maps and geographical 
memoirs or papers to which access could be had. Erroneous courses to 
streams and roads were frequently given, and no dependence could be 
placed on the information thus derived. This difficulty has been found to 
exist with respect to most portions of the State of Virginia, through which 
my military operations have extended. Reconnoissances, frequently under 
fire proved the only trustworthy sources of information. Negroes, however 



76 EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

truthful their reports, possessed or were able to communicate very little 
accurate and no comprehensive topographical information. 
On the 3d the following orders were given for the movement of the 4th : 

" Porter's and Hamilton's divisions and Averill's cavalry of the 3d corps, 
and Sedgwick's division of the 2d corps, under Brigadier General Heintzel- 
man, commanding 3d corps, will move to-morrow in the following order: 
Porter's division with Averill's cavalry at 6 a. m., over the Newmarket and 
New bridges to Big Bethel and Howard's bridge. This division will send 
forward to the batteries where the Ship Point road intersects the main York- 
town road a sufficient force to hold that point, and cut off the garrison of 
the Ship Point batteries. The whole division may be used for this purpose 
if necessary, and if possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops 
to-morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this purpose will 
encamp at Howard's bridge. 

"Hamilton's division will march at 1 a. m. by the New bridge road to Big 
Bethel, and will encamp on Howard's creek. 

" Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a. m. by the Newmarket bridge, 
taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will also encamp at Hov/ard's 
bridge. 

"Brigadier General Keyes, commanding 4th corps, will move with Smith's 
and Couch's divisions at 6 a. m., (Smith's division in advance,) by the James 
river road. The 5th regular cavalry, temporarily assigaed to this corps, 
will move with Smith's division, which will encamp at Young's mills, throw- 
ing forward at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to Warwick. 
Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's creek. 

"The reserve cavalry, artillery and infantry will move at 8.30 a. m., by 
the Newmarket bridge, to Big Bethel, where it will encamp. On the march 
it will keep in rear of Sedgwick's division." 

The following is an extract from the order issued on the 4th for the march 
of the 5th: 

" The following movements of the army will be carried out to-morrow (5th:) 

" General Keyes will move forward Smith's division at 6 a. m., via War- 
wick Court House and the road leading near the old ship yard, to the 'Half- 
way House' on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road. 

" General Couch's division will march at 6 a. m., to close up on General 
Smith's division at the ' Halfway House.' 

" General Keyes's command will occupy and hold the narrow dividing 
ridge near the ' Halfway House,' so as to prevent the escape of the garri- 
son at Yorktown by land, and prevent re-enforcements being thrown in. 

" General Heintzelman will move forward General Porter's two rear 
brigades at 6 a. m., upon the advanced guard, when the entire division will 
advance to a point about two and three-quarters miles from Yorktown, 
where the road turns abruptly to the north, and where a road comes in from 
Warwick Court House. 

"General Hamilton's division will move at 6 a.m., and follow General 
Porter's division, camping as neaf it as possible. 

" General Sedgwick's division will march at 5 a. m., as far as the Warwick 
road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Doctor Powers's house, and 
will await further orders. 

"The reserve will march at 6 a. ra., upon the main Yorktown road, halting 
for further orders at Doctor Powers's house; the infantry leading, the artillery 
following next, and the cavalry in rear. 

" General Sedgwick's division will, for the present, act with the reserve, 
and he will receive orders from headquarters." 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 77 

In givinp: these orders of inarch for the 4th and 5th, it was expected that 
there would be no serious opposition at Big Bethel, and that the advance 
of the 3d c(n-ps beyond that point would force the enemy to evacuate the 
works at Young's mills, while our possession of the latter would make it 
necessary for him to abandon those at Howard's bridge, and the advance 
thence on Yorktown would place Ship point in our possession, together with 
its garrison, unless they abandoned it promptly. The result answered the 
expectation. 

During the afternoon of the 4th, General Keyes obtained information of 
the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy in a strong position at 
Lee's mills. The nature of that position in relation to the Warwick not 
being at that time understood, I instructed General Keyes to attack and 
carry this position upon coming in front of it. 

Early in the afternoon of the 5th the advance of each column was brought 
to a halt, that of Heintzelman (Porter's division) in front of Yorktown, after 
overcoming some resistance at Big Bethel and Howard's bridge; that of 
Keyes (Smith's division) unexpectedly before the enemy's works at Lee's 
mills, where the road from Newport News to Williamsburg crosses War- 
wick river. 

The progress of each column had been retarded by heavy rains on that 
day, which had made the roads almost impassable to the infantry of Keyes's 
column, and impassable to all but a small portion of the artillery, while the 
ammunition, provisions and forage could not be brought up at all. 

When General Keyes approached Lee's mills his left flank was exposed to 
a sharp artillery fire from the further bank of the Warwick, and upon reach- 
ing the vicinity of the mill he found it altogether stronger than was ex- 
pected, unapproachable by reason of the Warwick river, and incapable of 
being carried by assault. 

The troops composing the advance of each column were, during _ the 
afternoon, under a-warm'artillery fire, the sharpshooters even of the right 
column being engaged when covering reconnoissances. 

It was at this stage and moment of the campaign that the following tele- 
gram was sent tome: 

" Adjutant General's Office, 

" Aj^'il 4, 1862. 

" By direction of the President, General McDowell's army corps has been 
detached from the force under your immediate command, and the general 
is ordered to report to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail. 

"L. THOMAS, 

"Adjutant General. 
" General McClellan." 

The President having promised, in an interview following his order of 
March 31, withdrawing Blenker's division of 10,000 men from my command, 
that nothing of the sort should be repeated— that I might rest assured that 
the campaign should proceed, with no further deductions from the force 
upon which its operations had been planned— I may confess to having been 
shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st ultimo and that of the 3d, 
removed nearly 60,000 men from my command, and reduced my force by 
more than one-third, after its task had been assigned; its operations planned; 
its fighting begun. To me the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated 
all my plans for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply com- 
mitted to withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations which 
had been begun. It compelled the adoption of another, a diiferent and a 
less efiTective plan of campaign. It made rapid and brilliant operations im- 
possible. It was a fatal error. 



78 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

It was now, of course, out of my power to turn Yorktown by West Point. 
I had, tlierefore, no choice left but to attack it directly in front, as I best 
could with the force at my command. 

Reconnoissances made under fire on that and the following day deter- 
mined that the sources of the "Warwick river were near Yorktown, com- 
manded by its g'uns, while that stream, for some distance from its mouth on 
the James river, was controlled by the confederate gunboats; that the fords 
had been destroyed by dams, the approaches to which were generally through 
dense forests and deep swamps, and defended by extensive and formidable 
works; that timber felled for defensive purposes and the flooding of the roads, 
caused by the dams, had made these works apparently inaccessible and im- 
possible to turn; that Yorktown was strongly fortified, armed and garri- 
soned, and connected with the defences of the Warwick by forts and in- 
trenchments, the ground in front of which was swept by the guns of York- 
town. It was also ascertained that the garrisons had been, and were daily 
being re-enforced by troops from Norfolk and the army under General J. E. 
Johnston. Heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe impassable, and 
delayed the arrival of troops, ammunition and supplies, while storms pre- 
vented for several days the sailing of transports from Hampton roads, and 
the establishment of depots on the creeks of York river, near the army. 

The ground bordering the Warwick river is covered by very dense and 
extensive forests, the clearings being small and few. This, with the com- 
parative flatness of the country, and the alertness of the enemy, everywhere 
in force, rendered thorough reconnoissances slow, dangerous and difficult, 
yet it was impossible otherwise to determine whether an assault was any- 
where practicable, or whether the more tedious but sure operations of a 
siege must be resorted to. 

I made, on the 6th and tth, close personal reconnoissances of the right 
and left of the enemy's positions, which, with information acquired already, 
convinced me that it was best to prepare for an assault b}'' the preliminary 
employment of heavy guns, and some siege operations. Instant assault 
would have been simple folly. On the 7th I telegraphed to the President as 
follows: 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"April 7, 1862. 

" Your telegram of yesterday is received. In reply, I have the honor to 
state that my entire force for duty amounts to only about (85,000) eighty- 
five thousand men. General Wool's command, as you will observe from the 
accompanying order, has been taken out of my control, although he has most 
cheerfully co-operated with me. The only use that can be made of his com- 
mand is to protect my communications in rear of this point. At this time 
only fifty-three thousand men have joined me, but they are coming up as 
rapidly as my means of transportation will permit. 

" Please refer to niy despatch to the Secretary of War to-night, for the 
details of our present situation. 

" GEO. B. McOLELLAN, 

" Major GeneraL 

" To the President, Washington, D. C." 

On the same day I sent the following: 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"In front of Yorktown, 
" April 7, 1862—7 p. m. 

" Your telegram of yesterday arrived here while I was absent, examining 
the enemy's right, which I did pretty closely. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN, 79 

"The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within a mile of 
Yorktown, is strongly defended by detached redoubts and other fortifica- 
tions, armed with heavy and light guns. The approaches, except at York- 
town, are covered by the Warwick, over which there is but one, or, at most, 
two passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It will be 
necessary to resort to the use of heavy guns, and some siege operations, 
before we assault. All the prisoners state that General J. E. Johnston 
arrived at Yorktown yesterday with strong re-enforceraents. It seems clear 
that I shall liave the whole force of the enemy on my hands — probably not 
less than (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and probably more. In con- 
sequence of the loss of Blenker's division and the 1st corps, my force is pos- 
sibly less than that of the enemy, while they have all the advantage of 
position. 

" I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the whole force 
and material of the government will be as fully and as speedily under my 
command as heretofore, or as if the new departments had not been created. 

"Since my arrangements were made for this campaign, at least (50,000) 
fifty thousand men have been taken from my command. Since my despatch 
of the 5th inst., five divisions have been in close observation of the enemy, 
and frequently exchanging shots. When my present command all joins, I 
sliall have about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from which a 
large force must be taken for guards, scouts, &c. With this army, I could 
assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry them; but were I in pos- 
session of their intrenchments, and assailed by double my numbers, I should 
have no fears as to the result. 

" Under the circumstances that have been developed since we arrived 
here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction that here is to be fought the 
great battle that is to decide the existing contest. I shall, of course, com- 
mence the attack as soon as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in 
my power to carry the enemy's works, but to do this with a reasonable de- 
gree of certainty requires, in my judgment, that I should, if possible, have 
at least the whole of the 1st corps to land upon the Severn river and attack 
Gloucester in the rear. 

" My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient for this 
purpose, without materially impairing the efficiency of this column. Flag- 
Uflficer Goldsborough thinks the works too strong for his available vessels, 
unless I can turn Gloucester. I send, by mail, copies of his letter and one 
of the commander of the gunboats here. 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

I had provided a small siege train and moderate supplies of intrenching 
tools for such a contingency as the present. Immediate steps were taken 
to secure the necessary additions. While the engineer officers were engaged 
in ascertaining the character and strength of all the defences, and the con- 
figuration of the ground in front of Yorktown, in order to determine the 
point of attack and to develop the approaches, the troops were occupied in 
opening roads to the depots established at the nearest available points, on 
branches of York river. Troops were brought to the front as rapidly as 
possible, and on the 10th of April the army was posted as follows : 

Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, Hooker's, and Hamilton's divi- 
sions, in front of Yorktown, extending in the order named, from the mouth 
of Wormley's creek to the Warwick road, opposite Winn's mills. Sumner's 
corps — Sedgwick's division only having arrived — on the left of Hamilton, 



80 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

extending down to Warwick and opposite to Winn's mills works. Keyes's 
corps (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) on the left of Sedgwick, 
facing the works at the one-gun battery, Lee's mills, &c., on the west bank 
of the Warwick. Sumner, after the 6th of April, commanded the left wing, 
composed of his own and Keyes's corps. 

Throughout the preparations for, and during the siege of Yorktown, I 
kept the corps under General Keyes, and afterwards the left wing, under 
General Sumner, engaged in ascertaining the character of the obstacles 
presented by the Warwick, and the enemy intrenched upon the right bank, 
wn'th the intention, if possible, of overcoming them and breaking that line of 
defence, so as to gain possession of the road to Williamsburg, and cut off 
Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces under General Heint- 
zeltnan were engaged in similar efKjrts upon the works between Winn's 
mills and Yorktown. General Keyes's report of the 16th of April, enclosing 
reports of brigade commanders engaged in reconiioissances up to that day, 
said, " that no part of his (the enemy's line opposite his own) line, so far as 
discovered, can be taken by assault without an enormous waste of life." 

Reconnoissances on the right flank demonstrated the fact tliat the War- 
wick was not passable in that direction, except over a narrow dam, the 
approaches to which were swept by several batteries, and intrenchments 
which could be filled quickly with supports sheltered by the timber immedi- 
ately in rear. 

General Barnard, chief engineer of the army of the Potomac, whose posi- 
tion entitled his opinions to the highest consideration, expressed the judg- 
ment that those formidable works could not, with any reasonable degree of 
certainty, be carried by assault. General Keyes, commanding 4th army 
corps, after the examination of the enemy's defences on tfie left, before 
alluded to, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira Harris, United 
States Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not strictly oflBcial, it de- 
scribes the situation at that time in some respects so well, that I have taken 
the liberty of introducing it here: ^^ 

" Headquarters 4th Corps, 
" Warioich Court House, Va., April 1, 1S62. 

"My Dear Senator : The plan of campaign on this line was made with the 
distinct understanding that /our army corps should be employed, and that 
the navy should co-operate in the taking of Yorktown, and also (as I under- 
stood it) support us on our left by moving gunboats up James river. 

"To-day I have learned that tlie 1st corps, which by the President's or- 
der was to embrace four divisions, and one division (Blenker's) of the 2d 
corps, have been withdrawn altogether from this line of operations, and from 
the army of the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the navy 
has not the means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gunboats up 
James river, for fear of the Merrimack. 

" The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by Major General 
McDowell and Brigadier Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, and 
was concurred in by Major General McClellan, who first proposed Urbana 
as our base. 

"This army being reduced by forty-five thousand troops, some of them 
among the best in the service, and without the support of the navy, the 
plan to which we are reduced bears scarcely any resemblance to the one I 
voted for. 

" I command the James river column, and I left my camp near Newport 
News the morning of the 4th instant. I only succeeded in getting my 
cirtillery ashore the afternoon of the day before, and one of my divisions had 
1 ot all arrived in camp the day I left, and for the want of transportation 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 81 

has not yet joined me. So you will observe that not a day was lost in the 
advance, and in fact we marched so quickly, and so rapidly, that many of 
our animals were twenty-four and forty-eight hours without a ration of 
forage. But notwithstanding the rapidity of our advance, we were stopped 
by a line of defence nine or ten miles long, strongly fortitied by breast- 
works, erected nearly the whole distance behind a stream, or succession of 
ponds, nowhere fordable, one terminus being Yorktown, and the other ending 
in the James river, which is commanded by the enemy's gunboats. York- 
town is fortified all around with bastioned works, and on the water side it 
and Gloucester are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack either. 

" The approaclies on one side are generally through low, swampy, or 
thickly wooded ground, over roads which we are obliged to repair or to 
make before we can get forward our carriages. The enemy is in great 
force, and is constantly receiving re-enforcements from the two rivers. The 
line in front of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an in- 
vading force in an}'- country. 

" You will, then, ask why I advocated such a line for our operations ? My 
reasons are few, but I think good. 

" With proper assistance from the navy we could take Yorktown, and 
then with gunboats on both rivers we could beat any force opposed to us 
on Warwick river, because the shot and shell from the gunboats would 
nearly overlap across the Peninsula ; so that if the enemy should retreat — 
and retreat he must — he would have along way to go without rail or steam 
transportation, and every soul of his army must fall into our hands or be 
destro^^ed. 

"Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan was, that this 
line, it was expected, would furnish water transportation nearly to Rich- 
mond. 

" Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in front of ns, 
what can we do next? The roads are very bad, and if the enemy retains 
command of James river, and we do not first reduce Yorktown, it would be 
impossible for us to subsist this army three marches beyond where it is now. 
As the roads are at present, it is with the utmost difficulty that we can 
subsist it in the position it now occupies. 

"You will see, therefore, by what I have said, that the force originally 
intended for the capture of Richmond should be all sent forward. If I 
thought the four army corps necessary when I supposed the navy would 
co-operate, and when I judged of the obstacles to be encountered by what I 
learned from maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort 
Monroe, and from all other sources, how much more should I think the full 
complement of troops requisite now that the navy cannot co-operate, and 
now that the strength of the enemy's lines and the number of his guns and 
men prove to be almost immeasurably greater than I had been led to expect. 
The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men here, who are at 
all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world, and the force of 
the enemy capable of being increased beyond the numbers we now have to 
oppose to hiin. Independently of the strength of the lines in front of us, and 
of the force of the enemy behind them, we cannot advance until we get 
command of either York river or James river. The efficient co-operation of 
the navy is, therefore, absolutely essential, and so I considered it when I 
voted to change our base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe. 

" An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown; and if several strong gunboats 
could be sent up James river also, our success will be certain and complete, 
and the rebellion will soon be put down. 

"On the other hand, we must butt against the enemy's works with heavy 
artillery, and a great waste of time, life, and material. 
H. Ex. Doc. 15 6 



82 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

"If we break through and advance, both our flanks will be assailed from 
two great water-courses in the hands of the enemy ; our supplies would 
give out, and the enemy, equal if not superior in numbers, would, with the 
other advantages, beat and destroy this army. 

"The greatest master of the art of war has said, 'that if you would in- 
vade a country successfully you must have one line of operations, and one 
army, under one general.' But what is our condition ? The State of Vir- 
ginia is made to constitute the command, in part or wholly, of some six gen- 
erals, viz : Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, 
besides the scrap over the Chesapeake, in the care of Dix. 

" The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win it, the rebel- 
lion will be crushed — if we lose it, the consequences will be more horrible 
than I care to tell. The plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out with 
the means proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the means pro- 
posed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to say that our 
success will be uncertain. 

"It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the 1st corps to have a 
separate department, and as this letter advocates his return to General 
McClellan's command, it is proper to state that I am not at all influenced by 
personal regard or dislike to any of my seniors in rank. If I were to credit 
all the opinions which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that, 
in regard to my present fine command, I owe much to General McDowell and 
nothing to General McClellan. But I have disregarded all such officiousness, 
and I have from last July to the present day supported General McClellan, 
and obeyed all his orders with as hearty a good will as though he had been 
my brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall continue to do so 
to the last, and so long as he is my commander. And I am not desirous to 
displace him, and would not if I could. He left Washington with the un- 
derstanding that he was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain 
prescribed means. The plan was good and the means sufficient, and with- 
out modification the enterprise was certain of success. But with the reduc- 
tion of force and means, the plan is entirely changed, and is now a bad plan, 
with means insuSicient for certain success. 

" Do not look upon this communication as the offspring of despondency. 
I never despond ; and when you see me working the hardest, you may be 
sure that fortune is frowning upon me. I am working now to my utmost, 

" Please show this letter to the President, and I should like also that Mr. 
Stanton should know its contents. Do me the honor to write to me as soon 
as you can, and believe me, with perfect respect, 
" Your most obedient servant, 

"E. D. KEYES, 
" Brigadier General, Commanding ith Army Corps. 

" Hon. Ira Harris, U. S. Senate." 

On the 7th of April, and before the arrival of the divisions of Generals 
Hooker, Richardson and Casey, I received the following despatches from the 
President and Secretary of War : 

"Washington, April 6, 1862 — S p. m. 

" Yours of 11 a. m. to-day received. Secretary of War informs me that 
the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, and Woodbury's brigade, 
uader your orders, is not, and will not be, interfered with. You now have 
over one hundred thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's 
command. I think you better break the enemy's line from Yorktown to 
Warwick river at once. This will probably use time as advantageously as 
you can. 

" A. LINCOLN, President. 

" General G. B., McClellan." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 83 



"Washington, April 6, 1862 — 2 p. m. 
*' The President directs me to say that your despatch to him has been 
received. General Sumner's corps is on the road to join you, and will go 
forward as fast as possible. Franklin's division is now on the advance 
towards Manassas. There is no means of transportation here to send it 
forward in time to be of service in your present operations. Tele- 
graph frequently, and all in the power of the government shall be done to 
sustain yoa as occasion may require. 

"E.M.STANTON, 

" Secretary of War, 
" General G. B. McClellan." 

By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty good knowledge of the posi- 
tion and strength of the enemy's works, and the obstacles to be overcome. 
On that day I received the following letter from the President : 

" Washington, April 9, 1862. 

" My Dear Sir : Your despatches complaining that you are not properly 
sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain me very much. 

" Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before you left here, and 
you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as I thought, acquiesced 
in it — certainly not without reluctance, 

" After you left I ascertained that less than 20,000 unorganized men, 
without a single field battery, were all you designed to be left for the de- 
fence of Washington and Manassas Junction, and part of this even was to 
goto General Hooker's old position. General Banks's corps, once designed for 
Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line of Winchester and 
Strasburg, and could not leave it without again exposing the upper Poto- 
mac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad. This presented, or would pre- 
sent, when McDowell and Sumner should be gone, a great temptation to 
the enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack Washington. 
My implicit order that Washington should, by the judgment of all the com- 
manders of army corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglected. It was 
precisely this that drove me to detain McDowell. 

" I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement to leave 
Banks at Manassas Junction ; but when that arrangement was broken up, 
and nothing was substituted for it, of course I was constrained to substi- 
tute something for it myself. And allow me to ask, do you really think I 
should permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this city, 
to be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by less than 
20,000 unorganized troops ? This is a question which the country will not 
allow me to evade. 

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. 
When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying you had over a hundred. thou- 
sand with you, I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement 
taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you 
and en route to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en 
route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrepancy of 23,000 
be accounted for ? 

"As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely * 
what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was 
away. 

" I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you is with you 
by this time. And if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a 
blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you— that is, he will 



84 REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than yon can by re-enforce- 
ments alone. And once more let me tell j'oii, it is indispensable to you that 
you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the jus- 
tice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a 
field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting, and not 
surmounting, a difiiculty ; that we would find the same enemy, and the 
same or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not fail to 
note, is now noting, that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched 
enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated. 

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in 
greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain 
you, so far as, in my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you 
must act. 

" Yours, very truly, 

"A. LINCOLN. 

" Major General McClellan." 

With great deference to the opinions and wishes of his excellency the 
President, I most respectfully beg leave to refer to the facts which I have 
presented and those contained in the accompanying letter of Greueral Keyes, 
with the reports of General Barnard and other officers, as furnishing a 
reply to the above letter. His excellency could not judge of the formidable 
character of the works before us as well as if he had been on the ground ; 
and whatever might have been his desire for prompt action, (certainly no 
greater than mine,) I feel confident if he could have made a personal inspec- 
tion of the enemy's defences, he would have forbidden me risking the safety 
of the army and the possible successes of the campaign on a sanguinary 
assault of an advantageous and formidable position, which, even if success- 
ful, could not have been followed up to any other or better result than 
would have been reached by the regular operations of a siege. Still less 
could I forego the conclusions of my most instructed judgment for the 
mere sake of avoiding the personal consequences intimated in the Presi- 
dent's despatch. 

The following extracts from the report of the chief engineer (Brigadier 
General J. G. Barnard) embody the result of our reconnoissances, and give, 
with some degree of detail, the character and strength of the defences of 
Yorktown and the Warwick, and some of the obstacles which the army 
contended against and overcame. 

Extracts from General Barnard's report. 

"The accompanying drawing (map No. 2) gives with accuracy the out- 
line and armament of the fortifications of Yorktown proper, with the de- 
tached works immediately connected with it. 

" The three bastioned fronts, looking towards our approaches, appear to 
have been earliest built, and have about fifteen feet thickness of parapet 
and eight feet to ten feet depth of ditch, the width varying much, but never 
being less at top of scarp than fifteen feet — I think generally much more. 

"The works extending around the town, from the western salient of 
fronts just mentioned, appear to have been finished during the past winter 
and spring. They have formidable profiles, eighteen feet thickness of 
parapet, and generallj'- ten feet depth of ditch. 

" The water batteries had generally eighteen feet parapet, the guns in 
barbette. 

" They were (as well as all the works mentioned) carefully constructed/ 
with well-made sod revetments. » 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 85 

"There were numerous traverses between the guns, and ample magazines ; 
how sufficient in bomb-proof qualities I am unable to sny. 

" The two first guns of the work on the heights bear upon the water as 
well as the land, and were of heavy calibre. 

" The list herewith gives all the guns in position, or for which there were 
emplacements. The vacant emplacements were all occupied before the 
evacuation by siege guns, rifled 4jinch 24-pounders, and 18-pounders. 

"In Fort Magruder (the first exterior work) there were found one 8-inch 
columbiad, one 42-pounder, and one 8-inch siege howitzer; the two former in 
barbette. The sketch will show the emplacements for guns on field and 
siege carriages; making, I think, with the foregoing, tvvent3'-two. Two of 
these were placed behind traverses, with embrasures covered by blindages. 

" The two external redoubts, with the connecting parapets, formed a 
re-entrant with the fronts of attack, and all the guns bore on our ap- 
proaches. 

" It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept by the fire of 
at least forty-nine guns, nearly all of which were heavy, and many of them, 
the most formidable guns known. Besides that, two-thirds of the guns of the 
water batteries and all the guns of Gloucester bore on our right batteries, 
though under disadvantageous circumstances. 

"The ravine behind wliich the left of the Yorktown fronts of attack was 
placed was not very difficult, as the heads formed depressions in front of 
their left, imperfectly seen by their fire, and from which access could be 
had to the ditches; but we could not be sure of the fact before the evacua- 
tion. The enemy held, b}' means of a slight breastwork and rifle trenches, 
a position in advance of the heads of these ravines as far forward as the 
burnt house. 

"The ravines which head between the Yorktown fortifications and the 
exterior works are deep and intricate. They were tolerably well seen, how- 
ever, by the works which run westwai'dly from the Yorktown works, and 
which were too numerous and complicated to be traced on paper. 

" Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to have been built 
at an early period. 

" The external connexion between this work was first a rifle trench, pro- 
bably afterwards enlarged into a parapet, with external ditch and an em- 
placement for four guns in or near the small redan in the centre. 

"Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulments, with connecting 
boyaus not fully arranged for infantry fires, and mainly intended probably 
to protect their camps and reserves against the destructive effects of our 
artillery. 

"From the 'red redoubt' these trenches and epaulments ran to the woods 
and rivulet which forms one head of the Warwick, and continue almost 
without break to connect with the works at Wynn's mill. This stream, 
just mentioned, whatever be its name, (the term 'Warwick,' according to 
some, applying only to the tidal channel from the James river up as high 
as Lee's mill,) was inundated by a number of dams from near where its 
head is crossed by the epaulments mentioned down to Lee's mill. 

" Below Lee's mill the Warwick follows a tortuous course through salt 
marshes of two hundred yards or three hundred yards in width, from which 
the land rises up boldly to a height of thirty or forty feet. 

" The first group of works is at Wynn's mill, where there is a dam and 
bridge. The next is to guard another dam between AVynn's and Lee's 
mills; (this is the point attacked by General Smith on the 16th ultimo, and 
where Lieutenant Merrill was Avoundcd; the object of the attack was merely 
to prevent the further construction of works and feel the strength of the 
position.) A work, of what strength is not known, was at the sharp angle of 



86 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

the stream just above Lee's mill, and a formidable group of works was at 
Lee's mill, where there was also a dam and bridge. 

" From Lee's mill a line of works extends across Mulberry island, or is 
supposed to do so. 

" At Southal's landing is another formidable group of works, and from 
here, too, they extend apparently across to the James river. 

"These groups of field-works were connected by rifle trenches or parapets 
for nearly the whole distance. 

" They are far more extensive than may be supposed from the mention of 
of them I make, and every kind of obstruction which the country affords, 
such as abattis, marsh, inundation, &c., was skilfully used. The line is 
certainly one of the most extensive known to modern times. 

" The country on both sides of the Warwick, from near Yorktown down, 
is a dense forest with few clearings. It was swampy, and the roads impas- 
sable during the heavy rains we have constantly had, except where our own 
labors had corduroyed them. 

" If we could have broken the enemy's line across the isthmus we could 
have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its garrison, have soon fallen 
into our hands. It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength 
of that line and the difEculty of handling our forces, (owing to the imprac- 
ticable character of the country,) to do so. 

" If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of that place, the 
enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we could do by siege operations. 
It was deemed too hazardous to attempt the reduction of the place by assault." 

The plan of the approaches and their defences as determined upon and 
finally executed is exhibited on the accompanying map, (No. — .) It was, 
in words, to open the first parallel as near as possible to the works of the 
enemy, and under its protection to establish almost simultaneously batteries 
along the whole front, extending from York river on the right to the War- 
wick on the left, a cord of about one mile in length. The principal ap- 
proaches were directed against the east end of the main work, which was 
most heavily armed and bore both on the water and land, and lay between 
Wormley's creek and York river. There also were placed the most of the 
batteries designed to act against the land front to enfilade the water bat- 
teries, and to act upon Gloucester. 

I designed at the earliest moment to open simultaneously with several 
batteries, and as soon as the enemy's guns, which swept the neck of land 
between Wormley's creek and the Warwick, were crippled and their fire 
kept down, to push the trenches as far forward as necessary and to assault 
Yorktown and the adjacent works. 

The approaches to the batteries, the necessary bridges, and the roads to 
the depots, had been vigorously pushed to completion by the troops under 
Generals Heintzelman and Sumner, and were available for infantry, and in 
some instances for artillery, on the llth of April, when the batteries and 
their connexions were commenced, and labor upon them kept up night and 
day until finished. Some of the batteries on easy ground and concealed 
from the view of the enemy were early completed and armed, and held 
ready for any emergency, but not permitted to open, as the return fire of the 
enemy would interfere too much with the labor on other and more import- 
ant works. The completion of the more exposed and heaviest batteries 
was delayed by storms, preventing the landing of guns and ammunition. 

It having been discovered that the enemy were receiving artillery stores 
at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 1 battery No. 1 was opened with effect 
upon the wharf and town. 

On the 22d of April General Franklin, with his division from General 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 87 

McDowell's corps, had arrived and reported to me. The garrison of Glou- 
cester point had been re-enforced and the works strengthened; but as this 
division was too small to detach to the Severn, and no more troops could be 
spared, I determined to act on Gloucester by disembarking it on the north 
bank of the York river, under the protection of the gunboats. The troops 
wore mainly kept on board ship while the necessary preparations were 
made for landing them, and supporting them in case of necessity. For a 
full account of this labor I refer to the report of Lieutenant Colonel B. S. 
Alexander, of the engineer corps, detailed for this expedition. 

While the siege works were being rapidly completed, the roads on the left 
wing necessary for communication and advance were opened and cordu- 
royed over the marshes, batteries were erected to silence the enemy's guns, 
and drive him from his works at Wynn's and Lee's mills, preparatory to the 
general attack. Active reconnoissances were continually going on, and 
attempts in force made to drive the enemy from the banks. 

Tiie result of various reconnoissances made under the immediate direction 
of General W. F. Smith, commanding second division fourth corps, led to 
the belief that the weakest point of that part of the enemy's lines was oppo- 
site a field where it was ascertained that there was a dam covered by a bat- 
tery known to contain at least one gun. 

It was determined to push a strong reconnoissance on this point to silence 
the enemy's fire, and ascertain the actual strength of the position. Being 
prepared to sustain the reconnoitring party by a real attack, if found expe- 
dient. General W. F. Smi<:h was directed to undertake the operation on 
the 16th of April. He silenced the fire of the enemy's guns, discovered the 
existence of other works previously concealed and unknown, and sent a 
strong party across the stream, which was finally forced to retire with some 
loss. Smith intrenched himself in a position immediately overlooking the 
dam and the enemy's works, so as to keep them under control, and prevent 
the enemy from using the dam as a means of crossing the Warwick to an- 
noy us. 

Many times towards the end of the month the enemy attempted to drive in 
our pickets, and take our rifle-pits near Yorktown, but always without 
success. 

As the siege progressed, it was with great difficulty that the rifle-pits on 
the right could be excavated and held, so little covering could be made 
against the hot fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry. Their guns con- 
tinued firing up to a late hour of the night of the 3d of May. 

Our batteries would have been ready to open on the morning of the 6tli 
May at latest; but on the morning of the 4th it was discovered that the 
enemy had already been compelled to evacuate his position during the night, 
leaving behind him all his heavy guns, uninjured, and a large amount of 
ammunition and supplies. For the details of the labor of the siege I re- 
fer to the accompanying reports and journals of Brigadier General J. G. 
Barnard, chief engineer, charged with the selections, laying out, and com- 
pletion of the approaches and batteries; of Brigadier General Wm. F. 
Barry, chief of artillery, charged with arming and supplying with ammuni- 
tion all the siege and field batteries; and of Brigadier General Fitz-John 
Porter, director of the siege, to whom were assigned the guarding of the 
trenches, the assembling and distribution of the working parties, &c., &c. 

Early in the morning of the 4th, on the enemy's abandoning his lines at 
Yorktown, I ordered all the available cavalry force, with four batteries of 
horse artillery, under Brigadier General Stoneman, chief of cavalry, in im- 
mediate pursuit by the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, with orders to 
harass the enemy's rear, and try to cut off such of his forces as had taken 
the Lee's mill and Williamsburg road. 



88 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 

General Heintzelman was directed to send Hooker's division forward on 
the Yorktown and Williamsburg I'oad to support General Stoneman ; and 
Smith was ordered to proceed with his division upon the Lee's mill and 
Williamsburg road for the same purpose. Afterwards, the divisions of 
Generals Kearney, Couch, and Casey, were put eu route — the first on the 
Yorktown road, and the others on the Lee's mill road. These roads unite 
about a quarter of a mile south of Fort Magruder, and are connected by 
cross-roads at several points between Yorktown and Williamsburg. After 
these directions had been given, General Sumner (the officer second in rank 
in the army of the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front and take 
immediate charge of operations until my arrival. 

General Stoneman moved forward promptly with his command, consist- 
ing of four batteries of horse artillery under Lieutenant Colonel Hays, the 
1st and 6th United States cavalry, the Sd Pennsylvania and 8th Illinois, and 
Barker's squadron, meeting with but little opposition until he arrived in 
front of the enemy's works about two miles east of Williamsburg. 

At a point about eight miles from Yorktown, in accordance with my 
instructions, he detached General Emory with Benson's battery, the 3d 
Pennsylvania cavalry, (Colonel Averill,) and Barker's squadron, to gain the 
Lee's mill road, and endeavor, with the assistance of General Smith, to cut 
ofiF the portion of the enemy's rear guard which had taken that route. 
General Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a regiment of cavalry and 
a battery under General Stuart, and drove them in the direction of Lee's 
mill. 

General Smith having met with obstructions in his front, had transferred 
his column, by a cross-road, to the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, so 
that General Emory, finding no force to co-operate with him, was unable to 
cut off the rear guard, and they succeeded in escaping by a circuitous route 
along the bank of the James river. 

The position in which General Stoneman encountered the enemy is about 
four miles in extent, the right resting on College creek, and the left on 
Queen's creek; nearly three-fourths of its front being covered by '|;ributaries 
of these two creeks, upon which there are ponds. 

The ground between the heads of the boundary streams is a cultivated 
plain, across which a line of detached works had been constructed, consist- 
ing of Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bastion front, and 
twelve other redoubts and epaulments for field guns. 

The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six feet high and nine feet thick; 
the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, filled with water. The length 
of the interior crest is about 600 yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, 
but are of small dimensions, having faces of about forty yards. The woods is 
front of the position were felled, and the open ground in front of the works 
was dotted with numerous rifle-pits. 

The roads leading from the lower part of the Peninsula to Williamsburg, 
one along the York river, (the Yorktown road,) and the other along the 
James, (the Loe's mill road,) unite between the heads of the tributary 
streams a short distance in front of Fort Magruder, by which they are com- 
manded, and debouch from the woods just before uniting. A branch from 
the James river road leaves it about one and three-fourths of a mile below 
Fort Magruder and unites with the road from Allen's landing to Williams- 
burg, which crosses the tributary of College creek over a dam at the outlet 
of the pond, and passes just in rear of the line of works, being commanded 
by the three redoubts on the right of the line, at about the same distance from 
Fort Magruder. A branch leaves the York river road and crosses the tribu- 
tary of Queen's creek on a dam, and passing over the position and through 



REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 89 

the works in its rear, finally enters Williamsburg ; this road is commanded 
by redoubts on the left of the line of the works. 

General Stoneman debouched from the woods with his advance guard, 
(consisting of a part of the 1st United States cavalry, and one section of 
Gibson's battery, under the command of General Cooke,) and the enemy im- 
mediatel}' opened on him with several field-pieces from Fort Magruder, hav- 
ing the correct range, and doing some execution. Gibson's battery was 
brought into position as rapidly as the deep mud would permit, and returned 
the fire ; while the 6th United States cavalry was sent to feel the enemy's 
left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it found unoccupied, and 
appeared in the rear of a second, when a strong cavalry force, with infantry 
and artillery, came down upon it, whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. 
The rear squadron, under command of Captain Saunders, I'epelled a charge 
of the enemy's cavalry in the most gallant manner. In the mean time the 
enemy was being re-enforced by infantry ; and the artillery fire becoming 
very hot. General Stoneman, having no infantry to carry the works, 
ordered the withdrawal of the battery. This was accomplished, with the 
exception of one piece, which could not be extricated from the mud. The 
enemy attempted to prevent the movement, but their charges were met by 
the 1st United States cavalry, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Grier, 
and they were driven back, losing several officers and one stand of colors. 
General Stoneman then took a defensive position a short distance in the 
rear of the first, to await the arrival of the infantry. 

The advance of General Smith's column reached Skiff's creek about 11^ 
o'clock, and found the bridge over that stream in flames, and the road im- 
passable. A practicable route to the Yorktown road having been discov- 
ered, the division, by order of General Sumner, moved on by that road, and 
reached General Stoneman's position about 5| o'clock. General Sumner, 
arriving with it, assumed command. 

Generals Heintzelman and Keyes also arrived. During the afternoon of 
the 4th, near the Halfway House, the head of General Hooker's column 
encountered Smith's division filing into the road, and was obliged to halt 
between three and four hours until it had passed. General Hooker then 
followed on, and at Cheesecake church turned off, by General Heintzel man's 
direction, taking a cross-road, and moved out on the Lee's mill road, thus 
changing places with General Smith. Marching part of the night, he came 
in sight of Fort Magruder early in the morning of the 5th. 

General Smith's division having bcHU deployed. General Sumner ordered 
an attack on the works in his front ; but the lines having been thrown into 
confusion while moving through the dense forest, and darkness coming on, 
the attempt for that night was abandoned. The troops bivouacked in the 
woods, and a heavy rain began, which continued until the morning of the 
6th, making the roads, already in very bad condition, almost impassable. 

During the morning of the 5th General Sumner reconnoitfed the position 
in his front, and at 11 o'clock ordered Hancock's brigade, of Smith's division, 
to take possession of a work on the enemy's left, which had been found to 
be unoccupied. The remainder of Smith's division occupied the woods in 
front without being actually engaged. 

The divisions of Couch and Casey had received orders during the night 
to march at daylight ; but on account of the terrible condition of the roads, 
and other impediments, were not able to reach the field until after 1 o'clock 
p. m., at which time the first brigade of Couch's division arrived, and was 
posted in the centre, on Hooker's right. The other two brigades came up 
during the afternoon, followed by Casey's division. 

In the mean time General Hooker, having reconnoitred the enemy's po- 
sition, began the attack at 7^ a, ra., and for a while silenced the guns of 



90 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

Fort Ma^ruder, and cleared the ground in his front ; but the enemy being 
continually re-enforced, until their strength greatly exceeded his, made 
attack after attack, endeavoring to turn his left. 

For several hours his division struggled gallantly against the superior 
numbers of the enemy. Five guns of Webber's battery were lost, and be- 
tween three and four o'clock his ammunition began to give out. The loss 
had been heavy, and the exhaustion of Ihe troops was very great. At this 
time the division of General Kearney came up, who, at 9 a. m., had received 
orders to re-onforce Hooker, and who had succeeded, by the greatest exer- 
tions, in passing Casey's troops, and pushing on to the front through the 
deep mud. General Kearney at once gallantly attacked, and thereby pre- 
vented the loss of another battery, and drove the enemy back at every point, 
enabling General Hooker to extricate himself from his position, and with- 
draw his wearied troops. Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, as has been 
mentioned before, was, immediately on its arrival, ordered by General Sum- 
ner to deploy on Hooker's right. This was promptly done, and the attacks 
of the enem}^ at that point were repulsed. General Peck held his position 
until late in the afternoon, when he was relieved by the other two brigades 
of Couch's division, and they were in quiet possession of the ground when 
night closed the contest. The vigorous action of these troops relieved Gen- 
eral Hooker considerably. General Emory had been left with his command, 
on the night of the 4th, to guard the branch of the Lee's mill road which 
leads to Allen's farm ; and on the morning of the 5th it was ascertained 
that by this route the enemy's right could be turned. A request for infantry 
for this purpose was made to General Heintzelman, who, late in the after- 
noon, sent four regiments and two batteries of Kearney's division — the first 
disposable troops he had — and directed General Emory to make the attack. 
With these re-enforcements his force amounted to about 3,000 men and three 
batteries. General Emory, on account of want of knowledge of the ground, 
and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in this movement. It involved 
some risks, but, if successful, might have produced important results. 

At 11 a. m., as before mentioned. General Smith received orders from 
General Sumner to send one brigade across a dam on our right, to occupy a 
redoubt on the left of the enemy's line. Hancock's brigade was selected for 
this purpose. He crossed the dam, took possession of the first redoubt, and 
afterwards, finding the second one vacated, he occupied that also, and sent 
for re-enforceraents to enable him to advance further and take the next 
redoubt, which commanded the plain between his position and Fort Magru- 
der, and would have enabled him to take in reverse and cut the communi- 
cation of the troops engaged with Generals Hooker and Kearney, 

The enemy soon began to show himself in strength before him, and as his 
rear and right flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his request for 
re-enforcements. General Smith was twice ordered to join him, with the 
rest of his division, but each time the order was countermanded at the mo- 
ment of execution, General Sumner not being willing to weaken the centre. 
At length, in reply to General Hancock's repeated messages for more 
troops, General Sumner sent him an order to fall back to his first position, 
the execution of which General Hancock deferred as long as possible, being 
unwilling to give up the advantage already gained, and fearing to expose 
his command by such a movement. 

During the progress of these events, I had remained at Yorktown to com- 
plete the preparations for the departure of General Franklin's and other 
troops to West Point by water, and to make the necessary arrangements 
with the naval commander for his co-operation. 

By pushing General Franklin, well supported by water, to the right bank 
of the Pamuukey, opposite West Point, it was hoped to force the enemy to 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 91 

abandon whatever works he might have on the Peninsula below that point, 
or be cut off. It was of paramount importance that the arrangements to 
this end should be promptly made at an early hour of the morning. I had 
sent two of my aids (Lieutenant Colonel Sweitzer and Major Hammcrstein) 
to observe the operations in front, with instructions to report to me every- 
thing of importance that might occur. I received no information from them 
leading me to suppose that there was anything occurring of more importance 
than a simple affair of a rear-guard, uutil about one o'clock p. m., when a 
despatch arrived from one of them that everything was not progressing 
favorably. This was confirmed a few minutes later by the reports of Governor 
Sprague and Major Hammerstein, who came directly from the scene of 
action. 

Completing the necessary arrangements, I returned to my camp without 
delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance of some fourteen miles, through 
roads much obstructed by troops and wagons, and reached the field between 
four and five p. m., in time to take a rapid survey of the ground. I soon 
learned that there was no direct communication between our centre and 
the left under General Heintzelman; the centre was chiefly in the nearer 
edge of the woods, situated between us and the enemy. As heavy firing 
was heard in the direction of General Hancock's command, I immediately 
ordered General Smith to proceed with his two remaining brigades to sup- 
port that part of the line. General Naglee, with his brigade, received similar 
orders. I then directed our centre to advance to the further edge of the 
woods mentioned above, which was done, and I attempted to open direct 
communication with General Heintzelman, but was prevented by the marshy 
state of the gi'ound in the direction in which the attempt was made. 

Before Generals Smith and Naglee could reach the field of General Han- 
cock's operations, although they moved with great rapidity, he had been 
confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat glowly, he awaited their 
onset, and then turned upon them, and after some terrific volleys of musketry, 
he charged them with the bayonet, routing and dispersing their wliole force, 
killing, wounding, and capturing from 500 to 600 men, he himself losing 
only 31 men. 

This was one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, and General 
Hancock merits the liighest praise for the soldierly qualities displayed, and 
his perfect appreciation of the vital importance of his position. 

Night put an end to the operations here, and all the troops who had been 
engaged in this contest slept on the muddy field, without shelter, and many 
without food. 

Notwithstanding the report I received from General Heintzelman, during 
the night, that General Hooker's division had suffered so much that it could 
not be relied on next day, and that Kearney's could not do more than hold 
its own without re-enforcements — being satisfied that the result of Hancock's 
engagement was to give us possession of the decisive point of the battle- 
field during the night, I countermanded the order for the advance of the 
divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, and directed them to return to York- 
town, to proceed to West Point by water. 

Our loss during the day, the greater part of which was sustained by 
Hooker's division, was as follows: 

Killed, 456; wounded, 1,400; missing, 372; total, 2,228. 

On the next morning we found the enemy's position abandoned, and occu- 
pied Fort Magruder and the town of Williamsburg, which was filled with 
the enemy's wounded, to whose assistance eighteen of their surgeons were 
sent by General J. E. Johnston, the officer in command. Several guns and 
caissons, which the enemy could not carry off on account of the mud, were 
secured. Colonel Averill was sent forward at once with a strong cavalry 



92 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

force to endeavor to overtake the enemy's rear-guard. He found several 
guns abandoned, and' picked up a large number of stragglers, but the con- 
dition of the roads and the state of the supplies forced him to return, after 
advancing a few miles. 

It is my opinion that the enemy opposed us here with only a portion of 
his arm}'. When our cavalry first appeared there was nothing but the 
enemy's rear-guard in Williamsburg. Other troops were brought back 
during the night and the next day to hold the works as long as possible, in 
order to gain time for the trains, &c., already well on the way to Richmond, 
to make their escape. Our troops were greatly exhausted by the laborious 
march through the mud from their positions in front of Yorktown, and by 
the protracted battle through which they had just passed. Many of them 
were out of rations and ammunition, and one division, in its anxiety to make 
a prompt movement, had marched with empty haversacks. The supply 
trains had been forced out of the roads on the fourth and fifth to allow the 
troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were now in such 
a state, after thirty-six hours' continuous rain, that it was almost impossible 
to pass even empty wagons over them. General Hooker's division had 
suffered so severely that it was in no condition to follow the enemy, even if 
the roads had been good. Under these circumstances, an immediate pursuit 
was impossible. 

Steps were at once taken to care for and remove the wounded, and to 
bring up provisions, ammunition, and forage. 

The condition of the roads, as has been said, rendered it next to impos- 
sible to accomplish this by land from Yorktown. A temporary depot was 
therefore promptly established on Queen's creek, and supplies drawn, and 
the wounded shipped from that place. 

The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richardson were sent 
from Yorktown by water to the right bank of the Pamunkey, in the vicinity 
of West Point, ' The remaining divisions, the trains, and the reserve ar- 
tillery moved subsequently by land. 

Early on the morning of the tth General Franklin had completed the 
disembarcation of his division, and had placed it in a good position to cover 
the landing place, both his flanks and a large portion of his front being pro- 
tected by water. 

Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division arrived during the morning. 

At about 9 a. m. a large force of the enemy appeared, consisting of 
Whiting's division and other troops, and between 10 and 11 they attacked the 
part of the line held by Newton's brigade. 

The action continued until 3 p. m., when the enemy retired, all his at- 
tacks having been repulsed. This affair, the most important in which the 
division had yet been engaged, was highly creditable to General Franklin 
and his command. For the details I refer to his report, which is herewith, 
submitted. Our loss was 49 killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing. Total, 
194, which includes a large proportion of officers 

Cavalry reconnoissances were sent out from Williamsburg on the 6th and 
*Ith, and on the 8th General Sloneman moved with an advance guard of cav- 
alry, artillery, and infantry to open communication with General Franklin. 

As soon as our supplies had been received and the condition of the roads 
had become a little better, though still very bad, the advance of the remain- 
ing troops was begun, Smith's division moving on the 8th. On the 10th 
headquarters were at Roper's church, 19 miles from Williamsburg, all the 
divisions which had moved by land, except Hooker's, being in the vicinity 
of that place. 

We were now in direct communication with the portion of the army 
which had gone by water, and we began to draw supplies from them. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 93 

On account of the small number and navrowness of the roads in this 
neighborhood, movements were difficult and slow. 

On the 15th, headquarters and the divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, 
and Smith reached Cumberland, which was made a temporary depot. Couch 
and Casey were then near New Kent Court House, Hooker and Kearney 
near Roper's church and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. 

On the 14th and 15th much rain fell. 

On the 15th and 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith, and Porter were 
with great difficulty moved to White House, five miles in advance. So bad 
was the road that the train of one of these divisions required thirty-six 
hours to pass over this short distance. General Stoneman had occupied this 
placp some days before, after several successful skirmishes, in which our 
cavalry proved superior to that of the enemy. The reports of these affairs 
are appended. 

About this time, with the consent of the President, two additional corps 
were organized, viz: the 5th provisional corps, consisting of the divisions of 
Porter and Sykes, and the reserve artillery, under the command of General 
F. J. Porter, and the 6th provisional corps, consisting of the divisions of 
Franklin and Smith, under the command of General W. B. Franklin. 

Headquarters reached White House on the 16th, and a permanent depot 
was at once organized there. 

On the 19th, headquarters and the corps of Porter and Franklin moved 
to Tunstall's station, five miles from White House. 

On the 20th more rain fell. 

On the 21st the position of the troops was as follows: Stoneman's ad- 
vance guard, one mile from New bridge; Franklin's corps three miles from 
New bridge, with Porter's corps at supporting distance in its rear; Sumner's 
corps, on the railroad about three miles from the Chickahominy, connecting 
the right with the left ; Keyes's corps, on New Kent road, near Bottom's 
bridge, with Heintzelman's corps at supporting distance in the rear. 

The ford at Bottom's bridge was in our possession, and the rebuilding 
of the bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy, was commenced. 

On the 22d, headquarters moved to Coal Harbor. 

On the 26th the railroad was in operation as far as the Chickahominy, 
and the railroad bridge across that stream nearly completed. 

CHAPTER 11. 

When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light troops reached the banks of 
the Chickahominy river, at Bottom's bridge, they found that this as well as the 
railroad bridge, about a mile above, had been destroyed by the enemy. 

The Chickahominy in this vicinity is about forty feet wide, fringed with a 
dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bordered by low marshy bottom lauds, 
varying from half a mile to a mile in width. 

Our operations embraced that part of the river between Bottom's and Meadow 
bridges, which covered the principal approaches to Richmond from the east. 

Within these limits the firm ground lying above high-water mark seldom ap- 
proaches near the river on either bank, and no locality was found within this 
section where the high ground came near the stream on both sides. It was 
subject to frequent, sudden, and great variations in the volume of water, and a 
rise of a few feet overflowed the bottom lands on both sides. 

At low water it could be forded at almost any point ; but during high water 
it was above a fording stage, and could then be crossed only at the few points 
where bridges had been constructed. These bridges had all been destroyed by 
the enemy on our approach, and it was necessary not only to reconstruct these, 
but to build several others. 



94 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAJT. 

The west bank of the river opposite the New and Mechanicsville bridges was 
bordered by elevated bluffs, which afforded the enemy commanding positions to 
fortify, establish his batteries, enfilading the approaches upon the two principal 
roads to Richmond on our right, and resist the reconstruction of the important 
bridges. This obliged us to select other less exposed points for our crossings. 
As the enemy was not in great force opposite Bottom's bridge on the arrival 
of our left at that point, and as it was important to secure a lodgment upon the 
right bank before he should have time to concentrate his forces and contest the 
passage, I forthwith ordered Casey's division to ford the river and occupy the 
opposite heights. This was promptly done on the 20th, and recounoissances 
were at once pushed out in advance. 

These troops were directed to throw up defences in an advantageous position 
to secure our left flank. General Heintzelman's corps was thrown forward in 
support, and Bottom's bridge immediately rebuilt. 

In the mean time our centre and right were advanced to the river above, and 
on the 24th we carried the village of Mechanicsville, driving the enemy out with 
our artillery, and forcing them across the bridge, which they destroyed. General 
Naglee on the same day dislodged a force of the enemy from the vicinity of the 
" Seven Pines," on the Bottom's bridge road, and our advance on the left secured 
a strong position near that place. 

All the information obtained from deserters, negroes, and spies, indicated that 
the enemy occupied in force all the approaches to Richmond from the east, and 
that he intended to dispute every step of our advance beyond the Chickahominy, 
and the passage of the stream opposite our right. That their army was superior 
to ours in numbers, did not admit of a doubt. Strong defences had been con- 
structed around Richmond. 

Impressed by these facts with the necessity of strengthening the army for the 
struggle, I did not fail to urge repeatedly upon my superiors the importance 
of re-enforcing the army of the Potomac with every disposable man, in order to 
insure the success of our attack upon the rebel capital. 

On the 1 0th of May I telegraphed as follows : 

" Camp at Ewell's Farm, three miles beyond Williamsburg, 

" May 10, 1862—5 a. m. 

" From the information reaching me from every source, I regard it as certain 
that the enemy will meet us with all his force on or near the Chickahominy. 
They can concentrate many more men than I have, and are collecting troops 
from all quarters, especially well disciplined troops from the south. Casualties, 
sickness, garrisons, and guards have much reduced our numbers, and will con- 
tinue to do so. I shall fight the rebel army with whatever force I may have, 
but duty requires me to urge that every effort be made to re-enforce me without 
delay with all the disposable troops in Eastern Virginia, and that we concentrate 
all our forces, as far as possible, to fight the great battle now impending, and to 
make it decisive. 

" It is possible that the enemy may abandon Richmond without a serious 
struggle ; but I do not believe he will, and it would be unwise to count upon 
anything but a stubborn and desperate defence — a life and death contest. I see 
no other hope for him than to fight this battle, and we must win it. I shall 
fight them whatever their force may be, but I ask for every man that the de- 
partment can send me. No troops should now be left unemployed. Those who 
entertain the opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond without a struggle, 
are, in my judgment, badly advised, and do not comprehend their situation, 
which is one requiring desperate measures. 

" I beg that the President and Secretary will maturely weigh what I say, 
and leave nothing undone to comply with my request. If I am not re-enforced, 
it is probable that I will be obliged to fight nearly double my numbers strongly 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 95 

intrenched. I do not think it will be at all possible for me to bring more than 
(70,000) seventy" thousand men upon the field of battle. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 
" Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, 

" Secretary/ of War." 

On the 14th of May I sent the following telegram to the President: 

"Camp at Cumberland, Mat/ 14, 1862. 

" I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of War, stating that, 
in my opinion, the enemy were concentrating all their available force to fight 
this army in front of Richmond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have 
received no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. I beg leave to repeat 
their substance to your excellency, and to ask that kind consideration which 
you have ever accorded to my representations and views. All my information 
from every source accessible to me establishes the fixed purpose of the rebels to 
defend Richmond against this army by offering us battle with all the troops they 
can collect from east, west, and south, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of 
all my commanders whom I have been able to consult. 

'• Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weakened my force, 
and will continue to do so. I cannot bring into actual battle against the enemy 
more than eighty thousand men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in 
position, probably intrenched, a much larger force, perhaps double my numbers. 
It is possible that Richmond may be abandoned without a serious struggle ; but 
the enemy are actually in great strength between here and there, and it would be 
unwise, and even insane, for me to calculate upon anything but a stubborn and 
desperate resistance. If they should abandon Richmond, it may well be that 
it is done with the purpose of making the stand at some place in Virginia south 
or west of there, and we should be in condition to press them without delay. 
The confederate leaders must employ their utmost efforts against this army in 
Virginia, and they will be supported by the whole body of their military officers, 
among Avhom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as there is also very 
little among the higher class of citizens in the seceding States. 

" I have found no fighting men left in this Peninsula. All are in the ranks 
of the opposing foe. 

"Even if more troops than I now have should prove unnecessary for purposes 
of military occupation, our greatest display of imposing force in the capital of 
the rebel government will have the best moral effect. I most respectfully and 
earnestly urge upon your excellency that the opportunity has come for striking 
a fatal blow at the enemies of the Constitution, and I beg that you will cause 
this army to be re-enforced without delay by all the disposable troops of the gov- 
ernment. I ask for every man that the War Department can send me. Any 
commander of the re-enforcements whom your excellency may designate will be 
acceptable to me, whatever expression I may have heretofore addressed to you 
on that subject. 

"I will fight the enemy whatever their force may be, with whatever force I 
may have ; and I firmly believe that we shall beat them, but our triumph should 
be made decisive and complete. The soldiers of this army love their govern- 
ernment, and will fight well in its support. You may rely upon them. They 
have confidence in me as their general, and in you as their President. Strong 
re-enforcements will at least save the lives of many of them. The greater our 
force the more perfect will be our combinations, and the less our loss. 

"For obvious reasons I beg you to give immediate consideration to this com- 



96 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

munication, and to inform me fully at the earliest moment of your final determi- 
nation. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN", 

" Major General. 
"His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

" President of the United -States." 

To which, on the 18th of May, I received this reply: 

"Washington, May 18—2^. m. 

" General : Your despatch to the President, asking re-enforcements, has been 
received and carefully considered. 

" The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely; and it is be- 
lieved that even if this were prudent, it would require more time to effect a 
junction between your army and that of the Rappahannock by the way of the 
Potomac and York river, than by a land march. In order, therefore, to increase 
the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the earliest moment, General 
McDowell has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest route. He 
is ordered, keeping himself always in position to save the capital from all pos- 
sible attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication with your 
right wing, and you are instructed to co-operate so as to establish this communi- 
cation as soon as possible by extending your right wing to the north of Rich- 
mond. • 

"It is believed that this communication can be safely established either north 
or south of the Pamunkey river. 

" In any event, you will be able to prevent the main body of the enemy's 
forces from leaving Richmond, and falling in overwhelming force upon General 
McDowell. He will move with between thirty-five (35) and forty thousand 
(40,000) men. 

" A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with this. The specific 
task assigned to his command has been to provide against any danger to the 
capital of the nation. 

" At your earnest call for re-enforcements, he is sent forward to co-operate iu 
the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in attempting this, not to uncover the 
city of Washington, and you will give no order, either before or after your 
junction, which can put him out of position to cover this city. You and he will 
communicate with each other by telegraph or otherwise, as frequently as may 
be necessary for sufficient co-operation. When General McDowell is in position 
on your right, his supplies must be di-awn from West Point, and you will in- 
struct your staff officers to be prepared to supply him by that route. 

"The President desires that General McDowell retain the command of the 
department of the Rappahannock, and of the forces with which he moves for- 
ward. 

"J3y order of the President. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 

"Major General George B. McClellan, 

" Commanding Army of the Potomac, hefore Richmond." 

It will be observed that this order rendered it impossible for me to use the 
James river as a line of operations, and forced me to establish our depots on the 
Pamunkey, and to approach Richmond from the north. 

I had advised, and preferred, that re-enforcements should be sent by water, for 
the reasons that their arrival would be more safe and certain, and that I would 
be left free to rest the army on the James river whenever the navigation of that 
fctream should be opened. 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 97 

The land movement obliged me to expose my riglit in order to secure the 
junction; and as the order for General McDowell's march was soon counter- 
manded, I incurred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, and 
frustrated the plan of campaign. Had General McDowell joined me by water, 
I could have approached Richmond by the James, and thus avoided the delays 
and losses incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had the 
army massed in one body instead of being necessarily divided by that stream. 

The following is a copy of the instructions to General McDowell : 

"War Department, 

" Washington, May 17, 1862. 

" General : Upon being joined by General Shields's division, you will move 
upon Richmond by the general route of the Richmond and Fredericksburg 
railroad, co-operating with the forces under General McClellan, now threatening 
Richmond from the line of the Pamunkey and York rivers. 

"While seeking to establish as soon as possible a communication between 
your left wing and the right wing of General McClellan, you will hold your- 
self always in such position as to cover the capital of the nation against a sud- 
den dash of any large body of the rebel forces. 

" General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these instructions, and 
will be directed to hold himself in readiness to establish communication with 
your left wing, and to prevent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving 
Richmond, and throwing itself upon your column, before a junction of the two 
armies is effected, 

"A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of your force is 
annexed. 

" By order of the President. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 

" General McDowell, 

" Co7nmanding Department of RappaJiannocky 

Having some doubts, from the wording of the foregoing orders, as to the ex- 
tent of my authority over the troops of General McDowell, and as to the time 
when I might anticipate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this despatch: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Tunstall's Station, Virginia, May 21, 1862 — 11 p. m. 

" Your despatch of yesterday, respecting our situation and the batteries of 
Fort Darling, was received while I was absent with the advance, where I have 
been all this day. I have communicated personally with Captain Goldsborough, 
and by letter with Captain Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co-oper- 
ation on land, which I Avill not be in condition to afford for several days. Cir- 
cumstances must determine the propriety of a land attack. 

" It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon makes the roads in- 
credibly bad for army ti'ansportation. I personally crossed the Chickahominy 
to-day at Bottom's bridge ford, and went a mile beyond, the enemy being about 
half a mile in front. I have three regiments on the other bank guarding the 
re-building of the bridge. Keyes's corps is on the New Kent road, near Bot- 
tom's bridge. Heintzelman is on the same road, within supporting distance. 
Sumner is on the railroad, connecting right with left. Stoneman, with advanced 
guard, is within one mile of New bridge. Franklin, with two divisions, is about 
two miles this side of Stoneman. Porter's division, with the reserves of infantiy 
and artillery, is within supporting distance. Headquarters will probably be at 
Coal Harbor to-morrow, one mile this side of Franklin. All the bridges over 
the Chickahominy are destroyed. The enemy are in force on every road lead 
H. Ex. Doc. 15 7 



98 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

ing to Richmond, witliin a mile or two west of the stream. Their main body is 
on the road from New bridge, encamped along it for four or five miles, spreading 
over the open ground on both sides. Johnston's headquarters are about two 
miles beyond the bridge. 

" All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our own. The 
position of the rebel forces, the declaration of the confederate authorities, the 
resolutions of the Virginia legislature, the action of the city government, the 
conduct of the citizens, and all other sources of information accessible to me, give 
positive assurance that our approach to Richmond involves a desperate battle 
between the opposing armies. 

" All our divisions are moving towards the foe. I shall advance steadily and 
carefully, and attack them according to my best judgment, and in such manner 
as to employ my greatest force. 

" I regret the state of things as to General McDowell's command. We must 
beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One division added to this army for that 
effort would do more to j^rotect Washington than his whole force can possibly 
do anywhere else in the field. The rebels are concentrating from all points for 
the two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I would still, most respectfully, sug- 
gest the policy of our concentrating here by movements on water. I have heard 
nothing as to the probabilities of the contemplated junction of McDowell's force 
with mine. I have no idea when he can start, what are his means of transpor- 
tation, or when he may be expected to reach this vicinity. I fear there is little 
hope that he can join me over land in time for the coming battle. Delays on 
my part will be dangerous. I fi ar sickness and demoralization. This region is 
unhealthy for northern men, and unless kept moving, I fear that our soldiers 
may become discouraged. At present our numbers are weakening from disease, 
but our men remain in good heart. 

" I regret also the configuration of the department of the Rappahannock. It 
includes a portion even of the city of Richmond. I think that my own depart- 
ment should embrace the entire field of military operations designed for the cap- 
ture and occupation of that city. 

" Again, I agree with your excellency that one bad general is better than two 
good ones. 

" I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 17th instant ad- 
dressed to myself and General McDowell. If a junction is effected before we 
occupy Richmond, it must necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg 
and within my department. This fact, my superior rank, and the express lan- 
guage of the 62d article of war, will place his command under my orders, unless 
it is otherwise specially directed by your excellency ; and I consider that he will 
be under ray command, except that I am not to detach any portion of his forces, 
or give any orders which can put him out of position to cover Washington. If 
I err in my construction, i desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels 
me to say, anxious as I am for an increase of force, that the march of McDowell's 
column upon Richmond by the shortest route will, in my opinion, uncover 
Washington, as to any interposition by it, as completely as its movement by 
water. The enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. 

" Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly improbable, 
their route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. 1 desire that the extent 
of my authority over McDowell may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings 
and conflicting views may produce some of those injurious results which a di- 
vided command has so often caused. I woiild respectfully suggest that this 
danger can only be surely guarded against by explicitly placing General Mc- 
Dowell under my orders in the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsi- 
ble for the closest observance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. President, that 
it is not necessary for me to assure you that your instructions would be observed 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 99 

in the utmost good faith, and that I have no personal feelings which could in- 
fluence me to disregard them in any particular. 

" I believe that there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither 
dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can, but 
in any event I shall fight it with all the skill, caution, and determination that I 
possess, and I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent 
confidence of my government, or that it may close my career. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLA¥, 

" Major General, Commanding. 
" His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 

" President of the United States." 

On the 24th I received the following reply : 

" May 24, \^&2.—{From Washington, 2it7i.) 

"I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening, Shields's command is 
there, but it is so worn that he cannot move before Monday morning, the twenty- 
sixth, (26th.) We have so thinned our line to get troops for other places that 
it was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to vis of one (I) 
regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, putting General Banks in some 
peril. 

" The enemy's forces, under General Anderson, now opposing General Mc- 
Dowell's advance, have, as their line of supply and retreat, the road to Richmond. 

" If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Anderson, you could 
send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's supplies from Richmond, 
preserve the railroad bridges across the two (2) forks of the Pamunkey and in- 
tercept the enemy's retreat, you will prevent the army now opposed to you from 
receiving an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) men; a*id 
if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure a line of railroad for sup- 
plies in addition to the one you now have. Can you not do this almost as well 
as not, while you are building the Chickahominy bridges ? McDowell and 
Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday morning, I wisk 
you to move cautiously and safely. 

" You will have command of McDowell, after he joins you, precisely as you 
indicated in your long despatch to us of the twenty-first, (21st.) 

" A. LINCOLN, President. 

"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

This information that McDowell's corps would march for Fredericksburg on 
the following Monday, (the 26th,) and that he would be under my command, 
as indicated in my telegram of the 21st, Avas cheering news, and I now felt 
confident that we would on his arrival be sufiiciently strong to overpower the 
large army confronting us. 

At a later hour on the same day I received the following : 

"May 24, 1862. — {Fro?n Washington, 4 p. m.) 
•'In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have been compelled 
to suspend General McDowell's movements to join you. The enemy are mak- 
ing a desperate push upon Harper's Feny, and we are trying to throw General 
Fremont's force, and part of General McDowell's, in their rear. 

"A. LINCOLN, President. 
"Major General Geo. B. McClella.v." 

From which it will be seen that I could not expect General McDowell to 
join me in time to participate in immediate operations in. front of Richmond, 
a id on the same evcuing I replied to the President that I would make my 
calculations accordingly. 



100 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

It then only remained for me to make the best use of the forces at my dis- 
posal, and to avail myself of all artificial auxiliaries to compensate as much as 
possible for the inadequacy of men. I concurred fully with the President in the 
injunction contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was necessary with my 
limited force to move "cautiously and safely." In view of the peculiar char- 
acter of the Chickahominy, and the liability of its bottom laud to sudden 
inundation, it became necessary to construct between Bottom's bridge and 
Mechauicsville eleven (11) new bridges, all long and difficult, with extensive 
log-way approaches. 

The entire army could pi'obably have been thrown across the Chickahominy 
immediately after our arrival, but this would have left no force on the left bank 
to guard our communications or to protect our right and rear. If the com- 
munication with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our army 
concentrated upon the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the stage of water 
as it was for many days after our arrival, the bridges carried away, and our 
means of transportation not furnishing a single day's supplies in advance, the 
troops must have gone without rations, and the animals without forage, and the 
army would have been paralyzed. 

It is true I might have abandoned my communications and pushed forward 
towards Richmond, trusting to the speedy defeat of the enemy aud the conse- 
quent fall of the city for a renewal of supplies ; but the approaches were 
fortified, and the town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrenchments, 
requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our troops could have dis- 
pensed with rations. 

*Under these circumstances, I decided to retain a portion of the army on the 
left bank of the river until our bridges Avere completed. 

It will be remembered that the order for the co-operation of General McDowell 
was simply suspended, not revoked, and therefore I was not at liberty to aban- 
don the northern approach. 

A very dashing and successful reconnoissance was made near New bridge, 
on the 24th of May, by Lieutenant Bowen, topographical engineers, escorted 
by the 4th Michigan volunteers and a squadron of the United States cavalry, 
commanded, respectively, by Colonel Woodbury and Captain Gordon. 

Oiu' troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, and with little loss drove it 
back upon its brigade, killing a large number and capturing several prisoners. 
Great credit is due to the staft' officers, as well as to Colonel Woodbury, Cap- 
tain Gordon, and their commands, for their conduct on this occasion. 

The work upon the bridges was commenced at once, and pushed forward 
with great vigor ; but the rains, which from day to day continued to fall, flooded 
the valley, and raised the water to a greater height than had been known f«r 
twenty years. 

This demolished a great amount of our labor, and our first bridges, with their 
approaches, which were not made Avith reference to such extreme high water, 
were carried ofiP or rendered impassable. We Avere obliged, with immense labor, 
to construct others, much longer, more elevated, and stable; our men worked 
in the water, exposed to the enemy's fire from the opposite bank. 
On the 25th of May I received the foUowiug telegram. 

"Washington, Motj 25, 1862. 

"Tour despatch received. General Baiiks was at Sharpsburg with about six 
rthousand (G,000) men. Shields having been taken from him to SAvell a column 
for McDowell to aid you at Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at va- 
rious places. On the twenty-third (23d) a rebel force of seven (7) to ten 
thousand (10,000) fell upon one regiment and two companies guarding the 
bridge at Port Royal, destroying it entirely ; crossed the Shenandoah, and on 
the twenty-fourth, (24th,) yesterday, pushed on to get north of Banks on the 



REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 101 

road to Winchester. General Banks ran a race witli tliem, beating tliem into 
"Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle ensued between the two 
forces, in which General Banks was beaten back into full retreat towards Mar- 
tinsburg, and probably is broken up into a total rout. Geary, on the Manassas 
Gap railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near Front Royal with ten 
thousand (10,000) troops, following up and supporting, as I understand, the 
force now pursuing Banks. Also, that another force of ten thousand is near Or- 
leans, following on in the same direction. Stripped bare, as we ai-e here, I will 
do all we can to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above. 
McDowell has about twenty thousand of his forces moving back to the vicinity of 
Port Royal ; and Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg ; 
both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear. 

" One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here to Harper's 
Ferry ; the rest of his forces remain for the present at Fredericksburg. We are 
sending such regiments and dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to 
Harper's Ferry, supplying their places in some sort, calling in militia from the 
adjacent States. We also have eighteen cannon on the road to Harper's Ferry, 
of which arm there is not a single one at that point. This is now our situation. 

"If McDowell's force was now beyond our reach, we should be entirely help- 
less. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain 
you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's forces from you. 

"Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you have. 

" A. LINCOLN, President. , 

" Major General McClellan." 

On the 25th the following was also received : 

" Washington, May 25, 1S62— 2 p. m. 

" The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before 
him ; precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg, 
and Geary on the Manassas Gap railroad, from both north and south, in pre- 
cisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and con- 
certed one, such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very 
desperate defence of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either 
attack Richmond or give up the job, and come to the defence of Washington. 
Let me hear from you instantly. 

"A. LINCOLN, President. 

"Major General McClellan." 

To which I replied as follows : 

" Coal Harbor, Mai/ 25, 1862. 

" Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very near when I shall 
attack Richmond. The object of the movement is probably to prevent re-en- 
forcements being sent to me. All the information obtained from balloons, de- 
serters, prisoners, and contrabands, agrees in the statement that the mass of the 
rebel troops are still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, ready to defend it. 
I have no knowledge of Banks's position and force, nor what there is at Ma- 
nassas; therefore cannot fonn a definite opinion as to the force against him. 

"I have two corps aci-oss Chickahominy, within six miles of Richmond; the 
others on this side at other crossings within same distance, and ready to cross 
when bridges are completed. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Conwianding. 

" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President.''^ 



102 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

On tlie 26tli I received the following : 

"Washington, May 26, 1862 — 12.40 a. m. 

" "We have General Banks's official report. He has saved his army and bag- 
gage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, and is probably safe at Wil- 
liamsport. He reports the attacking force at fifteen thousand (15,000.) 

"A. LINCOLN, President. 

•'Major General McClellan." 

On the 26th I received the. following : 

" Washington, May 26, 1862. 

" Can you not cut the Aquia Creek railroad. Also, what impression have 
you as to intrenched works for you to contend with in front of Richmond ? Can 
you get near enough to throw shells into the city ? 

''A. LINCOLN, President. 

"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

On the same day I sent the following : 

"Coal Harbor, May 26, 1862. 

"Have cut the Virginia Central road in three places between Hanover Court 
House and the Chickahominy. Will try to cut the other. I do not think 
Richmond intrenchments formidable; but am not certain. Hope very soon to 
be within shelling distance. Have railroad in operation from White House to 
Chickahominy. Hope to have Chickahominy bridge repaired to night. 
Nothing of interest to-day. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding. 
"His Excellency A. Lincoln, Presidents 

The interruption of the railroad, here referred to, was effected by the com- 
mand of Brigadier General Stoneman, and was intended to prevent the enemy 
from drawing supplies by that route, or from sending re-enforcements to An- 
derson or Jackson. 

At 10 a. m. I sent also the following despatch : 

" Telegrams of last night received. I am glad to know affairs are not so bad 
as might have been. I woidd earnestly call your attention to my instructions 
to General Banks of March 16, to General Wadsworth of same date, and to 
my letter of April 1 to the Adjutant General. I cannot but think that a prompt 
return to the principles there laid down Avould relieve all probability of danger. 
I will forAvard copies by mail. I beg to urge the importance of Manassas and 
Front Royal in contradistinction to Fredericksburg. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

•'His Excellency A. Lincoln, Presidcnt.^^ 

Later on the 26th I sent the following : 

"Camp near New Bridge, 

''May 2Q>, 1862—7.30 7?. ^' 
"Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are quietly closing in 
upon the enemy, preparatory to the last struggle. Situated as I am, I feel 
forced to take every possible precaution against disaster, and to secure my 
flanks against the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements 
for to-morrow are very important, and if successful, will leave me free to strike 
on the return of the force detached. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

''Major General. 
" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 103 

On the same day I received intelligence that a very considerable force of the 
enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court House, to the right and rear of our 
army, thus threatening our communications, and in a position either to re-enforce 
Jackson, or to impede McDowell's junction, should he finally move to luiite 
with us. On the same day I also received information from General McDowell, 
through the Secretary of War, that the enemy had fallen back from Fredericks- 
burg towards Richmond, and that General McDowell's advance was eight miles 
south of the Rappahannock. It was thus imperative to dislodge or defeat this 
force, independently even of the wishes of the President, as expressed in his 
telegram of the 26th. I intrusted this task to Brigadier General Fitz-Joha 
Porter, commanding the fifth corps, with orders to move at daybreak on the 
27th. 

Through a heavy rain, and over bad roads, that officer moved his command 
as follows : 

Brigadier General W. H. Emory led the advance, with the 5th and 6th regi- 
ments United States cavalry and Benson's horse battery of the 2d United 
States artillery, taking the road from New bridge, via Mechanicsville, to Hanover 
Court House. 

General Morell's division, composed of the brigades of Martindale, Butter- 
field and McQuade, with Berdan's regiment of sharpshooters, and three batteries, 
under Captain Charles Griffin, 5th United States artillery, followed on the 
same road. 

Colonel G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional brigade, composed of the 
5th and 13th New York, the 1st Connecticut artillery, acting as infantry, the 
6th Pennsylvania cavalry, and Weeden's Rhode Island battery, moved from 
his station at Old Church by a road running to Hanover Court House, parallel 
to the Pamunkey. 

After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles through the mud and rain, General 
Emory, at noon, reached a point about two miles from Hanover Coiirt House 
where the road forks to Ashland, and found a portion of the enemy formed in 
line across the Hanover Court House road. 

General Emory had, before this, been joined by the 25th New York, (of 
Martindale's brigade,) and Berdan's sharpshooters r these regiments were de- 
ployed with a section of Benson's battery, and advanced slowly towards the 
enemy until re-enforced by General Butterfield with four regiments of his brig- 
ade, when the enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of his guns being 
captured by the 17th New York, under Colonel Lansing, after having been 
disabled by the fire of Benson's battery. The firing here lasted about an hour. 
The cavalry and Benson's battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, fol- 
lowed by Morell's infantry and artillery, with the exception of Martindale's 
brigade. Warren's brigade having been delayed by repairing bridges, &c., 
now arrived, too late to participate in this affair ; a portion of this command 
was sent to the Pamunkey to destroy bridges, and captured quite a number of 
prisoners ; the remainder followed Morell's division. In the mean time Gen- 
eral Martindale, with the few remaining regiments of his brigade and a section 
of artillery, advanced on the Ashland road, and found a force of the enemy's 
infantiy, cavalry, and artillery, in position near Beake's station, on the Vir- 
ginia Central railroad ; he soon forced them to retire towards Ashland. 

The 25th New York having been ordered to rejoin him. General Martindale 
was directed to form his brigade and move up the railroad to rejoin the rest of 
the command at Hanover Court House. 

He sent one regiment up the railroad, but remained with the 2d Maine, after- 
wards joined by the 25th New York, to guard the rear of the main column. 

The enemy soon returned to attack General Martindale, who at once formed 
the 2d Maine, 25th New York, and a portion of the 44th New York, with one 



104 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B, m'cLELLAN. 

section of Martin's batteiy, on tlie New bridge road, facing his own position of 
the morning, and then held his ground for an hour against large odds until 
re-enforced. 

General Porter was at Hanover Court House, near the head of his column, 
when he learned that the rear had been attacked by a large force. He at once 
faced the whole column about, recalled the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ash- 
land, moved the 13th and 14th New York and Griffin's battery direct to Martin- 
dale's assistance, pushed the 9th Massachusetts and 62d Pennsylvania, of Mc- 
Quade's brigade, through the woods on the right, (our original left,) and attacked 
the flank of the enemy, while Butterfield, with the 83d Pennsylvania and 16th 
Michigan, hastened towards the scene of action by the railroad, and through 
the woods, further to the right, and completed the rout of the enemy. During 
the remainder of this and the following day our cavalry was active in the pur- 
suit, taking a number of prisoners. 

Captain Harrison, of the 5th United States cavalry, with a single company, 
brought in as prisoners two entire companies of infantry with their arms and 
ammunition. A part of Rush's lancers also captured an entire company with 
thv^ir arms. 

The immediate results of these affairs were, some two hundred of the enemy's 
dead buried by our troops, seven hundred and thirty prisoners sent to the rear, 
one 12-pound howitzer, one caisson, a large number of small arms, and two 
railroad trains, captured. 

Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing. 

The force encountered and defeated was General Branch's division, of North 
Carolina and Georgia troops, supposed to have been some 9,000 strong. 

Their camp at Hanover Court House was taken and destroyed. 

Having reason to believe that General Anderson, with a strong force, was 
still at Ashland, I ordered General Syke's division of regulars to move on the 
28th from New bridge toward Hanover Court House, to be in position to support 
General Porter. They reached a point within three miles of Hanover Court 
House, and remained there until the evening of the 29th, when they returned 
to their original camp. 

On the 28th General Stoneman's command of cavalry, horse artillery, and 
two regiments of infantry, were also placed under General Porter's orders. 

On the same day I visited Hanover Court House, whence I sent the follow- 
ing despatch : 

"Hanover Court House, 

" May 28 — 2 p. m. 

" Porter's action of yesterday was tioily a glorious victory ; too much credit 
cannot be given to his magnificent division and its accomplished leader. The 
rout of the rebels was complete ; not a defeat, but a complete rout. Prisoners 
are constantly coming in ; two companies have this moment arrived with excel- 
lent arms. 

" There is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating everything on Rich- 
mond. I will do my best to cut off Jackson, but am doubtful whether I can. 

" It is the policy and duty of the government to send me by water all the 
well-drilled troops available. I am confident that Washington is in no danger. 
Engines and cars in large numbers have been sent up to bring down Jackson's 
command. 

" I may not be able to cut them off, but will try ; we have cut all but the 
Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad. The real issue is in the battle about to 
be fought in front of Richmond. All our available troops should be collected 
here, not raw regiments, but the well-drilled troops. It cannot be ignored that 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 105 

a desperate battle is before us ; if any regiments of good troops remain unem- 
ployed, it will be an irreparable fault committed. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War." 

Having ascertained tbe state of affairs, instructions Avere given for tbe opera- 
tions of the following day. 

On the 2Sth a party under Major Williams, 6th United States cavalry, de- 
stroyed the common road bridges over the Pamunkey, and Virginia Central 
railroad bridge over the South Ann. 

On the 29th he destroyed the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad bridge 
over the South Ann, and the turnpike bridge over the same stream. 

On the same day, and mainly to cover the movement of Major Williams, 
General Emory moved a column of cavalry towards Ashland, from Hanover 
Court House. The advance of this column under Captain Chambliss, 5th United 
States cavalry, entered Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, destroyed 
the railroad bridge over Stony creek, and broke up the railroad and telegraph. 

Another column of all arms, under Colonel Warren, was sent on the same day 
by the direct road to Ashland, and entered it shortly after General Emory's 
column had retired, capturing a small party there. 

General Stoneman on the same day moved on Ashland by Leach's station, 
covering well the movements of the other columns. 

The objects of the expedition having been accomplished, and it being certain 
that the 1st corps would not join us at once. General Porter withdrew his com- 
mand to their camps with the main army on the evening of the 29th. 

On the night of the 27th and 2Sth I sent the following despatch to the 
Secretary of War : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near New Bridge, May 28, 1862 — 12.30 a. m. 
"Porter has gained two complete victories over superior forces, yet I feel 
obliged to move in the morning with re-enforcements to secure the complete de- 
struction of the rebels in that quarter. In doing so, I run some risk here, but I 
cannot help it. The enemy are even in greater force than I had supposed. I 
will do all that quick movements can accomplish, but you must send me all the 
troops you can, and leave to me full latitude as to choice of commanders. It 
is absolutely necessary to destroy the rebels near Hanover Court House before I 
can advance. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

In reply to which, I received the following from tbe President : 

"Washington, May 28, 1862. 

" I am very glad of General F. J. Porter's victory; still, if it was a total rout 
of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Richmond and Fredericksburg 
railroad was not seized again, as you say you have all the railroads but the 
Richmond and Fredericksburg. I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you can 
have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West Point. The scrap of the 
Virginia Central, from Richmond to Hanovev Junction, without more, is snnply 
nothing. That the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I thnak 
cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's Ferry, informs 
us that large forces, supposed to be Jackson's and E well's, forced his advance 



106 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

from Charlestown to-day. General King telegraphs us from Fredericksburg 
that contrabands give certain information that fifteen thousand left Hanover 
Junction Monday morning to re-enforce Jackson. I am painfully impressed with 
the importance of the struggle before you, and shall aid you all I can consist- 
ently with my view of due regard to all points. ..at T^rOT N" 

" Major General McOlellan." 

At 6 p. m. of the 29th I sent the Secretary of War the following despatch : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

''May 29, 1862— 6^. »i. 

" General Porter has gained information that General Anderson left his po- 
sition in vicinity of Fredericksburg at 4 a. m. Sunday with the following troops : 
l6t South Carolina, Colonel Hamilton; one battalion South Carolina rifles ; ^ 4th 
and 38th North Carolina; 45th Georgia; 12th, 13th, and 14th South Carolma; 
3d Louisiana; two batteries of four guns each, namely, Letcher s Virginia and 
Mcintosh's South Carolina batteries. General Anderson and his command 
passed Ashland yesterday evening en route for Richmond, leaving men behind 
to destroy bridges over the telegraph road which they travelled. Ihis intorma- 
tion is reliable. It is also positively certain that Branch's command was Irom 
GordonsviUe, bound for Richmond, whither they have now gone. 

" It may be regarded as positive, I think, that there is no rebel force between 

Fredericksburg and Junction. ,r r^r t^tt a xr 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

The following was also sent on the same day : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Ma^29, 1862. 

« A detachment from General F. J. Porter's command, under Major Williams, 
6th cavalry, destroyed the South Ann railroad bridge at about 9 a. m. to-day ; a 
large quantity of confederate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this 

"^"^■"^"S- "R. B. MARCY, 

'' Chief of Staff. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

In reply to which, the following was received : 

"Washington, May 29, 1862. 

"Your despatch as to the South Ann and Ashland being seized by our forces 
this morning is received. Understanding these points to be on the Richmond 
and Fredericksburg railroad, I heartily congratulate the country, and thank 

General McClellan and his army for their seizure. rvrr^r^x xr 

"A. LiiNL/iUIjIN. 

" General R. B. Marcy." 

On the 30th I sent the following: 

"Headquarters Army of the PotoMAC, 

''May 30, 1862. 

"From the tone of your despatches, and the President's, I do not think that 
you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of Porter's victory. It has en- 
tirely relieved my right flank, which was seriously threatened; routed and de- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 107 

moralized a considerable portion of tlie rebel forces ; taken over seven hundred 
and fifty prisoners ; killed and wounded large numbers ; one gun, many small 
arms, and much baggage taken. It was one of the handsomest things in the 
war, both in itself and in its results. Porter has returned, and my army is again 
well in hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle passable for 
artillery. It is quite certain that there is nothing in front of McDowell at Fred- 
ericksburg. I regard the burning of South Anna bridges as the least impor- 
tant result of Porter's movement. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Hon. E. M. Stanton, ^ 

'^ Secretary of War.'* 

The results of this brilliant operation of General Porter were the dispersal of 
General Branch's division, and the clearing of our right flank and rear. It was 
rendered impossible for the enemy to communicate by rail with Fredericksburg, 
or with Jackson via Gordonsville, except by the very circuitous route of Lynch- 
burg, and the road was left entirely open for the advance of McDowell had he 
been permitted to join the army of the Potomac. His withdrawal towards Front 
Royal was, in my judgment, a serious and fatal error; he could do no good in 
that direction, Avhile, had he been permitted to carry out the orders of May 17, 
the united forces would have driven the enemy within the immediate intrench- 
ments of Richmond before Jackson could have returned to its succor, and prob- 
ably would have gained possession promptly of that place. I respectfully 
refer to the reports of General Potter and his subordinate commanders for the 
names of the ofiicers who deserve especial meiition for the parts they took in 
these affairs, but I cannot omit here my testimony to the energy and ability here 
displayed by General Porter on this occasion, since to him is mainly due the 
successes there gained. 

On the 20th of May a reconnoissance was ordered on the south side of the 
Chickahominy towards James river. This was accomplished by Brigadier Gen- 
eral H. M. Naglee, who crossed his brigade near Bottom's bridge, and pushed 
forM'ard to within two miles of James river without serious resistance, or find- 
ing the enemy in force. The rest of the 4th corps, commanded by General E. 
D. Keyes, crossed the Chickahominy on the 23d of May. 

On the 24th, 25th, and 26th, a very gallant reconnoissance was pushed by 
General Naglee, with his brigade, beyond the Seven Pines, and on the 25th the 
4th corps was ordered to take up and fortify a position in the vicinity of the 
Seven Pines. The order was at once obeyed; a strong line of rifle-pits opened, 
and an abatis constructed a little in the rear of the point where the nine-mile 
road comes into the Williamsbui-g road. 

On the same day General Heintzelman was ordered to cross with his corps, 
(the 3d,) and take a position two miles in advance of Bottom's bridge, watch- 
ing the crossing of White Oak swamp, and covering the left and the rear of 
the left wing of the army. Being the senior ofiicer on that side of the river, he 
was placed in command of both corps, and ordered to hold the Seven Pines at 
all hazards, but not to withdraw the troops from the crossings of White Oak 
swamp unless in an emergency. 

On the 2Sth General Keyes was ordered to advance Casey's division to Fair 
Oaks, on the Williamsburg road, some three-quarters of a mile in front of the 
Seven Pines, leaving General Couch's division at the line of rifle-pits. A new 
line of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six field guns were commenced, and 
much of the timber in front of this line was felled on the two days following. 
The picket line was established, reaching from the Chickahominy to White Oak 
swamp. 

On the 30th General Heintzelman, representing that the advance had met 



108 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

witli sharp opposition in taking up their position, and that he considered the 
point a critical one, requested and obtained authority to make such dispositions 
of his troops as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He immediately advanced 
two brigades of Kearney's division about the fourth of a mile in front of 
Savage's station, thus placing them within supporting distance of Casey's divi- 
sion, which held the advance of the 4th corps. 

On the 30th the troops on the south side of the Chickahominy were in posi- 
tion as follows : Casey's division on the right of the Williamsburg road, at right 
angles to it, the centre at Fair Oaks; Couch's division at the Seven Pines; 
Kearney's division on the raih'oad, from near Savage's station toAvards the bridge ; 
Hooker's division on the borders of White Oak swamp. Constant skirmishing 
had been kept up between our pickets and those of the enemy; while these 
lines were being taken up and strengthened, large bodies of confederate troops 
were seen immediately to the front and right of Casey's position. 

During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent storm occurred. 
The rain falling in torrents rendered work on the rifle-pits and bridges impracti- 
cable, made the roads almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the 
bridges over the Chickahominy. 

The enemy perceiving the unfavorable position in which we were placed, and 
the possibility of destroying that part of our army which was apparently cut 
off from the main body by the rapidly rising stream, threw an overwhelming 
force (grand divisions of Generals D. H. Hill, Huger, Longstreet, and G. W. 
Smith) upon the position occupied by Casey's division. 

It appears from the official reports of General Keyes and his subordinate 
commanders that at ten o'clock a. m. on the 31st of May an aide-de-camp of 
General J. E. Johnston was captured by General Naglee's pickets. But little 
information as to the movements of the enemy was obtained from him, but his 
presence so near our lines excited suspicion and caused increased vigilance, and 
the troops were ordered by General Keyes to be under arms at eleven o'clock. 
Between eleven and twelve o'clock it Avas reported to General Casey that the 
enemy were approaching in considerable force on the Williamsburg road. At 
this time Casey's division was disposed as follows : Naglee's brigade extend- 
ing from the Williamsburg road to the Garnett field, having one regiment across 
the railroad ; General Wessel's brigade in the rifle-pits, and General Palmer's 
in the rear of General Wessel's ; one battery of artillery in advance with 
General Naglee ; one battery in rear of rifle-pits to the right of the redoubt ; 
one battery in rear of the redoubt, and another battery unharnessed in the re- 
doubt. General Couch's division, holding the second line, had General Aber- 
crombie's brigade on the right, along the nine-mile road, with two regiments and 
one battery across the railroad near Fair Oaks station; General Peck's brigade 
on the right, and General Devens's in the centre. 

On the approach of the enemy. General Casey sent forward one of General 
Palmer's regiments to support the picket line, but this regiment gave way with- 
out making much, if any, resistance. Heavy firing at once commenced, and the 
pickets were driven in. General Keyes ordered General Couch to move General 
Peck's brigade to occupy the ground on the left of the Williamsburg road, which 
had not before been occupied by our forces, and thus to support General Casey's 
left, where the first attack was the most severe. The enemy now came on in 
heavy force, attacking General Casey simultaneously in front and on both flanks. 
General Keyes sent to General Heintzelman for re-enforcements, but the messen- 
ger was delayed, so that orders were not sent to Generals Kearney and Hooker 
until nearly 3 o'clock, and it Avas nearly 5 p. m. when Generals Jameson and 
Perry's brigades of General Kearney's division arrived on the field. General 
Birney was ordered up the railroad, but by General Kearney's order halted his 
brigade before arriving at the scene of action. Orders Avere also despatched for 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 109 

General Hooker to move up from White Oak swamp, and he arrived after dark 
at Savage's station. 

As soon as the firing was heard at headquarters, orders were sent to General 
Sumner to get his command under arms and be ready to move at a moment's 
warning. His corps, consisting of Generals Richardson's and Sedgwick's 
divisions, was encamped on the north side of the Chickahominy, some six miles 
above Bottom's bridge; each division had thrown a bridge over the stream op- 
posite to its own position. 

At one o'clock General Sumner moved the two divisions to their respective 
bridges, with instructions to halt and await further orders. At two o'clock 
orders were sent from headquarters to cross these divisions without delay, and 
push them rapidly to General Heintzelman's support. This order was received 
and comnumicated at half past two, and the passage was immediately com- 
menced. In the mean time General Naglee's brigade, with the batteries of Gen- 
eral Casey's division, which General Naglee directed, struggled gallantly to 
maintain the redoubt and rifle-pits against the overwhelming masses of the 
enemy. They were re-enforced by a regiment from General Peck's brigade. 
The artillery under command of Colonel G. D. Bailey, 1st New York artillery, 
and afterwards of General Naglee, did good execution on the advancing column. 
The left of this position was, however, soon turned, and a sharp cross-fire opened 
upon the guniiers and men in the rifle-pits. Colonel Bailey, Major Van Val- 
kenberg, and Adjutant Ramsey, of the same regiment, were killed; some of the 
guns in the redoubt were taken, and the whole line was driven back upon the 
position occupied by General Couch. The brigades of Generals Wessel and 
Palmer, with the re-enforcements which had been sent them from General Couch, 
had also been driven from the field with heavy loss, and the whole position oc- 
cupied by General Casey's division was tals;en by the enemy. 

Previous to this time General Keyes ordered General Couch to advance two 
regiments to relieve the pressure upon General Casey's right flank. In making 
this movement. General Couch discovered large masses of the enemy pushing 
towards our right, and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy column which 
had been held in reserve, and which was now making its way towards Fair 
Oaks station. General Couch at once engaged this column with two regiments; 
but, though re-enforced by two additional regiments, he was overpowered, and the 
enemy pushed between him and the main, body of his division. With these four 
regiments and one battery General Couch fell back about half a mile towards the 
Grapevine bridge, where, hearing that General Sumner had crossed, he fonned 
liiie of battle facing Fair Oaks station, and prepared to hold the position. 

Generals Berry and Jameson's brigades had by this time arrived in front of 
the Seven Pines. General Berry was ordered to take possession of the woods 
on the left, and push forward so as to have a flank fire on the enemy's lines. 
This movement was executed brilliantly. General Berry pushing his regiments 
forward through the woods until their rifles commanded the left of the camp and 
works occupied by General Casey's division in the morning. Their fire on the 
pursuing columns of the enemy was very destructive, and assisted materially in 
checking the pursuit in that part of the field. He held his position in these 
woods against several attacks of superior numbers, and after dark, being cut off 
by the enemy from the main body, he fell back towards White Oak swamp, and 
by a circuit broui^ht his men into our lines in good order. 

General Jameson, with two regiments, (the other two of his brigade having 
been detached — one to General Peck and one to General Birney,) moved rapidly 
to the front on the left of the Williamsburg road, and succeeded for a time in 
keeping the abatis clear of the enemy. But large numbers of the enemy press- 
ing past the right of his line, he, too, was forced to retreat through the woods 
towards White Oak swamp, and in that way gained camp under cover of night. 

Brigadier General Devens, who had held the centre of General Couch's 



110 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

division, had made repeated and gallant efforts to regain portions of the ground 
lost in front, but each time was driven back, and finally withdrew behind the 
rifle-pits near Seven Pines. 

Meantime General Sumner had arrived with the advance of his corps, Gen- 
eral Sedgwick's division, at the point held by General Couch with four regi- 
ments and one battery. The roads leading from the bridge were so miry that it 
was only by the greatest exertion General Sedgwick had been able to get one of 
his batteries to the front. 

The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Colonel Sully) was immediately de- 
ployed to the right of Couch, to" protect the flank, and the rest of the division 
formed in line of battle, Kirby's battery near the centre, in an angle of the 
woods. One of General Couch's regiments was sent to open communication 
with General Heintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions made than the 
enemy came in strong force and opened a heavy fire along the line. He made 
several charges, but was each time repulsed with great loss by the steady fire 
of the infantry and the splendid practice of the battery. After sustaining the 
enemy's fire for a considerable time, General Sumner ordered five regiments (the 
34th New York, Colonel Sinter; 82d New York, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson; 
15th Massachusetts, Lieutenant Colonel Kimball; 20th Massachusetts, Colonel 
Lee; 7th Michigan, Major Richardson — the three former of General Gorman's 
brigade, the two latter of General Dana's bi'igade) to advance and charge with 
the bayonet. This charge was executed in the most brilliant manner. Our 
troops springing over two fences which Avere between them and the enemy, 
rushed upon his lines, and drove him in confusion from that part of the field. 
Darkness now ended the battle for that day. 

During the night dispositions were made for its early renewal. General 
Couch's division, and so much of General Casey's as could be collected together, 
with General Kearney's, occupied the rifle-pits near Seven Pines. General 
Peck, in falling back on the left, had succeeded late in the afternoon in rallying a 
considerable number of stragglers, and was taking them once more into the action, 
when he was ordered back to the intrenched camp by General Kearney. Gen- 
eral Hooker brought up his division about dark, having been delayed by the 
heaviness of the roads and the throng of fugitives from the field, through whom 
the colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) reports he "was obliged to force his 
way with the bayonet." This division bivouacked for the night in rear of the 
right of the rifle-pits, on the other side of the railroad. General Richardson's 
division also came upon the field about sunset. He had attempted the passage 
of the Chickahominy by the bridge opposite his own camp, but it was so far 
destioyed that he was forced to move Generals Howard and Meagher's brigades, 
with all his artillery, around by General Sedgwick's bridge, while General 
French's brigade, with the utmost difficulty, crossed by the other. General 
Sedgwick's division, with the regiments under General Couch, held about the 
same position as when the fight ceased, and General Richardson on his arrival 
was ordered to place his division on the left to connect with General Kearney; 
General French's brigade was posted along the railroad, and Generals Howard 
and Meagher's brigades in second and third lines. All his artillery had been 
left behind, it being impossible to move it forward through the deep mud as 
rapidly as the infantry pushed towards the field, but during the night the three 
batteries of the division were brought to the front. 

About five o'clock on the morning of the first of June skirmishers and some 
cavalry of the enemy were discovered in front of General Richardson's division. 
Captahi Pettit's battery, (B, 1st New York.) having come upon the ground, threw 
a few shells among them, when they dispersed. There was a wide interval be- 
tween General Richardson and General Kearney. To close this, General Rich- 
ardson's line was extended to the left and his first line moved over the railroad. 
Scarcely had they gained the position, when the enemy appearing in large force 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. Ill 

from the woods in front, opened a heavy fire of musketry at short range along 
the whole line. He approached very rapidly with columns of attack formed on 
two roads which crossed the railroad. These columns were supported by infantry 
in line of battle on each side, cutting General French's line. He threw out no 
skirmishers, but appeared determined to carry all before him by one crushing 
blow. For nearly an hour the first line of General Richardson's division stood 
and returned the fire, the lines of the enemy being re-enforced and relieved time 
after time, till finally General Howard was ordered with his brigade to go to 
General French's assistance. He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few 
minutes the fire of the enemy ceased and his whole line fell back on that part of 
the field. On the opening of the firing in the morning General Hooker pushed 
forward on the railroad with two regiments (5th and 6th New Jersey,) followed 
by General Sickles's brigade. It was found impossible to move the artillery of 
this division from its position on account of the mud. On coming near the woods, 
which were held by the enemy in force. General Hooker found General Birney's 
brigade. Colonel J. Hobart Ward in command, in line of battle. He sent back 
to hasten General Sickles's brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned off 
to the left by General Heintzelman to meet a column advancing in that direction. 
He at once made the attack with the two New Jersey regiments, calling upon 
Colonel Ward to support him with General Birney's brigade. 1 his was well done, 
our troops advancing into the woods under a heavy fire, and pushing the enemy 
before them for more than an hour of hard fighting. A charge with the bayonet 
was then ordered by General Hooker with the 5th and 6th New Jersey, 3d Maine, 
and 3Sth and 40th New York, and the enemy fled in confusion, throwing down 
arras and even clothing in his flight. General Sickles, having been ordered to 
the left, formed line of battle on both sides of the Williamsburg road and ad- 
vanced under a sharp fire from the enemy, deployed in the woods in front of 
him ; after a brisk interchange of musketry fire while crossing the open ground, 
the Excelsior brigade dashed into the timber with the bayonet and put the enemy 
to flight. 

On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hour's cessation, which was 
promptly responded to by General Richardson's division. Again the most vig- 
orous etl'orts were made to break our line, and again they were frustrated by 
the steady courage of our troops. In about an hour General Richardson's whole 
line advanced, pouring in their fire at close range, which threw the line of the 
enemy back in some confusion. This was followed up by a bayonet charge led 
by General French in person, with the 57th and 66th New York, supported by 
two regiments sent by General Heintzelman, the 71st and 73d New York, which 
turned the confusion of the enemy into precipitated flight. One gun captured, 
the pi'evious day was retaken. 

Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines held by them on the 31st before 
the attack. On the battle-field there were found many of our own and the con- 
federate wounded, arms, caissons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, aban- 
doned by the enemy in his rout. The state of the roads and impossibility of 
manoeuvring artillery prevented further pursuit. On the next morning a 
reconnoissance was sent forward, which pressed back the pickets of the enemy 
to Avithin five miles of Richmond ; but again the impossibility of forcing even a 
few batteries forward precluded our holding permanently this position. The 
lines held previous to the battle were therefore resumed. General J. E. John- 
ston reports loss of the enemy in Longstreet's and J. W. Smith's divisions at 
4,283 ; General D. H. Hill, who had taken the advance in the attack, estimates 
his loss at 2,500 ; which would give the enemy's loss 6,783. Our loss was, in 
General Sumner's corps, 1,223; General Heintzelman's corps, 1,394; General 
Keyes's corps, 3,120 — total, ,'T,737. 

Previous to the arrival of General Sumner upon the field of battle, on the 
31st of May, General Heintzelman, the senior coi'ps commander present, was in 



112 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

the immediate command of tlie forces engaged. The first information I received 
that the battle was in progress was a despatch from him stating that Casey's 
division had given Avay. During the night of the 31st I received a despatch 
from him, dated 8.45 p. m., in which he says : " I am just in. When I got to 
the front the most of General Casey's division had dispersed. # * # 
The rout of General Casey's men had a most dispiriting effect on the troops as 
they came tip. I saw no reason why we should have been driven back." 

This official statement, together with other accounts received previous to my 
an-ival upon the battle-field, to the effect that Casey's division had given way 
without making a proper resistance, caused me to state, in a telegram to the 
Secretary of War on the first, that this division "gave way unaccountably. and 
discreditably." Subsequent investigations, however, greatly modified the im- 
pressions first received, and I accordingly advised the Secretary of War of tbis 
in a despatch on the 5th of June. 

The official reports of Generals Keyes, Casey, and Naglee show that a very 
considerable portion of this division fought well, and that the brigade of Gen- 
eral Naglee is entitled to credit for its gallantry. This division, among the reg- 
iments of which were eight of comparatively new troops, was attacked by 
superior numbers ; yet, according to the reports alluded to, it stood the attack 
*'for three hours before it was re-enforced." A portion of the division was 
thrown into great confusion upon the first onslaught of the enemy ; but the 
personal efforts of General Naglee, Colonel Bailey, and otljer officers, who boldly 
went to the front and encouraged the men by their presence and example, at 
this critical juncture, rallied a great part of the division, and thereby enabled it 
to act a prominent part in this severely contested battle. It therefore affords 
me great satisi'action to withdraw the expression contained in my first despatch, 
and 1 cordially give my indorsement to the conclusion of the division commander, 
" that those parts of his command which behaved discreditably were exceptional 
cases." 

On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we had two of our 
bridges nearly completed ; but the rising waters flooded the log-way approaches 
and made them almost impassable, so that it was only by the greatest efforts 
that General Sumner crossed his corps and participated in that hard-fought en- 
gagement. The bridges became totally useless after this corps had passed, and 
others on a more permanent plan were commenced. 

On my way to headquarters, after the battle of Fair Oaks, I attempted to 
cross the bridge where General Sumner had taken over his corps on the day 
previous. At the time General Sumner crossed this was the only available 
bridge above Bottom's bridge. I found the approach from the right bank for 
some 400 yards submerged to the depth of several feet, and on reaching the 
place where the bridge had been, I found a great part of it carried away, so 
that I could not get my horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's 
bridge, six miles below, as the only practicable crossing. 

The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were also overflowed, 
and both of them were enfiladed by the enemy's batteries established upon com- 
manding heights on the opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong 
forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their front, which would have 
made it necessary, even had the approaches been in the best possible condition, 
to have fought a sanguinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a 
passage could have been secured. 

The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at Fair Oaks for 
an advance on Richmond soon after the battle, was to march the troops from 
Mechanicsville, and other points, on the left banks of the Chickahominy down 
to Bottom's bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the position near 
Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three (23) miles. In the condition of 
the roads at that time this march could not have been made with artillery in 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 113 

less than two days, by which time the enemy would have been secure within 
his iutrenchments around Richmond. In short, the idea of uniting the two 
wings of the army in time to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the 
prospect of overtaking him before he reached Richmond, only five miles distant 
from the field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I presume, never for a mo- 
ment seriously entertained by any one connected with the army of the Potomac. 
An advance, involving the separation of the two Avings by the impassable Chicka- 
hominy, would have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the 
position already gained, and completed our crossings as rapidly as possible. 

In the mean time the troojis at Fair Oaks were directed to strengthen their 
positions by a strong line of iutrenchments, which protected them while the 
bridges were being built, gave security to the trains, liberated a larger fighting 
force, and offered a safer retreat in the event of disaster. 

On the 2d of June I sent the following despatch : 

"Headquarters Ar.mv of the PotojMac, 

''New Bridge, June 2, 1862—10.30 a. m. 

" Our left is everywhere advanced considerably beyond the positions it oc- 
cupied before the battle. I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall 
sufiiciently to enable me to cross the right. We have had a terrible time with 
our communications — bridges and causeways, built with great care, having been 
washed away by the sudden freshets, leaving us almost cut off from communi- 
cation. All that human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose. 

" Please regard the portion of this relating to condition of Chickahominy as 
confidential, as it would be serious if the enemy were aware of it. I do not yet 
know our loss ; it has been very heavy on both sides, as the fighting was des- 
perate. Our victory complete. I expect still more fighting before we reach 
Richmond. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 

" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

On the same day I received the following from the Secretary of War : 

"Washington, June 2, 1S62. 

" Your telegram has been received, and we are greatly rejoiced at your suc- 
cess — not only in itself, but because of the dauntless spirit and courage it dis- 
plays in your troops. You have received, of course, the order made yesterday 
in respect to Fortress Monroe. The object was to place at your command the 
disposable force of that department. The indications are that Fremont or Mc- 
Dowell will fight Jackson to-day, and as soon as he is disposed of another large 
body of troops will be at your service. 

" The intelligence from Halleck shows that the rebels are fleeing, and pur- 
sued in force, from Corinth. All interest now centres in your operations, and 
full confidence is entertained of your brilliant and glorious success. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 

"Major General McClellan." 

On the 3d I received the following from the President : 

"Washington, June 3, 1S62. 
" With these continuous rains, I am very anxious about the Chickahominy — 
so close in your rear, and crossing your line of communication. Please look to it. 

"ABRAHASC LmCOLl:^^ President. 
" Major General McClellan." 
H. Ex. Doc. 15 S 



114 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. MCLELLAN. 

To wlucli I replied as followB : 

"HEADdUARTERS ArMY OF THE PoTOMAC, 

" Nciv Bridge, June 3, 1862. 
" Your despatch of 5 p. m. just received. As the Chickahominy has been 
almost the only obstacle in my way for several days, your excellency may rest 
assured that it has not been overlooked. Every effort has been made, and will 
continue to be, to perfect the communications across it. Nothing of importance, 
except that it is again raining. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 
" A. Lincoln, President, Washington.'" 

My views of the condition of our army on the 4th are explained in the follow- 
ing despatch to the President : 

" Hbadquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" New Bridge, June 4, 1862. 

" Terrible rain, storm during the night and morning — not yet cleared off. 
Chickahominy flooded, bridges in bad condition. Are still hard at work at 
them. I have taken every possible step to insure the security of the corps on 
the right bank, bu.t I cannot re-enforce them here until my bridges are all safe, 
as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, should the enemy attack in 
that direction, as they may probably attempt, I have to be very cautious now. 
Our loss in the late battle will probably exceed (5,000) five thousand. I have 
not yet full returns. On account of the effect it might have on our own men 
and the enemy, I request that you will regard this information as confidential 
for a few days. I am satisfied that the loss of the enemy was very considerably 
greater ; they were terribly punished. I mention these facts now merely to 
show you that the army of the Potomac has had serious work, and that no 
child's play is before it. 

" You must make your calculations on the supposition that I have been correct 
from the beginning in asserting that the serious opposition was to be made here. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding. 

" A. Lincoln, President." 

And in the following to the Secretary of War, on the same day : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'* New Bridge, June 4, 1862. 

" Please inform me at once Avhat re-enforcements, if any, I can count upon 
having at Fortress Monroe or White House within the next three days, and 
when each regiment may be expected to arrive. It is of the utmost importance 
that I should know this immediately. The losses in the battle of the 31st and 
1st will amount to (7, 000) seven thousand. Regard this as confidential for the 
present. 

" If I can have (5) five new regiments for Fort Monroe and its dependencies, 
I can draw (3) three more old regiments from there safely. I can well dispose 
of four more raw regiments on my communications. I can well dispose of from 
(15) fifteen to (20) twenty well drilled regiments artong the old brigades iu 
bringing them up to their original effective strength. Recruits are especially 
necessary for the regular and volunteer batteries of artillery, as well as for the 
regular and volunteer regiments of infantry. After the losses iu our last battle. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 115 

I trust that I will no longer be regarded as an alarmist. I believe we have at 
least one more desperate battle to fight. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

'■'■ Secretary of Wary 

Also in my despatch to the Secretary of War, on the 5t.h : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Neiv Bridge, June 5, 1862. 
" Rained most of the night ; has now ceased, but is not clear. The river 
still very high and troublesome. Enemy opened with several batteries on our 
bridges near here this morning; our batteries seem to have pretty much 
silenced them, though some firing still kept up. The rain forces us to remain 
in statu quo. With great difficulty a division of infantry has been crossed this 
morning to support the troops on the other side, should the enemy renew 
attack. I felt obliged to do this, although it leaves us rather weak here. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding. 
*' lion. E. M. Stanto.v, 

" Secretary of War." 

On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as follows : 

"Washington, June 5, 1862 — 8.30 77. m.. 
" I will send you five (5) ucav regiments as fast as transportation can take 
them ; the first to start to-morrow from Baltimore. I intend sending you apart 
of McDowell's force as soon as it can return from its trip to Front Royal, proba- 
bly as many as you want. The order. to ship the new regiments to Fort Mon- 
roe has already been given. I suppose that they may be sent directly to the 
fort. Please advise me if this be as you desire. 

" EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 
"Major General McClellan." 

On the 7th of June I telegraphed as follows : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"June 7, 1862—4.40^9. 7n. 

" In reply to your despatch of 2 p. m. to day, I have the honor to state that 
the Chickahominy river has risen so as to flood the entire bottoms to the depth 
of three and four feet. I am pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, and 
the men are working night and day. up to their waists in water, to complete 
them. 

" The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely impassable for ar- 
tillery, or even cavalry, except directly in the narrow roads, which renders any 
general movement, either of this or the rebel army, entirely out of the question 
until we have more favorable weather. 

" I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward re-enfbrcements so vigor- 
ously. 

" I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the mo- 
ment McOall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. 
I have advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel pickets 
and securing a very advantageous position. 



116 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

" The rebels have several batteries established, comraanding the debouches 
from two of our bridges, and fire upon our working parties continually, but as 
yet they have killed but very few of our men. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" J\^or General, Comiiianding. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War.'' ' 

As I did not think it pi'obable that any re-enforcements would be sent me in 
time for the advance on Richmond, I stated in the foregoing despatch that I 
should be ready to move when General iMcCall's division joined me; but I did 
not intend to be understood by this that no more re-enforcements were wanted, 
as Avill be seen from the following dispatch. 

"JuNh: 10, 1^62— 3.30 7?. w. 

" I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and that some of his 
troops are to follow him. No great reliance — perhaps none whatever — can be 
attached to this; but it is possible, and ought to be their policy. 

" I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and fields are liter- 
ally impassable for artillery, almost so for infantry. The Chickahominy is in 
a dreadful state; we have another rain-storm on our hands. 

" I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit ; but there will 
be a delay, the extent of which no one can foresee, for the season is altogether 
abnormal. 

•' In view of these circumstances, I present w your consideration the pro- 
priety of detaching largely from Halleck's army to strengthen this ; for it would 
seem that Halleck has now no large organized force in front of him, while we 
have. If this cannot be done, or even in connexion with it, allow me to sug- 
gest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton upon Atlanta. If but the 
one can be done, it would better conform to military principles to strengthen 
this army. And even although the re-enforcements migiit not arrive in season 
to take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral eft'ect would be great, and 
they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior movements. 

" I wish to be distinctly understood that, whenever the weather permits, I will 
attack with whatever force I may have, although a larger force Avould enable 
me to gain much more decisive results. 

"I woul J^ be glad to have McCall's infantry sent forward by water at once, 
without waiting for his artillery and cavalry. 

"If General Prim returns via Washington, please converse with him as to 
the condition of affairs here. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General, Commanding. 

"Hon. E. M. Sta.\ton, 

" Secretary of WarT 

Our work upon the bridges continued to be pushed forward A'igorously until 
the 20th, during which time it rained almost every day, and the exposure of tit*.- 
men caused much sickness. 

On the llth the following was received from the Secretary of yax: 

"Washington, June 11, 1862. 

" Your despatch of three thirty, (3.30,) yesterday, has been received. I am 
fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, and which no art or skill can 
avoid, but only endure, and am striving to the uttermost to render you every 
aid in the power of the government. Your suggestions will be immediately 



REPORT OF GENERAL C4E0RGE B. m'cLELLAX. 117 

communicated to General Halleck, with a reqxiest that he shall conform to them. 
At last advice he contemplated sending a column to operate with Mitchell 
against Chatfanooga, and thence upon East Tennessee. Buel reports Kentucky 
and Tennessee to be in a critical condition, demanding immediate attention. 
Halleck ' says the main body of Beauregard's force is with him at Okolona. 
McOall's force was reported yesterday as having embarked, and on its way to 
join you. It iS intended to send the residue of McDowell's force also to joia 
you as speedily as possible. 

"Fremont had a hard light, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at 
Union church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was 
pretty badly handled. It is clear that a strong force is operating with Jackson . 
for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as fast as 
possible, the new levies. 

" Be assured, general, that there never has been a moment when my desire 
has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, 
since the hour we first met ; and whatever others may say for their own pur- 
poses, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, 
or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be at the success 
which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 

"Major General G. B. McClellax." ,^ 

On the 12th and 13th General ]McCall's division arrived. 

On the l^th of Jiuie two squadrons of the 5th United States cavalry, under 
the command of Captain Royall, stationed near Hanover old church, were at- 
tacked and overpowered by a force of the enemy's cavalry, numbering about 
fifteen himdred men, with four guns. They pushed on towards our depots, but 
at some distance from our main body, and, though pursued very cleverly, made 
the circuit of the army, repassing the Chickahominy at Long bridge. The 
burning of two schooners laden with forage, and fourteen government wagons, 
the destruction of some sutlers' stores, the killing of several of the guard and 
teamsters at Garlick's landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's station, 
and a little eclat, were the precise results of this expedition. 

On the l-ith I sent the following to the Secretary of War: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Cam]} Lincoln, June 14, 1862 — midnight. 

"All quiet in every direction. The starppede of last night has passed away. 
Weather now very fovorable. I hope two days more will make the ground practi- 
cable. I shall advance as soon as the bridges are completed and the ground fit 
for artillery to move. At the same time I would be glad to have whatever 
troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage. 

" It ouglit to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are com- 
pletely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that Mc- 
Call's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival. 

" That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to 
me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such 
circumstances as those in which I am now placed. General McDowell should, 
wish the general interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his com- 
mand. 

"If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want.none of them, but would pre- 
fer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the 
results. 

" The department lines should not be allowed to interfere with me ; but Gen- 



118 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

eral McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my 
disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of as- 
sistance to me. I therefore requ(!st that I may have entire and full control. 
The stake at issue is too great to allovy personal considerations to be entertained; 
you know that I have none. 

" The indications are, from our balloon reconnoi.>sunce3 and from all other 
Bources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increasing in numbers, and deter- 
mined to hght desperately. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

On the 20th the following was communicated to the President : 

"Headciuarters Army of the Potomac, 

''Camp Lincoln, June 20, 1862 — 2 p. m. 

"Your excellency's despatch of (11) eleven a. m. received, also that of General 
Sigel. 

" 1 have no doubt that Jackson has been re-enforced from here. There is 
I'eason to believe that General R. S. Ripley has recently joined Lee's army, 
with a brigade or division from Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from 
Goldsboro'. There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the enemy iuteuds 
evacuating Richmond; he is daily increasing his defences. I find him every- 
where in force, and every reconnoissance costs many lives, yet I am obliged to 
feel my Avay, foot by foot, at whatever cost, so great are the difficulties" of the 
country; by to morroAV night the defensive works, covering our position on this 
side of the Chickahominy, should be completed. I am forced to this by my in- 
feriority in numbers, so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into 
action, and secure the army against the consequences of unforeseen disaster. I 
would be glad to have permission to lay before your excellency, by letter or 
telegraph, my vicAvs as to the present state of military affViirs throughout the 
whole country. In the mean time I would be pleased to learn the disposition, 
as to numbers and position, of the troops not under my command, \a Virginia 
and elsewhere. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

''Major General, Commanding. 

" His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 

To which I received this reply : 

"Washington, June 21, 1SG2 — 6 p. m. 

"Your despatch of yesterday, two (2) p. m., was received this morning. If 
it would not divert too much of your time and attention from the army under 
your immediate command, I would be glad to have your views as to the present 
state of military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you would 
be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by letter than by telegraph, 
because of the better chance of secrecy. As to the numbers and positions of 
the troops not under your command, in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I could 
do it with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not transmit either by tel- 
egraph or letter, because of the chances of its reaching the enemy. I would be 
very glad to talk with you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I cannot well 
leave here. 

"A. LINCOLN, P/-m<Zm^ 

"Major General George B. McClellan." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 119 

To wliicli I sent the following reply : 

" Camp Lincoln, June 22 — 1 p. m. 
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of S p. m. 
yesterday. Under the circumstances, as stated in your despatch, I perceive 
that it will be better at least to defer, for the present, the communication 1 de- 
sired to make. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
"3Iajor General, Commanding. 
"His Excellency the President." 

All the information I could obtain, previous to the 24th of June, regarding 
the movements of General Jackson, led to the belief that he was at Gordons- 
ville, where he was receiving re-enforcements from Richmond via Lynchburg and 
Staunton ; but what his purposes were did not appear until the date specified, 
when a young man, very intelligent, but of suspicious appearance, Avas brought 
in by our scouts from the direction of Hanover Court House He at first 
stated that he was an escaped prisoner, from Colonel Kenley's Maryland regi- 
ment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself to be a deserter 
from Jackson's command, Avhich*he left near Gordonsville on the 21st. Jack- 
son's troops were then, as he said, moving to Frederickshall, along the Virginia 
Central railroad, for the purpose of attacking my rear on the 2Sth. I imme- 
diately despatched two trusty negroes to proceed along the railroad and ascer- 
tain the truth of the statement. They were unable, however, to get beyond 
Hanover Court House, where they encountered the enemy's pickets, and were 
forced to turn back without obtaining the desired information. On that day I 
sent the following despatch : 

"Headuuarters ArxMY op the Potomac, 

^^Jimc 24, 1862—12^. m. 

"A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the enemy. The 
party states that he left Jackson, Whiting and Eweil, (fifteen brigades,) at Gor- 
donsVille on the 21st; that they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it Avas 
intended to attack my rear on the 2Sth. I would be glad to learn, at your 
earliest convenience, the most exact information you have as to the position and 
movements of Jackson, as well as the sources from which your information is 
derived, that I may the better compare it with what I have. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General." 

The following is his reply : 

"Washington, June 25, 18G2. 

" We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's 
force. General King yesterday reported a deserter's statement that Jackson's 
force was, nine days ago, forty thousand men. Some reports place ten thousand 
rebels under Jackson, at Gordonsville; others, that his force is at Port Republic, 
Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western 
Virginia was threatened ; and General Kelly, that Ewell was advancing to New 
creek, Avhere Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fremont con- 
tradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets 
are strong in advance at Luray; the people decline to give any information of 
his whereabouts. Within the last two (2) days the evidence is strong that_ for 
some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance ui various 
directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, 
who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to 
have any accurate knowledge of the subject. A letter transmitted to the de- 



120 REPOET OF GE.N-ERAL GEORGE B. m'clELLAN. 

looked very much like a blinrl nn^ ^ T ' ' '"'^'' ^"^ '^^'^'^'^- This letter 
movement Lw is to vavdsSm^^^^^^^^ '"V ''"tF''' \^''' J'^^^sou's real 

designed, like the nume oifs nZ n, I fl ! ^''"^ ^^^^^'-^^^l^-''^' •'^"d is certainly 
thatVhile the warn^r L deTe^-lrfn ' '' T^T^' ^ ^^^'"k' ^^cretore^ 

not safelj be disregarded I wiH !f -T? ""'^^ ^^'' ^"^ "" ^^'''^' '^'^^ ^^ could 
this subject that miyttceivedheT^*' ^'" any further infonnatiou on 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 
"Major General McClellan." "Secretari/ of War. 

^^^if^^'JZ^Un!":^ ^',T^^ ^* ^-^ --plated, an 

ward movement ' ^'^' '''"' '^■'^'•■^^^^- V^-^^'^tovy to a general for- 

walT;:^^;r^r ttn^ '^^^^^^' ^-^t^ ^" ^^'^ Wimamsburg road 
dred yards Wide wh th V ? v '""'T'^'^ ^'^^ "*' ^'"^^er, some five hun- 

advanl. t:^:.;^t^'^^::^^^^-^ [-• ---y days. Further in 

and commanded 4 a r:S;ra;^l^;^/t^:^^^ ''' '^"^'^ 

enabli:: tt:t:2t Z^:/^ ''- ^^^^T ^'^ '' ^^- -<^^- ^-^ ^rder to 
man and Sumner in no.i n. ' ^'T'"^' ""'^ *" P^^^*^ ^^enerals Heintzel- 

Old TavenlTn he 2G?ht .7th 'hf^T '^V^''^. j"^"^^"' '' ^^ -^^'^'^ -^ ^he 
tion in the rea^ ^^' ^^ ^""""^'^^ Franklin, by assailing that posi- 

all along the line, and LS ^d ^ Z::^::^^!'^^: T ''''''' '''''' 
object was accomplished l^hp fl^ aavance stubboinly, but by sunset our 

Heintzelman's co P^j^er' bri^^^^^^ ^^^tV^'- '^'''' '''''' ^^"^ '^'^''^^ «f 
a part of Richardion'. divf'ion J^ ^'T^'' '^''^''''''' ^^ ^^^^^'^ ^'^^'P.^. and 
the report of Gene'l Hd^r.elman "'^" "^'^ *'^ ^^^^^^^ ^ '^^^ ^'^ 

re^I^d wf ^ Sw'liS^ ^'r^, ^? T^'"^^'^ ^^''^^^' -^-^^ '-- -t been 

4S ''^'^T^ -rmi^!S'^;-i^^e"' "^^^^'"^' ^^ -^-^ 

ance^^'ot'm^fSSln^^^^^^ ^'f ^^^--^'^--^y, under sharp resist- 

men behaved veiy handsomely. Some firing still continues 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
"Hon. E. ]\r. Stantoiv." "Major General, Co?n?nanding. 

...p, "Redoubt No. 3, Ju7ic 25, 1862—3.15 n m 



REPOET OF C4EXERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 121 

"If we succeed in what we have undertaken, it will be a very important 
advantage gained. Loss not large thus far. The fighting up to this time has 
been done by General Hooker's division, which has behaved a.s usual — that is,, 
most splendidly. 

"On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in his front. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major Geveral, Commanding . 
"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

"Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862 — 5 p. vi. 
"The affair is over, and we have gained our point fully, and with but little 
loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition. Our men have done all that could 
be desired. The affair was partially decided by two guns that Captain De 
Russey brought gallantly into action under very difficult circumstances. The 
e>nemy was driven from the camps in fi'ont of this place, and is now quiet. 

"G.B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 
"Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Secretary of War." 

Also, on the same day, the following : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862 — 6.15 j}- vi. 
"I have just returned from the field, and find your despatch in regard to 
Jackson. 

" Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition 
that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beaure- 
gard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond, yesterday. 

" I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel 
force is stated at two hundred thousand (200,000,) including Jackson and Beau- 
regard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports 
be true. But this army will do all in the power of men to hold their position, 
and repulse any attack. 

" I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way 
responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of 
re-enforcements, that this was the decisive point, and that all the available 
means of the government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a 
general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command and, if it 
is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its 
fate. But if the result of the action which will probably occur to-morrow, or 
within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my 
shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. 

"Since I commenced this I have received additional intelligence confirming 
the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. 
I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the 
Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no 
use in again asking for re-enforcements. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Hon. E. M. Stvnton, 

" Secretary of War." 

The report of the chief of the "secret service corps," herewith forwarded, and 
dated the 26th of June, shows the estimated strength of the enemy, at the time 
of the evacuation of Yorktown, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The 



122 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'CLELLAN." 

same report puts his numbers, on the 26th of June, at about 180,000, and the 
speciiic iutbrination obtained regarding their organization warrants the belief 
that this estimate did not exceed his actual strength. It will be observed that 
the evidence contained in the report shows the following organizations, viz: 
two liundred regiments of infantry and cavahy, including the forces of Jackson 
and Ewell, just arrived; eight battalions of independent troops; five battalions 
ofaitillery; twelve companies of infantry and independent cav;ilry, besides 
forty-six companies of artillery; amounting, in all, to from forty to fifty brigades. 
There were undoubtedly many others whose designations we did not learn. 

The report also shows that numerous and heavy earthworks had been com- 
pleted for the defence of Richmond, and that in thirty- six of these were mounted 
some two hundred guns. 

On the 26lh, the day upon which I had decided as the time for our final ad- 
vance, the enemy attacked our right in strong force, and turned my .attention to 
the protection of our communications and depots of supply. 

The event was a bitter confirmation of the military judgment which had been 
reiterated to my superiors from the inception and through the progress of the 
Peninsula campaign. 

I notified the Secretary of War in the following despatch : 

"Headquarters Arimy of the Potomac, 

" Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862 — 12 m. 

" I have just heard that our advanced cavalry pickets on the left bank of Chicka 
hominy are being driven in. It is probably Jackson's advanced guard. If this 
be true, you may not hear from me for some days, as my communications will 
probably be cut oft'. The case is perhaps a difficult one, but I shall resort to 
desperate measures, and will do my best to out-manoeuvre, out-wit, and out-fight 
the enemy. Do not believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged if you 
learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown in possession of 
the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will not deceive the hopes you formerly 
placed in me. 

"G. B. McOLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Sec?-eta7-i/ of War." 

" Headciuartrrs Army of the I'otomac, 

" Ca?nj} Lincoln, June 26, 1862 — 2.30 ^j. m. 
" Yonr despatch and that of the President received. Jackson is driving in my 
pickets, &c , on the other side of the Chickahominy. It is impossible to tell 
where re-enforcements ought to go, as I am yet unable to predict result of ap- 
proaching battle. It will probably be better that they should go to Fort Mon- 
roe, and thence according to state of afi'airs when they arrive. 

"It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic communication more than 
an hour or two longer. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Hon. E. M. Stanton, 

" Sccrclari/ of War." ' 

On the same day I received the following despatches from the Secretary of 
War: 

"AVashington, June 25, 1862 — 11.20^;. m. 

" Your telegram of 6.15 has just been received. The circumstances that 
have hitherto rendered it impossible for the government to send you any more 



REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 123 

re-enforcements than ha:? been done, have been so distinctly stated to you hj 
the President that it is needless for me to repeat them. 

"Every tffort has been made by the President and myself to strengthen you. 
King's division has reached Falmoiitli, Shields's division and Ricketts's division 
are at Manassas. The President designs to send a part of that force to aid you 
as speedily as it can be done. 

"E. M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 
" Major General G. B. McClellan." 

"Washington, June 26, 1862 — 6 p. m. 
" Arrangements are being made as rapidly as possible to send you five thousand 
(5,000) men as fast as they can be brought from Manassas to Alexandria and 
embarked, which can be done sooner than to wait for transportation at Fred- 
ericksbiu-g. They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowell, Banks, and 
Fremont's force will be consolidated as the army of Virginia, and will operate 
promptly in your aid by land. Nothing will be spared to sustain you, and I 
have undoubting faith in your success. Keep me advised fully of your con- 
dition. 

"EDWIN M. STANTON, 

" Secretary of War. 
"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

But 5,000 of the re-enforcements spoken of in these communications came to 
the. army of the Potomac, and these reached us at Harrison's bar, after the seven 

In anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to provide for the contin- 
tingency of our communications witli the depot at the White House being sev- 
ered by the enemy, and at the same time to be prepared for a change of the base 
of our operations to James river, if circumstances should render it advisable, 
I liad made arrangements more than a week previous (on the 18th) to have 
transports with supplies of provisions and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, 
sent up James river. They reached Harrison's binding in time to be available 
for the army on its arrival at that point. Eveiits soon proved this change of 
base to be, though most hazardous and difficult, the only prudent course. 

In order to relieve the troops of the 6th corps, on the 19th of June General 
Reynolds's and General Seymour's brigades, of General McCall's division, 
(Pennsylvania reserves,) were moved from Gaines's farm to a position on Beaver 
Dam creek, General Meade's brigade being held in reserve in front of Gaines's farm. 
One regiment and a battery were thrown forward to the heights overlooking 
Mcchanicsville, and aline of pickets extended along the Chickahominy river 
between the Mcchanicsville and Meadow bridges. As has been already stated, I 
received, while engaged on the 2oth in directing the operations of Heintzelmau's 
corps, information which strengthened my suspicions that Jackson was advanc- 
ing with a large force upon our right and rear. On this day General Casey, at 
the White House, was instructed to prepare for a vigorous resistance, and de- 
fensive works were ordered at Tunstall's station. Early on the 25th General 
Porter was instructed to send out reconnoitring parties towards Hanover Court 
House to discover the position and force of the enemy, and to destroy the 
bridges on the Tolopotamoy as far as possible. 

Up to the 2Gth of June the operations against Richmond had been conducted 
along the roads leading to it from the east and northeast. The reasons (the 
President's anxiety about covering Washington from Fredericksburg, McDowell's 
promised co-operation, partial advance, and immediate withdraAval) whicli com- 
pelled the choice of this line of approach, and our continuance upon it, have 
been attended to above. 



1 
124 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

The superiority of the James river route, as a line of attack and supply, is too 
obvious to need exposition. My own opinion on that subject had been early 
given, and need not be repeated here. The dissipation of all hope of the co- 
operation by bind of General McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied in the 
defence of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat Jackson, disclosed an 
opportunity to the enemy, and a new danger to my right, and to the long line 
of supplies from the White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an imme 
diate change of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from the evening of 
the 26tli, every energy of the army was bent. Such a change of base, in the 
presence of a powerful enemy, is one of the most difficult undertakings in war. 
I was confident of the valor and discipline of my brave army, and knew th it it 
could be trusted equally to retreat or advance and to fight the series of battles 
now inevitable, whether retreating from victories or marching through defeats ; 
and, in short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against superior 
numbers, to fight its way through to the James river, and get a position whence 
a successful advance upon Richmond would be again possible. Their superb 
conduct through the next seven days justified my faith. 

On the same day General Van Vliet, chief quartermaster of the army of the 
Potomac, by my orders, telegraphed to Colonel Ingalls, quartermaster at the 
White House, as follows: "Run the cars to the last moment, and load them 
with provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have with subsistence, 
and send them to Savage's station, by way of Bottom's bridge. If you are 
obliged to abandon White House, burn everything that you cannot get off. You 
must throw all our supplies up the James river as soon as possible, and accom- 
pany them yourself with all your force. It will be of vast importance to estab- 
lish our depots on James river without delay if we abandon White House. I 
will keep you advised of every movement so long as the wires work; after that 
you must exerci>e your own judgment." 

All these commands Avere obeyed. So excellent were the dispositions of the 
different officers in command of the troops, depots, and gunboats, and so timely 
the warning of the approach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, 
and but a small amount of stores destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands 
of the enemy. 

General Stoneraan's communications with the main army being cut off, he fell 
back upon the White House, and thence to Yorktowu, when the White House 
was evacuated. 

On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders on the right bank 
of the Chivkahominy to be prepared to sen 1 as many troops as they could spare 
on the f.illowing day to the left bank of the river, as will be seen by the ap- 
pended telegrams. General Franklin received instructions to hold General 
Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 27th, and if heavy firing 
should at that time be heard in the direction of General Porter, to move at 
once to his assistance without further orders. 

At noon on the 26th the approach of the enemy, who had crossed above 
Meadow bridge, w^as disc ivered by the advanced pickets at that point, and at 
12.30 p. m. they were attacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called 
in, and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn. 

Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the line, and shortly 
after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of Morell's division, were moved for- 
ward and deployed on the right of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove 
church, to cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, were 
warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regiments relieved a portion of Rey- 
nolds's line just at the close of the action 

The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along the left bank 
of Beaver Dam creek, the left resting on the Chickahominy, and the right 
in thick woods beyond the upper road from Mechanicsville to Coal Har- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B m'cLELLAN. 125 

bor. The lower or river road crossed the creek at Ellison's mills. Seymour's 
brigade held the left of the line from the Chickahominy to beyond the mill, 
partly in woods and partly in clear ground, and Eeynolds's the right, princi- 
pally in the woods and covering the upper road. The artillery occupied posi- 
tions commanding the roads and the open ground across the creek. 

Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position generally prepared 
with a care that greatly contributed to the success of the day. The passage of 
the creek was diflicult along the Avhole front, and impracticable for artillery, ex- 
cept by the two roads where the main efforts of the enemy were directed. 

At 3 p. m. he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his skirmishers, and 
soon attacked our whole line, making at the same time a determined attempt to 
force the passage of the upper road, Mhicli was successfully resisted by General 
Reynolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to retire with very heavy loss. 
A rapid artillery fire, with desultoiy skirmishing, was maintained along the 
whole front, while the enemy massed his troops for another effort at the lower 
road about two hours later, Avhich Avas likewise repulsed by General Seymour 
with heavy slaughter. 

The firing ceased, and the enemy retired about 9 p. m., the action having lasted 
six hours, with entire success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops 
Avere engaged on this day. The portion of the enemy encountered were chii^ily 
from the troops on the right bank of the river, who crossed near MeadoAv bridge 
and at ^lechanicsville. 

The infn-mation in my possession soon after the close of this action convinced 
me that Jackson was really approaching in large force. The position on Beaver 
Dam creek, although so successfully defended, had its right flank too much in 
the air, and Avas t(50 for from the main army to make it available to retain it 
longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy guns at Hogan's and Gaines's 
houses over the Chickahominy during the night, Avitli as many of the wagons 
of the -Sth corps as possible, and to AvithdraAv the corps itself to a position 
stretching around the bridges, Avhere its flanks Avould be reasonably secure, and 
it would be within supporting distance of the main army. General Porter car- 
ried out my orders to that effect. 

It was not advisable at that time, CA-en had it been practicable, to AvithdraAv 
the 5th corps to the right bank of the Chickahominy. Such a movement Avould 
liaA'e exposed the rear of the ai'my, placed as between tAvo fires, and enabled 
Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the moA-ement to James riA'er, by crossing 
the Chickahominy in the A-icinity of Jones's bridge before we could reach Mal- 
A'ern hill Avith our trains. I determined then to resist Jackson Avith the 5th 
wrps, re-enforced by all our disposable troops in the new position near the 
bridge heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains and heavy guns, 
and to give time for the arrangements to secure the adoption of the James riA'er 
as our line of supjilies in lieu of the Pamuukey. 

The greater part of the heavy guns and wagons haA'ing been remoA-ed to the 
right bank of the Chickahominy, the delicate operation of withdrawing the 
troops from Beaver Dam creek Avas commenced shortly before daylight, and 
successfully executed. 

Meade's and Gritfin's brigades Avere the first to leave the ground; Seymour's 
brigade coA-ered the rear with the horse batteries of Captains Robertson and 
Tidball ; but the Avithdrawal was so skilful and gradual, and the repulse of the 
preceding day so complete, that although the enemy followed the retreat closely, 
and some skirmishing occurred, he did not appear in front of the new line in 
force till about noon of the 27th, AA^ien we were prepared to receive him. 

About this time General Porter, believing that General Stoneman would be 
cut off from him, sent him orders to fall back on the "White House, and after- 
wards rejoin the army as best he could. 

On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdraAval of his troops 



126 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGJE B. m'cLELLAN. 

from Mechauicsville to the selected position already mentioned, General Porter 
telegraphed as follows : 

" I hope to do without aid, though 1 request that Franklin, or some other 
command, be held ready to re-enforce me. The enemy are so close that I expect 
to be hard pressed in front I hope to have a portion in position to cover the 
retreat. This is a delicate movement, but relying on ^he good qualities of the 
commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get back and hold the new 
line. " 

This shows how closely Porter's retreat Avas followed. 

Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire night to remove the 
lieavy guns and WMgons, some of the siege guns were still in position at Gaines's 
house after sunrise, and were finally hauled off by hand. The new position of 
the 5th corps was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the 
bridges which connected our right wing with the troops on the opposite side of 
the river. 

Morell's division held the left of the line in a strip of woods on the left bank 
of the Gaines's mill stream, resting its left flank on the descent to the ( liickahom- 
iny, which was swept by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending 
into open ground on the right towards New Coal Harbor. In this line General 
Butterlield's brigade held the extreme left, General Martindale's joined his 
right, and General Gtiffin, still further to the right, joined the left of General 
Sykes's division, which, partly in woods and partly in open ground, extended in 
the rear of Coal Harbor. 

Eacli brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments. McCall's division 
having been engaged on the day before, was formed in a second line in the rear 
of the first, Meade's brigade on the left near the Chickahominy, Reynolds's bri- 
gade on the right, covering the approaches from Coal Harbor and Despatch 
station to Sumner's bridge, and Seymour's in reserve to the second line, still 
further in rear. General P. St. George Cooke, with five companies of the 5th 
regular cavalry, two squadrons of the 1st regular and three .•squadrons of the 
6tli Pennsylvania cavalry, (lancers,) was posted behind a hill in rear of the 
position, and near the Chickahominy, to aid in watching the left flank and de- 
fending the slope to the river. ' 

^^he troops were all in position by noon, witli the artillery on the commandiag 
ground, and in the intervals between the divisions and brigades. Besides the 
division batteries, there were Robertson's and Tidball's horse batteries, from the 
artillery reserve ; the latter posted on the right of Sykes's division, and the 
former on the extreme left of the line, in the valley of the Chickahominy. 
Shortly after noon the enemy were discovered approaching in force, and it soon 
became evident that the entire position was to be attacked. His skii-mishers 
advanced rapidly, and soon the firing became heavy along our whole front. At 
2 p. m.. General Porter asked for re-enforcements. Slocum's division of the 
6th corps was ordered to cross to the left bank of the river, by Alexander's 
bridge, and proceed to his support. 

General Porter's first call for reinforcements, through General Barnard, did 
not reach me, nor his demand for more axes, through the same officer. 

By 3 p. m.the engagement had become so severe, and the enemy Avere so 
greatly superior in numbers, that the entire second line and reserves had been 
moved forward to sustain the first line against repeated and desperate assaults 
along our whole front. 

At 3.30 p. m. Slocum's division reached the field and was immediately brou^^ht 
into action at tin; weak points of our line. 

On the left the contest was for the strip of woods running almost at right 
angles to the Chickahominy, in front of Adams's house, or between that and 
Gaines's house. The enemy several times charged up to this wood, but were 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B m'cLELLAN. 127 

each time driven back with heavy loss. The regulars, of Sykcs's division, oa 
the right, also repulsed several strong attacks. 

But our own loss under the tremendous fire of such greatly superior numhers 
was very severe, and the troops, most of whom had been under arms more than 
two days, were rapidly becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh men con- 
stantly brought against them. .,-™- 

When General Slocum's division arrived on the ground it increased General 
Porter's force to some 35,000, who were probably contending against about 
70,000 of the enemy. The line was severely pressed in several points, and as 
its being pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable for Gen- 
eral Porter, Avho was required to hold his position until night, to divide Slo- 
cum's division, and send parts of it, even single regiments, to the points most 
threatened. 

About 5 p. m., General Porter having reported his position as critical, French's 
and Meagher's brigades, of Richardson's division, (3d corps,) were ordered to 
cross to his support. The enemy attacked again in great force at 6 p. m., but 
failed to break our lines, though our loss was very heavy. 

About 7 p. m. they threw fresh troops against General Porter with still greater 
fury, and finally gained the woods held by our left. This reverse, aided by the 
confusion that followed an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the 5th 
cavalry, and followed as it was by more determined assaults on the remainder 
of our lines, now outflanked, caused a general retre it from our position to the 
hill in rear overlooking the bridge. 

French's and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving before them the 
stragglers who were thronging towards the bridge. 

These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their example, as well 
as by the steadiness of their bearings, reanimated our own troops and warned 
the enemy that re- enforcements had arrived. It Avas now dusk. The enemy, 
already repulsed sevei-al times with terrible slaughter, and hearing the shouts 
of the fresh troops, failed to follow up their advantage. This gave an oppor- 
tunity to rally our men behind the brigades of Generals French and Meagher, 
and they again advanced up the hill ready to repulse another attack. During 
the night our thin and exhausted regiments were all withdrawn in safety, and 
by the following morning all had reached the other side of the stream. T^^e 
regular infantry formed the rear guard,. and about 6 o'clock on the morning of 
the 2Sth crossed the river, destroying the bridge behind them. 

Our loss in this battle in killed, wounded, and missing, was very heavy, espe- 
cially in officers, many of whom were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners while 
gallantly leading on their men or rallying them to renewed exertions. 

It is impossible to arrive at the exact numbers lost in this desperate engage- 
ment, owing to the series of battles which followed each other in quick succes- 
sion, and in which the whole army was engaged. No general returns were made 
until after we had arrived at Harrison's landing, when the losses during the 
whole seven days were estimated together. 

Although we were finally forced from our first line after the enemy had been 
repeatedly driven back, yet the objects sought for had been obtained. The 
enemy was held at bay. Our siege guns and material were saved, and the right 
wing had now joined the main body of the army. 

I'he number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle was 22, three of 
which Avere lost by being run off the bridge during the final withdrawal. 

G^-eat credit is due for the efficiency and bravery with which this important 
arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and it was not until the last suc- 
cessful charge of the enemy that the cannoneers were driven from their pieces 
or struck down, and the guns captured. Deidrich's, Knierim's, and Grimm's 
batteries took position during the ei^gagemeut in the front of General Smith's 
line on the fight bank of the stream, and with a battery of siege guns, served 



128 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

by the 1st Connecticut artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of 
General Porter. 

So threatening were the movements of the enemy on both banks of the Ohick- 
ahoniiuy, that it was impossible to decide until the afternoon where the real 
attack would be made. Large forces of infantry were seen during the day near 
the old tavern, on Franklin's right, and threatening demonstrations were fre- 
quently made along the entire line on this side of the river, which rendered it 
necessary to hold a considerable force in position to meet them. 

On the 26th a circular was sent to the corps commanders, on the right bank 
of the river, asking them how many of their troops could be spared to re-enforce 
General Porter, after retaining sufficient to hold their positions for twenty-four 
hours. 

To this the following replies were received : 

"Headquarters Third Corps, 

" June 26 — 4 p. m. 

" I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for twenty-four 

hours. That would leave two brigades disposable tor service on the other side of 

the river, but the men are so tired and worn out that I fear they would not be 

in a condition to light after making a maa'ch of any distance. * * * 

"S. P. HEINTZELMAN, 

" Brigadier Geyieral. 
" General R. B. Marcv." 

Telegrams from General Heintzelman, on the 25th and 26th, had indicated 
that the enemy was in large force in front of Generals Hooker and Kearney, 
and on the Charles City road, (Longstreet, Hill, and Huger,) and General 
Heintzelman expressed the opinion, on the night of the 25th, that he could not 
hold his advanced position without re-enforcements. 

General Keyes telegraphed : 

"As to how many men will be able to hold this position for twenty-four 
hours, I must answer, all I have, if the enemy is as strong as ever in front, it 
haying at all times appeared to me that our forces on this flank are small 
enough." 

On the morning of the 27tli, the following despatch was sent to General 
Sumner : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" June 27 — 8.45 a. m. 
" General Smith just reports that six or eight regiments have moved down to 
the woods in front of General Sumner. 

"R. B. MARCY, 

" Chief of Staff, 
"General E. V. Sumner, 

" Cornd'g Second Army Corps.'^ 

At 11 o'clock a. m. General Sumner telegr-aphed, as follows: 

"The enemy threaten an attack on my right, near Smith." 
At 12.30 p. m. he telegraphed: 
"Sharp shelling on both sides." 
At 2.45 p. m.: 

"Sharp musketry firing in front of Burns; we are replying with artillery and 
infantry. The man on the lookout rejiorte some troops drawn up in line of 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 129 

battle about opposite my right and Smith's left ; the number cannot be made 
out." 

In accordance with orders given on the night of the 26th, General Slocum's 
division commenced crossing the river to support General Porter soon after 
daybreak on the morning of the 27th ; but as the firing in front of General Por- 
ter ceased, the movement was suspended. At 2 p. m. General Porter called for 
re-enforcements. I ordered them at once, and at 3.25 p. m. sent him the I'ollow- 
iug: 

" Slocum is noAV crossing Alexander's bridge with his whole command; enemy 
has commenced an infantry attack on Smith's left; I have ordered down Sum- 
ner's and Heintzelman's reserves, and you can count on the whole of Slocum's. 
Go on as you have begun." 

During the day the following despatches were received, which will show the 
condition of aflairs on the right bank of the Chickahomiuy : 

"June 27, 1862. 

"General Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy columns in the clearings 
to the right of James Garnett's house, and on the other side of the river oppo- 
site it. Three regiments are reported to be moving from Sumner's to Smith's 
front. The arrangements are very good, made by Smith. 

"W. B. FRANKLINT, 

"Brigadier General. 
"Colonel A. V. CoLBURN, 

" Assistant Adjutant General.^' 

Afterwards he telegraphed : 

"The enemy has begun an attack on Smith's left with infantry. I know no 
details." 

Afterwards the following : 

" The enemy has opened on Smith from a battery of three pieces to the right 
of the White House. Our shells are bursting Avell, and Smith thinks Sumner 
will soon have a cross fire upon thei^i that will silence them." 

Afterwards (at 5.50 p. m.) the following was sent to General Keyes : 

"Please send one brigade of Couch's division to these headcjuarters, without 
a moment's delay. A staif officer will be here to direct the brigade where to 
go." 

Subsequently the following was sent to Generals Sumner and Franklin : 

" Is there any sign of the enemy being in ferce in your front? Can you spare 
any more force to be sent to General Porter ] Answer at once." 

At 5.15 p. ra. the following was received from General Franklin : 

" I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from here at present." 

General Sumner replied as follows : 

" If the general desires to trust the defence of my position to my fi'ont line 
alone, I can send French with three regiments, and Meagher with his brigade, 
to the right ; everything is so uncertain, that I think it would be hazardous to 
do it." 

These two brigades were sent to re-enforce General Porter, as has been ob- 
served. 

H. Ex. Doc. 15 9 



130 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

At 5.25 p. m. I sent the following to General Franklin: 

" Porter is hard pressed ; it is not a question of prudence, hut of possibilities. 
Can you possibly maintain your position until dark with two brigades ? I have 
ordered eight regiments of Sumner's to support Porter ; one brigade of Couch'a 
to this place. 

" Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If possible, send a brigade 
to support Porter. It should follow the regiments ordered from Sumner." 

At 7.35 p. m. the following was sent to General Sumner: 
•'If it is possible, send another brigade to re-enforce General Smith; it is said 
three heavy columns of infantry are moving on him." , 

From the foregoing despatches it will be seen that all disposable troops were sent 
from the right bank jof the river to re-enforce General Porter, and that the corps 
commanders were left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they 
deemed adeqviate. To have done more, eveA though Porter's reverse had been 
prevented, would have had the still more disastrous result of imperilling the 
whole movement across the Peninsula. 

The operations of this day proved the numerical superiority of the enemy, 
and made it evident that while he had a large army on the left bank of the 
Chickahominy, which had already turned our right, and was in position to 
intercept the communications with our depot at the White House, he was also 
in lai-ge force between our army and Richmond ; I therefore eifected a junction 
of our forces. 

This might probably have been executed on cither side of the Chickahominy; 
and if the concentration had been effected on the left bank, it is possible we 
might, with our entire force, have defeated the enemy there ; but at that time 
tliey held the roads leading to the White House, so that it would have been 
impossible to have sent forward supply trains in advance of the army in that 
direction, and the guarding of those trains would have seriously embarrassed 
our operations in the battle ; we would have been compelled to fight, if concen- 
trated on that bank of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been fol- 
lowed by the enemy's forces ixpon the Richmond side of the river operating 
upon our rear; and if, in the chances of war, we had been ourselves defeated in 
the effort, we would have been forced to fall back to the White House, ami 
probably to Fort Monroe ; and, as both our flanks and rear would then have 
been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the greater part of the 
army itself, might have been lost. 

The movements of the enemy showed that they expected this, and, as they 
themselves acknowledged, they were prepared to cut off our retreat in that 
direction. 

I therefore concentrated all our forces on the right bank of the river. 

During the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th, all our wagons, heavy 
guns, &c., Avere gathered there. 

It may be asked, why, after the concentration of our forces on the right 
bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of the enemy drawn away from 
Richmond upon the opposite side, I did not, instead of striking for James river, 
fifteen miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond. 

It will be remembered that at this juncture the enemy was on our rear, and 
there was every reason to believe that he woiild sever our communications with 
the supply depot at the White House. 

We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we had advanced 
directly on Richmonu, it would have required considerable time to carry the 
strong works around that place, during which our men would have been desti- 
tute of food ; and even if Richmond bad fallen before our anns, the enemy 
could still have occupied our supply communications between that place and 



REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 131 

the gunboats, and turned tlie disaster into victory. If, on tlie other liand, the 
enemy had concentrated all his forces at Richmond during the progress of our 
attack, and we had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our 
trains before reaching the flotilla. 

The battles which continued day after day in the progress of our flank move- 
ment to the James river, with the exception of the one at Graines's mill, were 
successes to our arms, and the closing engagement at Malvern hill was the 
most decisive of all. 

On the evening of the 27th of June I assembled the corps commanders at 
my headquarters, and informed them of my plan, its reasons, and my choice of 
route and method of execution. 

General Keycs Avas directed to move his corps, with its artillery and baggage, 
across the White Oak swamp bridge, and to seize strong positions on the 
opposite side of the swamp, to cover the passage of the other troops and trains. 

This Avas executed on the 28th b_^ noon. Before daybreak on the 28th I 
went to Savage's station, and remained there during the day and night, direct- 
ing the withdrawal of the trains and supplies of the army. 

Orders were given to the different commanders to load their wagons with, 
ammunition and pi'ovisions, and the necessary baggage of the officers and men, 
and to destroy all property Avhich conld not be transported with the army. 

Orders Avere also given to leave with those of the sick and Avounded AA'ho 
could not be transported, a proper complement of surgeons and attendants, with 
a bountiful supply of rations and medical stores. 

The large herd of 2,500 beef-cattle AA^as, by the chief commissary. Colonel 
Clarke, transferred to the James river Avithout loss. 

On the morning of the 28tli, Avhile General Franklin was withdraAving his 
command from Golding's farm, the enemy opened upon General Smith's divis- 
ion from Garuett's hill, from the A'alley aboA'e, and from Gaines's hill on the 
opposite side of the Cliickahominy; and shortly afterwards two Georgia regi- 
ments attempted to carry the Avorks about to be vacated, but this attack was . 
repulsed by the 23d Ncav York and the 49th Pennsylvania volunteers on picket, 
and a section of Mott's battery. 

Porter's corps was moved across White Oak swamp during the day and 
night, and took up positions covering the roads leading from Richmond towards 
White Oak swamp and Long bridge. ^ McCall's diAdsion was ordered, on the 
night of the 28th, to move across the swamp and take a proper position to as- 
sist in covering the remaining troops and trains. * 

During the same night the corps of Sumner and Heintzelman, and the 
division of Smith, Avere ordered to an interior line, the left resting on Keyes's 
old intrenchments, and curving to the right, so as to cover SaA'age's station. 

General Slocum's division, of Franklin's corps, Avas ordered to Savage's 
station, in reserve. 

They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 29th, in order to 
cover the withdraAval of the trains, and then to fall back across the swamp and 
unite Avith the remainder of the army. 

On the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of War: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Savage's Station, June 28, 1862 — 12.20 a. m. 

"I noAV know the full history of the day. On this side of the river (the right 
bank) we repulsed several strong attacks. On the left bank our men did all 
that men could do, all that soldiers could accomplish, but they Avere overwhelmed 
by vastly superior numbers, even after I brought my last reserA^es into action. 
The loss on both sides is terrible. I believe it Avill prove to be the most desper- 
ate battle of the Avar. The sad remnants of my men behave as men. Those 



132 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

battalions who fought most bravely, and suffered most, are still in the best 
order. My regulars Avere superb; and I count upon what are left to turn 
another battle, in company with their gallant comrades of the volunteers. Had 
I twenty thousand (20,000,) or even ten thousand, (10,000,) fresh troops to use 
to-morrow, I could take Richmond ; but I have not a man in reserve, and shall 
be glad to cover my retreat and save the material and personnel of the army. 

" If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, and no one need 
blush for the army of the Potomac. I have lost this battle because my force 
was too small. 

"I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say it with the 
earnestness of a general who feels in his heart the loss of every brave man who 
has been needlessly sacrificed to-day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes ; but 
to do this the government must view the matter in the same earnest light that 
I do. You must send me very large re-enforcements, and send them at once. I 
shall draw back to this side of the Chickahomiuy, and think I can withdraw all 
our material. Please understand that in this battle we have lost nothing but 
men; and those the best we have. 

" In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say to the President 
that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous Avhen I said that my force 
was too weak. I merely intimated a truth which to-day has been too plainly 
pioved. If, at this instant, I could dispose often thousand (10,000) fresh men, 
1 could gain the victory to-morrow. 

"I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from 
a defeat to a victory. As it is, the government must not and cannot hold me 
responsible for the result. 

"I feel too earnestly to-night. I have seen too many dead and wounded 
comrades to feel otherwise than that the government has not sustained this army. 
If you do not do so now, the game is lost. 

"If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you, or 
to any other persons in Washington. 

"You have done your best to sacrifice this army. 

"G. B. McCLELLxiK 

"Hon. E. M. Stanton." 

The headquarters camp at Savage's station was broken lap early on the 
morning of the 29th, and moved acrosS White Oak swamp. As the essential 
part of this day's 'operation was the passage of the trains across the swamp, 
and their protection against attack from the direction of New Market and Rich- 
mond, as well as the immediate and secure establishment of our communications 
with the gunboats, I passed the day in examining the ground, dh-ecting the 
posting of troops, and securing the uninterrupted movement of the trains. 

In the afternoon I instructed General Keyes to move during the night to 
James river, and occupy a defensive position near Malvern hill, to secure our 
extreme left fiank. 

General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, and prolong the line towards 
the right. The trains were to be pushed on towards James river in rear of 
these corps, and placed under the protection of the gunboats as they arrived. 

A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry early this day on the Quaker 
road showed that his efforts were about to be directed towards impeding our 
progress to the river, and rendered my presence in that quarter necessary. 

BATTLE OF ALLEN'S FARM. 

General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 29, at daylight, 
and marched his command to Orchard station, halting at Allen's field, bc^tween 
Orchard and Savage's station. The divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick 



EEPORT OF GEXEEAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAX. 133 

were formed on the ric^lit of tho railroad, ficing towards Richmond, Richardson 
holding the right, and Sedgwick joining the right of Heintzelman's corps. The 
first line of Richardson's di%-ision was held by General Fi-ench, General Cald- 
well supporting in the second. A log building in front of Richardson's divi- 
sion was held by Colonel Brooks with one regiment, (53d Pennsylvania volun- 
teers,) with Hazzard's battery on an elevated piece of ground, a little in rear 
of Colonel Brooks's command. 

At nine a. m. the enemy commenced a furious attack on the right of General 
Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of Genei-al Richardson was next 
attacked, the enemy attempting in vain to carry the position of Colonel Brooks. 
Captain Hazzard's battery, and Pettet's battery, which afterwards rejilaced it, 
were served with great effect, while the 53d Pennsylvania kept up a steady fire 
on the advancing enemy, compelling them at last to retire in disorder. The 
enemy renewed the attack three times, but Avere as often repulsed. 

BATTLE OF SAVAGE'S STATION. 

General Slocum arrived at Savage's station at an early hour on the 29th, and 
was ordered to cross White Oak swamp and relieve General Keyes's corps. 
As soon as General Keyes was thus relieved, he moved towards James river, 
which he reached in safety, with all his artillery and baggage, early on the 
morning of the SOtli, and took up a position below Turkey creek bridge. 

During the morning General Franklin heard that the enemy, after having 
repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chickahominy in large force, and advanc- 
ing towards Savage's station. He communicated this information to General 
Sumner, at Allen's farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's station. A 
little after noon General Sumner united his forces with those of General Franklin, 
and assumed command. 

I had ordered General Heintzelman, with his corps, to hold the Williamsburg 
road until dark, at a point where were several field-works, and a skirt of timber 
between these works and the railroad ; but he fell back before night, and crossed 
White Oak swamp at Brackett's ford. 

General Sumner in his report of the battle of Savage's station says : 

"When the enemy appeared on the Williamsburg road I could not imagine 
why General Heintzelman did not attack him, and not till some time afterwards did 
I learn, to my utter amazement, that General Heintzelman had left the field, and 
retreated with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) before the action commenced. 
This defection might have been attended with the most disastrous consequences; 
and although we beat the enemy signally and drove him from the field, Ave 
should certainly have given him a more crushing bloAV if General Heintzelman 
had been there Avith his corps." 

General Heintzelman in his report of the operations of his corps says : 

"On the night of the 2Sth of June I received orders to AvithdraAv the troops 
of my corps irom the advanced position they had taken on the 25th of June, 
and to occupy the intrenched lines about a mile in rear. A map Avas sent me, 
showing the positions General Sumner's and General Franklin's corps Avould 
occupy. 

"About sunrise the next day our troops sloAvly fell back to the ncAV position, 
cautiously followed by the enemy, taking possession of our camps as soon as av« 
left them. 

"From some misapprehension Genei-al Sumner held a more adA^auced position 
than was indicated on the map furnished me, thus leaving a space of about 
three-fourths of a mile betAveen the right of his corps and General Smitii's divi- 
sion of General Franklin's corps. 

******** 



134 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

"At 11 a. m. on the 29th the enemy commenced an attack on General Sum- 
ner's troops, a few shells falHng within my lines. Late in the forenoon reports 
reached me that the rehels were in possession of Dr. Trent's house, only a mile 
and a half from Savage's station. I sent several cavalry reconnoissauces, and 
finally Avas satisfied of the fact. General Franklin came to my headquarters, 
when I learned of the interval between his left and General Sumner's right, in 
which space Dr. Trent's house is ; also that the rebels had repaired one of the 

bridges across the Chickahominy, and were advancing. 

******** 

"I rode forward to see General Sumner, and met his troops falling back on 
the Williamsburg road through my lines. General Sumner infoi-med me that 
he intended to make a stand at Savage's station, and for me to join him to 
determine iipon the position. 

"This movement of General Sumner's micovering my right flank, it became 
necessary for me to at once withdraw my troops. * * * * 

" I rode back to find General Sumner. After some delay, from the mass of 

troops in the field, I found him, and learned that the course of action had been 

determined on ; so I returned to give the necessary orders for the destruction of 

the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions still remaining on the ground. 
* * ******** 

"The whole open space near Savage's station was crowded with troops — more 
than I supposed could be brought into action judiciously. An aid from the 
commanding general had in the morning reported to me to point out a road 
across the White Oak swamp, starting from the left of General Kearney's posi- 
tion and leading by Brackett's ford. * * * * * * 

"The advance of the column reached the Charles City road at 6^^ p. m., and 
the rear at 10 p. m., without accident." 

The orders given by me to Generals Sumner, Heintzelman, and Franklin 
were to hold the positions assigned them until dark. As stated by General 
Heintzelman, General Sumner did not occupy the designated position ; but, as 
he was the senior officer present on that side of the White Oak swamp, he may 
have thought that the movements of the enemy justified a deviation from the 
letter of the orders. It appears from his report that he assumed command of 
all the troops near Savage's station, and determined to resist the enemy there ; 
and that he gave General Heintzelman orders to hold the same position as I had 
assigned him. 

The aid sent by me to General Heintzelman to point out the road across th« 
swamp was to guide him in retiring after dark. 

On reaching Savage's station, Sunmer's and Franklin's commands were 
drawn up in line of battle in the large open field to the left of the railroad, 
the left resting on the edge of the Avoods, and the right extending down to the 
railroad. General Brooks, with his brigade, held the Avood to the left of the field, 
where he did excellent service, receiA-ing a wound, but retaining his command. 

General Hancock's brigade was throAvn into the woods on the right and front. 
At 4 p. m. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by the Williamsburg 
road. It was gallantly met by General Burns's brigade, supported and re-en- 
forced by tAvo lines in reserve, and finally by the New York 69th, Hazzard's 
and Pettet's batteries again doing good service. Osborn's and Bramhall's bat- 
teries also took part effecti\'ely in this action, Avhich Avas continued with great 
obstinacy until betAveen 8 and 9 p. m., when the enemy Avere driven from the 
field. 

Immediately after the battle the orders Avere repeated for all the troops to 
fall back and cross White Oak swamp, which was accomplished during the 
night in good order. By midnight all the troops Avere on the road to White 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLA*N. 135 

Oak swamp bridge, General French, witli his brigade, acting as rear guard, and 
at 5 a. ra. on the 30th all had crossed and the bridge was desti'oyed. 

On the afternoon of the 29th I gave to the corps commanders their instruc- 
tions for the operations of the following day. As stated before, Porter's corps 
was to move forward to James river, and, with the corps of General Keyes, to 
occupy a position at or near Turkey Bend, on a line perpendicular to the river, 
thus covering the Charles City road to Richmond, opening communication Avith 
the gunboats, and covering the passage of the supply trains, which were pushed 
forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plantation. The remaining corps 
were pressed onward, and posted so as to guard the approaches from Richmond, as 
well as the crossings of the White Oak swamp, over which the army had pajSsed. 
General Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White Oak swamp bridge, 
and cover the withdrawal of the trains from that point. His command consisted 
of his own corps, with General Richardson's division and General Naglee's 
brigade placed under his orders for the occasion. General Slocuni's division 
was on the right of the Charles City road. 

On the morning of the 30th I again gave to the corps commanders within 
reach instructions for posting their troops. I found that, notwithstanding all 
the efforts of my personal etaif and other officers, the roads were blocked by 
wagons, and there was great difficulty in keeping the trains in motion. 

The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th to reconnoitre 
.the roads had neither returned nor sent me any reports or guides. Generals 
Keyes and Porter had been delayed — one by losing the road, and the other by 
repairing an old road — and had not been able to send any information. We 
then knew of but one road for the movement of the troops and our immense 
trains. 

It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of this road as well 
as our limited knowledge of the ground permitted, so as to cover the movement 
of the trains in the rear. 

I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the left, giving final in- 
structions for the posting of the troops and the obstructions of the roads toward 
Richmond, and all corps commanders were directed to hold their positions until 
the trains had passed, after which a more concentrated position was to be taken 
up near James river. 

Our force Avas too small to occupy and hold the entire line from the White 
Oak SAvamp to the river, exposed, as it was, to be taken in reverse by a move- 
ment across the lower part of the swamp, or across the Chickahominy, below the 
swamp. Moreover, the troops were then greatly exhausted, and required rest in 
a more secuie position. 

I extended my examinations of the country as far as Haxall's, looking at all 
the approaches to Malvern, Avhich position I perceived to be the key to our 
operations in this quarter, and Avas thus enabled to expedite very considerably 
the passage of the trains, and to rectify the positions of the troops. 

Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the different corps commanders 
to inform them Avhat I had done on the left, and to bring me information of the 
condition of affairs on the right. I returned from Malvern to Haxall's, and 
luiA'ing made arrangements for instant communication from Malvevn by signals, 
went on board of Captain Rodgers's gunboat, lying near, to confer Avith him in 
reference to the condition of our supply vessels, and the state of things on the 
river. It was his opinion that it Avould be necessary for the army to fall back 
to a position below City Point, as the channel there was so near the southern 
shore that it Avould not be possible to bring up the transports, should the enemy 
occupy it. Harrison's landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. 
Upon the termination of this interview I returned to Malvei-n hill, and remained 
there until shortly before daylight. 



136 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 



BATTLE OF "NELSON'S FARM," OR "GLENDALE." 

On the morning of the 30th General Sumner was ordered to march with 
Sedgwick's division to Glendale ("Nelson's farm.") General McCall's divi- 
sion (Pennsylvania reserves) was halted during the moniing on the New Market 
road, just in advance of the point where the road turns off to Quaker church. 
This line was formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, with Meade's 
brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and Keynolds's brigade, commanded 
by Colonel S. G. Simmons, of the 5th Pennsylvania, in reserve; Randall's regu- 
lar battery on the right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the centre, and 
Dietrich's and Kanerhun's batteries of the artillery reserve on the left — all in 
front of the infantry line. The cnnntry ia General McCall's front was an open 
field, intersected towards the right by the New Market road, and a small strip 
of timber parallel to it ; the open front was about 800 yards, its depth about 
1,000 yards. 

On the morning of the 30th General Heintzelman ordered the bridge at Brack- 
ett's ford to be destroyed, and trees to be felled across that road and the Charles 
City road. General Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City road. 
General Kearney's left to connect with General Slocum's left. General McCall's 
position was to the left of the Long bridge road, in connexion M'ith General 
Kearney's left. General Hooker was on the left of General McCall. Between 
12 and 1 o'clock the enemy opened a fierce cannonade upon the divisions of 
Smith and Richardson, and Naglee's brigade, at White Oak swamp bridge. 
This artillery fire -was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed 
some infantry below our position. Richardson's division suffered severely. 
Captain Ayres directed our artillery with great effect. Captain Hazzard's bat- 
tery, after losing many cannoneers, and Ca])tain Plazzard being mortally 
wounded, was compelled to retire. It was replaced by Pettit's battery, which 
partially silenced the enemy's guns. 

General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeatedly driving back 
the enemy in their attempts to cross the White Oak swamp. 

At two o'clock in the day the enemy were reported advancing in force by 
the Charles City road,, and at half past two o'clock the attack was made down 
the road on General Slocum's left, but was checked by his artillery. After this 
the enemy, in large force, comprising the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, 
attacked General McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was compelled to 
retire. 

General McCall, in his report of the battle, says : 

******* 

" About half past two my pickets were driven in by a strong advance, after 
some skirmishing, without loss on our part. 

" At three o'clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left centre and 
another on the right centre to feel for a weak point. They were under cover 
of a shower of shells, and boldly advanced, but were both driven back — on the 
left by the 12th regiment, and on the right by the 7th regiment. 

" For nearly two hours the battle raged hotly here." * * * "At last 
the enemy was compelled to retire before the well-directed musketry fire of the 
reserves. The German batteries were driven to the rear, but I I'ode up and 
sent them back. It was, hoAvever, of little avail, and they were soon after 
abandoned by the cannoneers." * # * * * # * 

" The batteries in front of the centre Avere boldly charged upon, but the 
enemy Avas speedily forced back." ******* 

" !^oon after this a most determined charge was made on Randall's battery by 
a full brigade, advancing in wedge shape, without order, but in perfect reckless- 
ness. Somewhat similar charges had, I have stated, been previously made on 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 137 

Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regiments without success, they having 
recoiled before the storm of canister hurled against them. A like result was 
anticipated by Randall's battery, and the 4th regiment was requested not to fire 
until the battery had done with them. 

"Its gallant commander did not doubt his ability to repel the attack, and his 
guns did, indeed, mow down the advancing host, but still the gaps were closed, 
and the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns. 

" It was a perfect ton-ent of men, and they were in his battery before the 
guns could be removed. Two guns that were, indeed, successfully limbered, 
had their horses killed and wounded and Avere overturned on the spot, and the 
enemy, dashing past, drove the greater part of the 4th regiment before them. 

" The left company, (T3,) nevertheless, stood its ground, with its captain, 
Fred. A. Conrad, as did, likewise, certain men of other companies. I had ridden 
into the regiment and endeavored to check them, but with only partial success.'' 

" There was no running. But my division, reduced by the previous battles 
to less than six thousand, (6,000,) had to contend with the divisions of Long- 
street and A. P. Hill, considered two of the strongest and best among many of 
the confederate army, numbering that day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it was 
reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accumulated i;pon them." 

* 5|j ;|; ;}; ;)< :ic * 

General Heintzelman states that about 5 o'clock p. m. General McCall's 
division was attacked in large force, evidently the principal attack ; that in less 
than an hour the division gave way, and adds : " General Hooker being on his 
left, by moving to his right, repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner with 
great slaughter. General Sumner, who was with General Sedgwick in McCall's 
rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry in driving back the ene- 
my. They now renewed their attack with vigor on General Kearney's left, 
and were again repulsed with heavy loss." 

" This attack commenced about 4 p. m., and was pushed by heavy masses 
with the utmost determination and vigor. Captain Thompson's battery, directed 
with great precision, firing double charges, swept them back. The whole open 
space, two hundred paces wide, was filled with the enemy ; each repulse brought 
fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid volleys and de- 
termined charge of the 63d Pennsylvania, Colonel Hays, and half of the 37th 
New York volunteers." 

General McCall's troops soon began ip emerge from the woods into the open 
field. Several batteries were in position and began to fire into the Avoods over 
the heads of our men in front. Captain DeRussy's battery Avas placed on the 
right of General Sumner's artillery Avith orders to shell the woods. General 
Burns's brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, and soon drove him 
back ; other troops began to return from the White Oak SAvamp. Late in the 
day, at the call of General Kearney, General Taylor's first NeAv Jersey brigade, 
Slociun's diA^sion, Avas sent to occupy a portion of General McCall's deserted 
position, a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back the 
enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting themselves Avith keep- 
ing up a desultory firing till late at night. BetAveen 12 and 1 o'clock at night 
General Heintzelman commenced to AvithdraAv his corps, and soon after daylight 
both of his divisions, w\tli General Slocum's division and a portion of General 
Sumner's command, reached Mah^eru hill. 

On the morning of the 30th General Sumner, in obedience to orders, had 
moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call from General Franklin for 
re-enforcements, sent him tAvo brigades, Avhich returned in time to participate 
and render good service in the battle near Glendale. General Sumner says of 
this battle : 



138 REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

" The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since the battle of Fair 
Oaks. About 3 o'clock p. m. the action commenced, and after a fm-ious contest, 
lasting till after dark, the enemy was routed at all points and driven from the 
field." 

The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the army reached 
Malvern hill about 4 p. m. At about this time the enemy began to appear in 
General Porter's front, and at 5 o'clock advanced in large force against his left 
flank, posting artillery itnder cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to engage 
our force on Malvern hill, while with his infantry and some artillery he attacked 
Colonel Warren's brigade. A concentrated fire of about thirty guns was brought 
to bear on the enemy, which, Avith the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's command, 
compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands of Colonel Warren, 
The gunboats rendered most efficient aid at this time, and helped to drive back 
the enemy. 

It was very late at night before my aids returned to give me the results of 
the day's fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs. While 
waiting to hear from General Franklin, before sending orders to Generals Sum- 
ner and Heintzelman, I received a message from the latter that General Frank- 
lin was falling back; whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn, of my staff, with orders 
to verify this, and if it were true, to order in Generals Sumner and Heintzelman 
at once. He had not gone far when he met two officers sent from General 
Franklin's headquarters with the information that he was falling back. Orders 
were then sent to General Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and defi- 
nite instructions were given as to the movement which was to commence on the 
right. The orders met these troops already en route to Malvern. Instructions 
were also sent to General Franklin as to the route he was to follow. 

General Barnard then received full instructions for posting the troops as they 
arrived. 

I then returned to Haxall's, and again left for Malvern soon after daybreak. 
Accompanied by several general officers, I once more made the entire circuit of 
the position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with Captain Rod- 
gers to select the final location for the army and its depots. I retxirned to Mal- 
vern before the serious fighting commenced, and after riding along the lines, and 
seeing most cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity. 

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL. 

The position selected for resisting the further advance of the enemy on the 
1st of July was with the left and centi^ of our lines resting on Malvern hill, 
while the right curved backwards through a Avooded country towards a point 
below Haxall's, on James river. Malvern hill is an elevated plateau about a 
mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile in area, well cleared of timber, and 
with several converging roads riinning over it. In front are numerous defensible 
raA-ines, and the ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the Avood- 
land, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. Towards the north- 
west the plateau falls off more abruptly into a ravine Avhich .extends to James 
river. From the position of the enemy his most obvious lines of attack Avould 
come from the direction of Richmond and White Oak swamp, and would almost 
of necessity strike us upon oiir left Aving. Here, therefore, the lines were 
strengthened by massing the troops and collecting the principal part of the ar- 
tillery. Porter's corps held the left of the line, (Sykes's division on the left, 
Morell's on the right,) with the artillery of his tAvo divisions advantageously 
posted, and the artillery of the reserve so disposed on the high ground that a 
concentrated fire of some sixty guns could be brought to bear on any point in 
his front or left. Coh)iiel Tyler also had, Avith great exertion, succeeded in 
getting ten of his siege guns in position on the highest point of the hill. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 139 

Coucli's division was placed on the riglit of Porter; next came Kearney and 
Hooker; next Sedgwick and Richardson; next Smith and Slocum; then the re- 
mainder of Keyes's corps, extending by a backwood curve nearly to the river. 
The Pennsylvania reserve corps was held in reserve, and stationed behind Por- 
ter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's was thrown to the left on 
the low ground to protect that flank from any movement direct from the Rich- 
mond road. The line was very strong along the whole front of the open pla- 
teau, but from thence to the extreme right the troops were more deployed. 
This formation was. imperative, as an attack would probably be made upon our 
left. The right was rendered as secure as possible by slashing the timber and 
by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, commanding the flotilla on 
James river, placed his gunboats so as to protect our flank, and to command the 
approaches from Richmond. 

Between 9 and 10 a. m. the enemy commenced feeling along our whole left 
wing, with his artillery and skirmishers, as far to the right as Hooker's division. 

About 2 o'clock a column of the enemy Avas observed moving towards our 
right, within the skirt of woods in front of Heintzelman's corps, but beyond the 
range of our artillery. Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated 
attack in that quarter, but, thoiTgh the column was long, occupying more than 
two hours in passing, it disappeared, and was not again heard of. The pre- 
sumption is, that it retired by the rear, and participated in the attack afterwards 
made on our left. 

About 3 p. m. a heavy fire of artillery opened on Kearney's left and Couch's 
division, speedily followed up by a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's front. 
The artillery was replied to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of 
Couch's division remained lying on the ground until the advancing column was 
within short musket range, when they sprang to their feet and poured in a 
deadly volley which entirely broke the attacking force and drove them in dis- 
order back over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until we 
had advanced the right of our line some seven or eight hundred yards, and 
rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving us a stronger position and a better 
fij-e. 

Shortly after four o'clock the firing ceased along the whole front, but no dis- 
position was evinced on the part of the enemy to withdraw from the field. 
Caldwell's brigade, having been detached from Richardson's division, was sta- 
tioned upon Couch's right by General Porter, to whom he had been ordered to 
report. The whole line was surveyed by the general, and everything held in 
readiness to meet the coming attack. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly opened 
upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of his artillery, and at once be- 
gan pushing forward his columns of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after 
brigade, formed under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open 
space and charge our batteries, but the heavy fire of our guns, with the cool and 
steady volleys of our infantry, in every case sent them reeling back to shelter, 
and covered the ground with their dead and wounded. In several instances our 
infantry withheld their fire until the attacking column, which rushed through the 
storm of canister Tind shell from our artillery, had reached within a few yards of 
our lines. They then poured in a single volley and dashed forward Avith the 
bayonet, capturing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in con- 
fusion from the field. 

About 7 o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in front of Porter and 
Couch, Sleagher and Sickles were sent with their brigades, as soon as it was 
considered prudent to withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's 
troops, to re-enforce that part of the line and hold the position. These brigades 
relieved such regiments of Porter's corps and Couch's division as had expended 
their ammunition, and batteries from the reseiwe were pushed forward to replace 
those whose boxes were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts 



140 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 



to take the position so tenaciously defended ; but, despite his vastly superior 
numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks were repulsed with fearful loss, and 
darkness ended the battle of Malvern hill, though it was not until after 9 o'clock 
that the artillery ceased its fire. 

Daring the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly to the discom- 
fiture of the enemy, by throwing shell among his reserves and adv^mciug coL- 
umus. 

As the army in its movement from the Chickahominy to Harrison's landing 
was continually occupied in marching by night and fighting by day, its com- 
manders found no time or opportunity for collecting data which would enable 
them to give exact returns of casualties in each engagement. The aggregate of 
our entire losses from the 2Gth of June to the 1 st of July, inclusive, was ascer- 
tained, after arriving at Harrison's landing, to be as follows : 

List of the hilled-, wounded, and missing in the army of the Potomac from tht 
2Q)th of June to the 1st oj" July, 1862, inclusive. 



Corps. 


Killed. 


Wounded. 


Missing. 


Aggregate. 




253 

187 
189 
69 
620 
245 


1,240 

1,076 

1,051 

507 

2,460 

1, 313 

2 

60 


1,581 

848 

833 

201 

1,198 

1,179 

21 

97 


3,074 


2d. Suumei's .. . . 


2,111 


3d. Heiiitzelmaii's ... ...... .. . 


2,073 




777 


5th. Poitei's ... . -■ 


4,278 


6tli. Franklixi's 


2,737 




23 


Cavalry .-. .- ....... 


19 


176 






Total 


1,582 


7,709 


5, 958 


15,249 







* Pennsylvania reserves. 

Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete victory, it was, 
nevertheless, necessary to fall back still further, in order to reach a point where 
our supplies could be brought to us with certainty. As before stated, in the 
opinion of Captain Rodgers, commanding the gunboat flotilla, this could only be 
done below City Point; concurring in his opinion, I selected Harrison's bar as 
the new position of the army. The exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage, 
and ammunition, made it imperative to reach the transports immediately. 

The greater portion of the transportation of the army having been started for 
Harrison's landing during the night of the 30th of June and 1st of July, the 
order for the movement of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse 
of the enemy at Malvern hill. The order prescribed a movement by the left 
and rear. General Keyes's corps to cover the manoeuvre. It was not carried 
out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the roads being somewhat 
blocked by the rear of our trains. Porter and Couch were not able to move 
out as early as had been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to place a 
rear guard between his command and the enemy. Colonel Averill, of the 3d 
Pennsylvania cavalry, was intrusted Avith this delicate duty. He had under 
his command his own regiment and Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan's brigade of 
regular infantry and one battery. By a judicious use of the resources at his 
command he deceived the enemy so as to cover the withdrawal of the left wing 
without being attacked, remaining himself on the previous day's battle-field until 
about 7 o'clock of the 2d of July. Meantime General Keyes, having received hia 
orders, commenced vigoi-ous preparations for covering the movement of the entire 
army and protecting the trains. It being evident that the immense number of 
wagons and artillery carriages pertaining to the army could not move with celerity 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 141 

along a single road, General Keyes took advantnge of eveiy accident of tlie ground 
to open new avenues and to facilitate tlie movement. He made preparations for 
obstructing the roads, after the army had passed, so as to prevent any rapid pur- 
suit, destroying effectually Turkey bridge, on the main road, and rendering other 
roads and approaches temporarily impassable by felling trees across them. He 
kept the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the troops could 
move ou each side of the roads, not obstructing the passage, but being in good 
position to repel an attack from any quarter. His dispositions were so success- 
ful that, to use his own words, " I do not think more vehicles or more public 
property were abandoned on the march from Turkey bridge than would have 
been left, in the same state of the roads, if the army had been moving toward 
the enemy instead of away from him. And when it is understood that the car- 
riages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in one line, would extend not 
far from forty miles, the energy and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal 
from the presence of an enemy, vastly superior in numbers, will be appreciated." 
The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at Harrison's bar until 
after dark on the 3d of July, and the rear guard did not move into their camp 
\intil everything was secure. The enemy followed up with a small force, and 
on the 3d threw a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly dispersed by 
our batteries and the fire of the gunboats. 

Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes for the skill and energy 
which characterized his performance of the important and delicate duties in- 
trusted to his charge. 

High praise is also due to the officers and men of the 1st Connecticut artil- 
lery, Colonel Tyler, for the manner in Avhich they withdrew all the heavy guns 
during the seven days, and from Malvern hill. Owing to the crowded state of 
the roads the teams could not be brought within a couple of miles of the posi- 
tion, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by hand for that distance, 
leaving: nothins: behind. 



THIRD PERIOD. 

On the 1st July I received the following from the President : 

"Washington, Juhj 1, 1862—3.30^. m. 

" It is impossible to re-enforce you for your present emergency. If we had a 
million of men we could not get them to you in time. We have not the men 
to send. If you are not strong enough to face the enemy, you must find a place 
of security, and wait, rest and repair. Maintain your ground if you can, but 
save the army at all events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still 
ha^'e strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. 

"A. LINCOLN. 

"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

In a despatch from the President to me, on the 2d of July, he says : 

" If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do 
not ask you to. Try just now to save the army, material and personnel, and I 
will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast as I can. The governors of 
eighteen States offer me a new levy of three hundred thousand, which I accept." 

OntheSdof July the following kind despatch was received from the Pres- 
ident : 



142. REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

[Extract.] 

"Washington, July 3, 1862— 87;. m. 
"Yours of 5.30 yesterdaj is just received. I am satisfied that yourself, 
officers and men, have done the best you could. All accounts say better 
fighting was never done. Ten thousand thanks for it. 

"A. LINCOLN. 

"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

On the 4th I sent the following to the President : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

^' Harrison' s Bar, James River, July 4, 1862. ~ 

" I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 2d 
instant. 

" I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my men the repose 
they so much require. 

"After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy attacked the left 
of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting until night ; they were repulsed 
with great slaughter. Had their attack succeeded, the consequences would have 
been disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting which had con- 
tinued from the afternoon of the 26th ultimo, in a daily scries of engagements 
wholly unparalleled on this continent for determination and slaughter on both 
sides. 

" The mutual loss in killed and wounded is enormous. That of the enemy 
certainly greatest. On Tuesday morning, the 1st, our army commenced its 
movement from Haxall's to this point, our line of defence there being too 
extended to be maintained by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, 
and about 4 p. m. on the 2d a heavy storm of rain began, which continued 
during the entire day and until the forenoon of yesterday. 

" The roads became horrible. Troops, artillery, and wagons moved on steadily, 
and our whole army, men and material, was finally brought safe into this camp. 

" The last of the wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion 
"was very great, but the army preserved its morale, and would have repelled any 
attack wliich the enemy was in condition to make. 

" We now occupy a line of heights, about two miles from the James, a plain 
extending from there to the river; our front is about three miles long; these 
heights command our whole position, and must be maintained. The gunboats 
can render valuable support upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us in front 
we must hold our ground as we best may, and at whatever cost. 

■ " Our positions cau be carried only by overwhelming niirabers. The spirit 
of the army is excellent ; stragglers are finding their regiments, and the soldiers 
exhibit the best results of discipline. Our position is by no means impreg- 
nable, especially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground from our 
centre to the James on our right. The enemy may attack in vast numbers, and 
if so, our front will be the scene of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be 
decisive. Our ahuy is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded and prisoners. 

" I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but we were not 
beaten in any conflict. 

"The enemy Avere unable, by their utmost efforts, to drive us from any field. 
Never did such a change of base, involving a retrograde movement, and under 
incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly more nvmierous foe, par- 
take so little of disorder. We, have lost no guns except 25 on the field of battle, 
21 of which were lost by the giving way of -McCall's division, under the onset 
of superior numbers. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. I4d 

" Our communications by the James river are not secure. There are points 
where the enemy can establish themselves with cannon or musketry and com- 
mand the river, and where it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them 
out. In case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make every 
effort to preserve, at least, the personnel of the army, and the events of the last 
few days leaA^e no question that the troops will do all that their country can ask. 
Send such re-enforcements as you can; I will do what I can. We are shipping 
our wounded and sick and landing supplies. The Navy Department should 
co-operate with us to the extent of its resources. Captain Ilodgers is doing all 
in his power in the kindest and most efficient manner. 

" When all the circumstances of the case are known, it will be acknowledged 
by all competent judges that the movement just completed by this army is 
unparalleled in the annals of war. Under the most difficult circumstances we 
have preserved our ti'aius, our guns, our material, and, above all, our honor. 

"G. B. McOLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

"The President. " 

To which I received the following reply : 

" Washington, July 5, 1862 — 9 a. m. 

" A thousand thanks for the relief your two despatches, of twelve and one 
p.m. yesterday, gave me. Be assured the heroism and skill of yourself and 
officers and me^ is, and forever will be, appreciated. 

" If you can hold your present position we shall hive the enemy vet. 

"A. LINCOLN. 
"Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan, 

" Com?nandi?ig Army of the Votomacy 

The following letters were received from his excellency the President : 

"War Department, 
''Washington City, D. C.,July 4, 1862. 
" I understand your position as stated in your letter, and by General Marcy. 
To re-enforce you so as to enable you to resume the offensive within a month, or 
even six weeks, is impossible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving 
from the Potomac, (about ten thousand men, I suppose,) and about ten thousand, 
I hope, you will have from Burnside very soon, and about live thousand from 
Hunter a little later, I do not see how I can send you another man within a 
month. Under these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be your 
only care. Save the army, first, where you are, if you can, and, secondly,' by 
removal, if you must. You, on the ground, must be the judge as to which you 
will attempt, and of "the means for effecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that 
with the aid of the gunboats and the re-enforcements mentioned above, you can 
hold your present position ; provided, and so long as you can keep the James 
river open below you. If you are not tolerably confident you can keep the 
James river open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not remem- 
ber that you have expressed any apprehension as to the danger of having your 
communication cut on the river below you, yet I do not suppose it can have 
escaped your attention. 

" Yours, very truly, 

"A. LINCOLN. 

"Major General McClellan." 

" p. S. — If at any time you feel able to take the ofGsnsive, you are not re- 
strained from doing so. 

" A. L." 



144 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

The following telegram was sent on the 7th : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
. " Berkelci/, July 7, 186SJ— 8.30 a. m. 

" As boat is starting, I liave only time to acknowledge receipt of despatch by 
General Marcy. Enemy have not attacked. My position is very strong, and 
daily becoming more so. If not attacked to-day, I shall langh at them. I have 
been anxious about my communications. Had long consultation about it with 
riag-otficer Goldsborough last night ; he is confident he can keep river open. 
He should have all gunboats possible. Will see him again this morning. My 
men in splendid spirits and anxious to try it again. 

" Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose confidence in 
this army. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

*' Major General. 
" A. Lincoln, President." 

While general-in-chief, and directing the operations of all our armies in the 
field, I had become deeply impressed with the importance of adopting and car- 
rying out, certain views regarding the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, 
were essential to its objects and its success. 

During an active campaign of three months in the enemy's country, these 
were so fully confirmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical position we 
then occupied, not to withhold a candid expression of the mgre important of 
these views from the commander-in-chief, whom the Constitution places at the 
head of the armies and navies, as well as of the government of the nation. 

The following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Camp near Harrison' s Landing, Va., July 7, 1862. 

"Mr. President: You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in 
the front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our positions or 
reducing us by blo'cking our river communications. I cannot but regard our 
condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies, 
to lay before your excellency, for your private consideration, my general views 
concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they do not strictly re- 
late to the situation of this army, or strictly come Avithin the scope of my 
official duties. These views amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed 
upon my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned ; it is the cause 
of free institutions and self-government. The Constitution and the Union must 
be preserved, whatever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If seces- 
sion is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let 
neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war shake your settled 
purpose to enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United States upon 
the people of every State. 

" The time has come when the government must determine upon a civil and 
military policyf covering the whole ground of our national trouble. 

" The responsibility of determining, declaring, and supporting such civil and 
military policy, and of directing the whole course of national atlairs in regard 
to the rebellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or our cause will 
be lost. The Constitution gives you power, even for the present terrible exigency. 

" This rebellion has assumed the character of a Avar ; as such it should be 
regarded, and it should be conducted ixpon the highest principles knoAvn to 
christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the 
people of any State, in any event. It should not be at all a Avar iij)on popula- 
tion, but against armed forces and political organizations. Neither confiscation 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 145 

of property", political executious of persons, territorial organization of States, 
or forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. 

" In prosecuting the Avar, all private property and unarmed persons should be 
strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations ; all pri- 
vate property taken for military use should be paid or receipted for ; pillage and 
waste should be treated as high crimes ; all unnecessary trespass sternly pro- 
hibited, and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly 
rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active 
hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments, constitutionally made, 
should be neither demanded nor received. 

" Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order 
and the protection of political right. Military power should not be allowed to 
interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the 
authority of the master, except for repressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, 
contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive 
it. The right of the government to appropriate permanently to its own service 
claims to slave labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compen- 
sation therefor should be lecognized. This principle might be extended, upon 
grounds of military necessity and security, to all the slaves of a particular 
State, thus working manumission in such State ; and in Missouri, perhaps in 
Western Virginia also, and possibly even in Maryland, the expediency of such 
a measure is only a question of time. A system of policy thus constitutional, 
and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the 
support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses 
and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend 
itself to the favor of the Almighty. 

" Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be 
made known and approved, the eftort to obtain requisite forces will be almost 
hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly 
disintegrate our present ai-mies. The policy of the government must be sup- 
ported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be 
dispei'sed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numei'ous armies, but should 
be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upoa the armies of the 
Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structiu-e 
which they support would soon cease to exist. 

" In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require 
a commander-in-chief of the army, one who possesses your confidence, under- 
stands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by directing 
the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you 
proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I aui willing to serve you in 
such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever sub- 
ordinate served superior. 

" I may be on the brink of eternity ; and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, 
I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my 
country. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"GEORGE B. McCLULLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 

"His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 
H. Ex. Doc. 15 10 



146 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 

I telegraphed the President on the 11th a? folh)ws: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, July 11, 1862—3 p- w- 
****** 
"We are very strong here now, so far as defensive is concerned. Hope you 
will soon make us strong enough to advance and try it again. All in fine 
spirits. 

"GEORGE B. M(CLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 
"A. Lincoln, President." 

These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th, and 18th, to his excellency the 
President : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'' Berkeley, July 12, 1862—7.15 a. m. 

"Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent county, via Long bridge. I am 
still ignorant what road they afterwards took, but will know shortly. 

"Nothing else of interest since last despatch. Rain ceased, and everything 
quiet. Men resting well, but beginning to be impatient for another fight. 

" I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to be withdrawn 
from here, but promptly re-enforced and thrown again upon Richmond. If we 
have a little more than half a chance we can take it. 

"I dread the effects of any retreat upon tlie morale of the men. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
~--^,^ " Major General, Commanding. 

"A. Lincoln, President." ^Ns^ 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, Jiily 17, 1862—8 a. m. 

"I have consulted fully with General Burnside, and would commend to your 
favorable consideration the general's plan for bringing (7) seven additional regi- 
ments from North Carolina by leaving Newbern to the care of the gunboats. 
It appears manifestly to be our policy to concentrate here everything we can 
possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of crushing the enemy 
at Richmond, which seems clearly to be the most important point in rebeldom. 
Nothing should be left to chance here. I would recommend that General Bum- 
side, Avith all his troops, be ordered to this army, to enable it to assume the 
offensive as soon as possible. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

'■^ Major General, Commanding. 

"A. Lincoln, President." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Berkeley, July 18, 1862—8 a. m. 
"No change #orth reporting in the state of aifairs. Some (20,000) twenty 
thousand to (25,000) twenty-five thousand of the enemy at Petersburg, and 
others thence to Richmond. 

"Those at Petersburg say they are part of Beauregard's army. New troops 
arriving via Petersburg. Am anxious to have determination of government 
that no time may be lost in preparing for it. Hours are very precious now, and 
perfect unity of action necessary. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General, Coinmanding. 
**A. LrNCOLN, President." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 147 

Tke following was telegraphed to General Halleck on the SSth: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

''Berkeleij, July 28, 1862—8 a. m. 

"Nothing especially new except corroboration of reports that re-enforcements 
are reaching Richmond from soutli. It is not confirmed that any of Bragg's troops 
are yet here. My opinion is more and more firm that here is the defence of 
Washington, and that I should be at once re-enforced by all available troops to 
enable me to advance. Retreat would be disastrous to the army and the cause. 
I am confident of that. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Covimanding JJ. S. Army, Washington, D. C." 

On the 30th I sent the following to the general-in-chief: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Berkeley, July 30, 1862—7 a. m. 
****** 

" I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by this army, and that 
l4ie decision may be to re-enforce it at once. We are losing mucli valuable 
time, and that at a moment when energy and decision are sadlv needed. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Com^nanding (J. S. Army, Washington, D. C" 

About half an hour after midnight, on the morning of August 1, the enemy 
brought some light batteries to Coggin's point and the Coles house, on the 
right bank of James river, directly opposite Harrison's landing, and opened a 
heavy fire upon our shipping and encampments. It was continued rapidly for 
about thirty minutes, when they were driven back by the fire of our guns; this 
affair was reported in the following despatch : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Berkeley, August 2, 1862 — 8 a. m. 

"Firing of night before last killed some ten (10) men and wounded about (15) 
fifteen. 

"No harm of the slightest consequence done to the shippitig, although several 
were struck. Sent party across river yesterday to the Coles house, destroyed 
it and ciit down the timber; will complete work to-day, and also send party to 
Coggin's point, which I will probably occupy. I will attend to your telegraph 
about pressing at once; will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside, and I will 
stir these people up. I need more cavalry; have only (3,700) thirty-seven 
hundred for duty in cavalry division. 

" Adjutant General's office forgot to send Sykes's commission as major general, 
with tliose of other division commanders ; do me the favor to hui'ry it on. 

"G. B. McOLELLAN, 

"Major General, Commanding. 

" Mtijor General H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

To prevent another demonstration of this character, and to insure a debouche 
on the south bank of the James, it became neces-^ary to oc-.apy Coggin's point, 
which was done on the 3d, and the enemy, as ^'ill be Sfen from the following 
despatch, driven back tOAvards Petersburg : 



148 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 



"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'' BerJiehy, August 3, 1862 — 10^. m. 

" Coggiu's point was occupied to-day, and timber felled so as to make it quite 
defensible. 1 went over the ground myself, and found tliat Duane had, as usual, 
selected an admirable position, which can be intrenched with a small amount of 
labor, so as to make it a formidable tete de pent, covering the landing of a large 
force. 

" I shall begin intrenching it by the labor of contrabands to-morrow. The 
position covers the Coles house, Avhich is directly in front of Westover. We 
have noAv a safe debouche on the south bank, and are secure against midnight 
cannonading. A few thousand more men would place us in condition at least 
to annoy and disconcert the enemy very much. 

" I sent Colonel Averill this morning with three hundred (300) cavalry to 
examine the country on the south side of the James, and try to catch some cav- 
alry at Sycamore church, which is on the main road from Petersburg to Suffolk, 
and some live (5) miles from the Coles house. He found a cavalry force of five 
hundred and fifty (550) men, attacked them at once, drove in their advance 
guards to their camp, Mhere we had a sharp skirmish, and drove them off iu 
disorder. 

" He burned their entire camp, with their commissary and quartermaster's 
stores, and then returned and re-crossed the river. He took but (2) two prisoners, 
had one man wounded by a ball, and one by a sabre cut. 

" Captain Mcintosh made a handsome charge. The troops engaged were of 
the (5th) fifth regulars, and the (^ 3d) third Pennsylvania cavalry. 

"Colonel Averill conducted this afi"air, as he does everything he undertakes, 
to my entire satisfaction. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
' " Major General, Commanding. 

"Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army, Wasldngton, D. C" 

On the 1st of August I received the following despatches : 

" Washington, July 30, 1862 — 8^. m. 
" A despatch just received from General Pope says that deserters report that 
the enemy is moving south of James river, and that the force in llichmond ia 
very small. I suggest he be pressed in that direction, so as to ascertain the 
facts of J,he case. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

^^ Major General. 
"Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

" Washington, July 30, 1862—8 p. m. 
"In order to enable you to move in any direction, it is necessary to relieve 
you of your sick. The Surgeon General has, therefore, been directed to make 
arrangements for them at other places, and the Quartermaster General to provide 
transportation. I hope you will send them away as quickly as possible, and 
advise me of their removal. 

"H.W. HALLECK, 

" Major General. 
" Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

It is clear that the general-in-chief attached some weight to the report re- 
ceived from General Pope, and I was justified in supposing that the order in 
regard to the removing the sick contemplated an offensive movement rather 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 149 

than a retreat, as I had no other data than the telegi-ams just given, from which 
to form an opinion as to the intentions of the government. 
The following telegram strengthened me in that belief: 

" Washington, July 31, 1862 — 10 a. m. 
" General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported to be evacuating 
Richmond, and falling back on Danville and Lynchburg. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major General. 
" Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan." 

In occupying Coggin's point, as already described, I was influenced by the 
necessity of possessing a secure debouche on the south of the James, in order 
to enable me to move on the communications of Richmond in that direction, as 
well as to prevent a repetition of midnight cannonades. 

To carry out General Halleck's first order, of July 30, it was necessary first 
to gain possession of Malvern hill, which was occupied by the enemy, apparently 
in some little force, and controlled the direct approach to Richmond. Its tem- 
porary occupation, at least, was equally necessary in the event of a movement 
upon Petersburg, or even the abandoument of the Peninsula. General Hooker, 
with his own division, and Pleasonton's cavalry, was therefore directed to gain 
possession of Malvern hill on the night of the 2d of August. 

He failed to do so, as the following despatch recites : 

"Headquarters Army or" the Potomac, 

" Berkeleij, August 3, 1862 — 10.20^. m. 

" The movement undertaken up the river last night failed on account of the 
incompetency of guides. 

" The proper steps have been taken to-day to remedy this evil, and I hope to 
be ready to-morrow night to carry out your suggestions as to pressing, at least 
to accomplish the first indispensable step. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Co?nmanding. 
" Maj. Gen. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

On the 4th General Hooker was re-enforced by General Sedgwick's division, 
and having obtained a knowledge of the roads, he succeeded in turning Malvern 
hill, and driving the enemy back towards Richmond. 

The following is my report of this affair at the time : 

"Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862 — 1 p. m. 

"General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a very considerable force of 
infantry and artillery stationed at this place, and carried it handsomely, dri\'ing 
the enemy towards New Market, which is four miles distant, and where it is said 
they have a large force. We have captured 100 prisoners, killed and wounded 
several, with a loss on our part of only three killed and eleven wounded ; among 
the latter, two ofiicers. 

" I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to act as circumstances may 
reqitire, after the return of my cavalry reconnoissances. 

"The mass of the enemy escaped under the cover of a dense fog; but our 
cavahy are still in pursuit, and I trust may succeed in capturing many more. 

" This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on Richmond, and 
only 14| miles distant; and I feel confident that with re-enforcements I would 
march this army there in five days. 

" I this instant learn that several brigades of the enemy are four miles from 
here on the Quaker road, and I have taken steps to prepare to meet them. 



150 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

" General Hooker's dispositions were admirable, and his officers and men dis- 
played their usual gallantry. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Majoi- General, Commandirtg. 
"Major General H. TV. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Arm,yP 

"Malvern Hill, August 5, 1862 — 8;?. m. 

" Since my last despatch Colonel Averill has returned from a recounoissance, 
in the direction of Savage's station, towards Richmond. He encountered the 
18th Virginia cavalry near White Oak swamp bridge, charged and drove them 
some distance towards Richmond, capturing 28 men and horses, killing and 
wounding several, 

" Our troops have advanced (12) twelve miles in one direction, and (17) seven- 
teen in another, towards Richmond to-day. 

"We have secured a strong position at Coggin's point, opposite our quarter- 
master's depot, which will effectually prevent the rebels from using artillery 
hereafter against our camps. 

" I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men about six miles 
back from this point, on the south bank of the river. What their object is I do 
not know, but will keep a sharp lookout on their movements. 

" I am sending off sick as rapidly as our transports will take them. I am 
also doing everything in my power to carry out your orders, to push rcconnois- 
sances towards the rebel capital, and hope soon to find out whether the reports 
regarding the abandonment of that place are true. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army" 

To the despatch of 1 p. m., August 5, the following answer was received : 

" Washington, August 6, 1862 — 3 a. m. 
" I have no re- enforcements to send you. 



" Major General G. B. McClellan. 
And soon after the following: : 



H.W. HALLECK, 

" Major General. 



"Washington, August 6, 1862. 

" You will immediately send a regiment of cavalry and several batteries of 
artillery to Burnside's command at Aquia creek. It is reported that . Jacksou 
is moving north with a very large force. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

"Major General. 
" Major General G. B. McClellan." 

On the 4th I had received General Halleck's order of the 3d, (which appears 
below,) directing me to withdraw the army to Aquia, and on the same day sent 
an earnest protest against it. A few hours before this. General Hooker had in- 
formed me that his cavalry pickets reported large bodies of the enemy advancing 
and driving them in, and that he would probably be attacked at daybreak. » 

Under these circumstances I had determined to support him ; but as I could 
not get the whole array in position until the next afternoon, I concluded, upon 
the receipt of the above telegram from the general-in-chief, to withdraw Gener?^ 



REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 151 

Hooker, tliat there miglit be tlie least possible delay in conforming to General 
Halleck's orders. I therefore sent to General Hooker th6 followuig letter : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeleij, August G, 1862—10 p. m. 

"My Dear General : I find it will not be possible to get the whole army 
into position before some time to-morrow afternoon, which will be too late to sup- 
port you, and hold the entire position, should the enemy attack m large force at 
daybreak, which there is strong reasons to suppose he mtends doing. 

"Should we fight a general battle at Malvern, it will be necessary to abandon 
the whole of our works here, and run the risk of getting back here. 

"Under advices I have received from Washington, I thmk it necessaiy for 
you to abandon the position to-night, getting everything away before daylight. 

" Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with orders to destroy tiie iur- 
key creek bridge when they are forced back. , , , , . ^ , . .. 

" The roads leading into Haxall's from the right should be strongly watched, 
and Haxall's at least held by strong cavalry force and some light batteries as 

long as possible. , . , ^• l- 

"I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely to your discretion 
"Please signal to the fleet when the withdrawal is about completed. 
" Report frequently to these headquarters. 
"General Sumner was ordered up to support you, but will halt where this 

passes him, and will inform you where ^^^^^^^^ ^ ^cOl.^lA.K^, 

" Major General. 

"General J. Hooker, 

" Commanding at Malvern Hdl." 

And the following reply was sent to General Halleck : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 6, 1862—11.30 p. m. 

"Despatch of to-day received. I have not quite (4,000) four thousand 
cavalry for duty in cavalry division, so that I cannot possibly spare any more. 

" I really need many more than I now have to carry out your instructions. 

" The enemy are moving a large force on Malvern hill. In view_ of your 
despatches, and the fact that 1 cannot place the whole army m position before 
daybreak, I have ordered Hooker to withdraw during the night it it is possible; 
if he cannot do so, I must support him. 

" Until this matter is developed I cannot send any batteries ; I hope i can do 
so to-morrow if transportation is on hand. ^^tillp^v is 

"I will obey the order as soon as circumstances permit. My art 1 ery is 
none too numerous now. I have only been able to send off some (1,200 t velve 
hundred sick. No transportation. ^^H^^^^^t^^I^ 

" Major General, Commanding. 

" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding U. S. Army." 

Five batteries, with their horses and equipments complete, were embarkexl on 
the 7th and 8th, simultaneously with General Hooker's operations upon Mal- 

""Tdespatched a cavalry force under Colonel Averill towards Savage's stji- 
tion, to ascertain if the enemy were making any movements towards our nglit 
flank. 



152 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

He found a rebel cavalry regiment near the White Oak swamp bridge, and 
completely routed it, pursuing well toM'ards Savage's station. 

These important preliminary operations assisted my preparations for the re- 
moval of the army to Aquia creek ; and the sending off our sick and supphes 
was pushed both day and night as rapidly as the means of transportation per- 
mitted, ^ 

On the subject of the withdrawal of the army from Harrison's landing, the 
following correspondence passed between the general-in-chief and myself, while 
the reconnoissances towards Richmond were in progress. 

On the 2d of August I received the following : 

"Washington, Ji/gust 2, 1862— 3 A5 p. m. 
" You have not answered my telegram of July 30, 8 p. m., about the removal 
of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as possible, and telegraph me when 
they will be out of your way. The President wishes an answer as early as 
possible. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

,^ . ^ ^ "Major General. 

"Major General G. B. McClellan." * 

To which this reply was sent : 

" HEADCiUARTERS ArMY OF THE PoTOMAC, 

" Berkeley, August 3 — 11 p. m. 

"Your telegram of (2d) second is received. The answer (to despatch of July 
30) was sent this morning. 

"We have about (12,500) twelve thousand five hundred sick, of whom per- 
haps (4,000) four thousand might make easy marches. We have here the 
means to transport (1,200) twelve hundred, and will embark to-morrow that 
number of the worst cases, with all the means at the disposal of the medical 
du-ector; the remainder could be shipped in from (7) seven to (10) ten days. 
_ " It is impossible for me to decide what cases to send off, unless I know what 
IS to be done with this army. 

" Were the disastrous measures of a retreat adopted, all the sick who cannot 
march and fight should be despatched by water. 

'^ Should the army advance, many of the sick could be of service at the depots. 
If It is to remain here any length of time, the question assumes still a different 
phase. 

" Until I am informed what is to be done, I cannot act understandingly or for 
the good of the service. If I am kept longer in ignorance of what is to be 
effected, I cannot be expected to accomplish the object in view. 

"In the mean time I will do all in my power to carry out what I conceive to 
be your wishes, 

"GEO. B. McOLELLAN, 
-^ . ^ "Major General, Commanding. 

" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army, Washington, D. C." 

The moment I received the instructions for removing the sick, I at once gave 
the necessary directions for carrying them out. 

With the small amount of ti'ansportation at hand, the removal of the severe 
cases alone would necessarily take several days, and, in the mean time, I de- 
sn-ed information to determine what I should do with the others. 

The order required me to send them aAvay as quickly as possible, and to no- 
tify the general-in-chief iv/wn they were removed. 

Previous to the receipt of the despatch of the 2d of August, not having been 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 153 

advised of wliat the army under my command was expected to do, or wliicli way 
it was to move, if it moved at all, I sent the following despatch : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, Angust 3, 1862. 

" I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe ; are they for removing my sick % If 
so, to what extent am I required to go in sending them off? There are not 
many who need go. 

" As I am not in any way informed of the intentions of the government m 
regard to this army, I am unable to judge what proportion of the sick should 
leave here, and must ask for specific orders. ^ ^ . ^-, 

"G. B..McCLELLAN, 

"31ajo/- General, Co7nmanding. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding U?iited States Army, Washington." 

If the army was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it was important that it should be 
unencumbered with any sick, wounded, or other men who might at all uitferfere 
with its mobihty ; but if the object was to operate directly on Richmond, from 
the position we then occupied, there were many cases of slight sickness which 
would speedily be cured, and the patients returned to duty. 

As the service of every man would be important in the event of a torward 
offensive movement, I considered it to be of the utmost consequence that I should 
know what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent the despatch 
of 11 p. m. on the 3d, before receiving the following telegram : 

"Washington, Angust 3, 1862 — 7.45^. m. 

" I have waited most anxiously to learn the result of your forced reconnoissance 
towards Richmond, and also whether all your sick have been sent away, and i 
can get no answer to my telegram. , -r. . i . a • i 

" It is determined to withdraw your army from the Peninsula to Aquia creek. 
You will take immediate measures to effect this, covering the movement the best 

vou can. , ^ „ 

" Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from your own 

" Your material and transportation should be removed first. You will assume 
control of all the means of transportation within your reach, and apply to the 
naval forces for all the assistance they can render you. You will consult tredy 
with the commander of these forces. The entu-e execution of the movement is 
left to your discretion and judgment. . -.^ . ivr xr f iv 

"You will leave such forces as you may deem proper at Fort Monroe, ^ortolk, 

and other places, which we must occupy. tt t t t -c^r^Tr 

" H. VV. llALil-irjL'lv, 

" Major General, Commanding United States Army. 
" Major General Geo. B. McClellan." 

I proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, firmly impressed, 
however, with the conviction that the withdrawal of the army of the 1 otomac 
from Harrison's landing, where its communications had by the co-operation ot 
the gunboats been rendered perfectly secure, would, at that time, have the most 
disastrous effect upon our cause. , -a <. 

I did not, as the commander of that army, allow the occasion to pass without 
distinctly setting forth my views upon the subject to the authorities m the tol- 
lowing telegram : 



154 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 



"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 4, 1862 — 12 vu 

" Your telegram of last evening is received. I must confess that it has caused 
me the greatest pain I ever experienced, for I am convinced that the order to 
withdraw this army to Aquia creek will prove disastrous to our cause. I fear 
it will be a fatal blow. Several days are necessary to complete the preparations 
for so important a movement as this, and while they are in progress, I beg that 
careful consideration may be given to my statements. 

" This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We hold a de- 
bouche on both banks of the James river, so that we are free to acfr in any 
direction ; and with the assistance of the gunboats, I consider our communications 
as now secure 

" We are twenty-five (25) miles from Hichmond, and are not likely to meet the 
enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle until we have marched fifteen (15) to 
eighteen (18) miles, which brings us practically within ten (10) miles of Rich- 
mond. Our longest line of land transportation would be from this point twenty- 
five (25) miles, but with the aid of the gunboats we can supply the army by 
water during its advance, certainly to within twelve (12) miles of Richmond. 

" At Aquia creek we would be seventy -five (75) miles from Richmond, with 
land transportation all the way. 

"From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about seventy (70) miles, for I 
regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army and its material, except by land. 

" The result of the movement would thus be a march of one hundred and 
forty-five (145) miles to reach a point now only twenty-five (25) miles distant, 
and to deprive ourselves entirely of the powerful aid of the gunboats and water 
transportation. 

"Add to this the certain demoralization of this army which would ensue, the 
terribly depressing eftect upon the people of the north, and the strong probability 
that it would influence foreign powers to recognize our adversaries; and these 
appear to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge in the 
strongest terms affijrded by our language that this order may be rescinded, and 
that far from recalling this army, it may be promptly re-enforced to enable it to 
resume the offensive. 

" It may be said that there are no re-enforcements available. I point to 
Burnside's force ; to that of Pope, not necessary to maintain a strict defensive 
in front of Washington and Harper's Ferry ; to those portions of the army of 
the west not required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front of this 
army, is the heart of the rebellion ; it is here that all our resources should be 
collected to strike the blow which will determine the fate of the nation. 

" All points of secondary importance elsewhere should be abandoned, and 
eveiy available man brought here ; a decided victory here, and the military 
sti"ength of the rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses we 
may meet with elsewhere ; here is the true defence of Washington ; it is here, on 
the banks of the James, that the fixte of the Union should be decided. 

" Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the consciousness that I have 
ever been, and still am, actuated solely by the love of my country, knowing 
that no ambitious or selfish motives have influenced me from the commencement 
of this war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat that this 
order may be rescinded. 

"If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey your orders to 
the utmost of my power, directing to the movements, ■which I clearly foresee 
will be one of the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. 
Whatever the result may be — and may God grant that I am mistaken in my 
forebodinjrs — I shall at least have the internal satisfaction that I have written 



EEPOET OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 155 

and spoken frankly, and have souglit to do the best in my power to avert dis- 
aster from my country. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
' "Major General, Commanding. 

" ajor General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

Soon after sending tkis telegram, I received the following, in reply to mine of 
11 p. m. of the 3d: 

"Washington, August 4, 1862 — 12.45 p. m. 
"My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy you in regard to future opera- 
tions ; it was expected that you would have sent ofl your sick, as directed, with- 
out waiting to know what were or would be the intentions of the government 
respecting future movements. 

"The President expects that the instructions which were sent you yesterday, 
with his approval, will be carried out with all possible despatch and caution. 
The Quartermaster General is sending to Fort Monroe all the transportation he 
can collect. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major Ge?ieral. 
"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

To which the following is my reply : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 5, 1862 — 7 a. m. 
" Your telegram of yesterday received, and is being carried out as promptly 
as possible. With the means at my command, no human power could have 
moved the sick in the time you say you expected them to be moved. 

**#* * **** 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

My efforts for bringing about a change of policy were unsuccessful, as will 
be seen from the following telegram and letter received by me in reply to mine 
of 12 m. of the 4th : 

"Washington, August 5, 1862 — 12 m. 

"You cannot regret the order of the withdrawal more than I did the neces- 
sity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and you will be expected to execute 
it with all possible promptness. It is believed that it can be done now without 
serious danger. This may not be so, if there should be any delay. I will 
write you my views more fully by mail. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 
" Major General, Commanding United States Army. 

"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

The letter was as follows : 

"Headquarters of the Army, 

" Washington, August 6, 1882. 

"General: Your telegram of yesterday was received this morning, and I 
immediately telegraphed a brief reply, promising to write you more fully by 
mail. 



156 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M'CLELLAiT. 

"You, general, certainly could not Lave been more pained at receiving my 
order than I was at the necessity of issuing it. I was advised by high officers, 
in whose judgment I had great cunfidence, to make the order immediately on 
my arrival here, but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes 
from a personal interview. And even after that interview I tried every means 
in my power to avoid withdrawing your army, and delayed my decision as long 
as I dared to delay it. 

"I assure you, general, it was not a hasty and inconsiderate act, but one that 
caused me more anxious thoughts than any other of my life. But after full and 
mature consideration of all the j)'>'0^ ^"^^ cons, I was reluctantly forced to the 
conclusion that the order must be issued — there was to my mind no alternative. 

"Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. 

"You and your officers at one interview estimated the enemy's forces in and 
around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. Since then, you and others 
report that they have received and are receiving large re-enforcements from the 
south. General Pope's army, covering Washington, is only about forty thousand. 
Your effective force is only about ninety thousand. You are thirty miles from 
Richmond, and General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly between 
you ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one or the other as he may 
elect; neither can re-enforce the other in case of such an attack. 

"If General Pope's army be diminished to re-enforce you, Washington, 
Maryland, and Pennsylvania would be left uncovered and exposed. If your 
force be reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even hold the 
position you now occupy, should the enemy turn round and attack you in full 
force. In other words, the old army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with 
the entire force of the enemy directly between them. They cannot be united 
by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet they must be united. 
To send Pope's forces by water to the Peninsula is, under present circumstances, 
a military impossibility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the 
Peninsula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the two armies 
can be united. 

"Let me now allude to some of the objections which you have urged: you 
say that the withdrawal from the present position will cause the certain de- 
moralization of the army 'which is now in excellent discipline and condition.' 

"I cannot understand why a simple change of position to a new and by no 
means distant base will demoralize an army in excellent discipline, unless the 
officers themselves assist in that demoralization, which I am satisfied they will 
not. 

" Your change of front from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to 
your present condition was over thirty miles, but I have not heard that it de- 
moralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe losses they sustained in 
effecting it. 

" A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings you within about 
sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a re-enforcement of forty or fifty thousand 
fresh and disciplined troops. 

" The change with such advantages will, I think, if properly represented to 
your army, encourage rather than demoralize your troops. Moreover, you your- 
self suggested that a junction' might be effected at Yorktown, but that a flank 
march across the isthmus would be more hazardous than to retire to Fort 
Monroe. 

"You will remember that Yorktown is two or three miles further than Fred- 
ericksburg is. Besides, the latter is between Richmond and Washington, and 
covers AVashington from any attack of the enemy. 

" The political effect of the withdrawal may at first be unfavorable ; but I 
think the public are beginning to understand its necessity, and that they will 
have much more confidence in a united army than in its separated fragments. 



KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 157 

" But you will reply, why not re-enforce me here, so that I can strike Rich- 
mond from my present position 1 To do this, you said, at our interview, that 
you required thirty thousand additional troops. I told you that it was impos- 
sible to give you so many. You finally thought that you would have ' some 
chance' of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards telegraphed 
me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the enemy was being largely 
re-enforced. 

" If your estimate of the enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was 
perfectly reasonable ; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new troo 
could be enlisted and organized, which would require several weeks. 

" To keep your army in its present position until it could it be so re-enforced 
would almost destroy it in that climate. 

"The months of August and September are almost fatal to whites who live on 
that part of .Tames river ; and even after you received the re-enforcements asked 
for, you admitted that you must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries be- 
fore you could advance on Richmond. 

" It is by no means certain that the reduction of these fortifications would 
not require considerable time — perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. 

" This delay might not only be fatal to the health of your army, but in the 
mean time General Pope's forces would be exposed to the heavy blows of the 
enemy without the slightest hope of assistance from you. 

" In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from the Peninsida to 
the Rappahannock, I must remark that a large number of your highest officers, 
indeed a majority of those whose opinions have been reported to me, are de- 
cidedly in favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally ad- 
vocated the line of the Peninsula now advise its abandonment. 

" I have not inquired, and do not wish to know, by whose advice or for what 
reasons the army of the Potomac was separated into two parts with the enemy 
between them. I must take things as I find them. 

" I find the forces divided, and I wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan 
has been presented for doing this. If you, or any one else, had presented a 
better plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your j)lans require 
re-enforcements Avhich it is impossible to give you. It is very easy to ask for 
re-enforcements, but it is not so easy to give them when you have no disposable 
troops at your command. 

" I have written very plainly as I understand the case, and I hope you will 
give me credit for having fully considered the matter, although I may have ar- 
rived at very different conclusions from your own. 
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 

" Major General G. B. McOlella.v, 

" Commanding, Sfc, Berkeley, Virginia." 

On the 7th I received the following telegram : 

"Washington, August 7, 1862 — 10 a. m. 

" You will immediately report the number of sick sent off since yoix received 
my order, the number still to be shipped, and the amount of transportation at 
your disposal — that is, the number of persons that can be carried on all the 
vessels which by my order you were authorized to control. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

"Major General. 
" Major General G. B. McClellan." 



158 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLEELAN, 

To wliicli I made tliis reply : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"August 7, 1862—10.40 p. m 

" In reply to your despatcli of 10 a. m. to-day, I report the number of sick 
sent off since I received your order as follows : Three thousand seven hundred 
and forty, including some that are embarked to-night and will leave in the 
morning. The number still to be shipped is, as nearly as can be ascertained, 
five thousand seven hundred. 

" The embarcation of five batteries of artillery, with their horses, wagons, 
&c., required most of our available boats except the ferry-boats. All the trans- 
ports that can ascend to this place have been ordered up ; they will be here to- 
morrow evening. Colonel Ingalls reports to me that there are no transports 
now available for cavalry, and will not be for two or three days. As soon as 
they can be obtained I shall send off the first New York cavalry. 

" After the transports with sick and wounded have returned, including some 
heavy-draught steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, we can 
ti"ausport t^yenty-five thousand men at a time. We have some propellers here, but 
they are laden with commissary supplies and are not available. 

" The transports now employed in transporting sick and wounded will carry 
12,000 well infantry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, and of too heavy 
draft to come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. Several of the largest 
steamers have been used for transporting prisoners of war, and have only be- 
come available for the sick to-day. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. 

" Major General. 

" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

The report of my chief quartermaster upon the subject is as follows : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Qffi(^^ ^f Chief Quartermaster, Han- ison^s Landing, August 7, 1862. 
"General: I have the honor to return the papers herewith which you sent 
me, with the following remarks : 

"We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their horses, baggage, &c., 
which requires the detailing of most of our available boats, except the ferry- 
boats. The medical department has ten or twelve of our largest transport ves- 
sels, which, if disposable, could carry 12,000 men. Besides, there are some 
heavyt draft steamers at Fort Monroe that cannot come to this point, but 
which can carry 8,000 or 10,000 inf^intry. 

"I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. They will be 
here to-morrow evening. As it now is, after the details already made, we can- 
not transport from this place more than 5,000 infantry. 

" There are no transports now available for cavalry. From and after to-mor- 
row, if the vessels arrive, I could transport 10,000 infantry. In t\¥0 or three 
days a regiment of cavalry can be sent if required. If you wait, and ship from 
Yorktown or Fort Monroe after the sick and wounded transports are at my 
disposal, we can transport 25,000 at a time. The number that can be trans- 
ported is contingent on circumstances referred to. 

"Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary or other sujjplies, 
and most of the tugs are necessary to tow off sail craft also laden with supplies. 
" I am, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, 

"BUFUS INGALLS, 

*' Cliief Quartermaster. 
"General R. B. Marcy, 

" Chief of Staf." 



EEPOtiT OF GENERAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 159 

On the 9th I received this despatch : 

" Washington, August 9, 1862 — 12.45 p. m. 
" I am of the opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front of Gen- 
erals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush them and move forward 
to the Potomac. 

"You must send re-enforccments instantly to Aqtiia creek. 
"Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay is 
not satisfactory. You must move with all possible celerity. 

"H. W. HALLEOK, 

" Major General. 
"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

To which I sent the following reply : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 10, 1862 — 8 a. m. 
" Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries sent to Burnside took the 
last available transport yesterday morning. Enough have since arrived to ship 
one regiment of cavalry to-day. The sick are being embarked as rapidly as 
possible. There has been no unnecessary delay, as you assert — not an hour's — 
but everything has been and is being pushed as rapidly as possible to carry out 
your orders. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General Commanding. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

The following report, made on the same day by the oflScer then in charge of 
the transports, exposes the injustice of the remark in the despatch of the gen, 
eral-in -chief, that, "considering the amount of transportation at your disposal 
your delay is not satisfactory." 

"Assistant Quartermaster's Office, Army of the Potomac, 

^^ Harrison's Landing, Virginia, August 10, 1862. 

"Colonel Ingalls, being himself ill, has requested me to telegraph to you con- 
cerning the state and capacity of the transports now here. On the night of the 
8th I despatched eleven steamers, principally small ones, and six schooners, 
with five batteries of heavy horse artillery, none of which have yet returned. 

"Requisition is made this morning for transportation of one thousand cavalry 
to Aquia creek. All the schooners that had been chartered for carrying horses 
have been long since discharged, or changed into freight vessels. 

"A large proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded with stores, or 
are in the floating hospital service engaged in removing the sick. To transport 
the one thousand cavahy to-day will take all the available steamers now here 
not engaged in the service of the harbor. These steamers could take a large 
number of infantry, but are not well adapted to the carrying of horses, and 
much space is thus lost. Several steamers are expected here to-day, and we 
ai-e unloading schooners rapidly; most of these are not chartered, but are being 
taken for the service required, at same rates of pay as other chartered schooners. 
If you could cause a more speedy return of the steamers sent away from here, 
it would facilitate matters. 

"C. G. SAWTELLE, 
" Ca])tain and Assistant Quartermaster, commanding Depot. 

"General M. C. Meigs, 

" Quartermaster General United States Army, Washington." 



160 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

Our wharf facilities at Harrison's landing were very limited, admitting but 
few vessels at one time. These were continually in use as long as there were 
disposable vessels, and the officers of the medical and quartermaster's depart- 
ments, with all their available forces, were incessantly occupied day and night 
in embai'king and sending off the sick men, troops, and material. 

Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the general-in-chief 
that such were the facts, on the lOtli I received the following: 

"Washington, August 10, 1862 — 12 p.m. 
" The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They are fighting Gen- 
eral Pope to-day; there must be no further delay in your movements ; that which 
has already occurred was entirely unexpected, and must be satisfactorily ex- 
plained. Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what pro- 
gress you have made in executing the order to transfer your troops. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major General. 
"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

To which I sent this reply : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

''Berkeley, August 10, 1862—11.30;?. m. 

"Your despatch of to-day is received. I assure you again that there has 
not been any unnecessary delay in carrying out your orders. 

"You are probably laboring under some great mistake as to the amount of 
transportation available here. 

"I have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off our sick, and the troops 
you ordered to Burnside. 

"Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed the Quartermaster General of the 
condition of our water transportation. From the fact that you directed me to 
keep the order secret, I took it for granted that you would take the steps neces- 
sary to provide the requisite transportation. 

"A large number of transports for all arms of service, and for wagons, should 
at once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Monroe. 

" I shall be ready to move the whole army by land the moment the sick are dis- 
posed of. You may be sure that not an hour's delay will occur that can be 
avoided. I fear you do not realize the difficulty of the operation proposed. 

"The regiment of cavalry for Burnside has been in course of embarcation to- 
day and to-night; (10) ten steamers were required for the purpose ; (1,258) 
twelve hundred and tifty-eight sick loaded to-day and to-night. 

" Our means exhausted, except one vessel returning to Fort Monroe in the mor- 
ning, which will take some (500) five hundred cases of slight sickness. 

"The present moment is probably not the proper one forme to refer to the un- 
necessary, harsh, and unjust tone of your telegrams of late. It will, however, 
make no difference to my official action. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General Commanding. 

"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commandmg United States Army." 

On the eleventh this report was made: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 11, 1862 — 11.30 p. m. 

"The embarcation of (850) eight hundred and fifty cavalry, and (1) one brigade 
of infantry will be completed by (2) two o'clock in the morning; (500) five 
hundred sick were embarked to-day. Another vessel arrived to-night, and 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 161 

-oOO) six Iir.ndred more sick are now being embarked. I still bave some 
(4,000) four thousand sick to dispose of. You bave been greatly misled as to 
the amount of transportation at my disposal. 

"Vessels loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, and others indispensable 
for service here, have been reported to you as available for carrying sick and 
well. I am sending off all that can be unloaded at Fort Monroe, to have 
them return here. 1 repeat that I have lost no time in carrying out your orders. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General f Commanding. 
*'Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

On the same day I received the following from the quartermaster in charge 
of the depot : 

"Assistant Quartermaster's Office, Army of the Potomac 

" Harrison's Landing, August 11, 1862. 

*' Colonel : In reply to the communication from General Marcy, which was 
referred to me by yovi, I have to state that there are now in this harbor no 
disposable transports not already detailed, either for the use of the hospital de- 
partment, for the transportation of the 1st N. Y. cavalry, or for the necessary 
service of the harbor, I think the steamers loading and to be loaded with cav- 
alry could take in addition three thousand infantiy. 1'hese boats are, how- 
ever, directed to leave as fiist as they are loaded ; some have already started. 
The embarcation of this cavalry regiment is going on very slowly, and it is 
not in my power to hurry the matter, although 1 have had several agents of 
the department and one commissioned officer at the wharf, to render all the as- 
sistance po.ssible. The entire army is this morning turning in, to be stored on 
vessels, knapsacks, officers' baggage, and other surplus property, and with our 
limited Avharf facilities it is impossible, unless the regular issues of forage, &c., 
are suspended, to avoid great confusion and delay with what is already or- 
dered to be done. Of course, if any infantry is ordered to embark on these 
cavalry transports, the confusion and difficulties will be increased. 

"I know of no boats that may be expected here to-day, except the South 
America and Fanny Cadwallader, a propeller which was ordered to be sent back 
from Fort Monroe. 

" The transports with the artillery left for Aquia creek on the night of the 
8th and the morning of the 9th. They were ordered to return immediately. 
" I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

" 0. G. -SAWTELLE, 
" Captain and A. (^. M., ijommanding Depot. 

" Lieut. Colonel RuFUS Ingalls, 

" A. D. C. and Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.''' 

On the I2th I received the following : 

"Washington, August 12, 1862 — 12 m. 
" The Quartermaster General informs me that nearly every available steam 
vessel in the country is now under your control. To send more from Philadel- 
phia, Baltimore and New York, would interfere with the transportation of army 
supplies and break up the channels of travel by which we are to bring forward 
the new troops. Burnside moved nearly thirteen thousand (13,000) troops to 
Aquk creek in less than two (2) days, and his transports were immediately 
sent back to you. All vessels in the James river and the Chesapeake bay 
H. Ex. Doc. 15 11 



162 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

were placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that (S) eight or (10) ten 
thousand of yom- men could be transported daily. 

" In addition to steamers, there is a large fleet of sailing vessels which could 
be used as transports. 

" The bulk of your material on shore it was thought could be sent to Fort 
Monroe, covered by that part of the army which could not get water transporta- 
tion. Such Avere the views of the government here ; perhaps we were misin- 
formed as to the facts. If so, the delay could be explained. Nothing in my 
telegram was intentionally harsh or unjust, but the delay was so unexpected 
that an explanation was required. There has been, and is, the most urgent ne- 
cessity for despatch, and not a single moment must be lost in getting additional 
troops in front of Washington. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major General. 

" Major General G. B. McClellan." 

I telegraphed the following reply : 

" HEADaUARTERS ArMY OF THE PoTOMAC, 

" Berkeley, August 18, 1862 — 11 p. m. 

" Your despatch of noon to-day received. It is positively the fact that no 
more men could have been embarked hence than have gone, and that no 
unnecessary delay has occurred. Before your orders were received. Colonel 
Ingalls directed all available vessels to come from Monroe. Officers have been 
sent to take personal direction. Have heard nothing here of Burnside's fleet. 

" There are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and Baltic, which draw 
too much to come here. Hospital accommodations exhausted this side New 
York, Propose filling Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases, for New York, 
and to encamp slight cases for the present at Monroe. In this way can probably 
get off the (3,400) thirty-four hundred sick, still on hand, by day after to- 
morrow night. 

" I am sure that you have been misinfonned as to the availability of vessela 
on hand. We cannot use heavily loaded supply vessels for troops or animals; 
and such constitute the mass of those here, which have been represented to you 
as capable of transporting this army. 

" 1 fear you will find very great delay in embarking troops and material at 
Yorktown and Monroe, both from want of vessels and of fiicilities of embarca- 
tion ; at least two additional wharves should at once be built at each place. I 
ordered two at the latter some (2) two weeks ago, but you countermanded the 
order. 

" I learn that wharf accommodations at Aquia are altogether inadequate for 
landing troops and supplies to any large extent. Not an hour should be lost 
in remedying this. 

" Great delay will ensue there from shallow water. You will find a vast de- 
ficiency in horse transports. We had nearly two hundred when we came here ; 
I learn of only (20) twenty provided now ; they carry about (50) fifty horses each. 
More hospital accommodations should be provided. We are much impeded 
here because our wharves are used night and day to land current supplies. At 
Monroe a similar difficulty will occur. 

"With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington, (6) six weeks about were 
occupied in embarking this army and its material. 

" Burnside's troops are not a fair criterion for rate of embarcation. All his 
means were in hand, his outfit specially prepared for the purpose, and his men 
habituated to the movement. 

" There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufacture vessels. I 
state these difficulties from experience, and because it appears to me that we 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 163 

have been lately working at cross purposes, because you have not been properly 
informed by those around you, who ought to know the inherent difficulties of 
such an undertaking. It is not possible for any one to place this army where 
you wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. 

" If Washington is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to 
save it ; it is in much better position to do so from here than from Aquia. 

"Our material can only be saved by using the whole army to cover it, if we 
are pressed. If sensibly weakened by detachments, the result might be the 
loss of much material and many men. I will be at the telegraph office to- 
morrow morning. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

To the reasons given in the foregoing despatch, to show why General Burn- 
side's movement from Fort Monroe was not a fair criterion for our operations, 
the follo\^ug may be added : 

He was not encumbered by either sick or wounded men. 

He had no cavalry, artillery, Avagons, or teams. His force consisted of in- 
fantry alone, with a few ambulances and officers' horses. 

His baggage was already on the transports, where it had remained since his 
arrival from North Carolina, and his men had only to resume their places on 
board. 

The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my despatches of the 7th, 10th and 
11th, were sent to supply his total deficiency in those arms. 

I may also repeat that the vessels used by General Burnside had not returned 
from Aquia creek when the army left Harrison's bar. 

It will be seen by the concluding paragraph of the foregoing despatch that in 
order to have a more direct, speedy, and full explanation of the condition of af- 
fairs in the army than I could by sending a single despatch by steamer to the 
nearest telegraph office at Jamestown island, some seventy miles distant, and 
waiting ten hours for a reply, I proposed to go in person to the office. This 
I did. 

On my arrival at Jamestown island there was an interruption in the electric 
current, which rendered it necessary for me to continue on to Fort Monroe, and 
across the Chesapeake bay to Cherry Stone inlet, on the " eastern shore," 
where I arrived late in the evening, and immediately sent the annexed des- 
patches : 

"Cherry Stone, August 13, 1862 — 11.30 _p. m. 

" Please come to office ; wish to talk to you. Wbat news from Pope? 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, Washington." 

"Cherry Sto\e Inlet, August 14, 1862 — 12.30 a. m. 
" Started to Jamestown island to talk with you; found cable broken and 
came here. Please read my long telegram. (See above despatch of August 
12, 11 p. m.j All quiet at camp. Enemy burned wharves at City Point yes- 
terday. No rebel pickets within eight (8) miles of Coggin's point yesterday. 
" Bichmond prisoners state that large force with guns left Richmond northward 
on Sunday. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, Washington." 



164 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

To wliich tlie following reply was received : 

"Washington, August 14, 1862 — 1.40 a. m. 
" I have read your despatch. There is no change of plans. You will send up 
your troops as rapidly as possible. There is no difficulty in landing them. 
According to your own accounts, there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your 
forces. Do so with all possible rapidity. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" Major General. 
"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

Before I had time to decipher and reply to this despatch, the telegraph 
operator in Washington informed me that General Halleck had gone out of the 
office immediately after writing this despatch, without leaving any intimation of 
the fact for me, or Avaitiug for any further information as to the object of my 
journey across the bay. As there was no possibility of other communication 
with him at that time, I sent the following despatch, and returned to Harrison's 
landing : 

-"Cherry Stone Inlet, August 14, 1862 — 1.40 a. m. 

"Your orders wfll be obeyed. I return at once. I had hoped to have had a 
longer and fuller conversation with you, after travelling so far for the purpose. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C." 

On the 14th and 15th, and before we had been able to embark all our sick 
men, two army corps were put in motion towards Fort Monroe. This was re- 
ported in the annexed despatch : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Berkeley, August 14, 1862 — 11^. m. 
"Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick will be away to- 
morrow night. Everything being done to carry out your orders. I don't like 
Jackson's movements; he will suddenly appear when least expected. Will 
telegraph fully and uuderstandingly in the morning. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major GcneraL 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C" 

The phrase "movement has commenced," it need not be remarked, referred 
obviously to the movement of the main army, after completing the necessary 
preliminary movements of the sick, &c., &c. 

The perversion of the term, to which the general-iu-chief saw fit to give cur- 
rency in a letter to the Secretary of War, should have been here rendered im- 
possible by th(! despatches which precede this of the 14th, which show that the 
movement really begun immediately after the receipt of the order of August 4th. 

The progress made in the movement on the loth was reported in the following 
despatches : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"August 15, 1862—12 vu 

" Colonel Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking the remaining 
brigade of McCall's division, with the sick, who are constantly accumulating, 
the transports now disposable will be all consumed. 

"Two of my army corps marched last night and this morning en route for 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAX. 165 

Yorktown — oue via Jones's bridge, and the other via Barrett's Ferry, where 
we have a pontoon bridge. The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as 
the roads are clear; and I hope before to-morrow morning to have the entire 
army in motion. 

" A report has just been received from my pickets that the enemy in force is 
advancing on us from the Chickahominy, but I do not credit it ; shall know 
soon. Should any more transports arrive here before my departure, and the 
enemy do not show such a force in our front as to require all the troops I have 
remaining to insure the safety of the land movement with its immense train, I 
shall send every man by water that transports will carry. 

«'G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"^ Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Cominanding U. S. A." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Berkeley, August 15, 1862— 1.30 p. m. 

"The advanced corps and trains are fairly started. I learn nothing more in 
relation to reported advance of rebels via Jones's bridge. Shall push the 
movement as rapidly as possible. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General H. "W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Berkeley, August 15, 1862 — \0 p. m. 

" Coggin's point is abandoned. The whole of McOall's division, with its ar- 
tillery, is now en route for Burnside. We have not yet transportation sufficient 
for our sick. I hope we will get it to-morrow. 

"Porter is across the Chickahominy, near its mouth, with his wagons and re- 
serve artillery. Heintzelman at Jones's bridge with a portion of his corps. 
They will all be up by morning. 

"Averill's cavalry on the other side. All quiet thus far. I cannot get the 
last of the wagons as far as Charles City Court House before some time to-mor- 
row afternoon. 

"I am hurrying matters with the utmost rapidity possible. Wagons will 
move all night. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 

"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

After the commencement of the movement, it was continued with the utmost 
rapidity, until all the troops and material were en route both by land and water, 
on the morning of the 16th, 

Late in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had disappeared from 
the deserted camps, I followed with my personal staff in the track of the grand 
army of the Potomac; bidding farewell to the scenes still covered with the 
marks of its presence, and to be forever memorable in history as the vicinity of 
its most brilliant exploits. 

Previous to the departure of the troops, I had directed Captain Duane, of the 
engineer corps, to proceed to BaiTctt's ferry, near the mouth of the Chicka- 
hominy, and throw across the river at that point a pontoon bridge. This was 
executed promptly and satisfactorily under the cover of gunboats ; and an ex- 



166 EEPOET OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

cellent bridge of about two tliouscaud feet in length was ready for the first ar- 
rival of troops. 

The greater part of tlie army, with its artillery, wagon trains, &c., crossed it 
rapidly, and in perfect order and safety, so that on the night of the 17th every- 
thing was across the Chickahominy, except the rear guard, which crossed early 
on the morning of the 18th, when the pontoon bridge was immediately removed. 

General Porter's corps, which was the first to march from Harrison's landing, 
had been pushed forward rapidly, and on the 16th reached Williamsburg, where 
I had directed him to halt until the entire army was across the Chickahominy. 

On his an-ival at Williamsburg, however, he received an intercepted letter, 
which led to the belief that General Pope would have to contend against a 
very heavy force then in his front. General Porter, therefore, very properly 
took the responsibility of continuing his march directly on to Newport News, 
which place he reached on the morning of the ISth of August, having marched 
his corps sixty miles in the short period of three days and one night, halting 
one day at the crossing of the Chickahominy. 

The cmbarcation of this corps commenced as soon as transports were ready, 
and on the 20th it had all sailed for Aquia creek. I made the following repo«rt 
from Barrett's ferry; 

"IIeadquarters Army of the Potomac, 
"Barrett's Ferrtj, ChickaJiominy, August 17, 1862 — 11 a. m. 

"Everything is removed from our camp at Harrison's bar. No property 
nor men left behind. 

♦' The (5th) fifth corps is at Williamsburg with all its wagons and the reserve 
artillery. The (3d) third corps is on the march from .Jones's bridge to Williams- 
burg,^ via Diascund bridge, and has probably passed the latter before this hour. 
Averill's cavalry watches everything in that direction. 

" The mass of the wagons have passed the pontoon bridge here, and are 
parked on the other side. Peck's wagons are now crossing ; his division will 
soon be over. Headquarters wagons follow Peck's. I hope to have every- 
thing over to-night, and the bridge removed by daylight. May be delayed be- 
yond that time. Came here to see Burnside, otherwise should have remained 
with the rear guard. Thus far all is quiet, and not a shot that I know of since 
we began the march. 

•' I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the whole army beyond the 
Chickahominy. I will then begin to forward troops by water as fast as trans- 
portation permits. 

" G. B. MrOLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 

** Major General H. W. Hali.eck, 

" Commanding United States Army, Washington, D. C" 

On the 18th and 19th our march was continued to Williamsburg and York- 
town, and on the 20th the remainder of the army was ready to embark at York- 
town, Fortress Monroe, and Newport News. 

The movement of the main body of the army on this march was covered by 
General Pleasonton with his cavalry and horse artillety. That ofiicer remained 
at Haxall's until the army had passed Charles City Court House, when he 
gradually fell back, picking up the stragglers as he proceeded, and crossed the 
bridge over the Chickahominy, after the main body had marched towards Wil- 
liamsburg. His troops were the last to cross the bridge, and he deserves great 
credit for the manner in which he performed this duty. 

General Averill did a similar service, in the same satisfactory way, in cover- 
ing the march of the 3d corps. 

As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here, I cannot close this part 



EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 167 

o my report witliout giving an expression of ray sincere thanks and gratitude 
to the officers and men whom I had the honor to command. 

From the commencement to the termination of this most arduous campaign, 
the army of the Potomac always evinced the most perfect subordination, zeal, 
and alacrity in the performance of all the duties required of it. 

The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army in the construction of 
intrenchments, roads, bridges, &c. was enormous; yet all the work was per- 
formed with the most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests of the 
service. 

During the campaign ten severely contested and sanguinary battles had been 
fought, besides numerous smaller engagements, in which the troops exhibited 
the most determined enthusiasm and bravery. They submitted to exposure, 
sickness, and even death, without a murmur. Indeed, they had become veterans 
in their country's cause, and richly deserved the warm commendation of the 
government. 

It was in view of these facts that this seemed to me an appropriate occasion 
for the general-in-chief to give, in general orders, some appreciative expression 
of the services of the army while upon the Peninsula. Accordingly, on the 18th 
I sent him the following despatch : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"August IS, 1862—11^. m. 

" Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat to them in general 
orders, in regard to their coaduct at Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, 
Hanover Court House, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the (7) 
seven days and the recent retreat. 

" No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. Say nothing 
about me. Merely give my men and officers credit for Avhat they have done. 
It will do you much good, and will strengthen you much with them if you issue 
a handsome order to them in regard to Avhat they have accomplished. They 
deserve it. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Major General Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

As no reply was received to this communication, and no order was issued by 
the general-'in-chief, I conclude that suggestion did not meet with his approbation. 

All the personnel and material of the army had been transferred from Harri- 
son's landing to the different points of embarcation in the very brief period of 
five days without the slightest loss or damage. Porter's troops sailed from New- 
port News on the 19th and 20th. Heintzelman's corps sailed from Yorktown 
on the 21st. On that day I received the following telegram from the general- 
in-chief : 

"Washington, August 21, 1862 — 6 p. m. 

" Leave such garrisons in Fortress Monroe, Yorktown, &c., as you may deem 
proper. They will be replaced by new troops as rapidly as possible. 

" The forces of Burnside and Pope are hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly 
as you can send it. Come yourselt as soon as you can. 

" By all means see that the troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We 
have no time here to supply them. Moreover, they may have to fight as soon 
as they land. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 
" Major General, Commanding United States Army. 

" General McClellan." 



168 EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEOEGE B. M'CLELLAIf. 

To wliich tlie following are replies : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Fortress Monroe, Awgust 21, 1862 — 7.30^9. m, 

" Your despatcli of (6) six p. m. received. I have not lost an Lour in sendins- 
troops, nor will I Franklin is here, and I will try to get some of his troops oS 
board to-night. I had already ordered all the ammunition forward. 

" I Avill put headquarters on hoard ship early to-morrow morning, so that I 
can leave at a moment's notice. I hope that I can get off to-morrow. Shall I 
go in person to Aquia, or do you wish to see me first at Washingtori ? If you 
wish It I can probably ship quite an amount of ammunition for other tvoons 
than this army. •' 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

./nr • AM 1 -rr ' "Major General. 

Major General Halleck, 

" Washhigton, D. C" 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Fort Monroe, August 21, 1862 — 10.25^. »t. 

"I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artillery, and will 
have It up m time. I can supply any deficiency that may exist in General 
1 ope^s army. Quite a number of rifled field guns are on hand here. 

"The forage is the only question for you to attend to; please have that ready 
tor me at Aquia. I want many more schooners for cavalry horses; they should 
have water on hand when they come here. 

" If you have leisure, and there is no objection, please communicate to me fully 
the state of affairs, and your plans. I will then be enabled to arranj-e details 
understandiugly. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
"Major General Halleck, Washington." 

Iminediately on reaching Fort Monroe, I gave directions for strengthening^ 
the defences of Yorktown, to resist any attack from the direction of Richmond*^ 
and left General Keyes, with his corps, to perform the work, and temporarily 
garrison the place. "^ 

I telegraphed as follows on the 22d : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862 — 2.15^. ?». 
"Despatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps is embarking as rapidly as 
possible. Sumner's corps is at Newport News, ready to embark as fast as 
ti-ansportation arrives. Keyes is still at Yorktown, putting it in a proper state 
of defence. I thhik that all of Franklin's corps will get off to-day, and hope 
to commence with Sumner to-morrow. I shall then push off the cavalry and 
wagons. '' 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

..Tir • /-I T TT-' -r,^ ^ "Major General. 

"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C" 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Fort Monroe, August 22, 1862 — 3.40 jt?. m. 
"Two (2) good ordnance sergeants are needed immediately at Yorktown and 
Gloucester. The new defences are arranged and commenced. 

" I recommend that (5,00Q) five thousand new troops be sent immediately to 



KEPOET OF GENEEAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAX. 169 

garrison York and Gloucester. They shonlcl be commanded by an experienced 
general officer, who can discipline and instruct them. About (900) nine hundred 
should be artillery. I recommend that a new regiment, whose colonel is an 
artillery officer, or graduate, be designated as heavy artillery, and sent there. 
A similar regiment is absolutely necessary here. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commajiding United States Anmj." 

On the 23d Franklin's corps sailed. I reported this in the following de- 
spatch : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Fort Monroe, August 23, 1S62 — 1.30^. m. 

"Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for Aquia in about half an hour. 
No transports yet for Sumner's corps. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States ArmyP 

On that evening I sailed with my staff for Aquia creek, where I arrived at 
daylight on the following morning, reporting as follows : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'■'■Aquia CrceJc, August 24, 1S62. 
"I have reached here, and respectfully report for orders. 

" G. B. McCLELLAT^, 

" Major General. 
Major General Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

I also telegraphed as follows : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

'■'■Aquia Creek, August 24, 1862 — 2 p. m. 
" Your telegram received. Morell's scouts report Rappahannock station 
burned and abandoned by Pope, without any notice to Morell or Sykes. This 
was telegraphed you some hours ago. Reynolds, Reno, and Stevens are sup- 
posed to be with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to-day. Morell and 
Sykes are near Morrisville Post Office, watching the lower fords of Rappahan- 
nock, with no troops between there and Rappahannock station, which is reported 
abandoned by Pope. 

"Please inform me immediately exactly where Pope is, and what doing; until 
I know that I cannot regulate Porter's movements ; he is much exposed now, 
and decided measures should be taken at once. Until I know what my com- 
mand and position are to be, and whether you still intend to place me in the 
command indicated in your first letter to me, and orally through General Burn- 
side, at the Chickahominy, I cannot decide where I can be of most use. If 
your determination is unchanged, I ought to go to Alexandria at once. Please 
define my position and duties. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 



170 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

To which I received the following reply : 

" Washington, August 24, 1862. 
" Toil ask me for information which I cannot give. I do not know either 
where General Pope is, or where the enemy in force is. These are matters 
which I have all day been most anxious to ascertain. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
"Major General McClellan." 

On the 26th I received the following : 

"Washington, August 26, 1862 — 11 a. m. 
" There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large force into the 
Shenandoah valley. Reconnoissances will soon determine. General Heintzel- 
man's corps was ordered to report to General Pope, and Kearney's will probably 
be sent to-day against the enemy's flank. Don't draw any troops down the 
Rappahannock at present ; we shall probably want them all in the direction of 
the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had better leave General Burnside in charge at 
Aquia creek, and come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities are reported 
there. General Franklin's corps will march as soon as it receives transportatioru 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Major General G. B. McClellan," 

On receipt of this I immediately sailed for Alexandria, and reported as fol- 
lows : 

"Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 8 a. m. 
" I arrived here last night, and have taken measures to ascertain the state of 
affairs here, dnd that proper remedies may be applied. Just received a rumor 
that railway bridge over Bull run was burned last night. 

" G. B. McClellan, 

" Major General. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Co?mnanding United States Army." 

"Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 9.40 a. m. 

" The town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers, who are said to be chiefly 
convalescents. 

" The affairs of the quartermaster's department are reported as going on well. 

" It is said that the Bull run bridge will be repaired by to-morrow. The 
disembarcation of Sumner's corps commenced at Aquia yesterday afternoon. 
I found that he could reach Rappahannock station earlier that way than from 
here. 

" G. B. McClellan, 

" Major General. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States ArmT/." 

On the same day I received the following : 

"Washington, August 27, 1862. 

"Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside, just received, say that 
Banks is at Fayetteville ; McDowell, Sigel. and Ricketts near Warrenton; 
Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton Junction, to re-enforce 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 171 

Pone Notbin- said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. 
Franklin's corps sbould move out by forced marcbes, ^'^y^!'? ^bree or four 
days' provisions, and to be supplied, as far as possible, by raib^ad. Peibaps 
you m^ay prefer some otber roid tban to CentreviUe. Colonel Haup bas just 
SLSpbed about sending out troops. Please see bim, and give bim your 
directions! Tbere bas been some serious neglect to guard tbe railroad, wbich 
should be immediately remedied. ^^ ^ ^ HALLECK, 

"General-in-Chief. 
"Major General McClellan." 

I replied as follows : 

''Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10 a. m. 
" Telegram this moment received. I bave sent orders to Franklin to prepare 
to marcb witb bis corps at once, and to repair bere m person to inform me as to 

bis means of transportation. , , ,. td . „f-R„n1fAn Kplb'n 

" Kearney was yesterday at Rappabannock station ; Porter at Bealton, Kellip, 

Barfeut&c. Sumner will commence reacbing Falmoutb to-day. Williams s 

Massachusetts cavalry will be mostly at Falmoutb to-day. _ 

"I loaned Burnside my personal escort (one sc^uadron 4tb regulais) to scout 

'"::? SCtTcoucb's division to come at once As fast as I gain any in- 
formation I will forward it, although you may «^|^7^^\eLLAN, 

''Major General. 

"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C" 

I also received the following telegrams : 

"Washington, August 27, 1862. 

"Direct General Casey to furnish you about five thousand of tbe new troops 

"^'?ak: e^n^dtction of the sending out of tbe troops from Alexandna^ 

"Determine questions of priority in transportation, and tbe places tbey jbd 
occupy. Pope'l headquarters are near Warrenton Junction, but 1 cannot 
ascertain the present position of his troops. ^^ ^ ^ HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
« Major General McClellan." 

"Washington, August 27, 1862. 

« I can get no satisfactory information from the front, either of the enemy or 

of our trooS There seems to have been great neglect and carelessness about 

mZs as!' Franklin's corps should march in tliat direct on as joon a^possible^ 

A competent officer should be sent out to take direction of affaiis m that 

^c^ity- -H. W. HALLECK, 

"General-in-Chief. 

"Major General McClellan." 

Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent the following telegi-am to Generals 
Heintzelman and Porter : 



172 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 



"Alexandria, August 27, 1862—10.30 a. m. 

"Where are you, and what is state of affairs — what troops in your front, 
right, and left? Sumner is now landing at Aquia. Where is Pojie's left, and 
what of enemy 1 Enemy burned Bull ruu bridge last night with cavalry force. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Major General Heintzelman, JVarrenfon. 
"Major General Porter, BeaJton. 

"P. S. — If these general officers arc not at the places named, nearest operator 
will please have message forwarded." 

I also telegraphed to the general-in-chief as follows : 

"Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 10.50 a. m. 

" I have sent all the information I possess to Burnside, instructing him to look 
out well for his right flank, between the Rappahannock and Potomac, and to 
send no trains to Porter without an escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed at 
Bull run last night may trouble Burnside a little. I have sent to communicate 
with Porter and Heiutzelman, via Falmouth, and hope to give you some definite 
infoi-mation in a few hours. I shall land the next cavalry I get hold of here, 
and send it out to keep open the communication between Pope and Porter, also 
to Avatch vicinity of Manassas. Please send me a number of copies of the best 
maps of present field of operations. I can use fifty (50) to advantage. 

"G. B. McOLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Major General Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

"Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 11.20 a. nu 

"In view of Burnside's despatch, just received, would it not be advisable to 
throw the mass of Sumner's corps here, to move out with Franklin to Centreville 
or vicinity 1 If a decisive battle is fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave 
any troops on lower Rappahannock in a dangerous position. 
"They would do better service in front of Washington. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Major General Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

" Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 12.5 p. m. 

"My aid has just returned from General Franklin's camp ; reports that Generals 
Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in Washington. He gave the order to the 
next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that 
heavy firing has been heard this morning at Centreville, and have sent to ascer- 
tain the truth. I can find no cavalry to send out on the roads. Are the works 
garrisoned and ready for defence? 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
Major General Halleck, Washington." 

"Alexandria, August 27, 1802 — 12.20 7?. m. 

"What bridges exist over Bull run? Have steps been tpdcen to construct 
bridges for the advance of troops to re-enforce Pope, or to enable him to retreat 
if in trouble ? 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 173 

" There slioiald be two gunboats at Aquia creek at once. Shall I push the 
rest of Sumner's corps here, or is Pope so sti'ong as to be reasonably certain of 
success 1 I have sent to inspect the works near here and their garrisons. 

"As soon as I can find General Casey, or some other commanding officer, I 
will see to the railway, &c. It would be well to have them report to me, as I 
do not know where they are. I am trying to find them, and will lose no time in 
cai-rying out your orders. Would like to see Burnside. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

♦'Major General H. W. Halleck, Washington.'" 

"Alexandria, August 27, 1862 — 1.15^. m. 

" Franklin's artillery have no horses, except for (4) four guns without caissons. 
I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push 
Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrange- 
ments for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of 
defence ? I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and 
ourselves. % • 

" Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in 
front? 

" Should not Burnside take steps at once to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, 
at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's troops who may fall back 
in that direction ? 

" I do not see that we have force enough in hand to form a connexion with 
Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of 
the valley 1 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

" Major General Halleck, Washington." 

"Alexandria, August 27, 1S62 — 1.35 p. m. 

" I learn that Taylor's brigade, sent this morning to Bull run bridge, is either 
cut to pieces or captured. 

" That the force against them had many guns, and about (5,000) five thousand 
infantry, receiving re-enforcements every minute ; also, that Gainesville is in 
possession of the enemy. Please send some cavalry out towards Drainsville, 
via Chain bridge, to watch Lewinsville and Drainsville, and go as f;ar as they 
can. If you will give me even one squadron of good cavalry here I will ascer- 
tain the state of the case. I think our policy now is to make these works per- 
fectly safe, and mobilize a couple of corps as soon as possible, but not to advance 
them until they can have their artillery and cavalry. 1 have sent for Colonel 
Tyler to place his artillerymen in the works. 

" Is Fort Marcy securely held ? 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

" General Halleck." 

"Alexandria, Augiist 27, 1862 — 2.30 p.m. 

" Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his corps that are within reach. 
Orders have been sent to Couch to cojne here from Yorktown with the least 
possible delay. But one squadron of my cavalry has arrived ; that will be dis- 
embarked at once and sent to the front. 

" If there is any cavalry in Washington it should be ordered to report to me 
at once. 

'' I still think that we should first provide for the immediate defence of Wash- 
ington on both sides of the Potomac. 



174 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

" I am not responsible for the past, and cannot be for the future, i;nless I re- 
ceive autlioritj to dispose of the available troops according to my judgment. 
Please inform me at once what my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General II. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army.^^ 

"Alexandria, August 27, 1863 — Q> p.m. 

" I have just received the copy of a despatch from General Pope to you» 
dated 10 a.m. this morning, in which he says: 'All forces now sent forward 
should be sent to my right at Gainesville.' 

" 1 now have at my disposal here about (10,000) ten thousand men of Frank- 
lin's corjis, about (2,800) twenty-eight hundred of General Tyler's brigade and 
Colonel Tyler's first Connecticut artillery, which I recommend should be held 
in hand for the defence of Washington. 

" If you wish me to order any part of this force to the front, it is in readiness 
to march at a moment's notice to any point jou may indicate. 

" In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have deemed it best 
to order General Casey to hold his men for Yorktown in readiness to move, but 
not to send them off till further orders. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

On the 2Sth I telegraphed as follows : 

"Headquarters Camp near Alexandria, 

" Augtist 28, 1862—4.10 p.m. 
" General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few minutes the con- 
dition of artillery and cavalry. 

" We are not yet in condition to move ; may be by to-moiTow morning. 
" Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. I have 
ordered troops to gai'rison the works at Upton's hill. They must be held at 
any cost. As soon as I can see the way to spare them, I will send a corps of 
good troops there. It is the key to Washington, which cannot be seriously 
menaced as long as it is held. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

I received the following from the general-in-chief : 

"Washington, August 28, 1862. 

" I think you had better place Sumner's corps as it arrives near the guns, and 
particularly at the Chain bridge. 

" The principal thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, especially 
in the night time. 

" Use Cox's and Tyler's brigade, and the new troops for the same object, if 
you need them. 

" Porter writes to Burnside from Bristow, 9.30 a. m. yesterday, that Pope's 
forces were then moving on Manassas, and that Burnside would soon hear of 
them by way of Alexandria. 

" General Cullum has gone to Harper's FeiTy, and I have only a single regular 
officer for duty in the office. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 175 

" Please send some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is 
taken at the forts against a raid ; also at the bridge. Please answer. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in- Chief. 
" Major General McClellan." 

On the 29th the following despatch was telegraphed : 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

'' A^igust 29, 18G2— 10.30 a. m. 
"Franklin's corps is in motion; started about (6) six a.m. I can give him 
but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose moving General Cox to Upton's hill, 
to hold tliat important point with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to 
Vienna, via Freedom hill and Hunter's lane. Cox has (2) two squadrons of 
cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your, approval. I have 
directed Woodbury, with the engineer brigade, to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner 
detached, last night, two regiments to vicinity of Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy. 
Meagher's brigade is still at Aquia. If he moves in support of Franklin it 
leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin 
is too weak alone. Wliat shall be done % No more cavalry arrived ; have but 
(3) three squadrons. Franklin has but (40) forty rounds of ammunition, and 
no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish 
much if he meets with serious resistance. I should not have moved him but for 
your pressing order of last night. What have you from Vienna and Draiusville ? 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General Halleck, - 

" Washington, D. C" 

To which the following is a reply : 

" Washington, August 29, 1862 — 12 m. 

" Upton's hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons and ammunition 
to Franklin as fast as they arrive. 

" Meagher's brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said on 
good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three hours. I have nothing 
from Draiusville. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Major General McClellan." 

On the same day the following was received from his excellency the Presi- 
dent : 

"Washington, August 29, 1862—2.30^. m. 

"What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What generallv? 

"A. LINCOLK 
"Major General McClellan." 

To which I replied as follows : 

" Camp near Alexandria, 

"August, 29, 1862 — 2.45^. m. 
" The last news I received from the direction of Manassas Avas from strag' 
glers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring 
towards Thoroughfare gap. This by no means reliable. 

" I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted : 1st, to concentrate all 
our available forces to open communications with Pope ; 2d, to leave Pope to get 



176 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make the capita! perfectly 
safe. 

" No middle ground will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and 
I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders 
and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. 
I only ask a prompt decision that I may at once give the necessary orders. It 
will not do to delay longer. 

"G. B. McCr-ELLAN. 

" Major General. 

"A.'LlNCOLN, President." 

And copy to General Halleck. 

To which the following is a reply : 

" Washingtox, Atigmt 29, 1862 — 4.10^. m. 
"Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit, 'to 
concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the 
right one, but I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, 
aided by your counsels. 

"A. LINCOLN. 
"Major General McClellan." 

It had been officially reported to me from Washington that the enemy, in 
strong force, was movins; through Vienna in the direction of the Chain bridge, 
and had a large force in Vienna. This report, in connexion with the despatch 
of the general-in-chief on the 2Sth, before noted, induced me to direct Frankhn 
to halt his command near Anandale until it could be determined, by recon- 
noissances to Vienna and towards Manassas, whether these reports were true. 
General Cox was ordered to send his small cavalry force from Upton's hill 
towards Vienna and Drainsville in one direction, and towards Fairfax Court 
House in the other, and Franklin to push his two squadrons as far towards 
Manassas as possible, in order to ascertain the true position of the enemy. 

With the enemy in force at Vienna, and towards Lewinsville, it would have 
been very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small force beyond Anandale. 
It must be remembered that at that time we were cut off" from direct communi- 
cation with General Pope; that the enemy was, by the last accounts, at Manas- 
sas in strong force, and that Frailklin had only from 10,000 to 11,000 men, 
with an entirely insuiUcient force of cavalry and artillery. 

In order to represent this condition of affairs in its proper light to the 
general-in-chief, and to obtain definite instructions from him, I telegraphed as 
follows : 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

" August 29, 1862—12 m. 

"Have ordered most of the (12th) twelfth Pennsylvania cavalry to report 
to General Barnard for scouting duty towards Rockville, Poolsville, &c. 

" If you apprehended a raid of cavalry on your side of river, I had better 
send a brigade or two of Sumner's to near Tenallytowu, where, with two or 
three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch both Chain 
bridge and Tenallytown. 

" Would it meet your views to post the rest of Sumner's corps between 
Arlington and Fort Corcoran, whence they can either support Cox, Franklin, 
or Chain bridge, and even Tenallytown ? 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 177 

"Franklin has only between (10,000) ten thousand and (11,000) eleven 
thousand for duty. 

" How far do you wish this force to advance 1 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" 3Iajor General. 
"Major General Halleck, Washington^ 

" Camp near Alexandria, 

" Avgust 29, ] 862 — 1 p. m. 
" I anxiously await reply to my last despatch in regard to Sumner. Wish to 
give the order at once. 

" Please authorize me to attach new regiments permanently to my old 
brigades. I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. 1 shall 
endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and Marcy, at least with 
strong advanced guards. I wish to hold the line through Prospect hill, 
Mackall's, Minor's, and Hall's hill. This will give us timely warning. Shall 
I do as seems best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including Franklin, 
who I really think ought not, under present circumstances, to advance beyond 
Anandale 1 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" General Halleck." 

On the same day I received a despatch from the gencral-in-chief, in which he 
asks me why I halted Franklin in Anandale, to which I replied as follows : 

" Camp near Alexandria, 

" Avgust 29, 1862—10.30 a. m. 
'' By referring to my telegrams of 10.30 a. m., 12 m., and 1 p. m., together 
with your reply of 2.48 p. m., you will see why Franklin's corps halted at 
Anandale. His small cavalry force, all I had to give him, was ordered to 
push on as far as possible towards Manassas. 

" It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circum- 
stances, until we knew what was at Vienna. 

" General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange 
for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, 
and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. 

" Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. 
I have sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction and supply trains as 
soon as possible. 

" General Tyler to furnish the necessary guiirds. 

" I have directed General Banks's supply trains to start out to-night at least 
as far as Anandale, with an escort from General Tyler. 

"In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is 
not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply 
exercised the discretion you committed to me. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" Major General Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

H. Ex. Doc. 15 12 



178 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

On tlie same evening I sent the following despatches : 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

" August 29, 1862—10 p. m. 

" Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to General Franklin to place him- 
self in communication with Grerteral Pope as soon as possible, and at the same 
time cover the transit of Pope's supplies. 

"Orders have been given for railway and wagon trains to move to Pope with 
least possible delay. 

" 1 am having inspections made of all the forts around the city by members 
of my staff, with instructions to give all requisite orders. 

" I inspected Worth and Ward myself this evening ; found them in good 
order. 

" Reports, so far as heard from, are favorable as to condition of works. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 

"Major General Halleck, Wasliingtun." 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

"August 29,1862—10 p. m. 

"Your despatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 
6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about fourteen thousand infantry, 
without cavalry or artillery, here. Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with 
two batteries of artillery. Men of two regiments, much fatigued, came in to-day. 
Tyler's brigade of three new regiments, but little drilled, is also here ; all these 
troops will be ordered to hold themselves ready to march to-morrow morning, 
and all except Franklin's to await further orders. 

" If you wish any of them to move toAvards Manassas, please inform me. 

"Colonel Wagner, 2d New York artillery, has just come in from the front. 
He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of rebels near Fairfax Court House. 
Reports rumors from various sources that Lee and Stuart, with lai-ge forces, are 
at Manassas. 

" That the enemy, with 120,000 men, intend advancing on the forts near 
Arlington and Chain bridge, with a view of attacking Washington and Balti- 
more. 

" General Barnard telegraphs me to-night that the length of the line of for- 
tifications on this side of the Potomac requires 2,000 additional artillerymen, 
and additional troops to defend intervals, according to circumstances ; at all 
events, he says an old regiment should be added to the force at Chain bridge, 
and a (ew regiments distributed along the lines to give confidence to our new 
troops. I agree with him fully, and think our fortifications along the upper 
part of our line on this side the river very unsafe with their present garrisons, 
and the movements of the enemy seem to indicate an attack upon those works. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

" General H. W. Halleck, 

General-in-Chief United States Army, Washington, D. C." 

" Camp near Alexandria, 

"August 30, 1862—11.30 a. m. 

" Your telegi'am of 9 a. m. received. Ever since General Franklin received 

notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been endeavoring to get 

transportation from the quartermaster at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been 

told that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 179 

After the departure of liis corps he procured twenty wagons to carry some extra 
ammunition, by unloading Banks's supply train. 

" General Sumner endeavored, by application upon the quartermaster's depart- 
ment, to get wagons to carry his reserve ammunition, but without success, and 
was obliged to march with what he could carry in his cartridge-boxes. 

" I have this morning directed that all my headquarters wagons that are 
landed be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin ; but they 
will not go far towards supplying the deficiency. 

"Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermasters last night, 
loaded with subsistence, and sent forward at 1 a. m. with an escort via Anan- 
dale. Every effort has been made to carry out your orders promptly. The 
great difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the trans- 
portation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current 
supplies of the garrisons. Such is the state of the case as represented to me 
by the quartermasters, and it appears to be true. 

" I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to vou. 

<' G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

"Major General Halleck, 

" General-in- Chief." 

On the morning of the 30th heavy artillery firing was heard in the direc- 
tion of Fairfax Court House, which I reported to the general-iu-chief. 
At 11 a. m. the following telegram was sent : 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

"August 30, 1862 — 11 a. m. 

"Have ordered Sumner to leave (1) one brigade in vicinity of Chain bridge, 
and to move the rest via Columbia pike on Anaudale and Fairfax Court House. 
" Is this the route you wish them to take 1 He and Franklin are both 
instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. 
" Shall Couch move out also when he arrives? 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major Qcjicral. 
"Major General Halleck, Washington." 

On the same day I received the following : 

"Washington, August 30, 1862 — 1.4oj9. m. 
"Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immediately sent forward 
to Centreville for General Pope. It must be done with all possible despatch. 

"H.W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" General McClellan." 

To Avhich this reply was made : 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

''August 30, 1862—2.10;?. m. 

" I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artillery. All I can do is to direct 
my ordnance officer to load up all the wagons sent to him. I have already sent 
all my headquarters Avagons. You Avill have to see that wagons are sent from 
Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that every available 
wagon in Alexandria shall be loaded at once. 

" The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain near Chain 
bridge and Tenallytown should go from your headquarters to save time. I un- 
derstand you to intend it also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the 
guard around my camp. I have sent off every man but those,, and will now 
send them with the train as you direct. I will also send my only remaining 



180 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

squadron of cavalry witli General Sumner. I can do no more. You now have 
every man of the anny of the Potomac who is within my reach. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck." 

At 10.30 p. m. the following telegram was sent: , 

"Camp near Alexandkia, 

''August 30, 1S62— 10.30^;. m. 

"I have sent to the front all my troops with the exception of Couch's division, 
and have given the orders necet?sary to insure its being disposed of as you 
directed. I hourly expect the return of one of my aids, Avho will give au- 
thentic news from the field of battle. 

" I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have experienced to-day 
in listening to tlie distant sound of the firing of my men. As I can be of no 
further use here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of the conflict 
being renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of battle with 
my stafi", merely to be with my own men, if nothing more ; they will fight none 
the worse for my being with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with 
the command even of my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their 
fate on the field of battle. 

" Please reply to this to-night. 

"I have been engaged for the last fcAV hours in doing what I can to make ar- 
rangements for the wounded. I have started out all the ambulances now landed. 
As I have sent my escort to the front, I would be glad to take some of Gregg's 
cavalry with me, if allowed to go. 

"G. B.McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 

"Major General 11. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United Stafes Army, Washington, D. C" 

To which, on the following day, I received this answer: 

"Washl\gton, August 31, 1862 — 9.18 a. m. 

" I have just seen your telegram of 11.5 last night. The substance was stated 
to me when received, but I did not know that you asked for a reply immediately. 
I cannot answer without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, 
by his orders, of the department. 

"I think Couch's division should go forward as rapidly as possible and find 
the battle-field. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Major General McClellan." 

On the same day the following was received : 

"Washington, August 31, 1862 — 12.45^. m. 
"The subsistence department are making Fairfax station their principal depot. 
It should be well guarded. The olficer in charge should be directed to secure 
the depot by abatis against cavalry. As many as possible of the new regiments 
should be prepared to take the field. Perhaps some more should be sent to the 
vicinity of Chain bridge. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
"■ Major General McClellan." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 181 

At 2.30 p. m. the following despatcli was telegraplied : 

" Camp near Alexandria, 

" August 31, 1862 — 2.30^. m. 
" Major Ilaller is at Fairfax station with my provost and headquarters guard 
and other troops. I have requested (4) four more companies to be sent at once, 
and the precautions you direct to be taken. 

" Under the War Department order of yesterday I have no control over any- 
thing except my staff, some one hundred men in my camp here, and the few re- 
maining near Fort Monroe. I have no control over the new regiments — do not 
know where they are, or anything about them, except those near here. Their 
commanding officers and those of the works are not under me. 

" Where I have seen evils existing under my eye I have corrected them. I 
think it is the business of General Casey to prepare the new regiments for the 
field, and a matter between him and General Barnard to order others to the 
vicinity of Chain bridge. Neither of them is under my command, and by the 
War Department order I have no right to give them orders. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
" General Halleck, Washington." 

To which the following is an answer : 

"Washington, August 31, 1862 — 10.7^. m. 
" S'nce receiving your despatch, relating to command, I have not been able 
to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have not seen the order as pub- 
lished, but will write to you in the morning. You will retain the command of 
everything in this vicinity not temporarily belonging to Pope's army in the field. 
" I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and experience. I 
am entirely tired out. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

" Gcneral-in- Chief. 
" General McClellan." 

The order referred to in the preceding despatch was as follows : 

" War Department, August 30, 1862. 
" The following are the commanders of the armies operating in Virginia: 
" General Burnside commands his own corps, except those that have been 
temporarily detached and assigned to General Pope. 

" General McClellan commands that portion of the army of the Potomac that 
has not been sent forward to General Pope's command. 

" General Pope commands the army of Virginia and all the forces temporarily 
attached to it. All the forces are under the command of Major General Halleck, 
general-in-chief. 

"E. D. TOWNSEND, 
"Assistant Adjutant General.^ 

I was informed by Colonel Townsend that the above was published by order 
of the Secretary of War. 

At 11.30 p. m. I telegraphed the following: 

"Camp near Alexandria, 

''August 31, 1862—11.30/. m. 

" The squadron of 2d regular cavalry that I sent with General Sumner was 
captured to-day about 2 p. m., some three miles from Fairfax Court House, be- 
yond it on the Little river pike, by Fitz Hugh Lee, with three thousand cavalry 
and three light batteries. 



182 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

"I Lave conversed with the 1st sergeant, who says that when he last saw 
them thej were within a mile of Fairfax. Pope had no troops on that road ; 
this squadron gettnig there by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right 
of Centreville but Sumner's corps. There was much artillery firing during the 
day. A rebel major told the sergeant that the rebels had driven in our entire 
left to-day. He says the road is filled with wagons and stragglers coming to- 
wards Alexandria. 

" It is clear from the sergeant's account that we were badly beaten yesterday, 
and that Pope's right is entirely exposed. 

" I recommend that no more of Couch's division be sent to the front, that 
Burnside be brought here as soon as practicable, and that everything available 
this side of Fairfax be drawn in at once, including the mass of the troops on 
the railroad. I apprehend that the enemy will, or have by this time occupied 
Fairfax Court House and cut off Pope entirely, unless he falls back to-night via 
Sangster's and Fairfax station. 

" I think these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in the 
dispositions made as I gather them. I^o speak frankly — and the occasion re- 
quires it — there appears to be a total absence of brains, and I fear the total de- 
struction of the army. I have some cavalry here that can carry out any orders 
you may have to send. The occasion is grave, and demands grave measures. 
The question is, the salvation of the country. I learn that our loss yesterday 
amounted to fifteen thousand. We cannot afford such losses withoiit an object. 

" It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation demand that 
Pope should fall back to-night if possible, and not one moment is to be lost. 

" I will use all the cavalry I have to watch our right. Please answer at once. 
I feel confident that you can rely upon the information I give you. 

" I shall be up all night, and ready to obey any orders you give me. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 

^' Major General. 

"General Halleck, Washington." 

To which this reply was received : 

"Washington, September I, 1862 — 1.30 a. m. 
" Burnside was ordered up very early yesterday morning. Retain remainder 
of Couch's forces, and make arrangements to stop all retreating troops in line of 
works, or where yon can best establish an entire line of defence. My news 
from Pope was up to 4 p. m. ; he was then all right. I must wait for more de- 
finite information before I can order a retreat, as the falling back on the line of 
works must necessarily be directed in case of a serious disaster. Give me all 
additional news that is reliable. 

" I shall be up all night, and ready to act as circumstances may require. I 
am fully aware of the gravity of the crisis, and have been for weeks. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 
" General-in-Chief. 
" Major General McClellan." 



FOURTH PERIOD. 

On the 1st of September I went into Washington, where I had an interview 
with the gencral-in-chicf, who instructed me, verbally, to take command of its 
defences, expressly hmiting my jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, 
and prohibiting me from exercising any control over the troops actively engaged 
in front under General Pope. During this interview I suggested to the general- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 183 

iu-cliief the necessity of his going in person, or sending one of his personal 
staff, to the army under General Pope, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact 
condition of affairs; he sent Colonel Kelton^ his assistant adjutant general. 

During the afternoon of the same day I received a message from the general- 
in-chief, to the effect that he desired me to go at once to his house to see the 
President. 

The President informed me that he had reason to believe that the army of the 
Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with and supporting General Pope ; 
that he had "always been a friend of mine;" and now asked me, as a special 
favor, to use my influence in correcting this state of things. I replied, sub- 
stantially, that I was confident that he was misinformed ; that I was sui'e, what- 
ever estimate the army of the Potomac might entertain of General Pope, that 
they would obey his orders, support him to the fullest extent, and do their 
whole duty. The President, who was much moved, asked me to telegraph to 
"Fitz-John Porter, or some other of my friends," and try to do away with any 
feeling that might exist; adding, that I could rectify the evil, and that no one 
else could. 

I thereupon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to General Porter, or 
do anything else in my power to gratify his wishes and relieve his anxiety; 
upon which he thanked me very warmly, assured me that he could never forget 
my action in the matter, &c., and left. 

I then wrote the following telegram to General Porter, which was sent to 
him by the general-in-chief : 

"Washington, September 1, 1862. 

" I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and the old army of the Poto- 
mac, that you and all my friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-opera- 
tion to General Pope, in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our 
country, the honor of our arms, are at stake, and all depends now upon the 
cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. 
Say the same thing to my friends in the army of the Potomac, and that the 
last request I have to make of them is, that, for their country's sake, they will 
extend to General Pope the same support they ever have to me. 

"I am in charge of the defences of Washington, and am doing all I can to ren- 
der your retreat safe, should that become necessary, 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN. 

"Major General Porter." 

To which he sent the following reply : 

"Fairfax Court House, 10 a. m., 

" Scptcmher 2, 1862. 

"You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every lover of his 
country, will ever give, as they have given, to General Pope their cordial co- 
operation and constant support in the execution of all orders and plans. Our 
killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our devoted duty. 

F. J. PORTER. 
" General George B. McClellan, 

" Major General Comvianding, Was/iington." 

Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor at any other time, did I think 
for one moment that General Porter had been, or would be, in any manner de- 
relict in the performance of his duty to the nation and its cause. Such an im- 
pression never entered my mind. The despatch in question was written purely 
at the request of the President. 

On the moruinff of the 2d the President and General Halleck came to 



184 REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

my bouse, wlien the President informed me that Colonel Kelton had returned 
from the front; that our affairs were in a bad condition'; that the army 
was in full retreat upon the defences of Washington; the roads filled with strag- 
glers, &c. He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and collect the strag- 
glers ; to place the works in a proper state of defence, and to go out to meet and 
take command of the army, when it approached the vicinity of the works, then 
to place the troops in the best position — committing everything to my hands. 

I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and sent an aid to Gen- 
eral Pope with the following letter : 

"Headquarters, Washington, 

" September 2, 1862. 

" General : General Halleck instructed me to report to you the order he sent 
this morning to withdraw your army to Washington, without unnecessary delay. 
He feared that his messenger might miss you, and desired to take this double 
precaution. 

"In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are already familiar, 
it would be best to move Porter's corps upon Upton's hill, that it may occupy 
Hall's hill, &c.; McDowell's to Upton's hill ; Franklin's to the works in front 
of Alexandria; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity; Couch to Fort Corcoran, or, 
if practicable, to the Chain bridge; Sumner either to Fort Albany or to Alex- 
andria, as may be most convenient. 

" In haste, general, very truly yours, 

" GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General United States Army. 
"Major General John Pope, 

" Commanding Army of Virginia^ 

In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the front, and at Upton's 
hill met the advance of McDowell's corps, and with it Generals Pope and 
McDowell. After getting what information I could from them, I sent the few 
aids at my disposal to the left to give instructions to the troops approaching 
in the direction of Alexandria ; and hearing artillery firing in the direction of 
the Vienna and Langley road, by Avhich the corps of Sumner, Porter, and Sigel 
were returning, and learning from General Pope that Sumner was probably en- 
gaged, I went, Avith a single aid and three orderlies, by the shortest line to 
meet that column. I reached the column after dark, and proceeded as far as 
Lewinsville, Avhere I became satisfied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be 
able to reach its intended position Avithout any serious molestation. 

I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the positions they were to 
occupy, sent instructions to General Sumner, and at a late hour of the night re- 
turned to Washington. 

Next day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was engaged in rectifying 
the positions of the troops, and giving orders necessary to secure the issuing of 
the necessary supplies, &c, 

I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any attack made by the enemy 
on the south side of the Potomac. 

On the 3d the enemy had disappeared from the front of Washington, and the 
information which I received induced me to believe that he intended to cross 
the upper Potomac into Maryland. This materially changed the aspect of 
affairs, and enlarged the sphere of operations; for, in case of a crossing in force, 
an active campaign would be necessary to cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion 
oi Pennsylvania, and clear Maryland. 

I therefore, on the third, ordered the 2d and 12th corps to Tenallytown, 
and the 9th corps to a point on the Seventh street road near Washington, and 



EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 185 

sent such cavalry as was available to the fords near Poolsville, to watcli and 
impede the enemy in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. 

On September 5, the 2d and 12th corps were moved to Rockville, and 
Couch's division (the only one of the 4th corps that had been brought from the 
Peninsula) to Offut's cross-roads. 

On the 6ih the 1st and 9th corps were ordered to Leesburg; the 6th corps, 
and Sykes's division of the 5th corps, to Tenallytown. 

On the 7th the 6tli corps was advanced to Rockville, to which place my head- 
quarters were moved on the same day. 

All the necessary arrangements for the defence of the city, under the new 
condition of things, had been made, and General Banks was left in command, 
having received his instructions from me. 

It will be seen from what has preceded that I lost no time that could be 
avoided in moving the army of the Potomac fi-om the Peninsula to the support 
of the army of Virginia ; that I spared no effoi-t to hasten the embarcation of 
the troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News and Yorktown, remaining at Fort 
Monroe myself until the mass of the army had sailed ; and that, after my arri- 
val at Alexandria, I left nothing in my power undone to forward supplies and 
re-enforcements to General Pope. I sent, with the troops that moved, all the 
cavalry I could get hold of. Even my personal escort was sent out upon the 
line of the railway as a guard, with the provost and camp guards at headquar- 
ters, retaining less than one hundred men, many of whom were orderlies, inva- 
lids, members of bands, &c. All the headquarters teams that arrived were sent 
out with supjilies and ammunition, none being retained even to move the head- 
quarters camp. The squadron that habitually served as my personal escort 
was left at Falmouth with General Burnside, as he was deficient in cavalry. 

I left Washington on the 7th of September. At this time it was known that 
the mass of the rebel army had passed up the south side of the Potomac in the 
direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of that army had crossed into Mary- 
land ; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force with a view 
to turn Washington by a flank movement down the north bank of the Potomac, 
to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were questions which, at that 
time, we had no means of determining. This uuceitainty as to the intentions of 
the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th of September, to march cautiously and to 
advance the army in such order as continually to keep Washington and Balti- 
more covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand so as to be 
able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Penn- 
sylvania ; or to return to the defence of Washington, if, as was greatly feared 
by the authorities, the enemy should be merely making a feint with a small 
force to draw off our army, while Avith their main forces they stood ready to 
seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the capital. 

In the mean time the process of re-organization, rendered necessary after the 
demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of the Poto- 
mac, was rapidly progressing ; the troops were regaining confidence, and their 
foi-mer soldierly appearance and discipline Avere fast returning. My cavalry 
was pushed out continually in all directions, and all possible steps were taken 
to learn the positions and movements of the enemy. 

The following table shows the movements of the army, from day to day, up 
to the 14th of September: 



186 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 





September 4. 


September 6. 


September 9. 


September 10. 


BURNSIDE. 
9th corps, Reno 


Seventh street road. 
Upton's hill 

Tenallytovcn 

Tenallytown 

Alex. Seminary . .. 
Tenallytown 


Leesburg 


Brook ville 




1st corps, Hooker 






SUMNER. 

12th corps, Williams . . . 
2d corps, Sumner 

FRANKLIN. 

6th corps, Franklin 

Couch's divitiion 




Middleburg 

Middleburg 

Damstown 

Mouth of Seneca 






Clarksburg 

Barnaville 


Tenallytown 

Oflfut's Cross Roads. 

Tenallytown 
















September 11. 


September 12. 


September 13. 


September 14. 


BURNSIDE. 
9th corps, Reno 


New Market 




Middleburg 




Ridgeville, New 
Market, camp on 
the Monocacy. 

Ijamsville Cross 
Roads. 




SUMNER. 

12th corps, Williams... 

2d corps, Sumner 

FRANKLIN. 
6th corps, Franklin 








Clarksburg 






Lickenwell Cross 
Road. 


Buckeystown 


BurkettBviile 






Sykes's division 


Middleburg. 















The right wing, consisting of the 1st and 9th corps, under the command of 
Major General Burnside, moved on Frederick ; the 1st corps via Brooksville, 
Cooksville and Ridgeville, and the 9th corps via Damascus and New Market. 

The 2d and 12th corps, forming the centre, under the command of Genez'al 
Sumner, moved on Frederick; the former via Clarksburg and Urbana, the 12th 
corps on a lateral road between Urbana and New Market, thus maintaining the 
communication with the right wing, and covering the direct road from Frede- 
rick to Washington. The 6th corps, under the command of General Franklin, 
moved to Buckeystown via Darnt^town, Dawsonville and Barnsville, covering 
the road from the mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and being in a position 
to connect with and support the centre, should it have been necessary (as was 
supposed) to force the line of the Monocacy. 

Couch's division moved by the " river road," covering that approach, watch- 
ing the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately following and supporting the 6th 
corps. * 

The following extracts from telegrams, received by me after my departure 
from Washington, will show how little was known there about the enemy's 
movements, and the fears which were entertained for the safety of the capital. 
On the 9th of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows ; 

" Until we can get better advices about the numbers of the enemy at Drains- 
ville, I think we must be very cautious about stripping, too much, the forts on 
the Virginia side. It may be the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our 
forces and then attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. Think 
of this." 

Again, on the 11th of September, General Halleck telegraphed me as follows : 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 187 

" Why not order forward Kejes or Sigel 1 I think the main force of the 
enemy is in your front ; more troops can be spared from here." 

This despatch, as published by the Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
and furnished by the gencral-in-chief, reads as follows : 

" Why not order forward Porter's corps or Sigel's 1 If the main force of the 
enemy is in your front, more troops can be spared from here." 

I remark that the original despatch, as received by me from the telegraph 
opeiator, is in the words quoted above, " I think the main force of the enemy '^ 
&c. 

In accordance with this suggestion I asked, on the same day, that all the 
troops that could be spared should at once be sent to re-enforce me, but none 
came. 

On the 12th I received the following telegram from his excellency the Presi- 
dent : " Governor Curtin telegrap'hs me, ' I have advices that Jackson is cross- 
ing the Potomac at Williamsport, and probably the whole rebel army will be 
drawn from Maryland.' " The President adds : " Receiving nothing from Har- 
per's Ferry or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheeling that 
the line is cut, corroborates the idea that the enemy is re-crossing the Potomac. 
Please do not let him get off without being hurt." 

On the 13th General Halleck telegraphed as follows : " Until you know more 
certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncov- 
ering the capital. I am of the opinion that the enemy Avill send a small column 
towards Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then suddenly move 
on Washington with the forces sonth of the Potomac and those he may cross 
over." Again, on the 14th, General Halleck telegraphed me that "scouts re- 
port a large force still on the Virginia side of the Potomac. If so, I fear you 
are exposing your left and rear." 

Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the most positive evidence that Lee's 
entire army was in front of us, I received the following : 

" War Department, 
" September 16, 1862—12.3^. m. 

"Yours of 7 a. m. is this moment received. As you give me no information in 
regard to the position of your forces, except that at Sharpsburg, of course I can- 
not advise. I think, however, you will find that the whole force of the enemy 
in your front has crossed the river ; 1 fear now more than ever that they will 
re-croas at Harper's Ferry, or below, and turn your left, thus cutting you off 
from Washington. This has appeared to me to be a part of their j)lan, and 
hence my anxiety on the subject; a heavy rain might prevent it. 

" H. W. HALLECK, 

*' General -in- Chief. 

" Major General McClellan," 

The importance of moving with all due caution, so as not to uncover the na- 
tional capital until the enemy's position and plans Avere developed, was, I believe, 
fully appreciated by me ; and as my troops extended from the Baltimore and 
Ohio railroad to the Potomac, with the extreme left flank moving along that 
stream, and with strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard all the available 
fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any degree exposed. But it ap- 
pears from the foregoing telegrams that the general-in-chief was of a different 
opinion, and that my movements were, in liis judgment, too precipitate, not only 
for the safety of Washington, but also for the security of my left and rear. 

The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a precipitate advance 
may now be perceived. The general-in-chief, in his testimony before the Com- 
mittee on the Conduct of the War, says : " In respect to General McClellan going 



188 



EEPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 



too fast or too slow from Washington, there can be found no such tele-ram from 
me to him. He had mistaken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him I tele- 
graphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Po- 
tomac, leaving General Lee the opportunity to comedown the Potomac and ffet 
between him and Washington. I thought General McClellan should keep more 
on he Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, so as the more 
readily to relieve Harper's Ferry." 

As I can find no telegram from the general-in-chief recommending me to keep 
my left flank nearer the Potomac, I am compelled to believe that when he save 
this testimony he had forgotten the purport of the telegrams above quoted, and 
had also ceased to remember the fact, well known to him at the time, that my 
left, from the time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and my 
centre was continually in position to re-enforce the left or right, as occasion mi-ht 
require. Had I advanced my left flank along the Potomac more rai)idly than 
the other columns marched upon the roads to the right, I should have thrown 
that flank out of supporting distance of the other troops, and greatly exposed it. 
And If L had marched the entire army in one column along the bank of the 
river instead of upon five different parallel roads, the column, with its trains, 
Avould have extended about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated the 
advance before the rear could have reached the scene of action. Moreover, such 
a movement would have uncovered the communications with Baltimore and 
VVashmgton on our right, and exposed our right and rear. I presume it will be 
admitted by every military man that it was necessary to move the army in such 
order that It could at any time be concentrated for battle; and I am of opinion 
that this object could not have been accomplished in any other way than the one 
employed Any other disposition of our forces would have subjected them to 
defeat in detached fragments. 

On the 10th of September I received from my scouts information which ren- 
dered it quite probable that General Lee's army was in the vicinity of Frederick, 
but whether his intention Avas to move towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania was 
not then known. On the 11th I ordered General Burnside to push a strong 
reconnoissance across the National road and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, to- 
wards New Market, and, if he learned that the enemy had moved towards 
Hagerstown, to press on rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops constantly 
ready to meet the enemy in force. A corresponding movement of all the troops 
m the centre and on the left was ordered in the direction of Urbana and Pools- 
vule. 

On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, after a brisk skir- 
misli at the outskirts of the city and in the streets. 

On the 13th the main bodies of the right wing and centre passed through 
±rederick. it was soon ascertained that the main body of the enemy's forces 
had marched out of the city on the two previous days, taking the roads to 
Boonsboro and Harper's Ferry, thereby rendering it necessary to force the 
passes through the Catoctin and South Mountain ridges, and gain possession of 
Boonsboro' and Rohrersville before any relief could be extended to Colonel 
Miles at Harper's Ferry. 

On the 13th an order fell into my hands, issued by General Lee, which fully 
disclosed his plans, and I immediately gave orders for a rapid and vigorous for- 
ward movement. 

The following is a copy of the order referred to : 

"SPECIAL ORDERS No. 19 L 

"Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 

" September 9, 1862. 
" The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the Hagerstown road. 
General Jackson's command will form the advance, and, after passing Middle- 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 189 

town, witli such portion as he may select, take the route towards Sharpsburg, 
cross the Potomac at the most convenient point, and, by Friday night, take 
possession of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, capture such of the enemy as 
may be at Martinsburg, and intercept such as may attempt to escape from Har- 
per's Ferry. 

" General Longstreet's command Avill pursue the same road as far as Boons- 
boro', where it Avill halt Avith the reserve, supply and baggage trains of the 
ai-my. 

*' General McLaws, with his own division and that of General R. H. Ander- 
son, will follow General Longstreet; on reaching Middletown, he will take the 
route to Harper's Ferry, and, by Friday morning, possess himself of the Mary- 
land heights, and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and vicinity. 

"General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the object in which 
he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's ford, ascend its right 
bank to Lovettsville, take possession of Loudon heights, if practicable, by Fri- 
day morning; Keys's ford on his left, and the road between the end of the 
mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as practicable, co-op- 
erate with General MeLaws and General Jackson in intercepting the retreat of 
the enemy, 

"General D. H. Hill's division will form the rear guard of the army, pursuing 
the road taken by the main body. The reserve artillery, ordnance and supply 
trains, &c., will precede General Hill. 

"General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accompany the com- 
mands of Generals Longstreet, Jackson and McLaws, and, with the main body 
of the cavalry, will cover the route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that 
may have been left behind. 

" The commands of Generals Jackson, McLaws and Walker, after accom- 
plishing the objects for which they have been detached, will join the main body 
of the army at Boonsboro' or Hagerstown. 

"Each regiment on the march will habitually carry its axes in the regnraental 
ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their encampments, to procure wood, &c. 

"By command of General E,. E. Lee. 

"R.H.CHILTON, 

"Assistant Adjutant General. 

" JLajor General D. H. Hill, 

" ConiJnanding Division." 

In the report of a military commission, of which Major General D. Hunter 
was president, which convened at Washington for the purpose of investigating 
the conduct of certain officers in connexion with the surrender of Harper's 
Ferry, 1 find the following: 

"The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an old oflScer, who 
has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot, from any motives of 
delicacy, refrain from censuring those in high command when it thinks such cen- 
sure deserved. 

"The general-in-chief has testified that General McClellan, after having 
received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Mai- j laud, marched 
only six miles per day, on an average, when pursuing this invading army. 

"The general-in-chief also testifies that, in his opinion, he could and should 
have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the commission 
fully conciu-." 

I have been greatly surprised that this commission, in its investigations, 
never called upon me, nor upon any otficer of my statt', nor, so far as 1 know, 
upon any officer of the army of the Potomac able to give an intelligent state- 



190 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

ment of the movements of that army. But another paragraph in the same 
report makes testimony from such sources quite superfluous. It is as follows: 

"By a reference to the evidence it will be seen that, at the very moment 
Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland heights, his little army was in reality 
relieved by Generals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's gap, within 
seven miles of his position." 

The corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner were a part of the army which I 
at that time had the honor to command, and they were acting under my orders 
at Crampton's gap and elsewhere; and if, as the commission states. Colonel 
Ford's "little army was in reality relieved" by those officers, it was relieved 
by me. 

I had, on the morning of the 10th, sent the following despatch in relation to 
the command at Harper's Ferry : 

"Camp near Rockvillr, 

" September 10, 1862 — 9.45 a. m. 

"Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand, with nine thou- 
sand troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if 
ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered to join me by the most prac- 
ticable route. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

'■^ Major General. 
"Major General Halleck, 

" Washington, D. C." 

To this I received the following reply : 

" There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present ; his only chance 
is to defend his works till you can open communication with him. 

"H. w. halleck." 

"George B. McClellan, Major General." 

It seems necessary, for a distinct understanding of this matter, to state that I 
was directed on the 12th to assume command of the garrison of Harper's Ferry 
as soon as I should open communications with that place, and that when I re- 
ceived this order all communication from the direction in which I was approach- 
ing was cut off. Up to that time, however, Colonel Miles could, in my opinion, 
have marched his command into Pennsylvania, by crossing the Potomac at Wil- 
liamsport or above ; and this opinion was confirmed by the fact that Colonel 
Davis marched the cavalry part of Colonel Miles's command from Harper's 
Ferry on the 14th, taking the main road to Hagerstown, and he encountered no 
enemy except a small picket near the mouth of the Antietam. 

Before I left Washington, and when there certainly could have been no 
enemy to prevent the withdrawal of the forces of Colonel Miles, I recommended 
to the proper authorities that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be with- 
drawn via Hagerstown, to aid in covering the Cumberland valley ; or that, taking 
up the pontoon bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it should fall back 
to the Maryland heights, and there hold out to the last. 

In this position it ought to have maintained itself for many days. It wa^i 
not deemed proper to adopt either of these suggestions, and when the matter 
was left to my discretion it was too late for me to do anything but endeavor to 
relieve the garrison. I accordingly directed artillery to be fired by our advance 
at frequent intervals as a signal that relief was at hand. This was done, and, as 
I afterwards learned, the reports of the cannon were distinctly heard at Har- 
per's Ferry. It was confidently expected that Colonel Miles would hold out 
until we had carried the mountain passes, and were in condition to send a de- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 191 

tacliment to his relief. The left was therefore ordered to move through Cramp- 
ton's pass in front of Burkettsville, while the centre and right marched upon 
Turner's pass in front of Middletown. 

It may be asked by those who are not acquainted with the topography of 
the country in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, why Franklin, instead of march- 
ing his column over the circuitous road from Jefferson via Burkettsville and 
Brownsville, was not ordered to move along the direct turnpike to Knoxville, 
and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. . 

It was for the reason that I had received information that the enemy were 
anticipating our approach in that direction, and had established batteries on the 
south side of the Potomac which commanded all the approaches to Knoxville; 
moreover the road from that point winds directly along the river bank at the 
foot of a precipitous mountain, where there was no opportunity of forming in 
line of battle, and where the enemy could have placed batteries on both sides of 
the river to enfilade our narrow approaching columns. 

The appx'oach through Crampton's pass, which debouches into Pleasant val- 
ley in rear of Maryland heights, was the only one which afforded any reasona- 
ble prospect of carrying that formidable position ; at the same time, the troops 
upon that road were in better relation to the main body of our forces. 

On the morning of the 1 4th a verbal message reached me from Colonel Miles, 
which was the first authentic intelligence I had received as to the condition of 
things at Harper's Ferry. The messenger informed me that on the preceding 
afternoon Maryland heights had been abandoned by our troops after repelling 
an attack of the rebels, and that Colonel Miles's entire force was concentrated at 
Harper's Ferry, the Maryland, Loudon, and Bolivar heights having been 
abandoned by him, and occupied by the enemy. The messenger also stated 
that there was no apparent reason for the abandonment of the Maryland 
heights, and that Colonel Miles instructed him to say that he could hold out 
with certainty two days longer. 

I directed him to make his way back, if possible, with the information that I 
was approaching rapidly, and felt confident I could relieve the place. 

On the same afternoon I wrote the following letter to Colonel Miles, and 
despatched three copies by three different couriers on different routes. I did 
no-t, however, learn that any of these men succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry : 

" Middletown, September 14, 1862. 

" Colonel : The army is being rapidly concentrated here. We are now at- 
tacking the pass on the Hagerstowu road over the Blue ridge. A column is 
about attacking the Burkettsville and Boonsboro' pass. You may count on our 
making every effort to relieve you. You may rely upon my speedily accomplish- 
ing that object. - Hold out to the last extremity. • If it is possible, reoccupy the 
Maryland heights with your whole force. If yoircan do that, I will certainly be 
able to relieve you. As the Catoctin valley is in our possession, you can safely 
cross the river at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as opposition on this side of the river 
is concerned. Hold out to the last. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General Commanding. 

" Colonel D. S. Miles." 

On the previous day I had sent General Franklin the following instructions : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Frederick, Septejnher 13, 1862 — 6.20 p. m. 
"General: I have now full information as to movements and intentions 
of the enemy. Jackson has crossed the upper Potomac to capture the gar- 
rison at Martinsburg and cut off Miles's retreat towards the west. A di- 



192 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

vision on the south side of the Potomac was to carry Loudon heights and 
cut off Km retreat in tliat direction. McLaws with his own command and 
the division of R. H. Anderson Avas to move by Boonsboro' and Rohrersville 
to carry the Maryland heights. The signal officers inform me that he is 
now in Pleasant valley. The firing shows that Miles still holds out. Long- 
street was to move to Boonsboro', and there halt with the reserve corps ; 
D. H. Hill to form the rear guard ; Stuart's cavalry to bring up stragglers, &c. 
We have cleared out all the cavalry this side of the mountains and north of us. 
The last I heard from Pleasonton he occupied Middletown, after several sharp 
skirniishcs. A division of Burnside's command started several hours ago to 
support him. The whole of Burnside's command, including Hooker's corps, 
march this evening and early to-morrow morning, foIlo\ved by the corps of Sum- 
ner and Banks, and Sykes's division, upon Boonsboro' to caiTy that position. 
Couch has been ordered to concentrate his division and join you as rapidly as 
possible. Without waiting for the whole of that division to join, you will move at 
daybreak in the morning by Jefferson and Burkettsville upon the road to Rohrers- 
ville. 1 have reliable information that the mountain pass by this road is practi- 
cable for artillery and wagons. If this pass is not occupied by the enemy in 
force, seize it as soon as practicable, and debouch upon Rohrersville in order to 
cut off the I'etreat of or destroy McLaws's command. If you find this pass held by 
the enemy in large force, make all your dispositions for the attack and commence 
it about half an hour after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstovvu 
pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the pass, your duty will 
be first to cut off", destroy, or capture McLaws's command and relieve Colonel 
Miles. If you effect this you will order him to join you at once with all his 
disposable troops, first destroying the bridges over the Potomac, if not already 
done, and, leaving a sufficient garrison to prevent the enemy from passing the 
ford, you will then return by Rohrersville on the direct road to Boonsboro', if 
the main column has not succeeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, take the 
road to Rohrersville, to Sharpsburg and Williamsport, in order either to cut off 
the retreat of Hill and Longstrcet towards the Potomac, or prevent the repassage 
of Jackson, My general idea is to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail. 
I believe I have sufficiently explained my intentions. I ask of you, at this im- 
portant moment, all your intellect and the utmost activity that a general can 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General Commanding. 
"Major General W. B. Franklin, 

" Commanding Qth CorpsP 

Again, on the 14th, I sent him the following: 

" Headuuarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Frederick, September 14, 1862 — 2 P' m. 
" Your despatch of 12.30 just received. Send back to hurry up Couch. Mass 
your troops and carry Burkettsville at any cost. We shall have strong opposi- 
tion at both passes. As fast as the troops come up I will hold a reserve in 
readiness to support you. If you find the enemy in very great force at any of 
these passes let me know at once, and amuse them as best you can so as to re- 
tain them there. In that event I will probably throw the mass of the army on 
the pass in front of here. If I carry that it will clear the way for you, and you 
must follow the enemy as rapidly as possible. 

"GEORGE B. MrCLELLAN, 

" Major General Commanding. 
<' Major General Franklin." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN". 193 

General Franklin pushed his corps rapidly forward towards Crampton's pass, 
and at about 12 o'clock on the 14th arrived at Burkettsville, immediately in rear 
of which he found the enemy's infantry posted in force on both sides of the road, 
with artillery in strong positions to defend the approaches to the pass. Slo- 
cum's division was formed upon the right of the road leading through the gap, 
and Smith's upon the left. A line formed of Bartlett's and Torbett's brigades, 
supported by Newton, whose activity was conspicuous, advanced steadily upon 
the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemy were driven from their posi- 
tion at the base of the mountain, where they were protected by a stone wall, 
steadily forced back up the slope until they reached the position of their battery 
on the road, well up the mountain. There they made a stand. They were, 
however, driven back, retiring their artillery in echelon until, after an action of 
three hours, the crest was gained, and the enemy hastily fled down the mountain 
on the other side. 

On the left of the road, Brooks's and Irvin's brigades, of Smith's division, 
formed for the protection of Slocum's flank, charged up the mountain in the 
same steady manner, driving the enemy before them until the crest was carried. 
Four hundred prisoners from seventeen different organizations, seven hundred 
stand of arms, one pi«ce of artillery, and three colors, were captured by our 
troops in this brilliant action. It was conducted by General Franklin in all its 
details. These details are given in a report of General Franklin, herewith sub- 
mitted, and due credit awarded to the gallant officers and men engaged. 

The loss in General Franklin's corps was one hundred and fifteen killed, four 
hundred and sixteen wounded, and two missing. The enemy's loss was about 
the same. The enemy's position was such that our artillery could not be used 
with any effect. The close of the action found General Franklin's advance in 
Pleasant valley on the night of the 14th, within three and a half miles of the 
point on Maryland heights where he might, on the same night or on the morn- 
ing of the loth, have formed a junction with the garrison of Harper's Ferry had it 
not been previously withdrawn from Maryland heights, and within six miles of 
Harper's Ferry. 

On the night of the 14th the following despatch was sent to General Frank- 
lin : 

" Bolivar, Septemhtr 15 — 1 a. m. 

"General: ******** 

" The commanding general directs that you occupy, with your command, the 
road from Rohrersville to Harper's Ferry, placing a sufficient force at Rohrers- 
ville to hold that position in case it should be attacked by the enemy from Boons- 
boro'. Endeavor to open communication with Colonel Miles at Harper's Ferry, 
attacking and destroying such of the enemy as you may find in Pleasant valley. 
Should you succeed in opening communication with Colonel Miles, direct him 
to join you with his whole command, with all the guns and public property that 
he can carry with him. The remainder of the guns will be spiked or destroyed; 
the rest of the public property will also le destroyed. You will then pro- 
ceed to Boonsboro', which place the commanding general intends to attack to- 
morrow, and join the main body of the army at that place; should you find, 
however, that the enemy have retreated from Boonsboro' towards Sharpsbiu-g, 
you will endeavor to fall upon him and cut off his retreat. 

" By command of Major General McClellan. 

"GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

" Culond and Aide-de-Camp. 

" General Franklin." 

H. Ex. Doc. 15 13 



194 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

On tlie 15th the following were received from General Franklin : 

"At the foot of Mount Pleasant, 
*' In Pleasant Valley, three miles from Rohrersville, 

" Septeviher 15 — 8.50 a. m. 

" General : My command started at daylight this morning, and I am wait- 
ing to have it closed up here. General Couch arrived about 10 o'clock last night. 
I have ordered one of his brigades and one battery to Rohrersville or to the 
strongest point in its vicinity. The enemy is drawn up in line of battle about 
two miles to our front, one brigade in sight. As soon as 1 am sure that 
Rohrersville is occupied I shall move forward to attack the enemy. This may 
be two hours from now. If Harper's Ferry has fallen — and the cessation of 
firing makes me fear that it has — it is my opinion that I should be strongly 
re-enforced. 

"W. B. FRANKLIN, 
"Major General Co7nmanding Corps. 
"General G. B. McClellan." 

" September 15 — 11 a. m. 

" General : I have received your despatch by Captain O'Heefe. The enemy 
is in large force in my front, in two lines of battle stretching across the valley, 
and a large column of ai'tillery and infantry on the right of the valley looking 
towards Harper's Ferry. They outnumber me two to one. It will of course 
not answer to pursue the enemy under these circumstances. I shall commu- 
nicate with Burnside as soon as possible. In the mean time I shall wait here 
until I learn what is the proi^pect of re-enforcement. I have not the force to 
justify an attack on the force I see in front. I have had a very close vi t o 
it, and its position is very strong. 
" Respectfully, 

"W. B. FRANKLIN, 

" Major General. 
"General G. B. McClellan, Commanding." 

Colonel Miles surrendered Harper's Feny at 8 a. m. on the 15th, as the ces- 
sation of the firing indicated, and Geuer; \ Franklin was ordered to remain 
where he was to watch the large force in fr nt of him, and protect our left and 
rear until the night of the 16th, when he av s ordered to join the main body of 
the army at Keedysville, after sending Co h's division to Maryland heights. 
While the events which have just been de ribed were taking place at Cramp- 
ton's gap the troops of the centre and right ing, which had united at Frederick 
on the 13th, were engaged in the contest fo. the possession of Turner's gap. 

On the morning of the 13th General Pleasonton was ordered to send Mc- 
Reynolds's brigade and a section of artillery in the direction of Gettysburg, 
and Rush's regiment towards Jefferson to communicate with Franklin, to whom 
the 6th United States cavalry and a section of artillery had previously been 
sent, and to proceed with the remainder of his force in the direction of Middle- 
town in pursuit of the enemy. 

After skirmishing with the enemy all the morning, and driving them from sev- 
eral strong positions, he reached Turner's gap of the South mountain in the after- 
noon, and found the enemy in force and apparently determined to defend the 
pass. He sent back for infantry to General Burnside, who had been directed to 
support him, and proceeded to make a reconnoissance of the position. 

The South mountain is at this point about one thousand feet in height, and its 
general direction is from northeast to southwest. The national road from Fred- 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 195 

erick to Hagerstown crosses it nearly at right angles tlirongh Turner's gap, a 
depression which is some four hundred feet in depth. 

The mountain on the north side of the turnpike is divided into two crests, or 
ridges, by a narrow valley, which, though deep at the pass, becomes a slight 
depression at about a mile to the north. There are two country roads, one to 
the right of the turnpike and the other to the left, which give access to the crests 
overlooking the main road. The one on the left, called the "Old Sharpsburg 
road," is nearly parallel to and about half a mile distant from the turnpike, until 
it reaches the crest of the mountain, when it bends off to the left. The other 
road, called the "Old Hagerstown road," passes up a ravine in the mountains 
about a mile from the turnpike, and bending to the left over and along the first 
crest, enters the turnpike at the Mountain House, near the summit of the pass. 

On the night of the 13th the positions of the diffei'ent corps were as follows : 

Reno's corps at Middletown, except Redman's division at Frederick. 

Hooker's corps on the Monocacy, two miles from Frederick. 

Sumner's corps near Frederick. 

Banks's corps near Frederick. 

Sykes's division near Frederick. 

Franklin's corps at Buckeystown. 

Couch's division at Licksville. 

The orders from headquarters for the march on the 14th were as follows : 

13th, 11.30 p. m. — Hooker to march at daylight to Middletown. 

13th, 11.30 p. m. — Sykes to move at 6 a. m. after Hooker, on the Middletown 
and Hagerstown road. 

14th, 1 a. m. — Artillery reserve to follow Sykes closely. 

13th, 8.45 p. m. — Turner to move at 7 a. m. 

14th, 9 a. m. — Sumner ordered to take the Shookstown road to Middletown. 

13th, 6.45 p. m. — Couch ordered to move to Jefferson with his whole division. 

On the 14tli General Pleasonton continued his reconnoissance. Gibson's bat- 
tery and afterwards Benjamin's battery (of Reno's corps) were placed on high 
ground to the left of the turnpike, and obtained a direct fire on the enemy's 
position in the gap. 

General Cox's division, which had been ordered up to support General Pleas- 
onton, left its bivouac, near Middletown, at 6 a. m. The 1st biigadc reached 
the scene of action about 9 a. m., and was sent up the old Sharpsburg road by 
General Pleasonton to feel the enem''' and ascertain if he held the crest on that 
side in strong force. This was soo found to be the case; and General Cox 
having arrived with the other brig^ le, and information having been received 
from General Reno that the column ould be supported by the whole corps, the 
division was ordered to assault the ] osition. Two 20-pounder Parrotts of Sim- 
mons's battery and two sections of LcMullan's batteiy were left in the rear in 
position near the turnpike, where th:y did good service during the day against 
the enemy's batteries in the gap. Colonel Scammon's brigade was deployed, 
and, well covered by skirmishers, moved up the slope to the left of the road v/ith 
the object of turning the enemy's right, if possible. It succeeded in gaining 
the crest and establishing itself there, in spite of the vigorous efforts of the 
enemy, Avho was posted behind stone walls and in the edges of timber, and the 
fire of a battery which poured in canister and case shot on the regiment on the 
right of the brigade. Colonel Crooke's brigade marched in columns at support- 
ing distance. A section of McMullan's battery, under Lieutenant Croome, 
(killed while serving one of his guns,) was moved up with great difficulty, and 
opened Avith canister at very short range on the enemy's infantry, by whom 
(after having done considerable execution) it was soon silenced and forced to 
withdraw. 

One regiment of Crook's brigade was now deployed on Scammon's left, and 



196 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

the otlier two in liis rear, and they several times entered the first line and re- 
lieved the regiments in front of them when hard pressed. A section of Sum- 
ner's battery was brought up and placed in the open space in the woods, wher6 
it did good service during the rest of the day. 

The enemy several times attempted to retake the crest, advancing with bold- 
ness, but Avere each time repulsed. They then withdrew their battery to a point 
more to the right, and formed columns on both our flanks. It was now about noon, 
and a lull occurred in the contest which lasted about two hours, during which 
the rest of the corps was coming up. General Wilcox's division was the first 
to arrive. "When he reached the base of the mountain. General Cox advised 
him to consult General Pleasonton as to a position. The latter indicated that 
on the right, afterwards taken up by General Hooker. General Wilcox waa 
in the act of moving to occupy this ground, when he received an order from 
General Reno to move up the old Sharpsburg road and take a position to its 
right, overlooking the turnpike. Two regiments were detached to support 
General Cox, at his request. One section of Cooke's battery was placed in po- 
sition near the turn of the road, (on the crest,) and opened fire on the enemy's 
batteries across the gap. The division was proceeding to deploy to the right 
of the road, when the enemy suddenly opened (at one hundred and fifty yards) 
with a battery which enfiladed the road at this point, drove off Cook's cannon- 
eers Avith their limbers, and caused a temporary panic in which the guns Avere 
nearly lost. But the 79th New York and 17th Michigan promptly rallied, 
changed front under a heavy fire, and moved out to protect the guns with which 
Captain Cook had remained. Order was soon restored, and the division formed 
in line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed as much as possible under 
the hillside until the whole line advanced. It Avas exposed not only to the fire 
of the battery in front, but also to that of the batteries on the other side of the 
turnpike, and lost heavily. 

Shortly before this time Generals Burnside and Reno arrived at the base of 
the mountain ; and the former directed the latter to move up the divisions of 
Generals Sturgis and Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Wilcox, and to 
move upon the enemy's position with his Avhole force as soon as he Avas in- 
formed that General Hooker (Avho had just been directed to attack on the 
right) was well advanced up the mountain. 

General Reno then went to the front and assumad the direction of affsiirs, the 
positions having been explained to him by General Pleasonton. Shortly be- 
fore this time I arrived at the point oc( upied by General Burnside, and my 
headquarters Avere located there until the conclusion of the action. General 
Sturgis had left his camp at 1 p. m., and reached the scene of action about 3^ 
p. m. Clark's battery, of his division, Avas sent to assist Cox's left, by order 
of General Reno, and tAvo regiments (2d Maryland and 6th New Hampshire) 
were detached by General Reno and sent fovAvard a short distance on the left 
of the turnpike. His division was formed in rear of Wilcox's, and Rodman's 
division was divided ; Colonel Fairchilds's brigade being placed on the extreme 
left, and Colonel Harland's, under General Rodman's personal supervision, on 
the right. 

My order to move the whole line forward and take or silence the enemy's 
batteries in front was executed with enthusiasm. The enemy made a desperate 
resistance, charging our advancing Hues Avith fierceness, but they were every- 
where routed and fled. 

Our chief loss was in Wilcox's division. The enemy's battery was found 
to be across a gorge and beyond the reach of our infantry ; but its position 
was made untenable, and it Avas hastily removed and not again put in position 
near us. But the batteries across the gap still kept up a fire of shot and shell. 

General Wilcox praises very highly the conduct of the 17th Michigan in this 
advance — a regiment which had been organized scarcely a month, but which 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B m'cLELLAN. 197 

charged the advancing enemy in flank in a manner worthy of veteran troops ; 
and also that of the 45th Pennsylvania, which bravely met them in front. 

Cook's battery now reopened fire. Sturgis's division was moved to the front 
of Wilcox's, occupying the new ground gained on the further side of the slope, 
and his artillery opened on the batteries across the gap. The enemy made an 
effort to turn our left about dark, but were repulsed by Fairchilds's brigade and 
Clark's battery. 

At about 7 o'clock the enemy made another effort to regain the lost ground, 
attacking along Sturgis's front and part of Cox's. A lively fire was kept up 
until nearly 9 o'clock, several charges being made by the enemy and repulsed 
with slaughter, and we finally occupied the highest part of the mountain. 

General Reno was killed just before sunset, while making a recouuoissance 
to the front, and the command of the corps devolved upon Greneral Cox. In 
Greneral Reno the nation lost one of its best general officers. He was a skilful 
soldier, a brave and honest man. 

There was no firing after 10 o'clock, and the troops slept on their arms ready 
to renew the fight at daylight; but the enemy quietly retired from our front 
during the night, abandoning their wounded, and leaving their dead in large 
numbers scattered over the field. While these operations were progressing on 
the left of the main column, the right under General Hooker was actively en- 
gaged. His corps left the Monocacy early in the morning, and its advance 
reached the Catoctin creek about 1 p. m. General Hooker then went forward 
to examine the ground. 

At about 1 o'clock General Meade's division was ordered to make a diversion 
in favor of Reno. The following is the order sent : 

" September 14 — 1 p. m. 

" General: General Reno requests that a division of yours may move up 
on the right (north) of the main road. General McClellan desires you to com- 
ply with this request, holding your whole corps in readiness to support the 
movement, and taking charge of it yourself. 

" Sumner's and Banks's corps have commenced arriving. Let General 
McClellan be informed as soon as you commence your movement. 

"GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 
"Colonel, Assistant Adjutant General, and Aide-de-Camp. 
" Major General Hooker." 

Meade's division left Catoctin creek about two o'clock, and turned off to the 
right from the main road on the old Hagerstown road to Mount Tabor church, 
where General Hooker was, and deployed a short distance in advance, its right 
resting about one and a half mile from the turnpike. The enemy fired a few 
shots from a battery on the mountain side, but did no considerable damage. 
Cooper's battery "B," 1st Pennsylvania artillery, was placed in position on high 
ground at about three and a half o'clock, and fired at the enemy on the slope, 
but soon ceased by order of General Hooker, and the position of our lines pre- 
vented any further use of artillery by us on this part of the field. The first 
Massachusetts cavalry was sent up the valley to the right to observe the move- 
ments, if any, of the enemy in that direction, and one regiment of Meade's 
division was posted to watch a road coming in the same direction. The other 
divisions were deployed as they came up. General Hatch's on the left, and 
General Ricketts's, which arrived at 5 p. m., in the rear. General Gibbon's 
brigade was detached from Hatch's division by General Burnside, for the 
purpose of making a demonstration on the enemy's centre, up the main road, 
as soon as the movements on the right and left had sufficiently progressed. 
The 1st Pennsylvania rifles of General Seymour's brigade were sent forward 
as skirmishers to feel the enemy, and it was found that he was in force. Meade 
was then directed to advance his division to the right of the road, so as to out- 



198 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

flank them if possible, and then to move forward and attack, while Hatch was 
directed to take with his division the crest on the left of the old Hagerstown 
road, Ricketts's division being held in reserve. Seymo^^r's brigade was sent up 
to the top of the slope, on the right of the ravine through which the road runs; 
and then moved along the summit parallel to the road, while Colonel Gal- 
lagher's and Colonel Magilton's brigades moved in the same direction along the 
slope and in the ravine. 

The ground was of the most difficult character for the movement of troops, 
the hillside being very steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone walls and 
timber. The enemy was very soon encountered, and in a short time the action 
became general along the whole front of the division. The line advanced 
steadily up the mountain side, where the enemy was posted behind trees and 
rocks, from which he was gradually dislodged. During this advance Colonel 
Gallagher, commanding 3d brigade, was severely wounded; and the command 
devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel Robert Anderson. 

General Meade having reason to believe that the enemy were attempting to 
outflank him on his right, applied to General Hooker for re-enforcements. 
General Duryea's brigade of Ricketts's division was ordered up, but it did not 
arrive until the close of the action. It was advanced on Seymour's left, but 
only one regiment could open fire before the enemy retired and darkness inter- 
vened. 

General Meade speaks highly of General Seymour's skill in handling his 
brigade on the extreme right, securing by his manoeuvres the great object of the 
movement, the outflanking of the enemy. 

While General Meade was gallantly driving the enemy on the right. Gen- 
eral Hatch's division was engaged in a severe contest for the possession of the 
crest on the left of the ravine; it moved up the mountain in the following order: 
two regiments of General Patrick's brigade deployed as skirmishers, with the 
other two regiments of the same brigade supporting them ; Colonel Phelps's 
brigade in line of battalions in mass at deploying distance. General Doubleday's 
brigade in the same order bringing up the rear. The 21st New York having 
gone straight up the slope instead of around to the right, as directed, the 2d 
United States sharpshooters was sent out in its place. Phelps's and Doubleday's 
brigades were deployed in turn as they reached the woods, which began about 
half up the mountain. General Patrick with his skirmishers soon drew the 
fire of the enemy, and found him strongly posted behind a fence which bounded 
the cleared space on the top of the ridge, having on his front the woods through 
which our line was advancing, and in his rear a cornfield full of rocky ledges, 
which afforded good cover to fall back to if dislodged. 

Phelps's brigade gallantly advanced, under a hot fire, to close quarters, and 
after ten or fifteen minutes of heavy firing on both sides (in which General 
Hatch was wounded while urging on his men) the fence was earned by a charge, 
and our line advanced a few yaids beyond it, somewhat sheltered by the slope 
of the hill. 

Doubleday's brigade, now under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Hoff- 
man, (Colonel Wainwright having been wounded,) relieved Phelps, and continued 
tiring for an hour and a half; the enemy behind ledges of rocks, some thirty or 
forty paces in our front, making a stubborn resistance, and attempting to charge 
on the least cessation of our fire. About dusk Colonel Christian's brigade of 
Ricketts's division came up and relieved Doubleday's brigade, which fell back 
into line behind Phelps's. Christian's brigade continued the action for thirty or 
forty minutes, when the enemy retired, after having made an attempt to flank 
us on the left, which was repulsed by the 75th New York and 7th Indiana. 

The remaining brigade of Ricketts's division (General nartsuff''s) was moved 
up in the centre, and connected Meade's left with Doubleday's right. We now 
had possession of the summit of the first ridge which commanded the tui'npike 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 199 

on both sides of the mountain, and the troops were ordered to hold their posi- 
tions until further orders, and slept on their arms. Late in the afternoon Gen- 
eral Gibbon, with his brigade and one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, 4th artil- 
lery,) was ordered to move up the main road on the enemy's centre. He 
advanced a regiment on each side of the road, preceded by skirmishers, and 
followed by the other 'two regiments in double column ; the artillery moving on 
the road until within range of the enemy's guns, which were firing on the col- 
umn from the gorge. 

The brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy from his positions in the 
woods and behind stone walls, until they reached a point Avell up towards the 
top of the pass, when the enemy, having been re-enforced by three regiments, 
opened a heavy fire on the front and on both flanks. The fight continued until 
9 o'clock, the enemy being entirely repulsed ; and the brigade, after having 
suffered severely, and having expended all its ammunition, including even the 
cartridges of the dead and wounded, continued to hold the ground it had so 
gallantly won until 12 o'clock, when it was relieved by General Gorman's brig- 
ade of Sedgwick's division, Sumner's corps, (except the 6th Wisconsin, which 
remained on the field all night.) General Gibbon, in this delicate movement, 
handled his brigade with as much precision and coolness as if upon parade, and 
the bravery of his troops could not be excelled. 

The 2d corps (Sumner's) and the 12th corps (Williams's) reached their final 
positions shortly after dark. General Richardson's division was placed near 
Mount Tabor church, in a position to support our right, if necessary; the 12th 
corps and Sedgwick's division bivouacked around Bolivar, in a position to sup- 
port our centre and left. 

General Sykes's division of regulars and the artillery reserve halted for the 
night at Middletown. Thus, on the night of the 14th the whole army was 
massed in the vicinity of the field of battle, in readiness to renew the action 
the next day, or to move in pursuit of the enemy. At daylight our skirmishers 
were advanced, and it was found that he had retreated during the night, leaving 
his dead on the field, and his wounded uncared for. 

About fifteen hundred prisoners were taken by us during the battle, and the 
loss to the enemy in killed was much greater than our own, and, probably, also 
in wounded. It is believed that the force opposed to us at Turner's gap con- 
sisted of D. H. Hill's corps, (15,000,) and a part, if not the whole, of Long- 
street's, and perhaps a portion of Jackson's, probably some 30,000 in all. 

We went into action with about 30,000 men, and our losses amounted to 
1,568 aggregate, (312 killed, 1,234 wounded, and 22 missing.) 

On the next day I had the honor to receive the following very kind despatch 
from his excellency the President : 

"War Department, 
" Washington, September 15, 1862 — 2.45 p. m. 

" Tour despatch of to-day received. God bless you, and all with you ; de- 
stroy the rebel army if possible. 

"A. LINCOLN. 
"Major General McOlellan." 



ANTIETAM. 



On the night of the battle of South Mountain, orders were given to the corps 
commanders to press forward the pickets at early dawn. This advance revealed 
the fact that the enemy had left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was or- 
dered : the cavalry, under General Pleasonton, and the three corps under Gen- 
erals Sumner, Hooker, and Mansfield, (the latter of whom had arrived that morn- 
ing and assumed command of the 12th, Williams's corps,) by the national turn- 



200 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

pike and Boonsboro' ; the corps of Generals Burnsicle and Porter (the latter 
command at that time consisting of but one weak division, Sjkes's) by the old 
Sharpsburg road, and General Franklin to move into Pleasant valley, occupy 
Rohrersville by a detachment, and endeavor to relieve Harper's Ferry. 

Generals Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from Boonsboro' to 
Rohrersville to re-enforce Franklin, or to move on Sharpsburg, according to cir- 
cumstances. 

Franklin moved towards Brownsville and found there a force of the enemy, 
much superior in numbers to his own, drawn up in a strong position to receive 
him. At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's Ferry indicated the sur- 
render of that place. 

The cavalry overtook the enemy's cavalry in Boonsboro', made a daring 
charge, killing and wounding a number, and capturing 250 prisoners and two 
guns. 

General Richardson's division of the 2d corps pressing the rear guard of the 
enemy with vigor, passed Boonsboro' and Kecdysville, and came upon the main 
body of the enemy, occupying in large force a strong position a few miles beyond 
the latter place. 

It had been hoped to engage the enemy during the 15th. Accordingly, instruc- 
tions were given that if the enemy were oVertaken on the march they should 
be attacked at once; if found in heavy force and in position, the corps in ad- 
vance should be placed in position for attack, and await my arrival. On reach- 
ing the advanced position of our troops, I found but two divisions, Richardson's 
and Sykes's, in position; the other troops were halted in the road; the head 
of the column some distance in rear of Richardson. 

The enemy occupied a strong position on the heights, on the west side of 
Antietam creek, displaying a large force of infantry and cavalry, with numer- 
ous batteries of artillery, which opened on our columns as they appeared in 
sight on the Keedysville road and Sharpsburg turnpike, which fire was returned 
by Captain Tidball's light battery, 2d United States artillery, and Pettit's bat- 
tery, 1st New York artillery. 

The division of General Richardson, following close on the heels of the re- 
treating foe, halted and deployed near Antietam river, on the right of the Sharps- 
burg road. General Sykes, leading on the division, of regulars on the old 
Sharpsburg road, came up and deployed to the left of General Richardson, on 
the left of the road. 

Antietam creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by four stone bridges — the upper 
one on the Keedysville and Williamsport road ; the second on the Keedysville 
and Sharpsburg turnpike, some two and a half miles below ; the third about a 
mile below the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharpsburg road ; and the fourth 
near the mouth of Antietam creek, on the road leading from Harper's Ferry to 
Sharpsburg, some three miles below the third. The stream is sluggish, with 
few and difficult fords. After a rapid examination of the position, I found that 
it was too late to attack that day, and at once directed the placing of the bat- 
teries in position in the centre, and indicated the bivouacs for the different corps, 
massing them near and on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps 
were not all in their positions until the next morning after sunrise. 

On the morning of the 16th, it was discovered that the enemy had changed 
the position of his batteries. The masses of his troops, however, were still 
concealed behind the opposite heights. Their left and centre were upon and in 
front of the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, hidden by woods and irre- 
gularities of the ground ; their extreme left re.-ting upon a wooded eminence 
near the cross-roads to the north of J. Miller's farm ; their left resting upon the 
Potomac. Their line extended south, the right resting upon the hills to the 
south of Sharpsburg, near Shaveley's farm. 

The bridge over the Antietam, described as No. 3, near this point, was 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 201 

strongly covered by riflemen protected by rifle-pits, stone fences, &c., and en- 
filaded by artillery. The ground in front of tbis line consisted of undulating 
hills, their crests in turn commanded by others in their rear. On all favorable 
points the enemy's artillery was posted and their reserves hidden from view by 
the hills, on which their line of battle was formed, could manoeuvre unobserved 
by our army, and from the shortness of their line could rapidly re-enforce any 
point threatened by our attack. Their position, stretching across the angle 
formed by the Potomac and Antietam, their flanks and rear protected by these 
streams, was one of the strongest to be found in this region of country, which is 
well adapted to defensive warfare. 

, On the right, near Keedysville, on both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike, 
were Sumner's and Hooker's corps. In advance, on the right of the turnpike 
and near the Antietam river, General Richardson's division of General Sumner's 
corps was posted. General Sykes's division of General Porter's corps was on 
the left of the turnpike and in line with General Richardson, protecting the 
bridge No, 2, over the Antietam. The left of the line, opposite to and some 
distance from bridge No. 3, was occupied by General Burnside's corps. 

Before giving General Hooker his orders to make the movement which will 
presently be described, I rode to the left of the line to satisfy myself that the 
ti-oops were properly posted there to secure our left flank from any attack made 
along tbe left bank of the Antietam, as well as to enable us to carry bridge 
No. 3. 

I found it necessary to make considerable changes in the position of General 
Burnside's corps, and directed him to advance to a strong position in the im- 
mediate vicinity of the bridge, and to reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge 
carefully. In front of General Sumner's and Hooker's corps, near Keedysville, 
and on the ridge of the first line of hills overlooking the Antietam, and between 
the turnpike and Fry's house on the right of the road, were placed Captain 
Taft's, Langner's, Von Kleizer's and Lieutenant Weaver's batteries of twenty- 
pounder Parrott guns. On the crest of the hill in the rear and right of bridge 
No. 3, Captain Weed's three-inch and Lieutenant Benjamin's twenty-pounder 
batteries. General Franklin's corps and General Couch's division held a posi- 
tion in Pleasant valley, in front of Brownsville, with a strong force of the 
enemy in their front. General Morell's division of Porter's corps was en route 
from Boonsboro', and General Humphrey's division of new troops en route from 
Frederick, Maryland. About daylight on the 16th the enemy opened a heavy 
fire of artillery on our guns in position, which was promptly returned ; their fire 
was silenced for the time, but Avas frequently renewed during the day. In the 
heavy fire of the morning. Major Arndt, commanding first battalion first New 
York artillery, was mortally wounded while directing the operations of his bat- 
teries. 

It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their positions for attack, 
being compelled to spend the morning in reconnoitring the new position taken 
up by the enemy, examining the ground, finding fords, clearing tlie approaches, 
and hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains, Avhich had been delayed by 
the rapid march of the troops over the few practic;ible approaches from Freder- 
ick. These had been crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry and artillery 
pressing on with the hope of overtaking the enemy before he could form to re- 
sist an attack. Many of the troops were out of rations on the previous day, 
and a good deal of their ammunition had been expended in the severe action of 
the 14th. 

My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack the enemy's 
left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's, and if 
necessary by Franklin's ; and, as soon as matters looked favorably there, to 
move the corps of Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridge 
running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having carried their position, 
to press along the crest towards our right j and whenever either of these flank 



202 EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

movements sliould be successful, to advance our centre with all the forces then 
disposable. 

About 2 p. TO. General Hooker, "with his corps, consisting of General Ricketts's, 
Meade's and Doubleday's divisions, was ordered to cross the Antietam at a ford, 
and at bridge No. 1, a short distance above, to attack and, if possible, turn the 
enemy's left. General Sumner was ordered to cross the corps of General Mans- 
field (the 12th) during the night, and hold his own (the 2d) corps ready to cross 
early the next morning. On reaching the vicinity of the enemy's ieft a sharp 
contest commenced Avith the Pennsylvania reserves, the advance of General 
Hooker's corps, near the house of D. Miller. The enemy were driven from the 
strip of woods where he was first met. The firing lasteduntil after dark, when 
General Hooker's corps rested on their arms on ground won from the enemy. 

During the night General Mansfield's corps, consisting of Generals Williams's 
and Green's divisions, crossed the Antietam at the same ford and bridge that 
General Hooker's troops had passed, and bivouacked on the farm of J. PofFen- 
berger, about a mile in rear of General Hooker's position. At daylight on the 
17th the action was commenced by the skirmishers of the Pennsylvania re- 
serves. The whole of General Hooker's corps was soon engaged, and drove the 
enemy from the open field in front of the first line of woods into a second line 
of woods beyond, which runs to the eastward of and nearly parallel to the 
Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike. 

This contest was obstinate, and as the troops advanced the opposition became 
more determined and the number of the enemy greater. General Hooker then 
ordered up the corps of General Mansfield, which moved promptly toward the 
scene of action. 

The first division. General Williams's, was deployed to the right on approach- 
ing the enemy ; General Crawford's brigade on the right, its right resting on 
the Hagerstown turnpike ; on his left General Gordon's brigade. The second 
division, General Green's, joining the left of Gordon's, extended as ftar as the 
burnt buildings to the north and east of the white church on the turnpike. 
During the deployment, that gallant veteran General Mansfield fell mortally 
wounded, while examining the groimd in front of his troops. General Hart- 
sufiP, of Hooker's corps, was sever^y Avounded, while bravely pressing forward 
his troops, and was taken from the field. 

The command of the twelfth corps fell upon General Williams. Five regi- 
ments of first division of this corps were new troops. One brigade of the sec- 
ond division was sent to support General Doubleday. 

The one hundred and twenty-fourth Pennsylvania volunteers were pushed 
across the turnpike into the woods beyond J. Miller's house, with orders to 
hold the position as long as possible.. 

The line of battle of this corps was formed, and it became engaged about 
seven a. m., the attack being opened by Knapp's (Pennsylvania,) Cothran's 
(New York,) and Hampton's (Pittsburg) batteries. To meet this attack the 
enemy had pushed a strong column of troops into the open fields in front of the 
turnpike, while he occupied the woods on the west of the turnpike in strong 
force. The woods (as was found by subsequent observation) were traversed by 
outcropping ledges of rock. Several hundred yards to the right ard rear was 
a hill which commanded the debouche of the woods, and m the fields between 
was a long line of stone fences, continued by breastworks of rails, which cov- 
ered the enemy's infantry from our musketry. The same woods formed a 
screen behind which his movements were concealed, and his batteries on the hill 
and the rifle works covered from the fire of our artillery in front. 

For about two hours the battle raged with varied success, the enemy en- 
deavoring to drive our troops into the second line of wood, and ours in turn to 
get possession of the line in front. 

Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the enemy back into the woods 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 203 

near the turnpike, General Green with his two brigades crossing into the 
woods to the left of the Dunbar church. Daring this conflict General Craw- 
ford, commanding first division after General Williams took command of the 
corps, was wounded and left the field. 

General Green being much exposed and applying for re-enforcements, the 
thirteenth New Jersey, twenty-seventh Indiana, and the third Maryland were 
sent to his support with a section of Knapp's battery. 

At about nine o'clock a. m. General Sedgwick's division of General Siimner'a 
corps arrived. Crossing the ford previixisly mentioned, this division marched 
in three columns to the support of the attack on the enemy's left. On neap- 
ing the scene of action the columns were halted, faced to the front, and estab- 
lished by General Sumner in three parallel lines by brigade, facing toward 
the south and west ; General Gorman's brigade in front. General Dana's 
second, and General Howard's third, with a distance between the lines of some 
seventy paces. The division was then put in motion and moved upon the field 
of battle, under fire from the enemy's concealed batteries on the hill beyond 
the roads. Passing diagonally to the front across the open space and to the 
front of the first division of General Williams's corps, this latter division with- 
drew. 

Entering the woods on the west of the turnpike, and driving the enemy be- 
fore them, the first line was met by a heavy fire of musketry and shell from 
the eneyny's breastworks and the batteries on the hill commanding the exit from 
the woods ; meantime a heavy column of the enemy had succeeded in crowd- 
ing back the troops of General Green's division, and appeared in rear of the left 
of Sedgwick's division. By command of General Sumner, General Howard 
faced the third line to the rear preparatory to a change of front to meet the 
column advancing on the left ; but this line now suffering from a destructive 
fire both in front and on its left, which it was unable to return, gave way to- 
wards the right and rear in considerable confusion, and was soon followed by 
the first and second lines. 

General Gorman's brigade, and one regiment of General Dana's, soon rallied 
and checked the advance of the enemy on the right. The second and third 
lines now formed on the left of General Gorman's brigade, and poured a destruc- 
tive fire upon the enemy. 

During General Sumner's attack, he ordered General Williams to support 
him. Brigadier General Gordon, with a portion of his brigade, moved forward, 
but when he reached the woods, the left of General Sedgwick's division had 
given way; and finding himself, as the smoke cleared up, opposed to the enemy 
in force with his small command, he withdrew to the rear of the batteries at the 
second line of woods. As General Gordon's troops unmasked our batteries on 
the left, they opened with canister; the batteries of Captain Cothran, 1st New 
York, and I, 1st artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Woodruff, doing good ser- 
vice. Unable to withstand this deadly fire in front and the musketiy fire from 
the right, the enemy again sought shelter in the woods and rocks beyond the 
turnpike. 

During this assault Generals Sedgwick and Dana were seriously wounded and 
taken from the field. General Sedgwick, though twice wounded, and faint from 
loss of blood, retained command of his division for more than an hour after his 
first wound, animating his command by his presence. 

About the time of General Sedgwick's advance. General Hooker, while urg- 
ing on his commiiud, was severely wounded in the foot and taken from the field, 
and General Meade was placed in command of his corps. General Howard as- 
sumed command after General Sedgwick retired. 

The repulse of the enemy oifered opportunity to rearrange the lines and re- 
organize the commands on the right, now more or less in confusion. The bat- 
teries of the Pennsylvania reserve, on high ground, near J. Poffenberger's house. 



204 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

opened fire, and checked several attempts of the enemy to establish batteries n 
front of our right, to turn that flank and enfilade the lines. 

While the conflict was so obstinately raging on the right, General French was 
purJiing his division against the enemy still further to the left. This division 
crossed the Antietam at the same ford as General Sedgwick, and immediately 
in his rear. Passing over the stream in three columns, the division marched 
about a mile from the ford, then facing to the left, moved in three lines towards 
the enemy : General Max Weber's brigade in front ; Colonel Dwight Morris's 
brigade of raw troops, nndrilled, and moving for the first time under fire, in the 
second, and General Kimball's brigade in the third. The division was first as- 
sailed by a fire of artillery, but steadily advanced, driving in the enemy's skir- 
mishers, and encountered the infantry in some force at the group of houses on 
Roulette's farm. General Weber's brigade gallantly advanced with an un- 
wavering front and drove the enemy from tlieir position about the houses. 

While General Weber was hotly engaged with the first line of the enemy, 
General French received orders from General Sumuer, his corps commander, to 
push on with renewed vigor to make a diversion in favor of the attack on the 
right. Leaving the new troops, who had been thrown into some confusion from 
their march through cornfields, over fences, &c., to form as a reserve, he ordered 
the brigade of General Kimball to the front, passing to the left of General 
Weber. The enemy was pressed back to near the crest of the hill, where he 
was encountered in greater strength posted in a sunken road forming a natural 
rifle-pit running in a northwesterly direction. In a cornfield in rear of this 
road were also strong bodies of the enemy. As the line reached the crest of 
the hill a galling fii-e was opened on it from the sunken road and cornfield. 
Here a tei-rific fire of musketry burst from both lines, and the battle raged along 
the whole line with great slaughter. 

The enemy attempted to turn the left of the line, but were met by the 7tli 
Virginia and 132d Pennsylvania volunteers and repulsed. Foiled in this, the 
enemy made a determined assault on the front, but were met by a charge from 
our lines which drove them back with severe loss, leaving in our hands some 
tJiree hundred prisoners and several stand of colors. The enemy having been 
repulsed by the terrible execution of the batteries and the musketiy fire on the 
extreme right, now attempted to assist the attack on General French's division 
by assailing him on his right and endeavoring to turn this flank, but this attack 
was met and checked by the 14th Indiana and 8th Ohio volunteers, and by 
canister from Captain Tompkins's battery, 1st Rhode Island artillery. Having 
been under an almost continuous fire for nearly four hours, and the ammunition 
nearly expended, this division now took position immediately below the crest of 
tlie heights on which they had so gallantly fought, the enemy making no at- 
tempt to regain their lost ground. 

On the left of General French, General Richardson's division was hotly en- 
gaged. Having crossed the Antietam about 9.30 a. m. at the ford crossed by 
the other divisions of Sumner's corps, it moved on a line nearly parallel to the 
Antietam, and formed in a ravine behind the high grounds overlooking Roulette's 
house; the 2d (Irish) brigade, commanded by General Meagher, on the right; 
the 3d brigade, commanded by General Caldwell, on his left, and the brigade 
commanded by Colonel Brooks, 53d Pennsylvania volunteers, in support. As 
the division moved forward to take its position on the field, the enemy directed 
a fire of artillery against it, but owing to the irregularities of the ground did 
but little damage. 

Meagher's brigade advancing steadily soon became engaged with the enemy 
posted to the left and in front of Roulette's house. It continued to advance un- 
der a heavy fire nearly to the crest of the hill overlooking Piper's house, the 
enemy being posted in a continuation of the sunken road and cornfield before 



REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 205 

referred to. Here tbe brave Irish brigade opened upon the enemy a terrific 
musketry fire. 

All of General Sumner's corps was now engaged : General Sedgwick on the 
right; General French in the centre, and General Richard.son on the left. The 
Irish brigade sustained its well-earned reputation. After suffering terribly in 
officers and men, and strewing the ground with their enemies as they drove them 
back, their ammunition nearly expended, and their commander. General Meagher, 
disabled by the fall of his horse shot under him, this brigade was ordered to 
give place to General Caldwell's brigade, which advanced to a short distance in 
its rear. The lines were passed by the Irish brigade breaking by company to 
the rear, and General Caldwell's by company to the front as steadily as on drill. 
Colonel Brooks's brigade now became the second line. 

The ground over which General Richardson's and French's divisions were 
fighting was veiy irregular, intersected by numerous ravines, hills covered with 
growing corn, enclosed by stone walls, behind which the enemy could advance 
unobserved upon any exposed point of our lines. Taking advantage of this, 
tlie enemy attempted to gain the right of Richardson's position in a cornfield 
near Roulette's house, where the division had become separated from that of 
General French's. A change of front by the 52d New York and 2d Delaware 
volunteers, of Colonel Brooks's brigade, under Colonel Frank, and the attack 
made by the 53d Pennsylvania volunteers, sent further to the right by Colonel 
Brooks to close this gap in the line, and the movement of the 132d Pennsyl- 
vania and 7th Virginia volunteers of General French's division, before referred 
to, drove the enemy from the cornfield and restored the line. 

The brigade of General Caldwell, with determined gallantry, pushed the 
enemy back opposite the left and centre of this division, but sheltered in the 
sunken road, they still held our forces on the right of Caldwell in check. Col- 
onel Barlow, commanding the 61st and 64th New York regiments of Caldwell's 
brigade, seeing a favorable opportunity, advanced the regiments on the left, taking 
the line in the sunken road in flank, and compelled them to surrender, capturing 
over three hundred prisoners and three stands of colors. 

The whole of the brigade, with the 57th and 66th New York regiments of 
Colonel Brooks's brigade, Avho had moved these regiments into the first line, now 
advanced with gallantry, driving tbe enemy before them in confusion into the 
cornfield beyond the sunken road. The left of the division was now well ad- 
vanced, when the enemy, concealed by an intervening ridge, endeavored to turn 
its left and rear. 

Colonel Cross, 5th New Hampshire, by a change of front to the left and rear, 
brought Lis regiment facing the advancing line. Here a spirited contest arose 
to gain a c(tmmanding height, the two opposing forces moving parallel to each 
other, giving and receiving fire. The 5th gaining the advantage, faced to the 
right and delivered its volley. The enemy staggered, but rallied and advanced 
desperately at a charge. Being re-enforced by the 81st Pennsylvania, these 
regiments met the advance by a counter charge. The enemy fled, leaving many 
killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the colors of the 4th North Carolina, in our 
hands. 

Another column of the enemy, advancing under shelter of a stone wall and 
cornfield, pressed down on the right of the division ; but Colonel Barlow again 
advanced the 61st and 64th New York against these troops, and with the attack 
of Kimball's brigade on the right, drove them from this position. 

Our troops on the left of this part of the line having driven the enemy far 
back, they, with re-enforced numbers, made a determined attack directly in 
front. To meet this. Colonel Barlow brought his two regiments to their position 
in line, and drove the enemy through the cornfield into the orchard beyond, 
under a heavy fire of musketry, and a fire of canister from two pieces of artil- 
lery in the orchard, and a battery further to the right, throwing shell and case 



206 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

shot. This advance gave us possession of Piper's house, the strong point con- 
tended for by the enemy at this part of the line, it being a defensible building 
several hundred yards in advance of the sunken road. The musketry fire at 
this point of the line now ceased. Holding Piper's house. General Richardson 
withdrew the line a little way to the crest of a hill, a more advantageous posi- 
tion. Up to this time the division was without artillery, and in the new position 
suifered severely from artillery fire which could not be replied to. A section of 
Robertson's horse battery, commanded by Lieutenant Vincent, 2d artillery, now 
arrived on the ground and did excellent service. Subsequently a battery of 
brass guns, commanded by Captain Graham, 1st artillery, arrived, and was 
jjosted on the crest of the hill, and soon silenced the two guns in the orchard. 
A heavy fire soon ensued between the battery further to the right and our own. 
Captain Graham's battery was bravely and skilfully served, but unable to reach 
the enemy, who had rifled guns of greater range than our smooth-bores, retired 
by order of General Richardson, to save it from useless sacrifice of men and 
hoi'ses. The brave general was himself mortally wounded while personally 
directing its fire. 

General Hancock was placed in command of the division after the fall of 
General Richardson. General Meagher's brigade, now commanded by Colonel 
Burke, of the 63d New York, having refilled their cartridge-boxes, was again 
ordered forward, and took position in the centre of the line. The division now 
occupied one line in close proximity to the enemy, who had taken ^^p a position 
in the i-ear of Piper's house. Colonel D wight Morris, with the 14th Connecticut 
and a detachment of the lOSth New York, of General French's division, was sent 
by General French to the support of General Richardson's division. This com- 
mand was now placed in an interval in the line between General Caldwell's 
aud the Irish brigades. 

The requirements of the extended line of battle had so engaged the artillery 
that the application of General Hancock for artillery for the division could not 
be comphed with immediately by the chief of artillery or the corps commanders 
in his vicinity. Knowing the tried courage of the troops. General Hancock felt 
confident that he could hold his position, although suffering from the enemy's 
artillery, but was too weak to attack, as the great length of the line he was 
obliged to hold prevented him from forming more than one line of battle, and, 
from his advanced position, this line was already partly enfiladed by the batteries 
of the enemy on the right, which were protected from our batteries opposite 
them by the woods at the Dunker church. 

Seeing i body of the enemy advancing on some of our troops to the left of 
his positica. General Hancock obtained Hexamer's battery from General Frank- 
lin's corps, which assisted materially in frustrating this attack. It also assisted 
the attack of the 7th Maine, of Franklin's corps, which, without other aid, 
made an attack against the enemy's line, and drove in skirmishers Avho were 
annoying our artillery and troops on the right. Lieutenant AVoodruff, with 
battery I, 2d artillery, relieved Captain Hexamer, whoso ammunition was 
expended. The enemy at one time seemed to be about making an attack in 
force upon this part of the line, and advanced a long column of infantry towards 
this division; but on nearing the position. General Pleasonton opening on them 
with sixteen guns, they halted, gave a desultory fire, and retreated, closing 
the operations on this portion of the field. I return to the incidents occurring 
still further to the right. 

Between 12 and 1 p. m. General Franklin's corps arrived on the field of 
battle, haWng left their camp near Crampton's pass at 6 a. m., leaving General 
Couch with orders to move with his division to occupy Maryland heights. 
General Smith's division led the column, followed by General Slocum's. 

It was first intended to keep this corps in reserve on the east side of the 
Autietam, to operate on either flank or on the centre, as circumstances might 



REPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'CLELLAN. 207 

require; but on nearing Keedysville, the strong opposition on the right, 
developed by the attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it necessary at once 
to send this corps to the assistance of the right wing. 

On nearing the field, hearing that one of our batteries, (A,) 4th United 
States artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Thomas, who occupied the same 
position as Lieutenant Woodruff's battery in the morning, was hotly engaged 
without supports, General Smith sent two regiments to its relief from General 
Hancock's brigade. On inspecting the ground, General Smith ordered the 
other regiments of Hancock's brigade, with Frank's and Cowen's batteries, 1st. 
New York artillery, to the threatened position. Lieutenant Thomas and Cap 
tain Cothran, commanding batteries, bravely held their positions against th^ 
advancing enemy, handling their batteries with skill. 

Finding the enemy still advancing, the 3d brigade, of Smith's division, com- 
manded by Colonel Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania volunteers, was ordered up, and 
passed through Lieutenant Thomas's battery, charged upon the enemy, and 
drove back the advance until abreast of the Dunker church. As the right of the 
brigade came opposite the woods it received a destructive fire, which checked 
the advance and threw the brigade somewhat into confusion. It formed again 
behind a rise of ground in the open space in advance of the batteries. 

General French having reported to General Franklin that his ammunition 
was nearly expended, that officer ordered General Brooks, with his brigade, to 
re-enforce him. General Brooks formed his brigade on the right of General 
French, where they remained during the remainder of the day and night, fre- 
quently under the fire of the enemy's artillery. 

It was soon after the brigade of Colonel Irwin had fallen back behind the 
rise of ground that the 7th Maine, by order of Colonel Irwin, made the gallant 
attack already refen-ed to. 

The advance of General Franklin's corps was opportune. The attack of the 
enemy on this position, but for the timely arrival of his corps, must have been 
disastrous, had it succeeded in piercing the line between Generals Sedgwick's and 
French's divisions. 

General Franklin ordered two brigades of General Slocum's division, General 
Newton's and Colonel Torbert's, to form in column to assault the woods that 
bad been so hotly contested before by Generals Sumner and Hooker. General 
Bartlett's brigade was ordered to form as a reserve. At this time General Sumner, 
having command on the right, directed further offensive operations to be post- 
poned, as the repulse of this, the only remaining corps available for attack, 
would peril the safety of the whole army. 

General Porter's corps, consisting of General Sykes's division of regulars 
and volunteers and General Morell's division of volunteers, occupied a position 
on the east side of Antietam creek, upon the main turnpike leading to Sharps- 
burg, and directly opposite the centre of the enemy's line. This corps filled 
the interval between the right wing and General Burnside's command, and 
guarded the main approach from the enemy's position to our trains of supply. 
It was necessary to watch this part of our line with the utmost vigilance, lest 
the enemy should take advantage of the first exhibition of weakness here to 
push upon us a vigorous assault, for the purpose of piercing our centre and 
turning our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. Once 
having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage to our rear could have met 
with but feeble resistance, as there were no reserves to re-enforce or close up 
the gap. 

Towards the middle of the afternoon, proceeding to the right, I found that 
Sumner's, Hooker's, and Mansfield's corps had met with serious losses. Several 
general officers had been carried from the field severely wounded, and the aspect 
of affairs was anything but promising. At the risk of greatly exposing our 
centre, I ordered two brigades from Porter's corps, the only available troops, to 



208 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

re-enforce the right. Six battalions of Sykes's regulars had been thrown for- 
ward across the Antictam bridge on the main road to attack and drive back the 
enemy's sharpshooters, who were annoying Pleasoutou's horse batteries in 
advance of the bridge; Warren's brigade, of Porter's corps, was detached to 
hold a position on Burnside's right and rear; so that Porter was left at one time 
with only a portion of Sykes's division and one small brigade of Morell's divi- 
sion (bnt little over three thousand men) to hold his important position. 

General Sumner expressed the most decided opinion against another attempt 
during that day to assault the enemy's position in front, as portions of our troops 
were so much scattered and demoralized. In view of these circumstances, after 
making changes in the position of some of the troops, I directed the different 
commanders to hold their positions, and being satisfied that this could be done 
without the assistance of the two brigades from the centre, I countermanded the 
order, which was in course of execution. 

General Slocum's division replaced a portion of General Sumner's troops, and 
positions were selected for batteries in front of the woods. The enemy opened 
several heavy fires of artillery on the position of our troops after this, but our 
batteries soon silenced them. 

On the morning of the 17th General Pleasonton, with his cavalry division 
and the horse batteries, under Captains Robertson, Tidball, and Lieutenant 
Haines, of the 2d artillery, and Captain Gibson, 3d artillery, was ordered to 
advance on the turnpike towards Sharpsburg, across bridge No. 2, and support the 
left of General Sumner's line. The bridge being covered by a fire of artillery 
and sharpshooters, cavalry skirmishers were thrown out, and Captain Tidball's 
battery advanced by piece and drove off the sharpshooters with caiyster suffi- 
ciently to establish the batteries above mentioned, which opened on the enemy 
with effect. The firing was kept up for about two hours, when, the enemy's fire 
slackening, the batteries were relieved by Randall's and Van Reed's batteries, 
United States artillery. About 3 o'clock Tidball, Robertson, and Haines 
returned to their positions on the west of Antietam, Captain Gibson having 
been placed in position on the east side to niard the approaches to the bridge. 
These batteries did good service, concentr ng their fire on the column of the 
enemy about to attack General Hancock', josition, and compelling it to find 
shelter behind the hills in rear. 

General Sykes's division had been in p ion since the 15th, exposed to the 
enemy's artillery and 'sharpshooters. Gen I Morell had come up on the 16th, 
and relieved General Richardson on the r of General Sykes. Continually, 
under the vigilant watch of the enemy, th orps guarded a vital point. 

The position of the batteries under G< * al Pleasonton being one of great 
exposure, the battalion of the 2d and lOl' lited States infantry, under Cap- 
tain Poland, 2d infantry, was sent to his si ort. Subsequently four battalions 
of regular infantiy, under Captain Dryer, 4t >, I'fantry, were sent across to assist 
in driving off the sharpshooters of the eneni, ; 

The battalion of the 2d and 1 0th infantry,- ilvancing far beyond the batteries, 
compelled the cannoneers of a battery of ti < enemy to abandon their guns. 
Few in numbers, and unsupported, they were unable to bring them ofi:". The 
heavy loss of this small body of men attests their gallantry. 

The troops of General Burnside held the left of the line opposite bridge No. 
3. The attack on the right Avas to have been supported by an attack on the 
left. Preparatory to this attack, on the evening of the 16th, General Burn- 
side's corps was moved forAvard and to the left, and took up a position nearer the 
bridge. 

I visited General Burnside's position on the 16th, and after pointing out to 
him the proper dispositions to be made of his troops during the day and night, 
informed him that he would probably be required to attack the enemy's right 
on the foUuwing moruir-g, and directed him to make careful recouuoissances. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN.. 209 

General Burnside's corps, consiptinf? of the divisions of Generals Cox, Wil- 
cox, Rodman, and Stixrgis, was posted as follows : Colonel Brooks's brigade, 
Cox's divijiou, on the right, General Sturgis's division immediately in rear. On 
the left was General Rodman's division, with General Scammon's brigade, Cox's 
division, in support. 

General Wilcox's division was held in reserve. 
The corps bivouacked in position on the night of the 16th. 
Early on the morning of the 17th I ordered General Burnside to form his 
troops, and hold them in readiness to assault the bridge in his front, and to 
await further orders. 

At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wilson, topographical 
engineers, to carry the bridge, then to gain possession of the heights beyond, 
and to advance along their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear. 

After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, J despatched an aid to 
ascertain what had been done. The aid returned with the infornifition that but 
little progress had been made. I then sent him back with an order to General 
Burnside to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at all hazards. The aid,re- 
turned to me a second time with the report that the bridge was still in the pos- 
session of the enemy. Whereupon 1 directed Colonel Sackett, inspector gen- 
eral, to deliver to General Burnside my positive order to push forward his troops 
without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge at the point of 
the bayonet ; and I ordered Colonel Sackett to remain with General Burnside 
and see that the order was executed promptly. 

After these three hours' delay, the bridge was carried at one o'clock by a 
brilliant charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania volunteers. 
Other troops were then thrown over, and the opposite bank occupied, the enemy 
retreating to the heights beyond. 

A halt was then made by General Burnside's advance until 3 p. m., upon 
hearing Avhich, I directed one of my aids. Colonel Key, to inform General 
Burnside that I desired him to push forward his troops with the utmost vigor, 
and carry the enemy's position on t.' -heights ; that the movement was vital to 
our success ; that this was a time i -^n we must not stop for loss of life, if a 
great object could thereby be accoU; -ished. That if, in his judgment, his at- 
tack would fail, to inform me so at <;e, that his troops might be withdrawn and 
used elsewhere on the field. He r< ■ «d that he would soon advance, and would 
go up the hill as for as a battery o^ 'e enemy on the left would permit. Up- 
on this report, I again immediately 't Colonel Key to General Burnside with 
orders to advance at once, if possil- o flank the battery, or storm it and carry 
the'heights ; repeating that if he c-'t dered the movement impracticable, to in- 
form me so, that his troops might ' • 3called. The advance was then gallantly 
resumed, the enemy driven from t^^', uns, the heights handsomely carried, and 
a portion of the troops even ref^iv'H the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this 
time it was nearly dark, and stron; l;i3-enforcements just then reaching the ene- 
my from Harper's Ferry, attacked 'General Burnside's troops on their left flank, 
and forced them to retire to a lowf^f^line of hills nearer the bridge. 

If this important movement had been consummated two hours earlier, a posi- 
tion would have been secured upon the heights, from which our batteries might 
have enfihided the greater part of the enemy's line, and turned their right and 
rear; our victory might thus have been much more decisive. 

The following is the substance of General Burnside's operations as given in 
his report : 

Colonel Crook's brigade was ordered to storm the bridge. This bridge. No. 
3, is a stone structm-e of three arches with stone parapets. The banks of the 
stream on the opposite side are precipitous, and command the eastern approaches 
to the bridge. On the hill-side, immediately by the bridge, was a stone fence 
running parallel to the stream ; the turns of the roadway, as it wound up the 

H. Ex. Doc. 15 14 



210 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B, m'cLELLAN. 

hill, were covered by rifle-pits and breastworks of rails, &c. These works, 
and the woods that covered the slopes, were filled with the enemy's riflemen, 
and batteries were in position to enfilade the bridge and its approaches. 

General Eodman was ordered to cross the ford below the bridge. From Col- 
onel Crook's position it was found impossible to carry the bridge. 

General Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from his division for that pur- 
pose. He sent forward the 2d Maryland and the 6th New Hampshire. These 
regiments made several successive attacks iu the most gallant style, but were 
driven back. 

The artillery on the left were ordered to concentrate their fire on the woods 
above .the bridge. Colonel Crook brought a section of Captain Simmons's bat- 
tery to a position to command the bridge. The 51st New York and 51st Penn- 
sylvania were then ordered to assault the bridge. Taking advantage of a small 
spur of the hills which ran parallel to the river, they moved towards the bridge. 
From the crest of this spur they rushed with bayonets fixed and cleared the 
bridge. 

The division followed the storming party, also the brigade of Colonel Crook's 
as a support. The enemy withdrew to still higher ground, some five or six 
hundred yards beyond, and opened a fire of artillery on the troops in the new 
position on the crest of the hill above the bridge. 

General Rodman's division succeeded in crossing the ford after a sharp fire 
of musketry and artillery, and joined on the left of Sturgis, Scammon's brigade 
crossing as support. General Wilcox's division was ordered across to take 
position on General Sturgis's right. 

These dispositions being completed about 3 o'clock, the command moved for- 
ward, except Sturgis's division, left in reserve. Clark's and Durell's batteries 
accompanied Rodman's division ; Cook's battery with Wilcox's division, and a 
section of Simmons's battery with Colonel Crook's brigade. A section of Sim- 
mons's battery and MuUenburgh's and McMullan's batteries were in position. 
The order for the advance was obeyed by the troops with alacrity. General 
Wilcox's division, with Crook in support, moved up on both sides of the turn- 
pike leading from the bridge to Sharpsburg, General Rodman's division, sup- 
ported by Scammon's brigade, on the left of General Wilcox. The enemy 
retreated before the advance of the troops. The 9th New York, of General 
Rodman's division, captured one of the enemy's batteries and held it for some 
time. As the command was driving the enemy to the main heights on the left 
of the town, the light division of General A. P. Hill arrived upon the field of 
battle from Harper's Ferry, and with a heavy artillery fire made a strong attack 
on the extreme left. To meet this attack the left division diverged from the 
line of march intended, and opened a gap between it and the right. To fill up 
this it was necessary to order the troops from the second line. Dur'ng these 
movements General Rodman was mortally wounded. Colonel Harland's brigade, 
of General Rodman's division, was driven iback. Colonel Scammon's brigade, 
by a change of front to rear on his right flank, saved the left from being driven 
completely in. The fresh troops of the enemy pouring in, and the accumulation 
of artillery against this command, destroyed all hope of its being able to accom- 
plish anything more. 

It was now nearly dark. General Sturgis was ordered forward to support 
the. left. Notwithstanding the hard work in the early part of the day, his 
division moved forward with spirit. With its assistance the enemy were checked 
and held at bay. 

The command was ordered to fall back by General Cox, who commanded on 
the field the troops engaged in this affair beyond the Autietam. The artillery 
had been well served during the day. Night closed the long and desperately 
contested battle of the 17th. Nearly two hundred thousand men and five hun- 
dred pieces of artillery were for fourteen hours engaged in this memorable battle. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 211 

We had attacked the enemy in a position selected by the experienced engineer 
then in person directing their operations. We had driven them from their line 
on one flank, and secured a footing within it on the other. The army of the 
Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident to previous reverses, had 
achieved a victory over an adversary invested with the prestige of recent suc- 
cess. Our soldiers slept that night conquerors on a field won by their valor 
and covei-ed with the dead and wounded of the enemy. 

The night, however, brought with it grave responsibilities. Whether to renew 
the attack on the 18th, or to defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retire- 
ment, was the question before me. 

After a night of anxious deliberation and a full and careful survey of the 
situation and condition of our army, the strength and position of the enemy, I 
concluded that the success of an attack on the 18th was not certain. I am 
aware of the fact that, under ordinary circumstances, a general is expected to 
risk a battle if he has a reasonable prospect of success ; but at this critical 
juncture I should have had a nai-row view of the condition of the country had I 
been Avilling to hazard another battle with less than an absolute assurance of 
success. At that moment — Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland in- 
vaded — the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One battle lost, and 
almost all woulxl have been lost. Lee's army might then have marched as it 
pleased on Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have 
levied its supplies from a fertile and undevastated country ; extorted tribute 
from wealthy and populous cities ; and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was 
there another organized force able to arrest its march. 

The following are among the considerations vt'hicli led me to doubt the cer- 
tainty of success in attacking before the 19tli: 

The troops were greatly overcome by the fatigue and exhaustion attendant 
upon the long continued and severely contested battle of the 17th, together with 
the long day and night marches to which they had been subjected during the 
previous three days. 

The sup|)ly trains were in the rear, and many of the troops had suffered from 
hunger. They required rest and refreshment. 

One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's corps, on the right, had, after 
fighting most valiantly for several hours, been overpowered by numbers, driven 
back in great disorder, and much scattered, so that they were for the time 
somewhat demoralized. 

In Hooker's corps, according to the return made by General Meade, com- 
manding, there were but 6,729 men present on the 18th; whereas, on the 
morning of the 22d, there were 13,09 3- men present for duty in the same corps, 
showing that previous to and during the battle 6,364 men were separated from 
their command. 

General Meade, in an official communication upon this subject, dated Sep- 
tember 18, 1862, says: 

" I enclose a field return of the corps made this afternoon, which I desire you 
will lay before the commanding general. I am satisfied the great reduction in 
the corps since the recent engagements is not due solely to the casualties of 
battle, and that a considerable number of men are still in the rear, some having 
dropped out on the march, and many dispersing and leaving yesterday during 
the fight. I think the efficiency of the corps, so far as it goes, good. To resist 
an attack in our present strong position I think they may be depended on, and I 
hope they will perform duty in case we make an attack, though I do not think 
their morale is as good for an offensive as a defensive movement." 

One division of Sumner's corps had also been overpowered, and was a good 
deal scattered and demoralized. It was not deemed by its corps commander in 
proper condition to attack the enemy vigorously the next day. 



212 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 

Some of the new troops on the left, although many of them fought well during 
the battle, and are entitled to great credit, were, at the close of the action, driven 
back, and their morale impaired. 

On the morning of the ISth General Burnside requested me to send him 
another division to assist in holding his position on the other side of the Antie- 
tam, and to enable him to withdraw his corps if he . should be attacked by 
a superior force. He gave me the impression that if he were attacked again 
that morning he would not be able to make a very vigorous resistance. I visited 
his position early, determined to send General Morell's division to his aid, and 
directed that it should be placed on this side of the Antietam, in order that it 
might cover the retreat of his own corps from the other side of the Antietam, 
should that become necessary, at the same time it was in position to re-enforee 
our centre or right, if that were needed. 

Late in the afternoon I found that, although he had not been attacked, Gen- 
eral Burnside had withdrawn his own corps to this side of the Antietam, and 
sent over Morell's division alone to hold the opposite side. 

A large number of our heaviest and most efficient batteries had consumed all 
their ammunition on the 16th and 17th, and it was impossible to supply them 
until late on the following day. 

Supplies of provisions and forage had to be brought up and issued, and in- 
fantry ammunition distributed. 

Finally, re-enforcements to the number of 14,000 men — to say nothing of 
troops expected from Pennsylvania — had not arrived, but were expected during 
the day. 

The 18th was, therefore, spent in collecting the dispersed, giving rest to the 
fatigued, removing the wounded, bmying the dead, and the necessary prepara- 
tions for a renewal of the battle. 

Of the re-enforcements. Couch's division, marchin."- 
came up into position at a late hour in the morr' 
new troops, in their anxiety to participate in t^ 
they received the order to march from Fred 
on the 17th, pressed forward during the e' 
reached the army during the following 
twenty-three miles after half past f 

were, of course, greatly exhausted, ana nov^^^.v -_. and retresiimeni. Ajaig,^ 
re-enforcements expected from Pennsylvania never arrived. During the 18th 
orders were given for a renewal of the attack at daylight on the 19th. 

On the night of the 18th the eneniy, after passing troops in the latter part of 
the day from the Virginia shore to their position behind Sharpsburg, as seen by 
our officers, suddenly formed the design of abandoning their position, and re- 
treating across the river. As their line was but a short distance from the river, 
the evacuation presented but little difficulty, and was efifected before daylight. 
About 2,700 of the enemy's dead were, under the direction of Major Davis, 
assistant inspector general, counted and buried upon the battle-field of Antietam. 
A portion of their dead had been previously buried by the enemy. This is con- 
clusive evidence that the enemy sustained much greater loss than we. 

Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors. up"w^ards of fifteen thousand stand of small 
arms, and more than six thousand prisoners, were the trophies which attest the 
success of our army in the battles of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and 
Antietam. 

Not a single gun or color was lost by our army during these battles. 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 



213 



Tabular report of casualties in the army of the Potomac in the hattlc of Antie- 
iam on the IQth and 11th of September, 1862. 





General 
officers. 


Other offi- 
cers. 


Elisted men. 


Aggregate. 




Corps and divisions. 


5 


13 

a 
o 


•a 
.2 

1 


■6 

■a 
a 

§ 




a 


a 


12 


a 
§ 


fcO 

a 

'i 


1 

c5 


let corps, Maj. Gen. Hooker: 
















98 

157 

97 


669 

898 
449 


95 

137 

23 


862 


















1 188 


















569 




















Total 














348 


2,016 


255 


2,619 




= 















2d corps, Maj. Geu. Sumner: 


1 
2 
1 


20 


39 


192 
272 


860 
1,577 
1,271 


24 

321 
203 


212 
355 
293 


900 
1,579 
1, 322 


24 

321 
203 


1,136 






2,255 
1,818 






21 


50 






Total 




4 


41 


89 


819 


3,708 


548 


860 


3,801 


548 


5,209 








5tli corps, Maj. Gen. F. J. 
Porter : 
































2 


13 
7 


92 
13 


1 
1 


13 

8 


94 
13 


1 
1 


108 








1 


22 










Total 






1 


2 


20 


105 


2 


21 


107 


2 


130 











5tli corps, Maj.Gen.Frankliu: 










5 
65 


58 
277 


2 
31 


65 


















373 




















Total 






1 








70 


335 


33 


438 


















til corps, Maj. Gen. Bum- 
side: 






2 

7 
8 
5 


20 

29 

40 

7 


44 
121 
212 

33 


264 
493 
743 
145 


7 
20 
70 
23 


46 

128 

220 

38 


284 
522 
783 
152 


7 
20 
70 
23 


337 








670 








1,073 








213 










Total 






22 


96 


410 


1,645 


120 


1 432 


1,741 


120 


2,293 










12th corps, (Gen. Banks,) 
Brig. Gen. Williams com- 
manding: 






9 
6 


35 

26 


151 

107 

1 


827 

481 

15 


54 
30 

1 


160 
113 

1 


862 

507 

15 


54 

30 

1 


1,076 








650 








17 














Total 






15 


61 


259 


1,323 


85 


i 274 


1,384 


1 85 


i 1, 743 


















1 

1 




8 






9 
23 




9 


Brig. General Pleasonton, 










5 


28 








1 














4 


79 


1 249 


:1, 508 


6,789 


755 


2, 010 


9,416 


1 1, Oi-i 


j 12,469 






1 



Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

Camp near Sharpsburg, September 29, 1862. 

Official. 



S. WILLIAMS, 
Assistant Adjutant General. 



An estimate of the forces under the confederate General Lee, made np by di- 
rection of General Banks, from information obtained by the examination of 
prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., previous to the battle of Antietam, is as f illows : 

General J. J. Jackson's corps 24,778 men. 

General James Longstreet's corps 23,342 

General D. H. Hill's 2d division 15.525 " 

General J. E. B. Stuart, cavalry 6,400 " 



214 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

General Ransom's and Jenkins's brigade 3,000 men. 

Forty-six regiments not included in above 18,400 " 

Artillery, estimated at 400 guns 6,000 " 

Total 97,445 " 



These estimates give the actual number of men present and fit for duty. 

Our own forces at the battle of Antietam were as follows : 

1st corps 14,856 men. 

2d corps 18,813 " 

5th corps (one division not arrived) 12,930 '• 

6th corps 12,300 " 

9th corps 13,819 " 

12th corps • 10,126 " 

Cavalry division 4,320 " 

Total in action 87,164 " 

I . . — 

When our cavalry advance reached the river on the morning of the 19th, it 
was discovered that nearly all the enemy's forces had crossed into Virginia 
during the night, their rear escaping under cover of eight batteries, placed in 
strong positions upon the elevated bluffs on the opposite bank. General Porter, 
commanding the 5th corps, ordered a detachment from Griffin's and Barnes's 
brigades, under General Griffin, to cross the river at dark, and carry the enemy's 
batteries. This was gallantly done under the fire of the enemy ; several guns, 
caissons, &c., were taken, and their supports driven back half a mile. 

The information obtained during the progress of this affiiir indicated that the 
mass of the enemy had retreated on the Oharlestown and Martinsburg roads, 
towards Winchester. To verify this, and to ascertain how for the enemy had 
retired. General Porter was authorized to detach from his corps, on the morning 
of the 20th, a reconnoitring party in greater force. This detachment crossed 
the river, and advanced about a mile, when it was attacked by a large. body of 
the enemy lying in ambush in the woods, and driven back across the river with 
considerable loss. This reconnoissance showed that the enemy Avas still in force 
on the Virginia bank of the Potomac, prepared to resist our further advance. 

It was reported to me on the 19th that General Stuart had made his ap- 
pearance at Williamsport with some four thousand cavalry and six pieces of 
artillery, and that ten thousand infimtry were marching on the same point from 
the direction of Winchester. I ordered General Couch to march at once with 
his division, and a part of Pleasonton's cavalry, Avith Franklin's corps, within 
supporting distance, for the purpose of endeavoring to capture this force. General 
Couch made a prompt and rapid march to Williamsport, and attacked the enemy 
vigoroffsly, but they made their escape across the river. 

I despatched the following telegraphic report to the general-in-chief : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potoimac, 

" Sliarpshurg, Scjptemhcr 19, 1862. 

" I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed from the presence 
of the enemy, who has been driven across the Potomac. No fears need now be 
entertained for the safety of Pennsylvania. 1 shall at once occupy Harper's 
Ferry. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
''Major General, Commanding. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

*' Commanding United States Army." 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 215 

On the followiug day I received this telegram : 

"Washington, Septemher 20, 1862 — 2^. m. 
" We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your own movements and 
those of the enemy. This should not be so. You shuuld keep me advised of 
both, so far as you know them. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Major General G. B. McClellan." 

To which I answered as follows : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Near Skarpsburg, SejJtember 20, 1862 — 8 p. m. 

" Your telegram of to-day is received. I telegraphed you yesterday all I 
knew, and had nothing more to inform you of until this evening. Williams's 
corps (Banks's) occupied Maryland heights at 1 p. m. to-day. The rest of the 
army is near here, except Couch's division, which is at this moment engaged 
with the enemy in front of Williamsport ; the enemy is retiring, via Charlestown 
and Martinsburg, on Winchester. He last night reoccupied Williamsport by a 
small force, but will be out of it by morning. I think he has a force of infantry 
near Shepherdstown. 

" I regret that you find it necessary to couch every despatch I have the honor 
to receive from you in a spirit of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found 
leisure to say one word in commendation of the recent achievements of this army, 
or even to allude to them. 

" I have abstained from giving the number of guns, colors, small arms, pris- 
oners, &c., captured, until I could do so with some accuracy. I hope by to- 
morrow evening to be able to give at least an approximate statement. 

"G. B. McOLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding. 

"Major General Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington." 

On the same day I telegraphed as follows : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" September 20, 1862. 

" As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side of the Potomac, must in a great 
measure be dependent for supplies of ammunition and provisions upon Rfchmond, 
I would respectfully suggest that General Banks be directed to send out a cav- 
alry force to cut their supply communication opposite Washington. This would 
seriously embarrass their operations, and will aid this army materially. 

" G. B. McCLELLA:^, 
" Major General, Gommcm,ding. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commanding United States Army." 

Maryland heights were occupied by General Williams's corps on this day, 
and on the 22d General Sumner took possession of Harper's Ferry. 

It will be remembered that at the time I was assigned to the command of the 
forces for the defence of the national capital, on the 2d day of September, 1862, 
the greater part of all the available troops were sufiering under the disheartening 
influences of the serious defeat they had encountered during the brief and unfor- 
tunate campaign of General Pope. Their numbers w(ii-e greatly reduced by 
casualties, their confidence was much shaken, and they had lost something of 
that ''esprit du corps" which is indispensable to the efiiciency of an army 



216 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

Moreover, they had left behind, lost, or worn out, the greatest part of their cloth,- 
iug and camp equipage, which required renewal before thej could be in proper 
coudition to take the field again. 

The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac into Maryland was 
received in Washington on the 4th of September, and the army of the Potomac 
was again put in motion, under my direction, on the following day, so that but 
a very brief interval of time was allowed to reorganize or procure supplies. 

The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam fought by this army 
a few days«afterwards, with the reconnoissances immediately following, resulted 
in a loss to us of ten general officers, many regimental and company officers, and 
a large number of enlisted men, amounting in the aggregate to fifteen thousand 
two hundred and twenty, (15,220.) Two army corps had been sadly cut up, 
scattered, and somewhat demoralized in the action on the 17th. 

In General Sumner's corps alone forty-one (41) commissioned officers and 
eight hundred and nineteen (819) enlisted men had been killed; four (4) general 
officers, eighty-nine (89) other commissioned officers, 'and three thousand seven 
hundred and eight (3,708) enlisted men had been wounded, besides five hundred 
and forty-eight (548) missing ; making the aggregate loss in this splendid veteran 
corps, in this one battle, five thousand two hundred and nine, (5,209.) 

In General Hooker's corps the casualties of the same engagement amounted 
to two thousand six hundred and nineteen, (2,619.) 

The entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoidable overwork, fa- 
tiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep and rest, previous to the last battle. 

When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia the means of transpor- 
tation at my disposal were inadequate to furnish a single day's supply of sub- 
sistence in advance. 

Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom had fought like veterans, 
but the morale of others had been a good deal impaired in those severely con- 
tested actions, and they required time to recover, as well as to acquire the neces- 
sary drill and discipline. 

Under these circumstances I did not feel authorized to cross the river with 
the main army over a very deep and difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, 
known to be in strong force. on the south bank, and thereby place that stream, 
which was liable at any time to rise above a fording stage, between my army 
and its base of supply. 

I telegraphed on the 22d to the general-in chief as follows : 

"As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, this army should 
be reorganized. It is absolutely necessary, to secure its efficiency, that the old 
skeleton regiments should be filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply 
the numerous existing vacancies. There are instances where captains are com- 
manding regiments, and companies are without a single commissioned officer." 

On the 23d the following was telegraphed to the general-in-chief : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Near SJicjjherdstown, Septemher 23, 1862 — 9.30 a. m. 

" From several different sources I learn that General R. E. Lee is still opposite 
to my position at Leestown, between Shcpherdstown and Martinsburg, and that 
General Jackson is on the Opequan creek, about three miles above its moutJi, 
both with large forces. There are also indications of heavy re-enforcements 
moving towards them from Winchester and Charlestown. I have therefore or- 
dered General Franklin to take position with his corps at the cross-roads about 
one mile northeast of Bakersville, on the Bakersville and Williamsport road, 
and General Couch to establish his division near Downsville, leaving sufficient 
force at Williamsport to watch and guard the ford at that place. The fact 
of the enemy's remaining so long in our front, and the indications of an advance 



REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN, 217 

of re-enforcements, seem to indicate tliat lae will give us another battle with all 
his available force. 

"As I mentioned to you before, our army has been very much reduced by 
casualties in the recent battles, and in my judgment all the re-enforcements of 
old troops that can possibly be dispensed with around Washington and other 
places should be instantly pushed forward by raU to this army. A defeat at 
this juncture would be ruinous to our cause. I cannot think it possible that 
the enemy will bring any forces to bear upon Washington till after the question 
is decided here ; but if he should, troops can soon be sent back from this army 
by rail to re-enforce the garrison there. 

" The evidence I have that re-enforcements are coming to the rebel army 
consists in the fact that long columns of dust extending from Winchester to 
Charlestown and from Charlestown in this direction, and also troops moving this 
way, were seen last evening. This is corroborated by citizens. General Sum- 
ner with his corps and Williams's (Banks's) occupies Harper's Ferry and the 
surrounding heights. I think he will be able to hold his position till re-enforce- 
ments arrive. 

"G. B. McCLELLAX, 

" Major General. 

" Major General Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington." 

On the 27th I made the following report : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Scptemler 27, 1862 — 10 a. m. 

" All the information in my possession goes to prove that the main body of the 
enemy is concentrated not far from Martinsburg, Avith some troops at Charles- 
town ; not many in Winchester. Their movements of late have been an exten- 
sion towards our right and beyond it. They are receiving re-enforcements in 
Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts — perhaps entirely so. 

"This army is not now in condition to undertake another campaign, nor to 
bring on another battle, unless great advantages are offered by some mistake of 
the enemy, or pressing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly 
deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced to mere skeletons. 
The new regiments need instruction. Not a day should be lost in filling the 
old regiments — our main dependence — and in supplying vacancies among the offi- 
cers by promotion. 

" My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, rendering Har- 
per's Ferry secure and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy 
should he attempt to cross to this side. 

" Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us the great advantage of a secure 
debouche, but we cannot avail oiu-selves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, 
because we cannot otherwise supply a gi-eater number of troops than we now 
have on the Vu-ginia side at that point. When the river rises so that the enemy 
cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's 
Ferry, and then acting according to circumstances, viz: moving on Winchester, 
if from the. position and attitude of the enemy we are likely to gain a great ad- 
vantage by doing so, or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of 
the army and instruction of the new troops, preparatory to an advance on what- 
ever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary 
to send new regiments at once to the old corps, for purposes of instruction, and that 
the old regiments be filled at once. I have no fears as to an attack on Wash- 
ington by "the hue of IManassas. Holding Harper's Ferry as I do, they will not 
run the risk of an attack on thek flank and rear while they have the garrison of 
Washinsrton in their front. 



218 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

" I rather apprehend a renewal of the attempt in Maryland should the river 
remain low for a great length of time, and should they receive considerable ad- 
dition to their force. I would be glad to have Peck's division as soon as possi- 
ble. I am surprised that Sigel's men should have been sent to Western Virginia 
withou my knowledge. The last I heard from you on the subject was that 
they were at my disposition. In the last battles the enemy was undoubtedly 
greatly superior to us in number, and it Was only by very hard fighting that we 
gained the advantage we did, As it was, the result was at one period very 
doubtful, and we had all we could do to win the day. If the enemy receives 
considerable re-enforcements and we none, it is possible that I may have too 
much on my hands in the next battle. My own view of the proper policy to be 
pursued is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and 
to send everything else available to re-enforce this army. The railways give us 
the means of promptly re-enforcing Washington should it become necessary. 
If I am re-enforced, as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will 
hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington. Several persons re- 
cently from Richmond say that there are no troops there except conscripts, and 
they few in number. I hope to give you details as to late battles by this eve- 
ning. I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry. 

" G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General Commanding. 

"Major General Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington." 

The work of reorganizing, drilling, and supplying the army, I began at the 
earliest moment. The different corps were stationed along the river in the best 
positions to cover and guard the fox-ds. The great extent of the river front 
froift near Washington to Cumberland, (some one hundred and fifty miles,) to- 
gether with the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, was to be carefully 
watched and guarded, to prevent, if possible, the enemy's raids. Reconnoissances 
upon the Virginia side of the river, for the purpose of learning the enemy's 
positions and movements, were made frequently, so that our cavalry, wiiicli from 
the time we left Washington had performed the most laborious service, and had 
from the commencement been deficient in numbers, was found totally inadequate 
to the requirements of the army. 

This overwork had broken down the greater part of the horses ; disease had 
appeared among them, and but a very small portion of our original cavalry force 
was fit for service. 

To such an extent had this arm become reduced, that when General Stuart 
made his raid into Pennsylvania on the 11th of October with two thousand 
men, I could only mount eight hundred men to follow him. 

Harper's Ferry was occupied on the 22d, and in order to prevent a catas- 
trophe similar to the one which had happened to Colonel Miles, I immediately 
ordered Maryland, Bolivar, and Loudon heights to be strongly fortified. This 
was done as far as the time and means at our disposal permitted. 

The main army of the enemy, during this time, remained in the vicinity of 
Martinsburg and Bunker hill, and occupied itself in drafting and coercing every 
able-bodied citizen into the ranks, forcibly taking their property, where it was 
not voluntarily offered, burning bridges, and destroying railroads. 

On the first day of October his excellency the President honored the army 
of the Potomac with a visit, and remained several days, during which he went 
through the different encampments, reviewed the troops, and went over the bat- 
tle-fields of South Mountain and Antietam. I had the opportunity during this 
visit to describe to him the operations of the army since the time it left Wash- 
ington, and gave him my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed 
the Potomac. 



EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 219 

On the 5tli of October the division of General Cox (about 5,000 men) was 
ordered from my command to Western Virginia. 

Oh the 7th of October I received the following telegram : 

"Washington, D. C, October 6, 1862. 

" I am instructed to telegraph you as follows : The President directs that 
you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your 
army must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross the river between 
the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your operation, you can be 
re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not 
more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the 
interioi" line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is 
very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. " You will immediately 
report what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river; also to 
what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of 
your operations be positively determined on, before orders are given for building 
bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed to add, that the Secretary of 
War and the general-in- chief fully concur with the President in these instruc- 
tions. 

"H. W. '3.KLLEQK,General-i7i- Chief. 

" Major General McClbllan." 

At this time General Averill, with the greater part of our efficient cavalry, 
was in the vicinity of Cumberland, and General Kelly, the commanding officer, 
had that day reported that a large force of the enemy was advancing on 
Colonel Campbell, at Saint John's river.* This obliged me to order General 
Averill to proceed with his force to the support of Colonel Campbell, which de- 
layed his return to the army for several days. 

On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the river at McCoy's Ferry, with 
2,000 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, on his raid into Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, making it necessary to use all our cavalry against him. This 
exhausting service completely broke down nearly all of our cavalry horses, and 
rendered a remount absolutely indispensable before we could advance on the 
enemy. 

The following were the dispositions of troops made by me to defeat the pur- 
poses of this raid : 

General Averill, then at Green Spring, on the upper Potomac, was ordered 
to move rapidly down upon the north side of the river, with all his disposable 
cavalry, using every exertion to get upon the trail of the enemy, and follow it 
up vigorously. 

General Pleasonton, with the remaining cavalry force, was ordered to take 
the road by Cavetown, Harmon's gap, and Mechanicsville, and cut off the re- 
treat of the enemy should he make for any of the fords below the position of 
the main army. His orders were to pursue them with the utmost rapidity, not 
to spare his men or horses, and to destroy or capture them if possible. 

General Crook, at that time commanding Cox's division, at Hancock, en route 
for Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, place his men in cars, and remain in 
readiness to move to any point above should the enemy return in that direction, 
keeping his scouts well out on all the roads leading from the direction of Cham- 
bersburg to the upper Potomac. 

The other commanders between Hancock and Harper's Ferry were instructed 
to keep a vigilant watch upon all the roads and fords, so as to .prevent the 
escape of the rebels within these limits. . 

General Burnside was ordered to send two brigades to the Monocacy crossing, 
there to remain in cars, with steam up, ready to move to any point on the rail- 
road to which Stuart might be aiming, while Colonel Rush, at Frederick, was 



220 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

directed to keep liis lancers scouting on the approaches from Chambersburg, so 
as to give timely notice to the commander of the two brigades at the Monocacy 
crossing. 

General Stoncman, whose headquarters were then at Poolsville, occupying 
with his division the different fords on the river below the mouth of the Monoc- 
acy, was directed to keep his cavalry well out on the approaches from the 
direction of Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his troops at any point 
where the enemy might attempt to cross the Potomac in his vicinity. He was 
informed of General Pleasonton's movements. 

After the orders were given for covering all the fords upon the river, I did 
not think it possible for Stuart to reci'oss, and I believed that the capture or 
destruction of his entire force was perfectly certain; but owing to the fact that 
my orders were not in all cases carried out as I expected, he effected his escape 
into Virginia without much loss. 

The troops sent by General Burnside to the Monocacy, owing to some neglect 
in not giving the necessary 'orders to the commander, instead of Temaining at 
the railroad crossing, as I directed, marched four miles into Frederick, and there 
remained until after Stuart had passed the railroad, only six miles below, near 
which point it was said he halted for breakfast. 

General Pleasonton ascertained, after his arrival at Mechanicsville, that the 
enemy were only about an hour ahead of him, beating a hasty retreat towards 
the mouth of the Monocacy. He pushed on vigorously, and, near its mouth, 
overtook them with a part of his force, having marched seventy-eight miles in 
twenty-four hours, and having left many of his horses broken down upon the 
road. He at once attacked with his artillery, and the firing continued for several 
hours, during which time he states that he received the support of a small por- 
tion of General Stoneman's command, not sufficient to inflict any material 
damage upon the enemy. 

General Stoneman reports that, in accordance with his instructions, he gave 
all necessary orders for intercepting the return of the rebels, and Colonel Staples, 
commanding one of his brigades, states that he sent two regiments of infantry 
to the mouth of the Monocacy, and one regiment to White's ford ; that on the 
morning of the 12th, about ten o'clock, he, by General Stoneman's order, marched 
the remaining three regiments of his command from Poolsville towards the mouth 
of the Monocacy ; that before getting into action he was relieved by General 
Ward, who states that he reported to General Pleasonton with his command, 
while the enemy was crossing the river, and was informed by him (General 
Pleasonton) that he was too late, and that nothing could be done then. 

General Pleasonton, in his report of this affiiir, says : " It was at this time 
that Colonel Ward reported to me from General Stoneman's division, with a 
brigade of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and a section of artillery: I told 
him that his command could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed the 
river. These are the only troops, that I knew of, that were in that vicinity, 
and this was the first intimation I received that any troops were endeavoring 
to assist me in capturing the rebels. I succeeded in preventing the enemy from 
crossing at the mouth of the Monocacy, and drove him to AVliite's ford, three 
miles below. Had White's ford been occupied by any force of ours previous 
to the time of the occupation by the enemy, the capture of Stuart's whole force 
would have been certain and inevitable. With my small force, which did not 
exceed one- fourth of the enemy's, it was not practicable for me to occupy that 
ford while the enemy was in front." 

It would seem from the report of General Stoneman that the disposition he 
made of his troops, previous to the arrival of Stuart, was a good one. He sta- 
tioned two regiments at the mouth of Monocacy, and two regiments at White's 
ford, the latter in the very place where the crossing was made, and the former 
only three miles off, with a reserve of three regiments at Poolsville, some six 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 221 

miles distant. General Pleasonton's report shows that from the time the firing 
commenced until the enemy were across the river was about four and a half 
hours. General Stonemau states that he started the reserve from Poolsville at 
about nine o'clock, but it appears, from the report of General Pleasonton, that 
it did not reach him until half past one. 

At the time I received the order of October 6, to cross the river and attack 
the enemy, the array was wholly deficient in cavalry, and a large part of our 
troops were in want of shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of 
clothing, notwithstanding all the efforts that had been made since the battle of 
Antietam, and even prior to that date, to refit the array with clothing, as well 
as horses. I at once consulted with Colonel Ingalls, the chief quarterraaster, 
who believed that the necessary articles could be supplied in about three days. 
Orders were immediately issued to the different commanders who had not 
already sent in their requisitions, to do so at once, and all the necessary steps 
were forthwith taken by me to insure a prompt delivery of the supplies. The 
requisitions were forwarded to the proper department at Washington, and I ex- 
pected that the articles would reach our depots during the three days specified; 
but day after day elapsed, and only a small portion of the clothing arrived. 
Corps commanders, upon receiving notice from the quartermasters that they 
might expect to receive their supplies at certain dates, sent the trains for them, 
which, after waiting, were compelled to return empty. Several instances oc- 
curred where these trains went back and forth from the camps to the depots, as 
often as four or five different times, without receiving their supplies, and I was 
informed by one corps commander that his wagon train had travelled over 150 
miles, to and from the depots, befoi*e he succeeded in obtaining his clothing. 

The corps of General Franklin did not get its clothing until after it had 
crossed the Potomac, and was moving into Virginia. General Reynolds's corps 
wf>(» flelaved a day at Berlin, to complete its supplies, and General Porter only 

• • ■ " TT_,_,„>^ TT'pvrv 



(^uartermaetci. v^v,..^^.-, 

promptly ordered. Notwithstanding this, they did not reacn oui ^J.■^^.^^^. 
The following extracts are frqm telegrams upon this subject : * 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 11, 1862 — 9 a. m. 

" We have been making every effort to get supplies of clothing for this army, 
and Colonel Ingalls has received advices that it has been forwarded by railroad ; 
but, owing to bad management on the roads, or from some other cause, it comes 
in very slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was anticipated to get 
articles that are absolutely indispensable to the army, unless the railroad man- 
agers forward supplies more rapidly. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major Gefieral. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington^ 



222 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 



"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

''October 11, 1862. 

" I am compelled again to call your attention to the great deficiency of shoes, 
. and other indispensable articles of clothing, that still exists in some of the corps 
in this army. Upon the assurances of the chief quartermaster, who based his 
calculation- upon information received from Washington, that clothing would be 
forwarded at certain times, corps commanders sent their wagons to Hagerstown 
and Harper's Ferry for it. It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet ar- 
rived. Unless some measures are taken to insure the prompt forwarding of 
these supplies, there will necessarily be a corresponding delay in getting the 
army ready to move, as the men cannot march without shoes. Everything has 
been done that can be done at these headquarters to accomplish the desired re- 
sult. 

" GEORGE <B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding, 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Commander-in-Chief, Washinqton.'" 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 15, 1862—7 p. m. 

* «'* * H: * * * 

" I am using every possible exertion to get this army ready to move. It was 
only yesterday that a part of our shoes and clothing arrived at Hagerstown. 
It is being issued to the troops as rapidly as possible. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

"General-in-Chief." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

n" October 15, 1862—7.30^9. m. 

" General Franklin reports that there is by no means as much clothing as was 
called for at Hagerstown. I think, therefore, you had better have additional 
supplies, especially of shoes, forwarded to Harper's Ferry as soon as possible. 

"R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. 
"jOolonel R. Ingalls, 

" Care of Colonel Rucher, Quartermaster, Washington." 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 16, 1862. 

" General J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as follows : ' My quartennaster re- 
ports that there are no shoes, tents, blankets, or knapsacks at Hagerstown. He 
was able to procure only a complete supply of overcoats and pants, with a few 
socks, drawers, and coats. This leaves many of the men yet without a shoe. 
My requisitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes.' 

" Please push the shoes and stockings up to Harper's Ferry as fost as pos- 
sible. 

_ "R. B. MARCY, Chief of Staff. 

" Colonel R. Ingalls, 

" Care of Colonel Ruclcer, Quartermaster, Washington.^' 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEOEGE B. m'cLELLAN. 223 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Knoxville, Maryland, October 9, 1862. 
" You did rig-ii.v n lending clothing to Harper's Feny. You will not be able 
•to send too much or too quickly. We Avant blankets, shoes, canteens, &c., very 
much. '' 

" EUFUS INGALLS, 
'^Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de- Camp, Chief Quartermaster. 
" Colonel C. G. Sawtelle, 

" Dejiot Quartermaster, WasJiington." 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 
" Camp near Knoxville, Maryland, October 10, 1862. 
" Shipments to Hagerstown must be made direct through, to avoid the con- 
•'temptible delays at Harrisbui-g. If Colonel Crosman was ordered to send 
jclothing, I hope he has sent it, for the suffering and impatience are excessive. 

" RUFUS INGALLS, 
"Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de- Camp, Chief Quartermaster. 
" Captain Augustus Boyd, 

" Quartermaster, Philadelphia" 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" Can\p near Knoxville, October 13, 1862. 
" Has the clothing arrived yet ? If not, do you know where it is 1 What 
clothing was taken by the rebels at Chambersburg ? Did they capture any 
property that was en route to you ? ' Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg ? 
Send an agent over the road to obtain information, and hurry up the supplies. 
Reply at once. 

"RUFUS INGALLS, 
" Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de- Camp, Chief Quartermaster. 
" Captain George H. Weeks, 

" Depot Quartermaster, Hagerstown.'" 

" Sharpsburg, October 15, 1862. 
" I have just returned from Hagerstown, where I have been for the clothing 
for the corps. There was nothing there but overcoats, trowsers, and a few uni- 
form coats and socks. There were not any shoes, blankets, shirts, or shelter 
tents. Will you please tell me where and when the balance can be had. Shall 
I send to Harper's Ferry for them to-morrow ? The corps surgeon has just 
made a requisitioli for 45 hospital tents. There are none at Hagerstown. Will 
you please to inform me if I can get them at Harper's Ferry I 

" FIELDING LOWRY, 
" Captain and Quarte?-master. 
" General In galls." 

" Hagerstown, October 15, 1862. 

" I want at least ten thousand (10,000) suits of clothing in addition to what I 
have received. It should be here now. 

"G.W. WEEKS, 
" Assistant Quartermaster. 
" Colonel Ingalls, Quartermaster." 



224 



KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 



"Harper's Ferry, October 22, 1862. 
" We have bootees, 12,000; greatcoats, 4,000; drawers and shirts are gone; 
blankets and stockings nearly so ; 15,000 each of these four articles are wanted. ' 

" ALEX. BLISS, 
" Captain and Assistant Quartermaster 
" General Ingalls, 

'■^ Chief Quartermaster , 8fC." 

"McClellan's Headquarters, 

" October 24, 1862—11 a. m. 

" Please send to Captain Bliss, at Harper's Ferry, 10,000 blankets, 12,000 
caps, 5,000 overcoats, 10,000 pairs bootees, 2,000 pairs artillery and cavalry 
boots, 15,000 pairs stockings, 15,000 drawers, and 15,000 pants. The clothing 
arrives sloAvly. Can it not be hurried along faster ? May I ask you to obtain 
authority for this shipment ? 

" RUFUS INGALLS, ■ 
" Lieutenant Colonel and Aide-de-Camp, Chief Quartermaster. 
" Captain D. G. Thomas, 

" Military Storekeeper, Washington*' 

" Hagerstown, October 30. 

" Clothing has arrived this morning. None taken by rebels. Shall I supply 
Franklin, and retain portions for Porter and Reynolds until called for 1 

" G. W. WEEKS, 
" Captain and Assistant Quartermaster. 
" Colonel Ingalls." 

""he following statement, taken from a report of the chief quartei-master with 
irmy, will show what progress was made in supplying the army with cloth- 
irom the 1st of September to the date of crossing the Potomac on the 31st 

Jctober, and that a greater part of the clothing did not reach our depots until 

)r the 14th of October : 



tement of clothing and equipage received at the different depots of the army 
of the Potomac from September 1, 1862, to October 31, 1862. 













•i 








"5 










DO 






X 




*^ 




a 




S 


Beceired at the depot — 


m 






o 


.2. 


H 


■2 


a 


£ 




a 




1 


t 






■3 

> 




a 


> 


^ 


o 


& 







S. 


» 


5 




a 


E 


» 


h 1 ^ 


00 


From September 1 to October 6. 


10,700 


4,000 


6,200 


4,190 


3,000 


6,000 


6,200 


6,000 


4,200 4,200 


11,100 


From October 6 to October 15 . . 


17, OOO 


11, 000 


22, 025! •---'•- 


500:i0,22i:i8,32."i 


12, 989 


1,000 6,000 


3,000 


From October 15 to October 25. . 


40, 000 


19, 500 


65, 200 




l,250i 9, 000!l8, 876 


5. 000 


2, .500 3, (iOO 


9,000 


From October 25 to October 31. . 


30, 000 




30, 000 




1, 500 3, 008 


2,200 


9, 900 


5, 000 20, 040 




Total 


97, 700 34, 500 


123, 425 


4,190 


6, 250^28, 229 

1 


45, 301 


33, 889 


12, 700 33, 840 

1 


23,100 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN. 



221 



Statement of clothing and equipage receiiied, t 


r. — Conliuued 






Received at the depot — 


1 


1 

p. 

1 


o 

<2 

"S 

o 

u 

o 

> 
O 


< 


J 
a 
S 


t 
o 

s, 

g 

> 
O 




o 
o 

c 

a 

M 


i 
2 


s 

o 
o 
B 


•a 

i4 


From Sept«mber 1 to October 6 . 
From October fi to October 15. .. 
From October 15 to October 25 . . 


799 
1,302 
1,894 


2,030 

2,100 
4,500 


3,500 

12, 000 
14, 770 


1,200 

500 

1,750 

1,000 


20 

"6,'566 
4,384 


1, 200 2, 200 2, 000 
875 7,00012,060 

3, 500 122, 500 

2,015, j 7,500 


2,000 

9,500 

39, 620 

25, 000 


2,000 
7,000 
52, 900 


2,655 
2,424 

11 r,Qic 









I".--" 


Total 


3,995 


8,630 


30, 270 


4, 450^10, 904 


7 590 f> 5>nn44 nfin 


76, 120 


61 goO'T! f^''^ 






' 









Colonel Ingalls, cliief quartennaster, in his report upon this subject, says : 
" There was great delay in receiving our clothing. The orders were promptly 
given by me and approved by General Meigs, but the roads were slow to trans- 
port, particularly the Cumberland Valley road. 

" For instance, clothing ordered to Hagerstown on the 7th October for the 
corps of Franklin, Porter, and Eeynolds did not arrive there until about the 18th, 
and by that time, of course, there were increased wants and changes in position 
of troops. The clothing of Sumner arrived in great quantities near the last of 
October, almost too late for issue, as the army was crossing into Virginia. We 
finally left 50,000 suits at Harper's Ferry, partly on the cars just arrived, and 
partly in store." 

The causes of the reduction of our cavalry force have already been recited. 
The difficulty in getting new supplies from the usual sources led me to apply 
for and obtain authority for the cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their 
own horses. The following are the telegrams and letters on this subject : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 12, 1862 — 12.-15 ;?. ?n. 

" It is absolutely necessary that some energetic means be taken to supply the 
cavalry of this army with remount horses. The present rate of supply is (1,050) 
ten hundred and fifty per week for the entire army here and in front of Wash- 
ington. From this number the artillery di'aw for their batteries. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 
" Major General Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief :' 

The general-in-chief, in a letter to me dated Washington, D. C., October 
14, 1862, replies to this despatch in the following language : 

" I have caused the matters complained of in your telegrams of the 11th and 
12th to be investigated. 
********** 

"■ In regard to horses, you say that the present rate of supply is only ] 50 
per week for the entire army here and in front of Washington. I find from the 
records that the issues for the last six weeks have been 8,754, making an average 
per week of 1,459." 

One thousand and fifty (1,050) is the number stated in the original despatch, 
now in my possession ; and as not only figures were used, but the number was 
written out in full, I can hardly see how it is possible for the telegraphic operator 
to have made a mistake in the transmission of the message. 
H. Ex. Doc. 15 15 



226 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 14, 1862—7 p. m. 

"With my small cavalry force it is impossible for me to watcli the line of the 
Totomac properly, or even make the reconnoissances that are necessary for our 
movements. This makes it necessary for me to weaken my line very much, by 
<'Xtending the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. This will continue until 
the river rises, and it will be next to impossible to prevent the rebel cavalry 
raids. My cavalry force, as 1 urged this morning, should be largely and im- 
mediately increased, under any hypothesis, whether to guard the river, or 
advance on the enemy, or both. 

"GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

"Major General. 
"Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" Command er-m- Chief." 

The following is an extract from the official report of Colonel Ingalls : 

" Immediately after the battle of Antietam efforts were made to supply de- 
ficiencies in clothing and horses. Large requisitions were prepared and sent in. 
The artillery and cavalry required large numbers to cover losses sustained in 
battle, on the march, and by diseases. Both of these arms were deficient when 
they left Washington. A most violent and destructive disease made its appear- 
ance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 animals out of service. Horses re- 
ported perfectly well one day would be dead lame the next, and it was difficult 
lo foresee where it would end, or what number would cover the loss. They 
were attacked in the hoof and tongue. No one seemed able to account for the 
appearance of this disease. Animals kept at rest would recover in time, but 
cou/d not be worked. I made application to send west and purchase horses at 
once, but it was refused, on the ground that the outstanding contracts provided 
for enough, but they were not delivered sufficie?itlyj'ast, nor insn&cientnwmhprSf 
until late in October and early in November I was authorized to buy 2,500 
late in October, but the delivery was not completed until in November, after we 
had reached Warrenton." 

In a letter from General Meigs, written on the 14th of October, and addressed 
to the general-in-chief, it is stated : " There have been issued, therefore, to the 
army of the Potomac, since the battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 
(9,254) nine thousand two hundred and fifty-four horses." 

W^hat number of horses were sent to General Pope before his return to Wash- 
ington I have no means of determining; but the following statement made 
upon my order, by the chief quartermaster with the army, and who had means 
for gaining accurate information, force upon my mind the conclusion that the 
Quartermaster General was in error: 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"Chief Quartermaster's Office, October 31, 1862, 

"Horses purchased since September 6, 1862, by Colonel Ingalls, 
chief quartermaster, and issued to the forces under the immediate 
command of Major General George B. McClellan 1,200 

"Issued and turned over to the above force by Captain J. J. Dana, 

assistant quartermaster, (in Washington) 2,261 

"Issued to forces at and near Washington which have since joined 

the command 352 

"Total purchased by Colonel Ingalls and issued and turned over by ■ 

Captain Dana to the forces in this immediate command 3,813 



EEPOET OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 227 

'Issued by Captain J. J. Dana, assistant quartermaster, to the forces 
in the vicinity of Washington 3,363 



"Grand total purchased by Colonel R. Ingalls, chief quartermaster, 
and issued and turned over by Captain J. J. Dana, assistant 
quartermaster, to the entire army of the Potomac and the forces 
around Washington 7,176 



About 3,000 horses have been turned over to the quartermaster's department 
by officers as iinfit for service ; nearly 1,500 should now be turned over also, being 
worn out and diseased. 
Respectfully submitted. 

"FRED. MYERS, 
" hieutenant Colonel and Quartermaster." 

This official statement, made up from the reports of the quartermasters who 
received and distributed the horses, exhibits the true state of the case, and gives 
the total number of horses received by the army of the Potomac, and the troops 
around Washington, during a period of eight weeks as (7,176) seven thousand 
one hundred and seventy-six, or (2,078) two thousand and seventy-eight less 
than the number stated by the Quartermaster General. 

Supposing that (1,500) fifteen hundred were issued to ^the army under General 
Pope previous to its return to Washington, as General Meigs states, there would 
still remain (578) five hundred and seventy- eight horses which he does not 
account for. 

The letter of the general-in-chief to the Secretary of War on the 28th of 
October, and the letter of General Meigs to the general-in-chief on the l-ith of 
October, convey the impression that, upon my repeated applications for cavalry 
and artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, I had received a much greater 
number than was really the case. 

It will be seen from Colonel Myers's report that, of all the horses alluded 
to by General Meigs, only (3,813) three thousand eight hundred and thirteen 
came to the army with which I was ordered to follow and attack the enemy. 
Of course the remainder did not in the slightest degree contribute to the efficiency 
of the cavalry or artillery of the ai-my with which I was to cross the river. 
Neither did they in the least facilitate any preparations for carrying out the 
order to advance upon the enemy, as the general-in-chief 's letter might seem to 
imply. 

During the same period that we were receiving the horses alluded to about 
(3,000) three thousand of our old stock were turned into the quartermaster's 
department, and 1,500 more reported as in such condition that they ought to be 
turned in as unfit for service; thus leaving the active army some 700 short of the 
number required to make good existing deficiencies, to say nothing of providing 
remounts for men whose horses had died or been killed during the campaign and 
those previously dismounted. Notwithstanding all the efforts made to obtain a 
remount, there were, after deducting the force engaged in picketing the river, 
but about a thousand serviceable cavalry horses on the 21st day of October. 

In a letter dated October 14, 1862, the general-in-chief says : 

" It is also reported to me that the number of animals with your army in the field 
is about 31,000. It is believed that your present proportion of cavalry and of 
animals is mixch larger than that of any other of our ai-mies." 

What number of animals our other armies had I am not prepared to say, but 
military men in European armies have been of the opinion that an army to be 
efficient, while carrying on active operations in the field, should have a cavalry 
force equal in numbers to from one-sixth to one-fourth of the infantry force. My 



228 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

cavalry did not amount to one-twentieth part of tlie armj, and hence the neces- 
sity of giving- every one of my cavahy soldiers a serviceable horse. 

Cavalry may be said to constitute the antcnnce of an army. It scouts all the 
roads in front, on the flanks and in the rear of the advancing columns, and con- 
stantly feels the enemy The amount of labor falling on this arm dui-ing the 
Maryland campaign was excessive. 

To persons not familiar with the movements of troops, and the amount of 
transportation required for a large army marching away from water or railroad 
communications, the number of animals mentioned by the general-in-chief may 
have appeared unnecessarily large; but to a military man, who takes the trouble 
to enter into an accurate and detailed computation of the number of pounds of 
subsistence and forage required for such an army as that of the Potomac, it will 
be seen that the 31,000 animals were considerably less than was absolutely neces- 
sary to an advance. 

As we were required to move through a country which could not be depended 
upon for any of our supplies, it became necessary to transport everything in 
wagons, and to be prepared for all emergencies. I did not consider it safe to leave 
the river without subsistence and forage for ten days. 

The official returns of that date show the aggregate strength of the army for 
duty to have been about 110,000 men of all arms. This did not include team- 
sters, citizen employes, officers' servants, &c., amounting to some 12,000, 
which gave a total of ]^2,000 men. 

The subsistence alone of this army for ten days required for its transporta- 
tion 1,830 wagons at 2,000 pounds to the wagon, and 10,980 animals. 

Our cavalry horses at that time amounted to 5,046, and our artillery horses 
to 6,836. 

To transport full forage for these 22,862 animals for ten days required 
17,832 additional animals ; and this forage would only supply the entire num- 
ber (40,694) of animals with a small fraction over half allowance for the time 
specified. 

It Avill be observed that this estimate does not embrace the animals necessary 
to transport quartermasters' supplies, baggage, camp equipage, ambulances, re- 
serve ammunition, forage for officers' horses, &c., which would greatly aug- 
ment the necessary transportation. 

It may very truly be said that we did make the march with the means at our 
disposal, but it Avill be remembered that we met with no serious opposition from 
the enemy ; neither did we encounter delays from any other cause. The roads 
were in excellent condition, and the troops marched with the most commenda- 
ble order and celerity. 

If we had met with a deteiTnined resistance from the enemy, and our pro- 
gress had been very much retarded thereby, we would have consumed our sup- 
plies before they could have been renewed. A proper estimate of my responsi- 
bilities as the commander of that army did not justify me in basing my 
preparations for the expedition upon the supposition that I was to have an un- 
interrupted march. On the contrary, it was my duty to be prcj)ared for all 
emergencies ; and not the least important of my responsibilities was the duty 
of making ample provision for supplying my men and animals with rations and 
forage. 

Knowing the solicitude of the President for an early movement, and sharing 
with him fully his anxiety for prompt r.ction, on the 21st of October I tele- 
graphed to the general-in-chief as follows : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 21, 1862. 

" Since the receipt of the President's order to move on the enemy, I have been 
making every exertion to get this army supplied with clothing absolutely necee- 
sary for marching. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 229 

" This, I am happy to saj, is now nearly accomplished. I have also, during 
the same time, repeatedly iirged upon you the importance of supplying cavalry 
and artillery horses to replace those broken down by hard service, and steps 
have been taken to insure a prompt delivery. 

" Our cavalry, even when well supplied with horses, is much inferior in num- 
bers to that of the enemy, but in efficiency has proved itself superior. So 
forcibly has this been impressed upon our old regiments by repeated successes, 
that the men are fully persuaded that they are equal to twice their number of 
rebel cavalry. 

" Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in picketing the river, I have 
not at present over about one thousand (1,000) horses for service. Officers have 
been sent in various directions to purchase horses, and I expect them soon. 
Without more cavalry horses our communications, from the moment we march, 
would be at the mercy of the large cavalry force of the enemy, and it would not 
be possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary informa- 
tion of the position and movements of the enemy, in such a way as to insure 
success. My experience has shown the necessity of a large and efficient cavalry 
force. 

" Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave to ask whether the President 
desires me to march on the enemy at once, or to await the reception of the new 
horses, every possible step having been taken to insure their prompt anival. 

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 
" Major General H. W. Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washi??gfon." 

On the same day General Halleck replied as follows : 

"Washington, October 21, 1862 — 3 p. 7n. 

" Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. He directs me 
to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th instant. 

" if you have not been, and are not now, in condition to obey it, you will be 
able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities ; 
but he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inac- 
tivity. Telegraph when you will move, and on what lines you propose to 
march. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in- Chief. 

" Major General Geo. B. McClellan." 

From the tenor of this despatch I conceived that it was left for my judgment 
to decide whether or not it was possible to move with safety to the army at that 
time ; and this responsibility I exercised with the more confidence in view of 
the strong assurances of his trust in me, as commander of that army, with which 
the President had seen fit to honor me during his last visit. 

The cavalry requirements, without which ati advance would have been iu 
the highest degree injudicious and unsafe, were still wanting. 

The country before us was an enemy's country, where the inhabitants fur- 
nished to the enemy every possible assistance ; providing food for men and 
forage for animals, giving all information concerning our movements, and ren- 
dering every aid in their power to the enemy's cause. 

It was manifest that we should find it, as we subsequently did, a hostile dis- 
trict, where we could derive no aid from the inhabitants that would justify dis- 
pensing Avith the active co-operation of an efficient cavalry force. Accordingly 
I fixed upon the first of November as the earliest date at which the forward 
movement could well be commenced. 



230 REPORT OP GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

The general-in-cliief, in a letter to the Secretary of War, on the 28th of 
October, says: "In my opinion, there has been no such want of supplies in the 
army under General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to 
advance against the enemy." 

Notwithstanding this opinion, expressed by such high authority, I am com- 
pelled to say again that the delay in the reception of necessary supplies up to 
that date had left the army in a condition totally unfit to advance against the 
enemy — that an advance, under the existing circumstances, would, in my judg- 
ment, have been attended with the highest degree of peril, with great suffering 
and sickness among the men, and with imminent danger of being cut off from 
our supplies by the superior cavalry force of the enemy, and with no reasonable 
prospect of gaining any advantage over him. 

I dismiss this subject with the remark, that I have found it impossible to resist 
the force of my own convictions that the commander of an army who, from the 
time of its organization, has for eighteen months been in constant communication 
with its officers and men, the greater part of the time engaged in active service 
in the field, and who has exercised this command in many battles, must cer- 
tainly be considered competent to determine whether his army is in proper con- 
dition to advance on the enemy or not; and he must necessarily possess greater 
facilities for forming a correct judgment in regard to the wants of his men, and 
the condition of his supplies, than the general-in-chief in his office at Wash- 
ington city. The movement from Washington into Maryland, which culminated 
in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was not a part of an offensive 
campaign, with the object of the invasion of the enemy's territory and an attack 
upon his capital, but was defensive in its purposes, although offensive in it3 
character, and would be technically called a "defensive-offensive campaign." 

It was undertaken at a time when our army had experienced severe defeats, 
and its object was to preserve the national capital and Baltimore, to protect 
I'ennsylvania from invasion, and to drive the enemy out of Maryland. These 
purposes were fully and finally accomplished by the battle of Antietam, which 
brought the army of the Potomac into what might be termed an accidental posi- 
tion on the upper Potomac. 

Having gained the immediate object of the campaign, the first thing to be done 
Mas to insure Maryland from a return of the enemy; the second, to prepare our 
own army, exhausted by a series of severe battles, destitute to a great extent of 
supplies, and very deficient in artillery and cavalry horses, for a definite offen- 
sive movement, and to determine upon the line of operations for a further 
advance. 

At the time of the battle of Antietqm the Potomac was very low, and pre- 
sented a comparatively weak line of defence unless watched by large masses of 
troops. 

The reoccupation of Harper's Feny, and the disposition of troops above 
that point, rendered the line of the Potomac secure against everything except 
cavalry raids. No time was lost in placing the army in proper condition for an 
advance, and the circumstances which caused the delay after the battle of An- 
tietam have been fully enumeratfed elsewhere. 

I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicinity as a proper base of opera- 
tions for a movement upon Richmond. I still considered the line of the Penin- 
sula as the true approach, but, for obvious reasons, did not make any proposal 
to return to it. 

On the 6th of October, as stated above, I was ordered by the President, 
through his general-in-chief, to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, 
or drive him south. Two lines were presented for my choice : 

1st. Up the valley of the Shenandoah, in which case I was to have 12,000 
to 15,000 additiontil troops. 



EEPOKT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 231 

2cl. To cross between tlie enemy and Washington — that is, east of the Blue 
Kidge — in which event I was to be re-enforced with 30,000 men. 

At first I determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah, for these reasons: 
The Harper's Ferry and Winchester raiboad and the various turnpikes con- 
verging upon Winchester afforded superior facilities for supplies. Our cavalry 
being weak, this line of communication could be more easily protected. Thero 
was no advantage in interposing at that time the Blue Ridge and the Shenan- 
doah between the enemy and myself. 

At the period in question the Potomac was still very low, and I apprehended 
that, if I crossed the river below Harper's Ferry, the enemy Avould promptly 
check the movement by re-crossing into Maryland, at the same time covering 
his rear by occupying in strong force the passes leading through the Blue Ridgo 
from the southeast into the Shenandoah valley. 

I anticipated, as the result of the first course, that Lee would fight me near 
Winchester, if he could do so under favorable circumstances j or else that he 
would abandon the lower Shenandoah, and leave the army of the Potomac 
free to act upon some other line of operations. 

If he abandoned the Shenauhoah, he would naturally fall back upon his 
railway communications. I have since been confirmed in the belief that, if I 
had crossed the Potomac below Harper's Ferry in the early part of October, 
General Lee would have re-crossed into Maryland. 

As above explained, the army was not in condition to move until late in 
October, and in the mean time circumstances had changed. 

The period had arrived when a sudden and great rise of the Potomac might 
be looked for at any moment ; the season of bad roads and difficult movements 
was approaching, which would naturally deter the enemy from exposing him- 
self very far from his base, and his movements all appeared to indicate a fall- 
ing back from the river towards his supplies. Under these circumstances, I 
felt at liberty to disregard the possibility of the enemy's re-crossing the Potomac, 
and determined to select the line east of the Blue Ridge, feeling convinced that 
it would secure me the largest accession of force, and the most cordial support 
of the President, whose views, from the beginning, were in ffivor of that line. 

The subject of the defence of the line of the upper Potomac, after the ad- 
vance of the main army, had long occupied my attention. I desired to place 
Harper's Ferry and its dependencies in a strong state of defence, and frequently 
addressed the general-in-chief upon the subject of the erection of field-works 
and permanent bridges there, asking for the funds necessary to accomplish 
the purpose. Although I did my best to explain, as clearly as I was able, that 
I did not wish to erect permanent works of masonry, and that neither the 
works nor the permanent bridges had any reference to the advance of the army, 
but solely to the permanent occupation of Harper's Ferry, I could never make 
the general-in-chief understand my wishes, but was refused the funds neces- 
sary to erect the field-works, on the ground that there was no appropriation for 
the erection of permanent fortifications ; and was not allowed to build the per- 
manent bridge, on the ground that the main army could not be delayed in its 
movements until its completion. 

Of course I never thought of delaying the advance of the army for that pur- 
pose, and so stated repeatedly. On the 25tli of October I sent to the general- 
iu-chief the following telegram : 

" Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

• " October 25, 1862—10.45 p. m. 

*' As the moment is at hand for the advance of this army, a question arisea 
for the decision of the general-in-chief, which, although perhaps impliedly 
decided by the President in his letter of the 13th, should be clearly presented 
by me, as I do not regard it as in my province to determine it. 



232 KEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. M CLELLAN 

" This question is the extent to Avhich the line of the Potomac should be 
guarded, after the army lcav('S, in order to cover Maryland and Pennsylvania 
from invasion by large or small parties of the enemy. 

" It will always be somewhat d fficult to guard tlie immediate line of the 
river, owing to its great extent and the laimei ous passages which exist. 

" It has long appeared to me that the best way of covering tliis line would be 
by occupying Front Royal, Strasburg, Wardeusville and Moorefield, or the 
debouches of the several valleys in which they are situated. 

" These points, or suitable places in their vicinity, should be strongly in- 
trenched and permanently held. One great advantage of this arranginnent 
would be the covering the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and an essential part 
of the system would be the construction of the link of railway from Winchester 
to Strasburg, and the rebuilding of the Manassas Gap railway bridge over the 
Shenandoah. 

" Tlie intrenchment of Manassas Junction would complete the system for 
the del'ence of the approaches to Washington and the upper Potomac. Many 
months ago I recommended this arrangement ; in fact, gave orders lor it to be 
carried into effect. I still regard it as essential under all circumstances. 

" The views of the chief engineer of this army, in regard to the defences 
and garrison of Harper's Ferry and its defeni^es, are in your possessr^ion. 

" The only troops under my command, outside of the organization of the 
army of the Potomac, are the Maryland brigade, under General Kenley ; the 
.54[h Pennsylvania, Colonel Vuss ; 12th Illinois cavalry, and Colonel Davis'a 
8th New York cavalry ; total, 2,894 infantry, one battery, and about 900 cav- 
alry men. 

" There are also two of my regiments of cavalry (about 750 men,) guarding 
the Baltimore and Ohio railroad between Hancock and Cumberland. 

" As I have no department, and command simply an active army in the field, 
my responsibility for the safety of the line of the Potomac and the States 
north (.f it must terminate the moment I advance so far beyond that line as to 
adopt another for my base of operations. The question for the general-in- 
chief to decide, and which I regard as beyond my province, is this : 

" 1st. Shall the safety of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac be re- 
garded its assured by tlie advance of the army south of the Blue Ridge, and 
the line left to take care of itself? 

" 2d. If it is deemed necessary to hold the line, or that hereinbefore indi- 
cated in advance of it, how many troops shall be placed there, at what points, 
(and in what numbers and of what composition at each,) and where shall they 
be sujiplied — ^. e., from the army, or from other sources ? 

" Omitting the detached troops mentioned above, and the small garrisons of 
Boonsboro' and Frederick, the last returns show the strength of this army for 
duty to be about (116,000) one hundred and sixteen thousand officers and men. 
This includes the divisions of Stoneman and Whipple, but does not include 
Heintzelman, Sigel, and Bayai-d. 

" If Harper's Feny and the river above are rendered fully secure, it is pos- 
sible that the active army, if it supplies the garrison, may be reduced so much 
as to be inadequate to the purposes contemplated. If it is preserved intact, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad may be unduly 
exposed. 

" I leave the decision of these grave questions to the general-in-chief. I 
know nothing of the number of troops at Baltimore, &c. 

" An important element in the solution of this problem is the fact that a 
great portion of Bragg's army is probably now at liberty to unite itself with 
Lee's cwmmand. 



EEPOBT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 233 

" I commence crossing the river at Berlin in the morning, and must ask a 
prompt decision of the questions proposed herein. 

" GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 

" Major General, Commanding. 
" Major General Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington. 

To which I received the following reply : 

"Washington, October 20,, 1862 — 1.25 p.m. 

" In addition to the command which you had when I came here, you also 
have the greater part of that of Major General Pope. Moreover, you have been 
authorized to use any troops within your reach in General Wool's department, and 
in Western Virginia. General Banks's command is also iinder your direction, 
with the single restriction that he is not to remove troops from Washington till 
he has notified me of his orders. 

" Since you left Washington I have advised and suggested in relation to your 
movements, but I have given you no orders ; I do not give you any now. The 
government has intrusted you with defeating and driving back the rebel army 
in your front. I shall not attempt to control you in the measures you may 
adopt for that purpose. You are informed of my views, but the President has 
left you at liberty to adopt them or not, as you may deem best. 

" You will also exercise your own discretion in regard to what points on the 
Potomac and the Baltimoi-e and Ohio railroad are to be occupied or fortified. I 
wUl only add that there is no appropriation for permanent intrenchments on 
tliat line. Moreover, I think it Avill be time enough to decide upon fortifying 
Front Royal, Strasburg, Wardensville, and Mooretield, when the enemy is driven 
Bouth of them, and they come into our possession. 

" I do not think that we need have any immediate fear of Bragg's army. 
You are within (20) twenty miles of Lee's, while Bragg is distant about (400) 
four hundred miles. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 

"Major General G. B. McClellan." 

On the 29th I sent the following : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

"October 29, 1862 — 1.15^. m. 

" On the 25th instant I sent you a despatch requesting you to decide what 
steps should be taken to giiard the line of the Potomac when this army leaves 
here. To this I received your reply that I had been intrusted by the Presi- 
dent with defeating and driving away the rebel army ; that you had given me 
no orders heretofore — did not give me any then, &c. Under these circumstances, 
I have only to make such arrangements for guarding this extended line as the 
means at my disposal will permit, at the same time keeping in view the supreme 
necessity of maintaining the moving army in adequate force to meet the rebel 
army before us. 

" The dispositions I have ordered are as follows, viz : Ten thousand men to 
be left at Harper's Ferry ; one brigade of infantry in front of Sharpsburg ; 
Kenley's brigade of infantry at Williamsport; Kelly's brigade, including Col- 
cmel Campbell's 54th Pennsylvania infantry, at Cumberland; and between that 
point and Hancock. I have also left four small cavalry regiments to patrol and 
watch the river and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad from Cumberland down to 
Harper's Ferry. 

" 1 do not regard this force as sufficient to cover securely this great extent of 



234 EEPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. MCLELLAN. 

line, but I do not feel justified in detaching any more troops from my moving 
columns ; I would, therefore, recommend that some new regiments of infantry 
and cavalry be sent to strengthen the forces left by me. 

" There should be a brigade of infantry and section of artillery in the vicinity 
of Cherry run, another brigade at Hancock, an additional brigade at Williams- 
port, one regiment at Hagerstown and one at Chambersburg, with a section of 
artillery at each place if possible. This is on the supposition that the enemy 
retain a considerable cavalry force west of the Blue Ridge; if they go east of 
it, the occupation of the points named in my despatch of the 25th instant will 
obviate the necessity of keeping many of these troops on the river. 

" There are now several hundred of our wounded, including General Rich- 
ardson, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, that cannot possibly be moved at present 

"I repeat, that I do not look upon the forces I have been able to leave from 
this army as sufficient to prevent cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsylva- 
nia, as cavalry is the only description of troops adeq^uate to this service, and I 
am, as you are aware, deficient in this arm. 

"G. B. McCLELLAN, 
" Major General, Commanding. 

" Major General Halleck, 

" General-in-Chief, Washington." 

To which I received on the 30th this reply : 

"Washington, October 30, 1862 — 11.30 a. m. 
" Your telegram of yesterday was received late last evening. The troops 
proposed for Thoroughfare gap will be sent to that place whenever you are in 
position for their co-operation, as previously stated, but no new regiments can be 
sent from here to the upper Potomac. The guarding of that line is left to your 
own discretion with the troops now under your command. 

"H. W. HALLECK, 

" General-in-Chief. 
" Major General G. B. McClellan." 

I accordingly left the 12th corps at Harper's Ferry, detaching one brigade 
to the vicinity of Sharpsburg. General Morell was placed in command of the 
line from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland; General Slocum in com- 
mand of Harper's Ferry and the line east of the mouth of the Antietam. 

The orders given to these officers were as follows : 

"Headquarters Army of the Potomac, 

" October 29, l!S62 — I p.m. 

" The general commanding directs that you send one brigade of your corps 
to march at once to the position now occupied by General F. J. Porter's corps, 
in front of Sharpsburg, to watch and guard the line of the river, the ford near 
the mouth of the Antietam creek to the mouth of the Opequan creek. 

" The officer in command Avill also take steps to afford proper protection to 
the sick and wounded in the hospitals in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Boons- 
boro'. The regiment now at Boonsboro' will be placed under his orders. General 
Kenlcy, at Williamsport, will guard the river from the mouth of the Opequan 
alone, including the ford at the mouth of the Opequan. 

" The commanding general also directs that you take immediate steps to 
establish the remainder of your corps as follows, viz : one brigade on Maryland 
heights, one brigade on Loudon heights, with the remainder on Bolivar heights 
and at Harper's Ferry. 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 235 

" These di&ipositions should be made at once, so that General Couch can move 
with his corps. Please acknowledge the receipt of this. 

"R. B. MARCY, 

" Chief of Staff. 
" General H. W. Slocum, 

" Commanding Army Corps., Harper's Ferryy 

" Headciuarters Army of the Potomac, 

♦• Oclober 31, 1862. 

" General : I am instructed by the commanding general to saj to you, that 
he has selected you to perform the highly important and responsible duty of 
taking charge of and commanding the troops left for the defence of the line of the 
Potomac river, from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland, as well as any 
other troops that may hereafter be sent for the protection of the Maryland and 
Pennsylvania frontier within the limits of the lines herein specified. The force 
which has been left to guard the line is not deemed adeqiiate to prevent cavalry 
raids, but it is all that the commanding general feels authorized to detach from 
the army of the Potomac at the present time, and it devolves upon you to make 
the best use of this force in your power. You will have four cavalry regiments 
under your command, which should be so distributed along the river as to watch 
all the available fords, and give timely notice to the infantry of the approach of 
any force of rebels. 

" You will afford all the protection in your power to the Baltimore and Ohio 
railroad. 

" You will endeavor to prevent any cavalry raids into Maryland and Pennsyl- 
vania. 

" You will take steps to have all the sick and wounded of our army, as well 
as of the rebel army within your lines, properly taken care of until they can be 
sent to general hospitals, or discharged, or paroled. 

" You will make your headquarters at Hagerstown, and occasionally visit the 
different parts of your line. 

"You will please report promptly to these headquarters everything of import- 
ance that occurs within the limits of your command. 

" The three brigades now at Cumberland, Williamsport, and Sharpsburg, in- 
cluding the fifty-fourth Pennsylvania volunteers, near Cumberland, will be under 
your command. They are commanded by Generals Kelly, Kenley, and Gordon. 
" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"S. WILLIAMS, 
" Assistant Adjutant General. 

"General G. W. Morell, 

" Commanding Upper Potomac.'' 

On the 25th of October the pontoon bridge at Berlin was constructed, there 
being already one across the Potomac, and another across the Shenandoah, at 
Harper's Ferry. 

On the 26th two divisions of the ninth corps, and Pleasonton's brigade of 
cavalry, crossed at Berlin and occupied Lovettsville. 

The first, sixth, and ninth corps, the cavalry, and the reserve artillery, crossed 
at Berlin between the 26th of October and the 2d of November. 

The second and fifth corps crossed at Harper's Ferry between the 29th of 
October and the 1st of November. Heavy rains delayed the movement con- 
siderably in the beginning, and the first, fifth and sixth corps were obliged to 
halt at least one day at the crossings to complete, as far as possible, necessary 
supplies that could not be procured at an earlier period. 

The plan of campaign I adopted during this advance was to move the anny, 
well in hand, parallel to the Blue Ridge, taking Warrenton as the point of direc- 



236 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

tion for the main ai-my ; seizing each pass on the Blue Ridge by detachments, as 
we approached it, and guarding- them after we had passed as long as they would 
enable the enemy to trouble our communications with the Potomac. It was 
expected that we would imite with the eleventh corps and Sickles's division near 
Thoroughfare gap. We depended upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies 
until the Manassas Gap railway was reached ; Avhen that occurred the passes in 
our rear were to be abandoned, and the army massed ready for action or move- 
ment in any direction. 

It was my intention if, upon reaching Ashby's or any other pass, I found that 
the enemy were in force between it and the Potomac in the valley of the 
Shenandoah, to move into the valley and endeavor to gain their rear. 

I hardly hoped to accomplish this, but did expect that by striking in 
between Culpeper Court House and Little Washington I could either separate 
their army and beat them in detail, or else force them to concentrate as far back 
as Gordonsville, and thus place the army of the Polomac in position either to 
adopt the Fredericksburg line of advance upon Richmond, or to be removed to 
the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossible to supply it by the 
Orange and Alexandria railroad beyond Culpeper. 

On the 27th of October the remaining divisions of the ninth corps crossed 
at Berlin, and Pleasonton's cavalry advanced to Purccllville. The concentra- 
tion of the sixth corps, delayed somewhat by intelligence as to the movements 
of the enemy near Hedgesville, &c., was commenced on this day, and the first 
corps was already in motion for Berlin. 

On the 28th the first corps and the general headquarters reached Berlin. 

On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed and encamped near Lovettsville. 
Stoncman's division, temporarily attached to the ninth corps, occupied Leesburg; 
Averill's cavalry brigade moved towards Berlin from Hagerstown ; two divisions 
of the ninth corps moved to Wheatland, and one to Waterford. The second 
corps commenced the passage of the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry, and moved 
into the valley east of Loudon heights. 

On the SOtli the first corps crossed at Berlin and encamped near Lovettsville, 
and the second corps completed the passage of the Shenandoah. The fifth 
corps commenced its march from Sharpsburg to Harper's Ferry. 

On the 31st the second corps moved to the vicinity of Hillsborough ; the 
sixth corps reached Boonsboro'; the fifth corps reached Harper's Ferry, ona 
division crossing the Shenandoah. 

On the 1st of November the first corps moved to Purccllville and Hamilton ; 
the second corps to Woodgrove; the fifth corps to Hillsborough; the sixth corps 
reached Berlin, one division crossing. Pleasonton's cavalry occupied Philomont, 
having a sharp skirmish there and at Bloomfield. 

On NoA'cmber 2 the second corps occupied Snicker's gap ; the fifth corps, 
Snickersville ; the sixth corps crossed the Potomac and encamped near Wheat- 
land ; the ninth corps advanced to Bloomfield, Union, and Philomont. Pleasonton 
drove the enemy out of Union. Averill was ordered to join Pleasonton. Tlxe 
enemy offered no serious resistance to the occupation of Snicker's gap, but ad- 
vanced to gain possession of it with a column of some 5,000 to 6,000 infantry, 
who were driven back by a few rounds from our rifled guns. 

On the 3d the first corps moved to Philomont, Union, Bloomfield, &c. ; the 
second corps to the vicinity of Upperville ; the fifth corps remained at Snicker's 
gap ; the sixth corps moved to Purcellville ; the ninth corps moved towards 
Upperville. Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Upperville after a severe fight. 

On the 4th the 2d corps took possession of Ashby's gap; the 6th corps 
reached Union ; the 9th corps, Upperville ; the cavalry occupied Piedmont. 
On the 5th the 1st corps moved to Rectortown and White Plains ; one division 
of the 2d corps to th(> intersection of the Paris and Piedmont with the Upper- 
ville and Barber's road ; the 6th corps to the Aldie pike, east of Upperville; 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 237 

the 9tli corps beyond tlae Manassas railroad, between Piedmont and Salem, 
with a brigade at Manassas gap. The cavalry under Averill had a skirmish 
at Manassas gap, and the brigade of Pleasonton gained a handsome victory 
over superior numbers at Barber's Cross Koads. Bayard's cavalry had some 
sharp skirmishing in front of Salem. 

On the 6th the 1st corps advanced to Warrenton ; the 2d corps to Eector- 
town ; the 5th corps commenced its movement from Snicker's gap to White 
Plains ; the 9th corps to Waterloo and vicinity on the Rappahannock ; the 11th 
corps was at New Baltimore, Thoroughfare and Hopewell's gaps ; Sickles'a 
division guarding the Orange and Alexandria railroad from Manassas Junc- 
tion towards Warrenton Junction ; the cavalry near Flint liill ; Bayard to cut 
ofi" what there might be in Warrenton, and to proceed to the Eappahannock 
station. 

November 7th : General Pleasonton was ordered to move towards Little 
Washington and Sperryville, and thence towards Culpeper Court House. 

November 8th : the 2d corps moved half way to Warrenton ; the 5th corps 
to New Baltimore. 

November 9 : the 2d and 5th corps reached Warrenton ; the 6th corps. New 
Baltimore. 

Late on the night of the 7th I received an order relieving me from the com- 
mand of the army of the Potomac, and directing me to turn it over to General 
Burnside, which I at once did. 

I had already given the orders for the movements of the 8th and 9th ; these 
orders were carried into effect without change. 

The position in which I left the army, as the resiilt of the orders I had 
given, Avas as follows : 

The 1st, 2d, and 5th corps, reserve artillery, and general headquarters, at 
Warrenton ; the 9th corps on the line of the Rappahannock, in the vicinity of 
Waterloo ; the 6th corps at New Baltimore ; the 11th corps at New Baltimore, 
Gainesville, and Thoroughfare gap ; Sickles 's division of the 3d corps, on the 
Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Manassas Junction to Warrenton Junc- 
tion ; Pleasonton across the Rappahannock at Amissville, Jefferson, &c., with 
his pickets at Hazel river, ficing Longstreet, six miles from Culpeper Court 
House ; Bayard near Rappahannock station. 

The army was thus massed near Warrenton, ready to act in any required 
direction, perfectly in hand, and in admirable condition and spirits. I doubt 
whether, during the whole period that I had the honor to command the army 
of the Potomac, it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle. When 
I gave up the command to General Burnside, the best information in our pos- 
session indicated that Longstreet was immediately in our front near Culpeper ; 
Jackson, with one, perhaps both, of the Hills, near Chester and Thornton's 
gaps, with the mass of their force west of the Blue Ridge. 

The reports from General Pleasonton on the advance indicated the possibility 
of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, and either beating Long- 
street separately, or forcing him to fall back at least upon Gordonsville, to 
effect his junction with the rest of the army. 

The following is from the report of General Pleasonton : 

" At this time, and from the 7th instant, my advance pickets were at Hazel 
river, within six miles of Culpeper, besides having my flank pickets towards 
Chester and Thornton's gaps extended to Gaines's Cross Roads andNewby's 
Cross Roads, with numerous patrols in the direction of Woodville, Little Wash- 
ington, and Sperryville. 

"The information gained from these parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, 
contrabands, as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet, with his 
command, being at Culpeper, while Jackson, with D. H. Hill, with their re- 
spective commands, were in the Shenandoah valley, on the western side of the 



238 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

Blue Ridge, covering Chester and Thornton's gaps, and expecting us to pass 
through and attack them. 

" As late as the 17th of November, a contraband just from Strasburg camo 
in my camp and reported that D. H. Hill's corps was two miles beyond 
that place, on the railroad to Mount Jackson. Hill was tearing up tho 
road and destroying the bridges, under the impression that we intended to fol- 
low into that valley, and was en route for Staunton. 

" Jackson's corps was between Strasburg and Winchester. Ewell and A. P. 
Hill were with Jackson. Provisions were scarce, and the rebels were obligetl 
to keep moving to obtain them." 

Had I remained in command, I should have made the attempt to divide tho 
enemy as before suggested, and could he have been brought to a battle within 
reach of my supplies, I cannot doubt that the result would have been a 
brilliant victory for our army. 

On the 10th of NoA^ember General Pleasonton was attacked by Longstreet, 
with one division of infantry and Stuart's cavalry, but repulsed the attack. 

This indicates the relative position of our army and that of the enemy at 
the time I was relieved from command. 

It would be impossible to participate in operations, such as those described 
in the foregoing pages, without forming fixed opinions upon subjects connected 
with the organization of our armies, and the general conduct of military opera- 
tions. 

This report would be incomplete without a brief allusion to some general con- 
siderations which have been firmly impressed upon me by the events which 
have occun-ed. 

To my mind the most glaring defect in our armies is the absence of system 
in the appointment and promotion of general and other officers, and the want of 
means for the theoretical instruction of the mass of officers. The expansion of 
the army was so great and so rapid at the commencement of the existing war 
that it was perhaps impossible, in the great scarcity of instructed officers, to 
have adopted any other course than that which was pursued ; but the time has 
arrived when measures may be initiated to remedy existing defects, and provide 
against their recurrence. 

I think that the army should be regarded as a permanent one ; that is to say, 
its affairs should be administered precisely as if all who belonged to it had made 
it their profession for life ; and those rules for promotion, &c., which have been 
found necessary in the best foreign armies to excite honorable emulation, pro- 
duce an esprit du corps and procure efficiency, should be followed by us. 

All officers and soldiers should be made to feel that merit — that is to say, 
courage, good conduct, the knowledge and performance of the duties of their 
grade, and fitness to exercise those of a superior grade — will insure to them ad- 
vancement in their profession, and can alone secure it for them. 

Measures should be adopted to secure the theoretical instruction of staff of- 
ficers at least, who should, as far as possible, be selected from officers having a 
military education, or who have seen actual service in the field. 

The number of cadets at the Military Academy should be at once increased 
to the greatest extent permitted by the capacity of the institution. The regular 
army should be increased and maintained complete in numbers and efficiency. 

A well-organized system of recruiting and of depots for instruction should 
be adopted, in order to keep the ranks of the regiments full, and supply promptly 
the losses arising from battle or disease. This is especially necessary for the 
artillery and cavalry arms of the service, which, from the beginning of the war, 
have rendered great services, and which have never been fully appreciated by 
any but their comrades. We need also Luge bodies of well-instructed engineer 
troops. 

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 239 

professional soldiers. A statesman may, perhaps, be more competent than a 
soldier to determine the political objects and direction of a campaign; bnt those 
once decided upon, everytliing should be left to the responsible military head, 
without interference from civilians. In no other manner is success probable. 
The meddling of individual members of committees of Congress with subjects 
which, from lack of experience, they are of course incapable of comprehending, 
aaid which they are too apt to view through the distorted medium of partisan or 
personal prejudice, can do no good, and is certain to produce incalculable mis- 
chief. 

I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President for the constant 
evidence given me of his sincere personal regard, and his desire to sustain the 
military plans which my judgment led me to urge for adoption and execution. 
I cannot attribute his failure to adopt some of those plans, and to give that sup- 
port to others which was necessary to their success, to any want of confidence 
in me; and it only remains for me to I'cgret that other counsels came between 
the constitutional commander-in-chief and the general whom he had placed at 
the head of his ai'mies — counsels which resulted in the failure of great campaigns. 

If the nation possesses no generals in service competent to direct its military af- 
fairs without the aid or supervision of politicians, the sooner it finds them and 
places them in position the better will it be for its fortunes. — ^' 

I may be pardoned for calling attention to the memorandum submitted by me 
to the President on the 4tli of August, 1861; my letter to him of July 7, 
1862; and other similar communications to him and to the Secretary of War. 
I have seen no reason to change in any material regard the views there ex- 
pressed. 

After a calm, impartial, and patient consideration of the subject — a subject 
which demands the closest thought on the part of every true lover of his 
country — I am convinced that by the proper employment of our resources it is 
entirely possible to bring this war to a successful military issue. I believe that 
a necessary preliminary to the re-establishment of the Union is the entire de- 
feat or virtual destruction of the organized military power of the confederates ; 
and that such a result should be accompanied and followed by conciliatory 
measures ; and that by pursuing the political course I have always advised, it 
is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the Union — a re-union 
by which the rights of both sections shall be preserved, and by which both 
parties shall preserve their self-respect, while they respect each other. 

In this report I have confined myself to a plain narrative of such facts as are 
necessary for the purposes of history. 

Where it was possible, I have preferred to give these facts in the language 
erf despatches, written at the time of their occurrence, rather than to attempt a 
new relation. 

The reports of the subordinate commanders, hereto annexed, recite what time 
and space would fail me to mention here : those individual instances of con- 
spicuous bravery and skill by which every battle was marked. To them I 
must especially refer, for without them this narrative would be incomplete, and 
justice fail to be done. But I cannot omit to tender to my corps commanders, 
and to other general officers under them, such ample recognition of their cordial 
co-operation and their devoted services as those reports abundantly avouch. 

1 have not sought to defend the.army which I had the honor to command, 
nor myself, against the hostile criticisms once so rife. 

It has seemed to me that nothing more was required than such a plain and 
truthful narrative to enable those whose right it is to form a correct judgment 
on the important matters involved. 

This report is, in fact, the history of the army of the Potomac. 

During the period occupied in the organization of that army, it served as a 
barrier against the advance of a lately victorious enemy, while the fortifications 



240 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLA^ 

of the capital were in progress ; and under the discipline which it then received 
it acquired strength, education, and some of that experience which is necessary 
to success in active operations, and which enabled it afterwards to sustain itself 
under circumstances trying to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes oc- 
curred along the lines, conducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops 
to the realities of war. 

The army grew into shape but slowly ; and the delays which attended on the 
obtaining of arms, continuing late into the winter of 1861-'62, were no less 
trying to the soldiers than to the people of the country. Even at the time of 
the organization of the Peninsula campaign, some of the finest regiments were 
without rifles ; nor were the utmost exertions on the part of the military authori- 
ties adequate to overcome the obstacles to active service. 

When, at length, the army was in condition to take the field, tlie Peninsula 
campaign was planned, and entered upon with enthusiasm by ofiicers and men- 
Had this campaign been folloAved up as it was designed, I cannot doubt that it 
would have resulted in a glorious triumph to our arms, and the permanent re- 
storation of the power of the government in Virginia and North Carolina, if not 
throughout the revolting States. It was, however, otherwise ordered, and instead 
of reporting a victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the heroism of 
a reduced army, sent upon an expedition into an enemy's country, there to 
abandon one and originate another and new plan of campaign, which might 
and would have been successful if supported with appreciation of its necessities, 
but which failed because of the. repeated failure of promised support, at the most 
critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. That heroism surpasses ordi- 
nary description. Its illustration must be left for the pen of the historian in 
times of calm reflection, when the nation shall be looking back to the past from 
the midst of peaceful days. 

For me, now, it is sufiicient to say that my comrades were victors on every 
field save one, and there the endurance of but little more than a single corps 
accomplished the object of the fighting, and, by securing to the army its transit 
to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and barren victory. 

The army of the Potomac was first reduced by the withdrawal from my com- 
mand of the division of General Blenker, which was ordered to the Mountain 
department, under General Fremont. We had scarcely landed on the Peninsula 
when it was further reduced by a despatch revoking a previous order giving me 
command at Fortress Monroe, and under which I had expected to take ten 
thousand men from that point to aid in our operations. Then, when under fire 
before the defences of Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of 
General McDowell's corps of about 35,000 men. This completed the over- 
throw of the original plan of the campaign. About one-third of my entire 
army (five divisions out of fourteen, one of the nine remaining being but little 
larger than a brigade) was thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid advance 
which I had planned, aided by a flank movement up the York river, it was only 
left to besiege Yorktown. That siege was successfully conducted by the army, 
and when these strong works at length yielded to our approaches, the troops rushed 
forward to the sanguinary but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus opened 
an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the Chickahominy, Eichmond lay 
before them, surrounded with fortifications, and guarded by an army larger than 
our own ; but the prospect did not shake theiCourage of the brave men who com- 
posed my command. Eelyiug still on the support which the vastness of our un- 
dertaking and the grand results depending on our success seemed to insure us, 
we pressed forAvard. The weather was stormy beyond precedent : the deep soil 
of the Peninsula was at times one vast morass ; the Chickahominy rose to a 
higher stage than had been known for years before. Pursuing the advance, the 
crossings were seized, and the right T\'ing extended to efiect a junction with re- 
enforcements now promised and earnestly desired, and upon the arrival of which 



REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 241 

the complete success of the campaign seemed clear. The brilliant battle of Han- 
over Court House was fought, which opened the way for the first corps, with the 
aid of which, had it come, we should then have gone into the enemy's captial. It 
never came. The bravest army could not do more, under such overwhelming 
disappointment, than the army of the Potomac then did. Pair Oaks attests 
their courage and endurance when they hurled back, again and again, the 
vastly superior masses of the enemy. But mortal men coidd not accomplish 
the miracle that seemed to have been expected of them. But one course was 
left — a flank march in the face of a powerful enemy to another and better base — ' 
one of the most hazardous movements in war. The aiiny of the Potomac, hold- 
ing its own safety and almost the safety of our cause, in its hands, was equal to 
the occasion. The seven days are classical in American history; those days in 
which the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution fought an outnumbering 
enemy by day, and retreated from successive victories by night, through a week 
of battle, closing the temble series of conflicts with the ever-memorable victory 
of Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and shattered, the entire eastern 
ai-my of the confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place of rest and a 
point for a new advance upon the capital from the banks of the James. Rich^ 
mond was still within om- grasp, had the army of the Potomac been re-enforced 
and permitted to advance. But counsels, which I cannot but think subsequent 
events proved unwise, prevailed in Washington, and we were ordered to aban- 
don the campaign. Never did soldiers better deserve the thanks of a nation 
than the army of the Potomac for the deeds of the Peninsula campaign, 
and although that meed was withheld from them by the authorities, I am per* 
suaded they have received the applause of the American people. 

The army of the Potomac was recalled from within sight of Richmond, and 
incorporated with the army of Virginia. The disappointments of the campaign 
on the Peninsula had not damped their ardor nor diminished their patriotism. 
They fought well, faithfully, gallantly, under General Pope ; yet were com^ 
pelled t,o fall back on Washington, defeated and almost demoralized. 

The enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his own capital, poured his troops 
northward, entered Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania, and even Washington 
itself. Elated by his recent victories, and assured that our troops were disor- 
ganized and dispirited, he was confident that the seat of war was now perma- 
nently transferred to the loyal States, and that his own exhausted soil was to 
be relieved from the burden of supporting two hostile armies. But he did not 
understand the spirit ^ hich animated the soldiers of the Union. I shall not, 
nor can I living, forget that ^a hen I was ordered to the command of the troops 
for the defence of the capital, the soldiers, with whom I had shared so much of 
the anxiety, and pain, and sufiering of the war, had not lost their confidence in 
me as their coramnnder. They sprang to my call with all their ancient vigor, 
discipline, and courage. I led them into Maryland. Fifteen days after they 
had fallen back defeated before Washington, they vanquished the enemy on the 
rugged height of South Moimtain, pursued him to the hard-fought field of 
Autietam, and drove him, broken and disappointed, across the Potomac into 
Virginia. » 

The army had need of rest. After the temble experiences of battles and 
marches, with scarcely an interval of repose, which they had gone through from 
the time of leaving for the Peninsula ; the return to Washington ; the defeat in 
Vh ginia ; the victory at South Mountain, and again at Antietam, it was not sur- 
prising that they were in a large degree destitute of the absolute necessaries to 
efiective duty Shoes were worn out; blankets were lost; clothing was in 
rags : in short, the army was unfit for active service, and an interval for rest and 
equipment was necessary. When the slowly forwarded supplies came to us I 
led the armv across the river, renovated, refreshed, in good order and disciplinci 



242 REPORT OF GENERAL GEORGE B. m'cLELLAN. 

and followed the retreating foe to a position where I was confident of decisive 
victory, when, in the midst of the movement, while my advance guard was ac- 
tually in contact with the enemy, I was removed from the command. 

I am devoutly gratefid to God that my last campaign with this brave army 
was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had 
then undergone. I have not accomplished my purpose if, by this report, the 
army of the Potomac is not placed high on the roll of the historic armies of the 
world. Its deeds ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always ready for 
battle, always firm, steadfast, and trustworthy, I never called on it in vain ; nor 
will the nation ever have cause to attribute its want of success, under myself, or 
under other commanders, to any fiiilure of patriotism or bravery in that noble 
body of American soldiers. 

No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the command- 
ing general to the private, any lack of devotion to the service of the United 
States government, and to the cause of the Constitution and the Union. They 
have proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffering, danger, and through the 
very shadow of death. Their comrades dead on all the fields where we fought 
have scarcely more claim to the honor of a nation's reverence than their sur- 
vivors to the justice of a nation's gratitude. 

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, 
Major General, United States Army. 

Brigadier General L. Thoma8, 

Adjutant General, United States Army. 

War Department, 
Adjutant General's Office, Washington, December 22, 1863. 
I certify that the above is a true copy of the original report on file in this 
office. 

E. D. TOWNSEND, 
Assistant Adjutant General. 



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